


OPERATION STEADFAST HISTORICAL SUMMARY

A HISTORY OF THE REORGANIZATION
OF THE U.S. CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND
(1972-1973)



HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND
FORT McPHERSON, GEORGIA

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA

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
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COMMANDER, U.S. CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND
1 November 1970 - 31 January 1973



GENERAL WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
COMMANDER, U.S. CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND
1 February - 31 December 1973
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (PROV)
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FOREWORD

The vast expansion of the nation's armed forces just prior to and during World War II led to the establishment in 1940 of a command and control organization for the U.S. Army which had been envisioned much earlier by military planners. Indeed, the concept actually had been enacted into law in the National Defense Act of 1920. General Headquarters (GHQ), U.S. Army, which was established in 1940, was soon troubled by conflicts between its training responsibilities and the command and control of the ground combat troops and their supporting forces. These functions, however, were separated in 1942 when a general reorganization of the War Department retained command and control of the ground combat troops at the departmental level, while assigning responsibility for training the troops to the newly established Army Ground Forces (AGF). With the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the recommendations of both the Patch and Simpson Boards resulted in combining these functions once again in the Army Ground Forces structure. This attempt at combining the functions was short-lived, at best, since a general reorganization of the redesignated Department of the Army in 1948 established the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) as the training arm of the Army. OCAFF was, in reality, a staff agency of the Department of the Army and was not a legitimate separate command.

The uncoordinated command structure which resulted from the reorganization of 1948 created problems which, in turn, led to demands for still another reorganization of the Department of the Army structure. The findings of the Davies Committee resulted in the establishment of the Continental Army Command (CONARC) in 1955, once more combining command/control and training functions in a single headquarters. No attempts, however, were made to eliminate the inherent conflicts between the training responsibilities and the command and control of ground combat troops.

The crises of the Cold War Era served to highlight the operating inefficiencies of the Department of the Army and led to the famous Project 80 Reorganization of 1962. At that time, the planning elements involved recommended that the command and control of ground combat troops and their supporting forces be given first priority and that education and training be combined in a single subordinate command reporting directly to the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command. These recommendations seemed only logical since CONARC recently had been designated as the Army Component Command of the newly established U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM). Once again the recommendations were ignored, and the conflicts in priorities continued to plague the Army.

Demands for reform and reorganization in the Department of the Army culminated in the appointment of the Parker Board in 1969 which

spent the better part of two years in deliberations and produced a host of significant recommendations, applicable Army wide. The findings of the Parker Board ultimately led to a decision by the Chief of Staff of the Army for a sweeping reorganization of the entire subordinate command structure of the Department of the Army. At the U.S. Continental Army Command level, the reorganization process was dubbed "Project STEADFAST." Unlike Project 80, the planning period for Project STEADFAST extended over approximately a year and a half. Despite the importance of previous reorganization efforts, no full historical record was developed at the operating command levels for the reorganization of 1948 (OCAFF), 1955 (CONARC), and 1962 (Project 80). The Office of the Chief of Military History, however, did prepare an overall historical study of Project 80 from the Department of the Army level. Consequently, in October 1972, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command -- Maj. Gen. D. R. Pepke -- directed that a comprehensive historical study of the reorganization be prepared at the CONARC level and that a backup file of all documents pertinent to that reorganization be developed for permanent retention. The present study, which is the result of that directive, was begun by Mr. Jean R. Moenk while serving as Deputy Chief Historian, U.S. Continental Army Command, and was completed by him while serving as Chief Historian, U.S. Army Forces Command, subsequent to the full implementation of Project STEADFAST. All documents cited herein are preserved in a permanent STEADFAST Supporting Document File located in the Historical Office, U.S. Army Forces Command.

Chapters 1 to 3, inclusive, were thoroughly reviewed by Gen. Ralph E. Haines, Jr., former CONARC commander, in order to get the full flavor of his involvement in the initial stages of the reorganization planning. The entire study was reviewed by Maj. Gen. L. M. Jones, Jr., who served as chief action agent of the reorganization planning group and the study has benefited immensely from his comments and advice. In addition, the major portion of the study was also reviewed by Lt. Gen. D.R. Pepke, former CONARC Chief of Staff, and Maj. Gen. W.K. Bennett, Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army/Army Forces Command (Provisional) during the planning and provisional implementation phases of Project STEADFAST.

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Chapter I

BACKGROUND (Pre-STEADFAST)

Periodically since the end of World War II, the Department of the Army has questioned the organization for command and control in the continental United States. Meaningful recommendations and studies were developed by various levels of command throughout the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense on almost a cyclical basis. In 1948, six years after the establishment of the Army Ground Forces, a thorough reorganization of the Department of the Army created the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) and placed the subordinate armies and installations in the continental United States directly under departmental control. Seven years later, the conclusions and recommendations of the Davies Committee were implemented, establishing the Continental Army Command as both a training and operational command. The idea at that time was to decentralize as much authority and operational control as possible. In 1962, seven years after the implementation of the Davies Committee recommendations, the Hoelscher and Traub Committees recommended a thorough reorganization of the entire Department of the Army structure. Thus, by 1969, the time cycle for soul-searching, self-criticism, and management improvement was again imminent at the Department of the Army and Department of Defense levels. The 1962 reorganization had been accomplished in an era of peace, Cold War threats, and expansion of the Army establishment. However, like the 1954-1955 period, 1969-1970 was an era of transition from combat status to peacetime operations, a time for contraction of the manpower base, and an era of economy in operations throughout the military departments. In an era of dwindling manpower resources and enforced economies in operations, it was almost inevitable that study groups would be inaugurated at both the Department of the Army level and at the level of the U.S. Continental Army Command with their resultant drastic proposals for reorganization.

Reorganization of the Overall CONARC Command Structure

The Department of the Army Special Review Panel

With the beginning of FY 1970, the Department of the Army began its eighth year of operations under the concepts which had been implemented on 1 July 1962 as a result of the Project 80 Study. The Hoelscher and Traub Committees had thoroughly reorganized the entire structure of the Department of the Army; abolishing the Technical and Administrative Services; broadening the missions and responsibilities of the U.S. Continental Army Command; centralizing all materiel functions in an Army Materiel Command; and establishing a separate Combat Developments Command. However, certain recommendations of the two committees with regard to command and control

of the Army's service schools and training centers were not approved for implementation at that time. In the interim, the introduction of advanced management techniques and automated information systems shed new light on the inefficiencies and inadequacies of the existing structure and system. What is more, experience factors gained during the seven years of operation under the 1962 Project 80 concepts indicated that a thorough review of the entire Department of the Army organizational structure was in order. Consequently, at the end of September 1969, General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army, directed an intensive review and study of the existing structure of the Department of the Army in order to determine its responsiveness to current and foreseeable requirements. In pursuing this decision, General Westmoreland selected Maj. Gen. D.S. Parker of his office on 30 September 1969 to head a Special Review Panel which would examine the functions, organizations, and procedures of the Department of the Army to include those of the U.S. Continental Army Command, the Combat Developments Command, the Army Materiel Command, and the departmental headquarters staff, itself. This panel, however, was not to bother itself with any tactical organizations.¹

In its initial terms of reference, the panel was instructed to analyze supercifically the roles of the U.S. Continental Army Command, its subordinate armies in the continental United States, and the Military District of Washington; the roles of the Combat Developments Command and the Army Materiel Command; the increasing number of Class II Activities reporting directly to the Department of the Army Staff; and the size of, and procedures used by, the Department of the Army headquarters staff.²

CONARC Problem Areas and Alternative Solutions. After an intensive review of both the U.S. Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command, the Review Panel concluded that the problems of both were closely interrelated and, therefore, required joint consideration. The panel questioned whether the existing mission assignments and command structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate armies in the continental United States were the most efficient and effective that could be obtained in terms of the results achieved and the resources required to execute and supervise the functions involved. In addition, the panel questioned the efficiency and effectiveness of the structure in terms

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Ltr, GEN W.C. Westmoreland, CofSA to MG D.S. Parker, OCoFA, 30 Sep 69, subj; LOI for Review of DA Organization.

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HQ DA, 1 Mar 71, Report of the Special Review Panel on DA Organization, Vol. I, TAB B.

of its high visibility and the response of the U.S. Continental Army Command to the current national policy of constrained resources. The panel concluded that the missions of the U.S. Continental Army Command covered a number of functional areas which were only partially related and thus tended to inhibit adequate performance in individual areas. Moreover, the CONARC/CONUS army command structure, with its two intervening levels between Headquarters, Department of the Army, and the operating installations, gave rise to the possibility of duplicative staffing and slowness in response.³

In order to correct the alleged inadequacies of, and promote a greater efficiency and effectiveness in, the command structure of the Combat Developments Command and the U.S. Continental Army Command, along with the latter's subordinate commands and agencies, the Review Panel gave considerable attention to the development of alternative solutions. Because the Military District of Washington served more as a Headquarters Commandant for the Department of the Army than a geographical area command for the U.S. Continental Army Command, the panel considered transferring the Military District to Department of the Army control. In order to eliminate the double layering of headquarters structures in the continental United States, the panel first considered the elimination of Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, with the Department of the Army directly commanding the subordinate armies in the continental United States. A second alternative considered the elimination of all subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States, with the U.S. Continental Army Command directly commanding the Class I installations. Another alternative considered a reduction in number of the subordinate army headquarters from four to three. In order to alleviate certain other specific problem areas, the panel considered the establishment of a Support (Housekeeping) Command, on the one hand, and a separate Reserve Forces Command, on the other. To solve the problem of the relation of doctrinal development to the operation of the service schools, the panel first considered the elimination of the Combat Developments Command; the creation of a Concepts and Experimentation Agency directly under the Department of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR); and the concurrent return of the basic responsibilities for combat developments to the U.S. Continental Army Command where they had been located prior to the 1962 reorganization. The panel, however, felt that the most practical alternative for solving the problems which the Department of the Army staff had brought to light was the retention of the Combat Developments Command and a trade-off of U.S. Continental Army Command functions to the former. Prominent among the functions and responsibilities of the U.S. Continental Army Command considered by the panel for transfer to the Combat Developments Command were command of the Command and General

Staff College; approval authority for all programs of instructions (POI) for the U.S. Continental Army Command's educational courses; operational control of only the Officer Advanced Courses; operational control of all officer-type courses; command of all schools -- including the Army War College -- with the exception of installation command; command of Project MASSTER combined with the Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC); direction of the Army's Reserve Officer Training Corps Program; command of fifteen service school installations; operational control of five Army Training Centers; and command of five Army Training Center installations.⁴

Recommendations of the Special Review Panel. The Department of the Army Special Review Panel on Organization developed sixty-eight recommendations covering the broad spectrum of organizational structure throughout the Department of the Army; thirty-four of these concerned management improvement actions, while the remainder dealt with reorganization matters. In the field of management improvement, only two of the panel's recommendations -- Nos. 31 and 32 -- dealt with the structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command. The first called for a review of the organizational structure for the management of Reserve Component activities at the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate army headquarters with a view to improving management through increased centralization of responsibilities and uniform procedures. The second recommendation called for a survey of the subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States to determine if administrative, logistical, or other functional channels should bypass those headquarters. In addition, the survey should either develop long-range goals for the reconfiguration of these subordinate army headquarters (if that move were considered feasible); streamline those headquarters structures, if possible; or reconfirm their current role. These recommendations were acted upon by General Bruce Palmer, Jr., the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, on 30 November 1970, at which time, recommendations No. 31 and No. 32 were approved for further study. In mid-December 1970, General Palmer assigned responsibility for the review called for in recommendation No. 31 to the Chief of Reserve Components (CORC) and for the survey called for in recommendation No. 32 to the Comptroller of the Army (COA). However, at a meeting with General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., the CONARC commander, at the end of January 1971, General Palmer agreed to withhold any decision on the two recommendations pending the completion of certain studies then being developed by the U.S. Continental Army Command.⁵


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Ibid., TAB G.

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(1) Ltr AGDA-A (M) (2 Mar 71) CSSMD, DA to Distr, 18 Mar 71, subj; Report of the Special Review Panel on Department of the Army Organization, w/2 incls. (2) DF ATCOM-M, CONARC DCSCOMPT to CofS, 7 Oct 71, subj; Response to Parker Panel Recommendations.

Chart 1 -- COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS AND SCHOOLS COMMAND



With regard to the actual organization of the Department of the Army, the panel made three recommendations dealing with the U.S. Continental Army Command, the first of which -- No. 32 -- recommended placing the Military District of Washington under the direct command and control of the Department of the Army. Recommendation No. 33, however, was of much more importance to the U.S. Continental Army Command since it called for the establishment of a Combat Developments and School Command (CDSC) which would include the current functions of the Combat Developments Command; the CONARC service schools (less installation command) and associate staff supervisory elements; the Army War College; and Project MASSTER (combined with the Combat Developments Experimentation Command). The third recommendation -- No. 34 -- depended upon the approval and implementation of the previous recommendation concerning the establishment of the Combat Developments and Schools Command. In particular, the third recommendation stipulated that studies would be conducted after a 1-year lapse in order to determine the feasibility and desirability of transferring both the direction of the ROTC Program and the command of the fifteen service school installations to the newly established command. On 27 and 29 January 1971, General Westmoreland reviewed the organizational recommendations; No. 32 dealing with the Military District of Washington was approved for immediate implementation.⁶ As in the case of the management improvement recommendations, General Westmoreland deferred any decision on recommendations No. 33 and No. 34 pending an evaluation of ongoing internal reorganization actions at both the U.S. Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command. Chart 1 shows the organizational structure of the Combat Developments and Schools Command as proposed by the Special Review Panel. It is interesting to note that the panel recommended the transfer of twenty-three Army service schools from the U.S. Continental Army Command to the new Combat Developments and Schools Command but disapproved any such transfer of the Army Training Centers because of the inherent relationships between the training centers and the U.S. Continental Army Command.⁷

The CONARC Management Improvement Committee

At the end of September 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense instructed the three services to review their organizational struc-

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The Military District of Washington was established as a major command of the Department of the Army on 1 July 71.

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Incls 2 and 3 to Ltr AGDA-A (M) (2 Mar 71) CSSMD, DA to Distr, 18 Mar 71, subj; Report of the Special Review Panel on Department of the Army Organization, pp. 3 - 4 and II-15-22 to II-17-B-3.

tures once again and offered the complete assistance of the Department of Defense for this purpose. His directives resulted from the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and the Department of the Army Special Review Panel, as well as from directives emanating from Congress concerning the reduction of major headquarters in all of the Armed Services. Moreover, recent and anticipated reductions in resource levels led the U.S. Continental Army Command to conclude that immediate action was necessary to accelerate planning for a commensurate modification of its own operations. Consequently, on 3 October 1970, the U.S. Continental Army Command established a special Management Improvement Panel to accomplish a detailed review and analysis of the command's missions, functions, organizations, and methods of operation; to develop new, innovative concepts for management improvements within the U.S. Continental Army Command and to list those concepts in order of feasibility, suitability, and desirability; and to develop the methodology for converting such concepts to command action. This special panel was to conduct its review based on the following assumptions: that pressure to reduce the size of the Army would continue as a result of the rollup in Vietnam and reductions in other oversea areas; that austere funding of the U.S. Continental Army Command's mission and support program would continue through FY 1972 and into future fiscal years; that the strength and composition of units assigned to the U.S. Continental Army Command would be as derived from the FY 1973 Force Structure Base Line; that the stationing of units would be in consonance with the Department of the Army/U.S. Continental Army Command Long-Range Stationing Plan; that there would be no changes in the major missions assigned to the U.S. Continental Army Command in accordance with the provisions of AR 10-7; and that any major organizational realignments could be expected to have both political and community relations impacts. In mid-November 1970, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command informed the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army of the ongoing management improvement actions at the major subordinate command level in order to have some influence on the decisions then pending concerning the recommendations of the Department of the Army Special Review Panel.⁸

Conclusions and Recommendations of the Panel. The U.S. Continental Army Command's Management Improvement Panel met for the first time on 17 November 1970 and completed a series of five reports by the end of February 1971. It soon became evident to the panel that the problem areas facing the command could be narrowed into five high-resource-consuming categories, namely; organizational structure; mission priorities; school training; intraservice sup-

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(1) DF ATCS-70-2015, CONARC CofS to CONARC Stf, 3 Oct 70, subj: CONARC Concepts for Management Improvement Committee. (2) Info furnished by the Mgt Br, Mgt Div, ODCSCOMPT, 12 Oct 72.

port; and contractual requirements. Of the five categories selected, the organizational structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command proved to be the most significant since the overall structure dictated operating procedures, chain of command, levels of supervision, and resources requirements. Hence, the panel concluded that a reduction in, and streamlining of, the command structure provided the most far-reaching method of achieving economies while modernizing and simplifying operations. In mid-March 1971, the CONARC Management Improvement Panel submitted its final report to the CONARC commander for his review and approval. As submitted, the paper contained five separate reports: No. 1 -- Concept for Realignment; No. 2 -- CONARC Mission Priorities; No. 3 -- Elimination of School Courses; No. 4 -- Intraservice Support Reimbursement; and No. 5 -- Evaluation of Contract Requirements. General Haines approved Reports No. 2 through No. 5 with minor revisions and forwarded summaries thereof to the Department of the Army.⁹

Panel Report No. 1 -- Reorganization of the Command Structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command. Report No. 1 -- Concept for Realignment envisioned the retention of Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command; the elimination of the command's subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States; and the designation of major command installations (MCI). The commanding general of each major command installation would have a defined geographical area of responsibility to include the command of Active Army, USAR, and ROTC units; schools; Army Training Centers; troop units; and sub-installations within his assigned area. Twenty-one major command installations were to be established, providing for a well-defined command structure which the panel felt was within a feasible peacetime span of control, yet was capable of expansion for mobilization purposes.¹⁰ After a briefing in mid-April, General Haines indicated that the concepts contained in Report No. 1 might have some merit as a long-range goal, but that they were totally impractical for the near term and were in need of a great deal of revision. On 7 May 1971, General Haines informed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army of the concepts and contents of Report No. 1, along with his reasons for rejecting the report and returning it to the panel for revision. General Haines felt that the proposal to eliminate entirely the subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States was not acceptable since these headquarters

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(1) CONARC ODCSCOMPT, Mar 71, CONARC Management Improvement Panel Report. (2) Info furnished by GEN R.E. Haines, Jr. (USA Ret), 24 Apr 73.

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Incl 1, "Report No. 1," to CONARC ODCSCOMPT, Mar 71, CONARC Management Improvement Panel Report.

were needed, among other things, to provide effective co-ordination in the event of domestic emergencies or disasters; to provide co-ordination of the support and supervision of Reserve Component training; to insure the co-ordinated planning and execution of rapid mobilization; and to preserve Army visibility in major metropolitan areas.¹¹ At that time, General Palmer indicated that, while all five reports of the CONARC Management Improvement Panel were important, Report No. 1 was of special interest, as was General Haines' redirected study of the organization of the U.S. Continental Army Command using centralized management and control and decentralized operations. General Palmer requested that he be kept informed of the progress and results of the panel reports as well as General Haines' own assessment of this special approach to management improvement.¹²

Revised Report No. 1. Between the end of May and the latter part of August 1971, the CONARC Management Improvement Panel re-wrote Report No. 1 to conform with General Haines' guidance concerning the retention of the subordinate army structure in the continental United States. In the interim, on 1 July 1971, a major reorganization action was accomplished at the direction of the Department of the Army when Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, at Fort Sheridan, Ill., was eliminated from the subordinate army structure and the boundaries of the four remaining armies were realigned. The revised report developed a new concept which retained the philosophy of centralized management and control by Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, yet had the maximum possible decentralization with resource management vested in the major command installations. At the same time, the subordinate army headquarters were used to command and control the U.S. Army Reserve; to conduct mobilization and contingency planning for senior command implementation; and to provide U.S. Army presence in or near major population centers. As actually developed, the revised Report No. 1 would transfer responsibilities and resources from the subordinate army headquarters to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, and the major command installations; would change some installations to the status of sub- or satellite-installations; and would reduce the size of the subordinate army headquarters. The revised concept called for the retention of four subordinate army headquarters with a greatly reduced structure and mission and for the establishment of nineteen major command installations, each with a specified geographical area jurisdiction. The revised report, along with all

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(1) Ltr, GEN R.E. Haines, Jr., to GEN Bruce Palmer, Jr., 7 May 71. (2) DF ATCOM, CONARC DCSCOMPT to CofS, 3 Sep 71, subj; MIP Report No. 1 -- Concept for CONARC Organizational Realignment.

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Ltr, GEN Palmer to GEN Haines, 28 May 71.

of the necessary action papers, were submitted to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command on 3 September 1971 and formally briefed to the CONARC Commander on 15 September. At that time, General Haines withheld approval for the revised concept since he felt that it retained too many of the impractical features of the original report; did not give the armies a meaningful mission; failed to utilize the resource management capabilities of those armies in an optimum fashion; and greatly increased the size of Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command. Shortly thereafter, this effort gave way to the development of the CONARC 72 -- Mission and Structure Study.¹³

CONARC 72 -- Mission and Structure Study

As indicated earlier, the Department of the Army had assigned various special studies related to the recommendations of the Department of the Army Special Review Panel to certain departmental staff agencies. Of particular interest to the U.S. Continental Army Command were Recommendation No. 31, applying to the Reserve Component structure throughout CONARC, and Recommendation No. 32, pertaining to the CONUS headquarters through which administrative, logistical, and other management functions should be channeled, to include the possible streamlining of these headquarters. In January 1971, General Haines discussed the two recommendations with General Palmer and requested that final action be held in abeyance pending the completion of certain studies then being developed within Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command. However, the CONARC Management Improvement Panel became so involved with major reorganization proposals that it did not explore in any depth the original areas of interest of the Army Special Review Panel in its Recommendations No. 31 and No. 32. Meanwhile, in the various conversations between General Haines and General Palmer, the CONARC commander was made aware that there was a growing feeling in the Pentagon that one level of headquarters between the Department of the Army and the installations in the continental United States should be eliminated. General Palmer disassociated himself from this view but conceded that it was strongly held within Headquarters, Department of the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. With his disapproval of the Management Improvement Panel Report No. 1 in mid-September 1971, General Haines felt that the issue of the command structure for the U.S. Continental Army Command should be faced squarely in correspondence with Headquarters, Department of the Army, and hopefully could be disposed of once and for all. He indicated that his review of both the original and revised Report

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(1) DF ATCOM, DCSCOMPT to CofS, 3 Sep 71, subj: Management Improvement Panel (MIP) Report No. 1 -- Concept for CONARC Organizational Alignment, w/incl 2, "MIP Report No. 1" (2) Fact Sheet, DCSCOMPT, 3 Sep 71. (3) Info furnished by Mgt Br, Mgt Div, ODCSCOMPT, 12 Oct 72.

Report No. 1 of the Management Improvement Panel had convinced him that the existing structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command -- especially with the recent reduction of one subordinate numbered army -- was essentially sound. What is more, the fact would have to be clearly established as the essential framework for a series of recommendations for internal headquarters restructuring and management improvements in such areas as individual training; Reserve Component supervision; force development; and personnel, financial, and logistical management. He, therefore, directed his Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, to prepare a major policy statement for presentation to the Army Vice Chief of Staff, outlining his (General Haines') rationale for retaining the current overall organizational structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command and detailing contemplated management and organizational improvements within that overall organization.¹⁴

The CONARC Report and the Reaction of the Commanding General. By 7 October 1971, the CONARC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, had completed its versions of a general policy statement concerning the reasons for retaining the existing configuration of the U.S. Continental Army Command. This statement was incorporated in a proposed letter to General Palmer contending that a reconfiguration of the command structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command or the complete revamping of the missions and headquarters structure of that command's subordinate armies would produce no significant management improvements. Appended to the letter were a short synopsis of the mission development of the U.S. Continental Army Command; a thorough analysis of CONARC's subordinate army structure to demonstrate its vitality and validity; and a series of recommendations concerning individual training, the Reserve Components, and management techniques for financial, personnel, and force development.¹⁵

General Haines did not believe that the contents of either the letter or its supporting inclosures were sufficiently persuasive. He developed a lengthy draft letter to demonstrate the type of material needed for forwarding to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. He desired that this letter be backed up by a full-fledged study containing, among other things, all of the information existing in the separate inclosures to the original letter.¹⁶

14

DF ATCOM-M, DCSCOMPT to CofS, 7 Oct 71, subj; Response to Parker Panel Recommendations.

15

Ibid., w/incls.

16

Memo, GEN Haines to CONARC DCSCOMPT, 18 Oct 71.

General Haines Guidance for the Development of CONARC 72 -- Mission and Organization Study. On 21 October 1971, General Haines discussed the development of the CONARC 72 -- Mission and Organization Study with his Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller. At that time, he stressed that the problem should be viewed in depth with a full development of the history and background of the U.S. Continental Army Command. The study should first show the role of Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, and then show the nature and scope of the functions performed by the headquarters of that command's subordinate armies. He stressed the fact that a historical perspective, which previous studies lacked, was essential to examine in depth the requirement for the continued existence of the U.S. Continental Army Command which served as both the Army's major training command and as the Army Component Command of the U.S. Strike Command¹⁷ and the U.S. Atlantic Command. The fact would have to be stressed that only one command was actually handling both of these functions. In further developing this picture, the study should treat first the Army side of the house and then the joint side, on a chronological basis up to the current time. In examining CONARC's subordinate armies, the study should adequately depict the great span of command and the number of activities requiring supervision and control. Some sort of subordinate control headquarters were required by the sheer weight of the number of functions which must be accomplished as well as the need for a geographic coverage of the nation. However, the study should stress the fact that the primary mission of the U.S. Continental Army Command was training and should examine the close ties between unit training and individual training in peace and war. Within the framework of the study, moreover, constant attention should be given to those functional areas where channels could be streamlined or simplified.¹⁸

The Final Report. The CONARC 72 -- Mission and Organization Study, along with the accompanying letter to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, was completed by the Comptroller's Office in mid-November 1971. Both were given intensive review by the Chief of Staff and the CONARC Commander prior to forwarding to the Department of the Army on 25 November. The lengthy cover letter explained the evolutionary development of the U.S. Continental Army Command as the Army's major training command in the continental United States and


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The U.S. Strike Command was redesignated as the U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) on 1 Jan 72.

18

MFR BG R.L. West, CONARC DCSCOMPT, 26 Oct 71, subj; Guidance by the CG on the CONARC Organization Study.

Chart 2 -- CONARC COMMAND ORGANIZATION



the Army Component Command of two important unified commands. The report consisted of a review of the development of the U.S. Continental Army Command into its present structure, along with the development of missions assigned to the command. It discussed the overall role of the U.S. Continental Army Command, the role of the command's headquarters, and the roles of the subordinate armies in the continental United States. Five alternative solutions for restructuring the command organization in the continental United States were presented, along with the advantages and disadvantages of each. In selecting Alternative No. 1 -- Retention of the Current Structure, the study indicated that the existing command structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command had a single headquarters responsible for a major portion of the Army's mission relative to combat-ready forces, training of Active Army and Reserve Component units and personnel, and base operations in the continental United States. The day-to-day performance of these missions was decentralized, insofar as possible, to four geographical commands, relieving Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, of many coordinating and operating functions and ensuring a workable span of command and control. At the same time, the overall structure permitted maximum flexibility, efficient use of available resources, close co-ordination of Active Army and Reserve Component activities, and a rapid expansion of the training base in the event of mobilization. The structure above installation level -- Headquarters, CONARC, and the four area headquarters in the continental United States -- included fewer headquarters than at any time in the history of the U.S. Army since World War I. Chart 2 shows the command structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command which was in existence at the time that the report was published.¹⁹

Conclusions and Recommendations of the Study. The study concluded that it was evident that Department of the Army needed both the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate armies. The overall mission, as directed by the Department of the Army, was both broad and multifaceted -- the U.S. Continental Army Command served as an Army component command of two unified commands, as well as the Army's training command, and performed the bulk of the Army's installation and housekeeping functions in the continental United States. Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, provided direction and interface for the accomplishment of these missions, while the subordinate army headquarters provided a more detailed super-

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(1) DF ATCOM-M, DCSCOMPT to CofS, 18 Nov 71, subj; Response to Parker Panel Recommendations, w/3 incls (CONFIDENTIAL -- Info used is UNCLASSIFIED). (2) DF ATCOM-M DCSCOMPT to CONARC Stf, 26 Nov 71, subj; Errata Sheet for Staff Study (CONARC 72: Mission and Structure). (3) HQ CONARC, 17 Nov 71, CONARC 72: Mission and Structure Study, pp. 8-9.

vision of the day-to-day operations. The subordinate army headquarters played an important role in force development and training, the ROTC program, the U.S. Army Reserve program, Army National Guard training, and regional representation. They also provided a geographical organization which could be called upon in the event of national emergencies or disasters. The study pointed out that it was neither desirable nor feasible that any of these functions be managed directly from the Department of the Army. It appeared that the Department of the Army was getting the maximum in return in terms of resources expended in headquarters operations by having a single operational command accomplish the three major functional missions -- Forces, Training, and Base Operations. Consequently, the study concluded that the existing command structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command was appropriate, sound, and mission-effective.²⁰

Thus, after a year of study, the U.S. Continental Army Command decided that its existing structure was the most effective for the discharge of its assigned missions. The command recommended that no further action be taken on those recommendations of the Department of the Army Special Review Panel (Parker Panel) which dealt with the overall organizational realignment of the U.S. Continental Army Command, the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, the Army service school system, or the command and control organization for the Reserve Components.

Internal Reorganization of Headquarters, CONARC


CONARC Internal Reorganization Studies

Reorganization of the actual headquarters structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command and those of its subordinate elements had received an impetus from the Department of the Army toward the end of FY 1970. At that time, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed all Department of the Army major commands to establish a separately identifiable staff element which would be concerned with force development. Consequently, on 20 May 1970, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command directed the implementation of two separate staff actions -- the establishment of an Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development on his own headquarters staff and the development of a comprehensive study which would evaluate the organizational structure and functional alignment of the entire U.S. Continental Army Command headquarters.²¹

²⁰ HQ CONARC, 17 Nov 71, CONARC 72: Mission and Organization Study, p. 9.

²¹ (1) Msg 122041Z May 70, DA sgd Westmoreland to Distr, subj: Improving TAADS Management. (2) Memo ATCS, CONARC CofS, 20 May 72, same subj.

Chart 3 -- MISSION ORIENTED CONCEPT



By the beginning of FY 1971, the entire U.S. Army was faced with the additional problem of the prospect of dwindling manpower resources. To meet this problem, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Continental Army Command, issued more definitive instructions for the proposed study of the headquarters organization structure. Consequently, he directed the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, to determine an optimum headquarters configuration which would enable the U.S. Continental Army Command to accomplish its assigned missions in an era of dwindling manpower resources. The Chief of Staff further stipulated that the studies would be limited to the headquarters structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command; no external alternatives were to be considered. By this guidance he eliminated consideration of proposals that would transfer certain functions either to the Department of the Army or to subordinate elements of the U.S. Continental Army Command, or which would create new subordinate commands or agencies to perform selected functions then being performed by Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command. The deadline date for the submission of this study to the Chief of Staff was originally established as 11 December 1970; however, because of the overriding involvement of personnel in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, with the five overall CONARC Management Improvement Studies, as previously discussed, that deadline was successively revised.²²

May 1971 Recommendations and the Reaction of the Commanding General. The CONARC Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, did not complete the study until 20 May 1971. Following a limited review of the study by interested members of the staff, a formal briefing was presented to General Haines on 24 May 1971. At that time, four alternative concepts were presented for General Haines' consideration and selection for eventual implementation. These included a modified status quo; a closer alignment with the organization of Headquarters, Department of the Army; a reduction of the span of control through staff mergers; and a mission-oriented concept. The latter of the four concepts was recommended for adoption and implementation by the proponents of the study. Chart 3 shows the organizational concept for the mission orientation of the headquarters structure as proposed by the CONARC Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller. This concept expanded the functions of the Comptroller into the force development and management information systems fields and, in fact, absorbed existing staff entities in those fields. Across-the-board mission and program control was vested in the proposed new Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, which clearly made him the dominant member of the staff.

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(1) DF ATCS-70-1398, CONARC Cofs to CONARC Stf, 2 Jul 70, subj; HQ CONARC Reorganization Study. (2) DF ATCOM-M, CONARC DCSCOMPT to CONARC Stf, 1 Sep 70, same subj.

General Haines noted that such a concept changed the primary orientation of the headquarters from training to resource management and did away with Force Development as a separate and distinct staff entity at the Deputy Chief of Staff level. He considered that, while the study had many attractive features, the so-called mission-oriented concept (actually a misnomer) was unacceptable. He directed a further refinement of the first alternative concept. General Haines outlined certain organizational areas and functions to be refined and directed the development of appropriate related recommendations. Areas to be studied included the consolidation of the Adjutant General, the Provost Marshal, and the Chaplain with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; an alternative merger of the Provost Marshal with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; a merger of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Staff Weather Office with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces; the transfer of combat developments (research and development) responsibilities to either the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, or the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; the rationale for the assignment of intelligence collecting units to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command; the organizational structure which controlled Reserve Components; the centralization of functions related to Management Information Systems at Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command; the transfer of the CONARC Headquarters Commandant to the Commander, Fort Monroe; a realignment of the functions between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development, U.S. Continental Army Command, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army; the duplications existing between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training, U.S. Continental Army Command, and the Director of Individual Training in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army; and the relation of services and support between Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, Headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, and Forts Monroe and Eustis.

General Haines specified that the conceptual proposals arising from these studies should eliminate from consideration the establishment of a Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Forces or Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Communications-Electronics, Engineer, or Reserve Forces. General Haines stipulated that separate staff elements would be retained for both Force Development and Comptroller; that two staff elements in the large areas of Individual and Unit Training and Readiness would be maintained, although some adjustments could be made in these functions; and that the Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Force Development and Comptroller be carefully examined with respect to resources management and how they related to each other. General Haines directed his Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, to develop a headquarters structure

for the U.S. Continental Army Command that would incorporate the above directives.²³

July 1971 Study. The entire staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command joined in refining the problem areas delineated by General Haines with a deadline date of 15 July 1971. In particular, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Individual Training, Logistics, and Military Operations and Reserve Forces were tasked with providing detailed recommendations concerning the management and organization of certain specific areas within the headquarters of both the Department of the Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training would survey the areas of individual training and the Reserve Officer Training Corps program; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces would survey the areas of Reserve Components and Civil Affairs; while the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics would survey the Engineer area. By the end of July 1971, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces approved a concept for the amalgamation of all reserve component responsibilities assigned to his staff office into a single office at the directorate level, with a general officer (brigadier general) assigned to head the directorate on a full-time basis.²⁴ However, the study was delayed during August and September due to the continuing emphasis placed on the revision of the Management Improvement Panel Report No. 1 dealing with the overall command organization for the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate elements. The study was further delayed during October and November due to the preparation of the CONARC 72 -- Mission and Organization Study.²⁵ At the end of November 1971, the CONARC Chief of Staff directed the establishment of the Headquarters, CONARC, Organization Study Group which thereupon assumed responsibility for the further development

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(1) MFR MG E. Bautz, Jr., CONARC DCSOPS, 24 May 71, subj: Comptroller Briefing for the CG on Headquarters, CONARC, Reorganization. (2) DF ATCOM-M, CONARC DCSCOMPT to CONARC Stf, 15 Jun 71, subj: HQ CONARC Organization Study. (3) DCSOPS Mgt Ofc Talking Paper, 22 May 71, subj: HQ CONARC Organization Study Briefing. (4) Info furnished by GEN R.E. Haines, Jr. (USA Ret), 24 Apr 73.

24

(1) DF ATCOM-M, DCSCOMPT to CONARC Stf, 15 June 71, subj: HQ CONARC Reorganization Study. (2) DF ATOPS, DCSOPS to Dirs and Div Chiefs, 23 Jul 71, subj: Staff Organization for Reserve Forces, ODCSOPS.

25

Info furnished by the Mgt Br, Mgt Div, ODCSCOMPT, 12 Oct 72.

gle staff agency subordinate to the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Training. By the end of that month, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces had concurred in the Study Group's proposals and further recommended that the two existing staff sections involved in the proposal -- Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training -- be redesignated as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSO) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCST), respectively, with the following functional alignment:³¹

Functional Alignment

<u>Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSO)</u>	<u>Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCST)</u>
Operations	Unit Training
Plans	Individual Training
Unit Readiness	Army Training Centers
Force Structure	Schools
Joint/Special Operations	SAFEGUARD
Command and Control	Training Support
Communications/Electronics	Budget Programs
History/Management/Budget	Training Readiness
Research and Development	Training Literature
NBC/EOD	

It was pointed out that these functional areas were not all inclusive, but rather represented the highlights of broad functional categories. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the Reserve Components constituted an inherent element of each function which cut across the staff lines.

In mid-January 1972, the Study Group made another proposal concerning the realignment of the special staff of headquarters which called for the establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration (DCSP&A) with the Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, and Chaplain placed under its staff supervision. Placement of the Surgeon under the proposed general staff section was deferred pending the outcome of the WORSAMS Study at the Department of the Army level. The Information Officer, the Staff Judge Advocate, the Surgeon, and the Inspector General would remain as

31

(1) DF ATCOM, HCOSC to CONARC Stf, 5 Jan 72, subj: Proposed Establishment of a DCST (HCOS-1). (2) DF ATOPS-TNG-TS, DCSOPS to HCOSG, 26 Jan 72, same subj.

personal staff officers of the Chief of Staff.³²

None of these proposals reached fruition, however, as the work of the Headquarters, CONARC, Organization Study Group was overtaken by events at the beginning of February 1972. The reorganization directed by the Department of the Army -- known at the CONARC level as Operation STEADFAST -- superseded all studies at the level of the U.S. Continental Army Command which dealt with either the internal headquarters organization or the overall structural organization.

Accomplishments of the Study Group. Despite the fact that the work of the Headquarters, CONARC, Organization Study Group was overtaken by events before any concrete decisions concerning major organizational changes could be made, several accomplishments were recorded. On 24 February 1972, the CONARC Chief of Staff approved for implementation the transfer of the office and functions of the U.S. Continental Army Command Headquarters Commandant to the Commander, Fort Monroe. The actual merger of the Office of the Headquarters Commandant into the installation headquarters staff at Fort Monroe occurred on 1 July 1972.³³ The other accomplishment concerned the proposal made by the Study Group in January 1972 for the consolidation of all functions related to training aids, training devices, and educational television into a single agency to be subordinate to the proposed Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training. On 28 February 1972, the Chief of Staff directed the two CONARC general staff sections concerned to study the matter further with a view to implementing the proposal under the staff supervision of the existing Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training. The Chief of Staff approved implementation of the proposal on 18 May 1972 and the CONARC Training Aids Agency was established at Fort Eustis, Va., on 1 July 1972.³⁴

Program/Budget Decision 92

Department of Defense Decision

On 23 November 1971, the Department of Defense published its

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DF ATOPS-MGT, OPS MGT to Dirs and Div Chs ODCSOPS, 17 Jan 72, subj: Proposed Realignment of the HQ CONARC Special Staff (HCOS-5).

33

DF ATCS-72-0697, CONARC CofS to Cdr Ft Monroe, 24 Feb 72, subj: Transfer of the CONARC HQ Commandant to Cdr Ft Monroe.

34

Semiannual Hist Rept, ODCSIT, Jan - Jun 72, Sec. VIII, pp. 1 - 2 (CONFIDENTIAL -- Info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

Program/Budget Decision 92 which dealt with Army Budget Program 9 -- Administration and Associated Activities. In that decision, the Department of Defense reduced the Department of the Army's overall budget estimate for that particular budget program for FY 1973 from \$480.8 million to \$466.9 million -- a reduction of \$13.9 million. Among the recommendations of the Department of Defense to achieve these savings was the development of a revised organizational role for the U.S. Continental Army Command's subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States. As suggested by the Department of Defense budget planners, the new role for the subordinate army headquarters would emphasize only three functional areas -- supervision of the Reserve Components, contingency planning, and local representation for the U.S. Army. It was estimated that this reduction would represent a savings of 535 military and 688 civilian spaces and a monetary savings of \$8.8 million for FY 1973.³⁵

Department of Defense Rationale. In justifying this recommendation, the Department of Defense budget planners pointed out that the full range of management and decision processes generally were repeated at Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, after having taken place originally at that command's subordinate army headquarters. In recognition of this problem, the Department of the Army already had consolidated these subordinate army headquarters from six to four in the continental United States. This did diminish the problem of duplication of effort to some extent, but not to the degree made possible by increases in management technology. Moreover, duplicative headquarters could not be justified to any extent in an era of dwindling manpower and financial resources. Consequently, PBD 92 stated that a new role for CONARC's subordinate army headquarters should be established which would remove their day-to-day operating responsibilities in logistics, personnel, and resources management and stress instead a more generalized policy role. However, the nature and magnitude of the workload involved in three particular functional areas -- Reserve Components, contingency planning for emergencies, and representation of the Army in key metropolitan areas -- was such as to require the continuation of an operational role. While the savings from such a change were difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy, it appeared to the Department of Defense staff that personnel requirements could be reduced by 25 percent in FY 1973, with further significant savings possible in FY 1974. The Department of Defense planners pointed out, moreover, that a refinement of the estimated savings would be possible during the third quarter of FY 1972 upon completion of studies concerning this question by both the Department

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DOD Program/Budget Decision 92, 23 Nov 71, subj: Program 9 -- Administration and Associated Activities.

of the Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command. On the basis of these premises, the Department of Defense staff felt that it was possible to reduce the Department of the Army budget estimate by \$2.9 million in the area of military personnel and \$5.9 million in the area of civilian personnel.³⁶

Conditions of Approval by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved his staff's alternative estimates for the Department of the Army's budget program for FY 1973, but attached certain conditions to his approval. The Deputy Secretary pointed out that the individual areas of adjustment in Budget Program 9 as recommended by his staff should be considered as guidance rather than as directive in nature. The Department of the Army should be given the right to determine the methods of achieving the intended reductions.³⁷

Department of the Army Reclama

The Department of the Army submitted a reclama to the Department of Defense requesting relief from those provisions of Program/Budget Decision 92 which applied to the field headquarters and activities of the Department of the Army, i.e., the subordinate army headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command. However, the Department did concur in the need to investigate the possibility of simplifying all headquarters, to include the headquarters structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command. The rationale used by the Department of Defense in establishing the cuts was based on the premise that such savings could be generated by certain management improvements in the continental United States which were then being studied at several levels. The Department of the Army insisted that any further reductions would have to be accomplished as the result of an orderly plan, and the Management Improvement Concept Study being developed by the U.S. Continental Army Command was not yet definitive enough to identify any specific manpower and dollar savings for FY 1973. In addition, the Department of the Army pointed out many factors which had some bearing on the reduction in the headquarters structures of the U.S. Continental Army Command. First, the capability to bypass either the subordinate Army level or Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, in reporting was dependent upon the development and implementation of two automatic data processing systems in FY 1973 -- the Base Operations Information System (BASEOPS) and the Standard Installation/Division Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS). However, the programs for both of these

36

Ibid.

37

Ibid.

systems had been reduced by Congress in FY 1972. Furthermore, the duplication of functions in the U.S. Continental Army Command was not clear cut; some additions to any residual headquarters would be necessary to accomplish the required workload. From the historical viewpoint, moreover, it was unreasonable to expect manpower reductions during the last half of the calendar year in which a National Election was being held. Therefore, phased reductions could not begin until the last half of FY 1973 with an average of only one quarter of a year's savings.

As a final argument, the Department of the Army pointed out that the imposition of dollar savings for FY 1973 at that stage of planning would impose artificial restraints upon those who were charged with planning a beneficial reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command. As a workable solution, the Department of the Army proposed to identify in its FY 1973 Apportionment Request those manpower and dollar savings which would accrue from the implementation of its reorganization plan for the U.S. Continental Army Command. For planning purposes, the Department of the Army strongly recommended that no dollar or manpower reductions be assessed at that time for FY 1973 and that the proposed \$8.8 million cut be restored to the Army's Operation and Maintenance (OMA) budget program.³⁸

Summary

By 1 January 1972, it was becoming increasingly apparent that demands were being made at Headquarters, Department of the Army, and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for a complete streamlining of, and a reduction of headquarters levels in, the overall command structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command. These demands had been accommodated by the CONARC Management Improvement Panel in both its initial and revised Report No. 1. In its CONARC 72 -- Mission and Organization Study, however, the U.S. Continental Army Command concluded that the overall organizational structure of the command was sound, practical, and feasible and that no further reduction should be made in the number of subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States. Although the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, reached this latter conclusion, he had apprised the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in March 1971 of the contents of the CONARC Management Improvement Panel Report No. 1 and of his rationale for sending that report back to the panel for a thorough revision. Moreover, although it had never been formally provided to the Department of the Army, the revised Report No. 1 of the CONARC Management Improvement Panel recommended

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HQ DA, undtd, subj: Reclama of Program/Budget Decision
92 -- FY 1973 Budget Submission, w/4 incls.

a reduced role for CONARC's subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States which was very similar to that proposed by the Department of Defense in its Program/Budget Decision 92 some three months later. The conclusions and recommendations of the CONARC 72 Study were being formulated and forwarded to the Department of the Army at the same time that the Department of Defense was formulating and publishing its Program/Budget Decision 92. On the one hand, the U.S. Continental Army Command was recommending that no changes be made in its overall organizational structure. The Department of Defense, on the other hand, was proposing a streamlining of the role of CONARC's subordinate army headquarters which was obviously based on the revised Report No. 1 of the CONARC Management Improvement Panel, with resultant reductions in civilian and military manpower generating \$8.8 million in savings during FY 1973. In its reclama to the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army indicated that reorganization studies were then underway at both the departmental level and at the U.S. Continental Army Command and that a meaningful reorganization with its resultant streamlining and manpower reductions was in the offing. In fact, as indicated immediately above, the Department of the Army had proposed to delineate in its budget apportionment requests those areas where savings would accrue once the studies were completed and implemented. The conclusions and recommendations of the CONARC 72 -- Mission and Organization Study arrived at the Department of the Army subsequent to publication of Program/Budget Decision 92 by the Department of Defense and the resultant reclama by the Department of the Army. Consequently, it was almost inevitable that such a reorganization and streamlining would be directed from above and that it would take such form as the higher headquarters determined. Thus, the stage was set for Operation STEADFAST as calendar year 1972 began.³⁹

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Based in part on info furnished by GEN R.E. Haines, Jr.
(USA Ret), 24 Apr 73.

Chapter II

THE GENESIS OF OPERATION STEADFAST

Department of the Army Proposals for Reorganization

Proposals by the Office of the Army Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

Because of divergencies of viewpoints between Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, and Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Haines informally suggested to General Palmer at the Chief of Staff's Commanders' Conference in early December 1971, that he be afforded an opportunity to sit down with selected members of the Army staff. General Haines primarily wanted to talk to those involved in organizational and resource management matters in order to expound on his organizational philosophy and his views of current CONARC problems. The meeting could later be opened to questions and free discussion. He expressed a desire to have a representative number of key Department of the Army action officers present at this meeting with the hope that viewpoints could be reconciled. General DePuy and General Haines conferred several times on this matter and the requested meeting was scheduled for early January 1972. The meeting was attended by Generals Haines and West of the U.S. Continental Army Command and a broad spectrum of Department of the Army staff officers, ranging from Generals Dupuy and Forsythe to lieutenant colonel action officers. The meeting lasted approximately six hours and covered a wide range of subjects with primary emphasis on the organizational structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command, along with its currently assigned missions and allocated resources. General Haines emphasized the point that while the U.S. Continental Army Command was primarily training oriented, the subordinate CONUS armies were resource management oriented, with a clear offset in the functions in both of these areas. In the operation of service schools, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, dealt directly with the school commandants, while in a number of administrative, logistical, and public affairs areas, the subordinate CONUS armies dealt directly with appropriate agencies of the Department of the Army. Some members of the Department of the Army staff became involved, from time to time, in the details of the training mission, thus duplicating the role of the U.S. Continental Army Command. At the same time, other members of the Department of the Army staff were insisting that the U.S. Continental Army Command exercise greater centralized control over resource management matters which were traditionally handled at the level of the installation and the subordinate CONUS armies.¹

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Info furnished by GEN R.E. Haines, Jr. (USA Ret), 24 Apr

Subsequent to this meeting, General Haines forwarded a letter to the Department of the Army dealing with Program/Budget Decision 92, stressing that these proposed reductions would have to be reviewed much more thoroughly at both the level of the Department of the Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command. Furthermore, alternative courses of action would have to be developed so that the best possible solution could be developed with the least damage to the basic missions of the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate armies. General Haines also requested that he be permitted to review any proposal developed in this area by Department of the Army staff members prior to a final decision on the matter. General Haines did inform the Department of the Army that Department of Defense Program/Budget Decision 92 was, in his opinion, a simplistic solution which moved in the wrong direction. In addition, a deeper analysis of the decision by the CONARC staff showed clearly that the course of action contained therein was totally infeasible for FY 1973, thus eliminating the possibility of budget cuts for that particular year. He did emphasize, however, that reductions could be achieved in the headquarters of both the U.S. Continental Army Command and those of its subordinate armies, but not without some disruption in the currently assigned missions of the affected headquarters. In order to accomplish the reduction in the subordinate CONUS armies, CONARC would have to transfer some missions either up, down, or laterally, while still other functions would have to be eliminated completely. He did caution the Department of the Army that strength reductions of the scope envisioned for the U.S. Continental Army Command/subordinate army headquarters complex would eventually involve the Department of the Army and its other major commands in the continental United States.²

In the interim, the consensus in the upper command echelons of the Department of the Army lent support to the conclusions that a thorough reorganization of the entire Army structure in the continental United States was practically inevitable. The Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army pointed out at the end of January 1972 that sufficient pressure existed from outside the Army -- principally from the Department of Defense and from Congress -- to require a study of the adequacy and effectiveness of the existing organizational structure. Moreover, these outside pressures were reinforced by certain reasons internal to the Army.³


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Personal correspondence, GEN Haines to GEN Palmer, dtd 26 Jan 72, subj: DOD PBD 92.

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Incl 1, Staff Study, undated, to Memo, Dep PMR-DA to CONARC DCSCOMPT, 31 Mar 72, pp. 1 - 2.

Chart 4 -- DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ORGANIZATION SINCE 1962



Reasons for Change. In a study prepared for presentation to the Army Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense -- in that order -- Lt. Gen. W.E. DePuy, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, pointed out that the main features of the present organizational structure of the Department of the Army -- as shown on Chart 4 -- dated from 1962. At that time, the Department of the Army had been reorganized along lines recommended by the Department of Defense Project 80 Study, as well as certain related studies conducted by the Department of the Army. Within a short time, this reorganized structure was distorted by the requirements of the conflict in Southeast Asia with the result that its adequacy and effectiveness were never really proven in actual operation. With the de-escalation of U.S. participation in the conflict in Southeast Asia by the end of calendar year 1971, it became evident that the cessation of hostilities would bring many changes to the Army structure in the continental United States. First, a higher proportion of the Army's troop strength would be stationed in the continental United States. Consequently, the maintenance of deployable forces in a high state of combat readiness would assume much greater importance to the Army as a whole. In addition, a smaller Active Army would result in placing a greater reliance on the Reserve Components. As a final measure, the expectation of highly constrained resources for defense purposes on the national level would present much more difficult choices in the developing and fielding of new organizations, weapons, and doctrine. In short, the consensus of the Department of the Army staff was that three Army functions would assume a greatly increased importance in the immediate future -- the maintenance of combat-ready forces; the training of individuals in tactics, techniques, and skills; and the developing of new force structures and materiel systems.⁴

The Existing Span of Control of the U.S. Continental Army Command. At the beginning of FY 1972, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was responsible both for maintaining forces in a state of readiness and for conducting individual training. In executing these missions, General Haines controlled a total of fifty-six subordinate elements. While General Haines and his staff at the U.S. Continental Army Command insisted that the primary mission of that command was one of training, it was evident that both of the major missions would increase in importance in the very near future. In addition, as more of the Active Army was based in the continental United States, the U.S. Continental Army Command would be responsible for a growing proportion of the Army's actual troop strength. According to plans then being developed at the Department of the Army level, the U.S. Continental Army Command

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Ibid., pp. 2 - 3.

would be responsible for 53 percent of the Active Army strength and 73 percent of the total Active and Reserve strength of the Army by the end of FY 1973. Since an increased proportion of the Active Army would be stationed in the continental United States, contingency planning, particularly for the deployment of combat-ready forces, was bound to increase in importance. Consequently, the very increased importance of contingency planning dictated that the maintenance of forces in a high state of readiness would become much more critical. This, in turn, required a greater emphasis both on effective unit training and training exercises and on the managing of supply, maintenance, and personnel. The span of control of the U.S. Continental Army Command in this regard is vividly portrayed in the following ramifications of the various elements of the overall force development mission of the U.S. Continental Army Command.⁵

The Force Mission -- FY 1973

ARRED/ARLANT	ACTIVE FORCES
125 Contingency Plans	2 Corps
23 Joint Exercises per year	7 Divisions
	1 Armored Cavalry Regiment
	3 Special Forces Groups
	3 Support Brigades
READINESS	RESERVE COMPONENTS
Deployment Exercises	8 Divisions
FORSTAT Reports	1 TRICAP Roundout Brigade
Operational Readiness Tests	9 Early Deployment Brigades
	4 Armored Cavalry Regiments
UNIT TRAINING	3 Separate Battalions
Active and Reserve	(ROUNDOUT -- 2d Armd Div)
TRICAP TEST	45 GOCOM's
	18 ARCOM's
RESERVE FORCES INTEGRATION	RESOURCES
Hybrid	14 Major Installations
ROUNDOUT	\$761.7 Million OMA
Deploy Time Compression	221,400 Military (Active)
	64,900 Civilians
	609,300 Reserves

It was evident to the Department of the Army staff that individual training also would require increased attention and emphasis when the Army's training mission reverted to preparation for, rather than fighting in, a war. The emphasis on individual training would

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Ibid., pp. 4 - 8.

be further increased by the need for highly trained units and the need to extract the full potential of each soldier in a smaller, volunteer Army. The scope of the Army's individual training mission was great, with an average training load of 156,000 students and the expenditure of \$802.7 million in Army Operation and Maintenance (OMA) funds. The scope of this mission is best seen in the following depiction of the various elements of the training and doctrinal development mission of the U.S. Continental Army Command.⁶

The Training Mission (Doctrine) -- FY 1973


CONDUCT BASIC SKILL TRAINING FOR ENLISTED ACCESSIONS 240,000 Active 145,000 Reserves 705 MOS's	23 SCHOOLS 26,000 Instructor/School Overhead 11,000 School Troops
CONDUCT SKILL UPGRADE TRAINING 27,000 Students 108 Functional Courses NCO Educational System	6 ACTIVE TRAINING CENTERS 23,000 Trainers
CONDUCT OFFICER PRECOMMISSION TRAINING 1,000 OCS 48,000 ROTC	2 RESERVE TRAINING COMMANDS 285 ROTC INSTRUCTOR GROUPS 3,400 Instructors
BASIC, ADVANCED, AND STAFF TRAINING FOR OFFICERS 15,000 Basic 4,100 Advanced 2,000 Command and General Staff	RESOURCES 21 Major Installations \$802.7 Million OMA 218,000 Military (Active) 38,300 Civilians 40,700 Reserves
TRAINING ASSISTANCE TO UNITS	

From the above factors, the Army's Assistant Vice Chief of Staff concluded that, by any standards, the mission of maintaining Active and Reserve Forces in readiness in the continental United States was vast enough to fully occupy the span of attention and control of a single major commander. However, the mission of training individuals in tactics, techniques, and skills was also of sufficient size and significance to fully occupy the span of attention and control of a single major commander. Consequently, the Department of the Army Staff concluded that the span of control of the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, would soon become

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Ibid., p. 8.

Chart 5 -- PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY



overtaxed and that commander would be unable to devote the required attention to each of these major functions.⁷

Proposed Reorganization. With the desired goals in mind of attaining better performance in the areas of maintaining forces in readiness, training individuals, and conducting continuous force development, General DePuy and the Department of the Army Staff determined that any reorganization proposals would have to be able to: reduce the span of control of the U.S. Continental Army Command; emphasize training, readiness, and contingency planning for deployable forces; emphasize effective individual training; close the loop between doctrine and schools; rationalize the combat and force development processes; simplify the test and experimentation processes; and fulfill area responsibilities in the continental United States. Above all else, any reorganization proposal would have to be manageable. In order to arrive at the optimum solution, several alternative organizational structures were analyzed and tested by the Department of the Army staff against the reorganization criteria mentioned immediately above. Since the alternative solutions were all discarded, only the recommended solution is discussed here. To begin, the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (USACDC) would be dis-established and its various elements transferred elsewhere. Two new agencies -- the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency and the Concepts and Analysis Agency -- would be established at the Department of the Army level in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (OACSFOR). At the same time, the U.S. Continental Army Command would be split into two new independent commands -- a Force Command and a Doctrine and Training Command. The structure proposed by the Department of the Army Staff is shown on Chart 5. The proposed Force Command would control approximately fourteen installations; the subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States; and the combat troops stationed in the continental United States, i.e., the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF). On a reduced mission basis, the subordinate army headquarters would directly command the units of the U.S. Army Reserve; supervise the training of the Army National Guard; and co-ordinate certain geographic-area-oriented activities. The Doctrine and Training Command would control approximately twenty-one installations, the principal activity of which was individual training -- those containing service schools or training centers -- as well as several schools located on installations of other major commands.⁸

Comparison with Previous Proposals. The command organization


7

Ibid., p. 6.

8

Ibid., pp. 11 - 18.

Chart 6 -- PROPOSED ORGANIZATION, U.S. ARMY
FORCE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND -- 1961



SOURCE: OSD PROJECT 80 (ARMY) STUDY REPT, PART I.

proposed by the Army's Vice Chief of Staff and the Department of the Army staff differed from earlier proposals in this regard mainly in the fact that the current mission of the U.S. Continental Army Command was to be split in half and assigned to two co-equal commands, each directly responsible to the Department of the Army. Thus, the primary thrust of the reorganization shifted from the so-called high-visibility of the structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the excessive number of headquarters involved to that of the overextension of the command and its excessive span of control. Some features of the proposed Program/Budget Decision 92 reorganization -- such as a reduced role for the subordinate armies in the continental United States -- were retained in this new reorganization proposal. In addition, the major portion of the Army's combat developments functions was joined once again with the Army School System from which it had been separated by the Department of Defense Project 80 reorganization of the Army in 1962.⁹

Preliminary studies for the 1962 reorganization -- the Hoelscher and Traub Committee Studies -- had proposed the disestablishment of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the establishment of three new major commands of the Department of the Army, namely, the Army Materiel Command (AMC), the Combat Developments Command (CDC), and the Force Development Command (FDC). A separate Individual Training Command (ITC) -- commanded by a lieutenant general -- was to be established to control all Army service schools, training centers, and personnel processing activities. The Individual Training Command was to be a subordinate command of the Force Development Command on an equal basis with the subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States which would command all troop units -- both Active and Reserve -- assigned to the Force Development Command. The proposed organization for the Force Development Command is shown on Chart 6. It is interesting to note the similarity between the organizational structure proposed by the Hoelscher and Traub Committees in 1961 - 1962 and the proposals of General DePuy and the Department of the Army staff approximately ten years later.¹⁰

Approval of the Reorganization Concepts. The first full explanation of the impending reorganization was given to the U.S. Continental Army Command on 2 February 1972 at a presentation made in Washington by General DePuy, the Army's Assistant Vice Chief of

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Info furnished by GEN R.E. Haines, Jr. (USA Ret), 14
Apr 73.

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Staff. General Haines had been informed of the pending reorganization by General Palmer some two days earlier. By that time, General DePuy had already presented his concept for the reorganization to General W.C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff; the Honorable R.F. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army; and the Honorable M.F. Laird, Secretary of Defense. At the presentation, General DePuy announced that Secretary Laird had approved the concept for planning and implementation on the morning of 2 February. At the time of the presentation on 2 February, General DePuy indicated that the new Doctrine and Training Command would be formed at Fort Monroe, Va., from resources of both the Combat Developments Command and the U.S. Continental Army Command. The location of the new Force Command would be at Fort McPherson, Ga., in lieu of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, which General DePuy indicated would be merged with First U.S. Army at Fort George G. Meade, Md. This seemed to indicate that the concept for the reduction in the number of subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States also had been approved.¹¹

Responsibilities of the U.S. Continental Army Command

The headquarters staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command correctly gauged the fact that this command would have to play a key role in the proposed reorganization. Consequently, the staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command immediately proposed that the headquarters remain in a control position until such time as both the Doctrine and Training Command and the Force Command were organized, established, and capable of reporting directly to the Department of the Army. It was evident that many problems would require resolution during the planning and reorganization periods, including such matters as the allocation and shifting of resources. Consequently, it was the feeling of the headquarters staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command that it was in the best position to do the detailed planning and to settle resource problems during the period of reorganization. When it was no longer needed, the U.S. Continental Army Command could be disestablished. However, the first organizational change to be undertaken should be the establishment of a separate Doctrine and Training Command under the control of the U.S. Continental Army Command. To avoid the unnecessary layering of headquarters, the U.S. Continental Army Command should be phased out once the Force Command was ready to become operational. In the interim period, some functions could be permitted to bypass the U.S. Continental Army Command and be handled directly with the Department of the Army. It was also felt by the U.S. Continental Army Command's headquarters staff that once

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HQ CONARC, ODCSCOMPT, Discussion Summary (CG-72-01), 5 Feb 72, pp. 1 - 2.

that command had been phased out, its title should be used to redesignate the Force Command.¹² On 8 February 1972, General DePuy informed the CONARC Chief of Staff that the Department of the Army was then planning to appoint an overall Project Manager for the reorganization process and would then task the major commands involved as executive agents for the actual planning and implementation. He further indicated that the U.S. Continental Army Command would be designated as the executive agent for planning, developing, and establishing the two new major commands.¹³

Formation of the CONARC Special Study Group

In order to handle the problem properly, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command established a Special Study Group (SSG) as a permanent planning board. The three principal members of this board were tentatively designated as Special Assistants to the Chief of Staff. Brig. Gen. L.M. Jones, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, was designated as Special Assistant for the development of the Force Command; Brig. Gen. G.J. Duquemin, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training, was designated as the Special Assistant for the development of the Doctrine and Training Command; and Brig. Gen. R.L. West, Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, was designated as CONARC Staff Co-ordinator. Both General Jones and General Duquemin were assigned to the Study Group on a full-time basis while General West was designated as Staff Co-ordinator in addition to his other duties. On 14 February, Maj. Gen. D.R. Pepke, the CONARC Chief of Staff, announced that he had selected the title, "Operation STEADFAST," for the study in question. This title was taken from the motto of the 4th Infantry Division ("Steadfast and Loyal") which General Pepke had commanded in combat in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the CONARC Special Study Group was designated as the STEADFAST Study Group (SSG).¹⁴

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Ibid., pp. B-1 - B-2.

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MFR ATCS, (CG-72-02A2), COL F.U. Roquemore, CONARC ACofS, 8 Feb 72, subj: Reorganization Study.

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(1) Ibid. (2) MFR ATCS, CONARC SGS, 9 Feb 72, subj: Special Study Group Documents Handling. (3) Memo ATCS, SGS to all DCS's, 14 Feb 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST. (4) MFR (CS-SSG-FC-72-024), STEADFAST Study Gp, 10 Mar 72, subj: Liaison Visit, Operation STEADFAST.

Conference at the Department of the Army

In order to make his viewpoints concerning the proposed reorganization concepts known to the Department of the Army, General Haines arranged a conference with both the Army Chief of Staff and his Vice Chief of Staff on 16 February 1972.¹⁵ General Haines presented his ideas during a luncheon in the Chief of Staff's office. In his presentation, the CONARC commander covered five major points, the first of which concerned his feelings that the proposed reorganization concept had been developed on a very close hold basis by Department of the Army staff officers, who were not fully familiar with the complete gamut of CONARC operations. In extension of this comment, General Haines mentioned that the study was addressed from the Department of the Army, rather than the installation point of view, and that additional attention would have to be given to installation requirements. Consequently, this concept should be studied intensively at the installation level to determine its feasibility and desirability.

General Haines' second point concerned mobilization. He emphasized that he did not feel that we could afford to reorganize the Army solely for the discharge of its peacetime functions and enunciated the view that we should be able to move to a full wartime posture without the necessity for a major reorganization at the outset. In this connection, he stressed the fact that the study did not deal with a mobilization situation, nor whether the proposed organizational structure was the optimum for the discharge of the Army's primary mission, i.e., engagement in land combat. In addition, General Haines expressed reservations over the splitting of the training function.

General Haines' third point concerned his view that two new headquarters could not be organized within the spaces currently allocated to one. He did indicate that, since the combat developments function was not within his area of responsibility, he could not determine whether space savings could be effected in that area under the proposed reorganization or whether the focus of that effort would be improved. The CONARC commander added that he felt the proposed reorganization would also require more general officer positions unless some general officer spaces were downgraded to the level of colonel. General Haines did feel that some spaces might eventually be saved at intermediate headquarters levels in the continental United States due to the improved capabilities of the

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The entire section is based on: (1) Ofc of the CG CONARC, (CG-72-10A1), subj: Notes for the CG's Conference with the CofSA, 16 Feb 72; (2) CONARC DCSCOMPT (COMPT-071-72), 17 Feb 72, BG R.L. West's handwritten notes concerning GEN Haines' meeting with GEN Westmoreland and GEN Palmer, 16 Feb 72; (3) Info furnished by GEN R.E. Haines, Jr., (USA Ret), 16 May 73.

BASOPS II System to aggregate and transmit personnel, logistics, and financial management data from the installation to the Department of the Army level. Such spaces, however, would be saved even under the existing organization and, therefore, could not properly be credited to the reorganization itself. In any event, no savings could be effected in the subordinate numbered armies during FY 1973 beyond those made pursuant to recent and projected manpower surveys by the U.S. Continental Army Command, due primarily to delays in the installation of BASOPS II.

Still another point presented by General Haines was that the number of subordinate armies should not be reduced from four to three. He felt strongly that it would be a mistake to attempt such a reduction prior to FY 1974 at the earliest, since BASOPS II should be operational by that time. He indicated that, in any event, we could not merely combine First and Third U.S. Armies -- as intimated by the study -- but that all of the subordinate army boundaries would have to be altered. Furthermore, he recommended that the final decision on the reduction in the number of subordinate armies be withheld and that Fort Sheridan, Ill., rather than Fort McPherson, Ga., be explored as the headquarters location for the U.S. Army Force Command. Alternatively, Fort Sheridan could be considered as the location of a subordinate army headquarters and Fort Sam Houston, Tex., could then be considered for the Force Command headquarters.

As a final point, General Haines stressed that this was not a propitious time for a major reorganization of the Army. He stated that the Army needed a period of stabilization to digest and implement the large number of directives from the Department of the Army and, in addition, to get on with the job of improving professionalism, discipline, and attitude throughout the Army. He stressed once again the momentum gained in these areas by the team effort of the commanders in the continental United States and the adverse effect that the proposed reorganization could have on that effort. He pointed out the difficulties in meeting the proposed date of 1 July 1972 for organizing the two new commands -- only four and one-half months in the future -- since both the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate armies were well into the development of their Command Operating Budgets for FY 1973. He also cited the awkwardness of the 1 July date since it fell in the middle of the summer training period for the Reserve Components and the Reserve Officer Training Corps. In addition, this date would affect the conduct of the Williamson Board tests which were sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and involved almost all elements of the U.S. Continental Army Command. General Haines felt that there was a clear requirement carefully to spell out the responsibilities of the two new commands and the subordinate numbered armies for conducting and supporting the training of the Reserve Components and the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Moreover, he

was convinced that the above factors presented a valid argument for a slower implementation schedule. He stated his belief that the new Chief of Staff should have the opportunity to guide the reorganization and not be faced with a fait accompli on the very date he was due to assume his new assignment. He also suggested that, prior to final approval, the Chief of Staff seek the advice of certain retired officers -- such as Generals Bruce Clarke, Hamilton Howze, and Paul Freeman -- who were accomplished troop leaders and trainers.

In the discussion which followed General Haines' presentation, General Westmoreland and General Palmer agreed that the reorganization should proceed in an orderly manner and that the proposed timetable would have to be slowed down, with a probable extension over a 2-year period. Both general officers, however, felt that the reorganization should proceed along the lines planned, with the new Chief of Staff informed at the earliest possible moment. They were in full agreement that the effects of the reorganization should be thoroughly explored at the installation level with a combined Department of the Army/U.S. Continental Army Command team visiting three or more test installations. However, they appeared to feel in advance that the reorganization would not unduly complicate operations at the installation level. On his part, General Westmoreland indicated that a Doctrine and Training Command could readily be placed under the U.S. Army Force Command for the purposes of national mobilization, if that move were considered desirable. General Palmer stated that the proposed reorganization picked up the essential outlines of the Parker Board proposals with which the U.S. Continental Army Command was already familiar. General Westmoreland assured General Haines that the reduction of the subordinate armies in the continental United States from four to three in number was not firm and that the matter would be explored further along with various headquarters locations for the U.S. Army Force Command. He did feel that the job at the U.S. Continental Army Command was too big for one individual, although he complimented General Haines on his performance of duty in that assignment.

The 2-hour conversation was then guided into the various details of the plan itself, such as whether the installation commanders would be "dual-hatted" and, in most cases, serve under both commands; which command would control the Reserve Office Training Corps Program; whether the U.S. Army Recruiting Command and the Army War College should be placed under the Doctrine and Training Command as advocated by General Haines; the timing and content of the proposed public information release on the reorganization which General Haines recommended be worded in general terms so as to not lock in the Army; the terms of reference for the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization; and the proposed designation of the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, as the Executive Agent for that part of the overall reorganization related

TABLE 1 -- SCHEDULE FOR REORGANIZATION ACTIONS
(REVISED 18 FEBRUARY AND 1 MARCH 1972)

ACTIONS	DATE
Name of Project Manager	18 Feb 1972
Publish Charter Establishing Office of Project Manager	25 Feb 1972
Publish Initial Guidance for Transfer of Functions and Resources	30 Mar 1972
Public Announcement Release	1 Apr - 1 May 1972 (Tentative - After Budget Hearings)
Executive Agents Submit Outline Plan	1 May 1972
FY 1973 Funding Realignment	15 May 1972
Department of the Army Incorporates Broad Features and Manpower Estimates in POM	22 May 1972
Issue Final Reorganization Guidance to the Executive Agents	20 June 1972
Executive Agents Submit Detailed Plans to Department of the Army PMR	15 Jul 1972
Department of the Army Issues Reorganization Directive	15 Aug 1972
Initiate Establishment of Forces Command	TBA
Initiate Establishment of Training and Doctrine Command	TBA
Initiate Establishment of Concepts and Analysis Agency	TBA
Initiate Establishment of Operational Test and Evaluation Agency	TBA
Submit FY 1974 Budget Incorporating Reorganization	1 Oct 1972
All New Commands and Agencies Become Operational	1 Jul 1973
Reorganization Complete	31 Dec 1973

Source: Incl 1 to Memo ATIT-SSG-TC (CG-SSG-TC-22), SSG for CofS, 8 Mar 72, subj: Charter for the Project Manager for Reorganization.

specifically to the establishment of the two new commands.

General Haines returned to his headquarters and communicated the gist of his conference with the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to his Deputy Commander, his Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller. General Haines stated that, in his belief, General Westmoreland intended to press ahead with the reorganization, but that the pace of the effort would be slowed considerably. He added -- in accordance with an agreement reached with General Westmoreland -- that he would be the proponent for the Doctrine and Training Command and that his Deputy Commander, Lt. Gen. J.J. Tolson, would be the proponent for the Force Command. This move would help to ensure an equitable distribution of resources and functions between the two commands.

Development of Charters for the Reorganization Groups

Department of the Army Charter for Reorganization

On the day prior to General Haines' conference with the Army's Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff, the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff had forwarded to the U.S. Continental Army Command a draft of the proposed charter for the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization (DA-PMR). This charter was based on many of the assumptions which had been modified by agreements between General Westmoreland and General Palmer, on the one hand, and General Haines, on the other, during the 16 February conference. Thus, review of the document by Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, seemed unnecessary.¹⁶

Revision of the Charter, 18 February 1972. On the very day that the comments of the U.S. Continental Army Command on the draft charter were being forwarded to the Department of the Army, General Westmoreland directed a major revision of that charter in line with the agreements made with General Haines. For example, the milestone dates on the reorganization schedule were slipped to approximate those recommended by General Haines during the 16 February conference. The new commands and agencies were now scheduled to become operational on 1 July 1973, rather than on 1 July 1972. The revised key dates are shown on Table 1. While the draft document still showed three subordinate army headquarters, General Westmoreland personally

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(1) Memo ATCS (CG-72-05), CONARC CofS to Cdr CONARC, 11 Feb 72, subj: Organization Project. (2) Memo ATCS (CG-72-08), CONARC CofS to Distr, 15 Feb 72, subj: Draft Charter -- Operation STEADFAST. (3) Ltr ATCS (CG-72-12), CONARC CofS to AVCoFSA, 18 Feb 72, subj: Charter for the Project Manager for Reorganization, w/1 incl.

changed the draft to read "4 armies," with a 3 and a question mark in parentheses beside that number. Thus, it was assumed at Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, that the question concerning the reduction of subordinate army headquarters was still open and that the idea of retaining the existing four headquarters in the overall Army structure was gaining momentum. To answer another of General Haines' objections, the revised draft stated that the Force Command would command all U.S. Army Reserve forces with the exception of Training Divisions and Centers. The Force Command would exercise command -- less operational control -- over the Reserve Training Divisions and Centers, with operational control being given logically to the Doctrine and Training Command. The revised draft also increased the responsibility for combat developments in the new Doctrine and Training Command but, at the same time, slightly modified the role of the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, as executive agent for establishing the two new commands. In the revised wording, General Haines was directed to consult with the Commander, Combat Developments Command, in planning and developing the new organizations. In addition, the disestablishment of the U.S. Continental Army Command was stated as a formal task for the commander of that command.¹⁷

Appointment of the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization. During the first week of March 1972, the Chief of Staff of the Army selected Maj. Gen. J.G. Kalergis, Deputy Commanding General for Logistical Support, U.S. Army Materiel Command, to be the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization (DA-PMR). General Kalergis met with the Army Chief of Staff for the first time on 8 March; met with the principal members of the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group on 9 March; and had an interview with Secretary of the Army Froehle on 10 March. During his meeting with the Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland informed General Kalergis that he was being given three main missions: to write the reorganization directive; to validate the requirement to reorganize; and to supervise the implementation phase of the reorganization. With respect to the validation process, General Kalergis apprised the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group that he intended to build checkpoints into the reorganization plan at which both the Department of the Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command would stop, thoroughly review the completed plans, and validate that all were on the proper course. By the time that he conferred with the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group on 9 March, General Kalergis had decided to scrap the draft charters, of which the U.S. Continental Army Command now had three different versions. General Kalergis stated that he intended

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Memo ATIT-SSG-TC (CG-SSG-TC-22), STEADFAST Study Group for CofS, 8 Mar 72, subj: Charter for the Project Manager for Reorganization, w/1 incl.

to draw up a new charter which would contain much of the same substance as the earlier draft versions, but with much less detail. He also intended to publish a reorganization directive which would contain all of the details omitted from the new charter.¹⁸

Publication of the Department of the Army Charter. On 24 April 1972, Secretary of the Army Froehlke approved for publication the official version of the Department of the Army Charter for the Project Manager for Reorganization. The Office of the Project Manager was established in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff, effective that same date. As indicated earlier by General Kalergis, the approved charter was a simplified version of the earlier drafts. The document established the office; designated the Project Manager by name; gave the Project Manager the full line authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army; established five major functions to be accomplished; and delineated the channels of relationship for the Project Manager and his office. The charter was scheduled to expire on 31 December 1973, unless terminated sooner by the Department of the Army. The actual method of reorganization, the recommended organizational structures, and the designation of executive agents for planning and implementing the reorganization were all left to the Department of the Army Reorganization Directive which General Kalergis intended to publish in the very near future.¹⁹

Tentative Planning for Operation STEADFAST

Once the Department of the Army charter for the reorganization had been authenticated and published, General Kalergis was faced with the task of developing and publishing an overall reorganization directive and identifying the major problem areas requiring solution before definitive plans could be drawn up.

The Department of the Army Reorganization Directive. General Kalergis developed a reorganization directive which contained much more detail than was previously included in the draft versions of the charter for his office. According to the Office of the Project Manager for Reorganization, the major purposes of this overall reorganization directive were: to provide authority for the initiation of the detailed planning which was required to properly validate the concepts for reorganizing certain functions of the Department

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(1) Ibid. (2) MFR CS-SSG-FC (CS-SSG-FC-72-024), STEADFAST Study Group, 10 Mar 72, subj: Liaison Visit, Operation STEADFAST.

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OSA, 24 Apr 72, subj: Charter for the Project Manager for Reorganization.

of the Army; to designate executive agents who would develop the detailed plans for the orderly activation of the new commands and the modification of existing commands and agencies; to develop planning guidelines; to identify actions which would have to be accomplished concurrently with the planning; to establish a tentative schedule for the actual reorganization processes; and to outline channels of communication and administrative procedures. As General Kalergis interpreted the program which he was to develop and administer, the concept for reorganization provided for six major actions, the first two of which concerned the split of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the disestablishment of the Combat Developments Command. The major reorganization actions were concerned with the establishment of a Force Command to which all Active and Reserve Army combat forces in the continental United States would be assigned and a Training and Doctrine Command devoted to training officers and soldiers and to developing doctrine and materiel associated with force organization. Two additional actions at the Department of the Army level dealt with the establishment of two agencies in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development which would be concerned with doctrine and combat developments. These included an independent Operational Test and Evaluation Agency and a Concepts and Analysis Agency which would provide an in-house capability at the Department of the Army level for the analysis of force concepts and major weapons systems requirements. A major action affecting the overall organizational structure of the U.S. Continental Army Command concerned the elimination of one headquarters echelon (subordinate army headquarters) between the Department of the Army and the major tactical commands and installations in the continental United States. And, finally, the reorganization was to provide a command structure which would be responsive to the needs of the installation commanders.²⁰

The Department of the Army Reorganization Directive stipulated that the Project Manager for Reorganization had the full line authority of the Army Chief of Staff for planning and co-ordinating the implementation of those organizational changes directed by the Secretary of the Army and was responsible for both validating the reorganization plans and for their implementation. He also was designated as the sole point of contact within the Department of the Army for the co-ordination and direction of all actions pertaining to the reorganization. However, all detailed reorganization planning, co-ordination, and implementation was to be accomplished by designated executive agents. The Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command was designated as executive agent for establishing both the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command; the Commander, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, was the executive agent

for the transfer of the functions of that command; while the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, was the executive agent for establishing the Concepts and Analysis Agency and the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency.²¹

Planning Concepts for the Force Command. The Department of the Army Reorganization Directive stipulated that the U.S. Army Force Command would be the Army Component Command of the U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and the U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), in addition to being a major field command of the Department of the Army. In this latter uniservice capacity, the missions of the new command dealt with the command and control of Active Army combat forces and U.S. Army Reserve forces; the training of Army National Guard units; the maintenance of all assigned units in a state of combat-readiness; the development of pertinent contingency plans; planning for, and participation in, the control of civil disasters, civil disturbances, and domestic emergencies; and providing for the land defense of the continental United States. The major subordinate commands of the Force Command would include the subordinate armies -- or area commands, if so designated -- to command and supervise the training of the various elements of the Reserve Components; III Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps to exercise operational control over designated Active Army troop units; and certain assigned major units and installations.²²

Planning Concepts for the Training and Doctrine Command. As a new major field command of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command was intended to conduct all aspects of individual training for the Army; to develop and approve training procedures for unit training; to control the Reserve Officer Training Corps and National Defense Cadet Corps Programs; to exercise operational control over the U.S. Army Reserve training divisions and centers; to conduct all aspects of the combat developments program which were not reserved to the Department of the Army; and to command those installations where individual training was the primary activity. The major subordinate elements of the new command would be all Army service schools and training centers currently assigned to the U.S. Continental Army Command.²³

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid., Annex A.

23

Ibid.

Definition of Problem Areas. In the initial conference between General Kalergis and the principal members of the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group, various possible problem areas were discussed, along with the concepts for approaching each of these areas at the Department of the Army level and at the U.S. Continental Army Command. General Kalergis was convinced that there were only three fundamental problem areas which would have to be resolved as early as possible during the planning phases. These included the number of subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States -- four versus three; the assignment, tenanting, or attaching of units of the Strategic Army Forces on installations commanded by the Training and Doctrine Command; and the paralleling of missions and resources. All other problem areas could be worked out as planning progressed and sufficient data were collected to enable their resolution.²⁴

CONARC Charter for Operation STEADFAST

By mid-March 1972, it was evident to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Continental Army Command, that the close time schedule for STEADFAST planning activities and the resulting proliferation of STEADFAST staff actions within Headquarters, CONARC, dictated the prompt development and publication of a charter and tasking directives for the special study groups headed by Generals Jones, Duquemin, and West. In addition, general concept information concerning Operation STEADFAST would have to be published and disseminated down to division level of the U.S. Continental Army Command's headquarters staff. Provision would have to be made for timely prior approval by the Command Group of any assumptions that would be incorporated into papers circulated for formal staff co-ordination. A central point of contact would have to be designated in each headquarters staff element for information and informal co-ordination concerning the feasibility and appropriateness of major organizational and functional alignments being considered by the CONARC Study Groups. Appropriate consideration would have to be given to the challenging of time tables, concepts, resource allocations, and the like, whether these be directed by the Department of the Army or inferred by lateral headquarters. General Pepke, CONARC Chief of Staff, insisted that, since all STEADFAST planning was to be subject to proper validation at the Department of the Army level, it should be the best that the Army could devise.²⁵

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MFR CS-SSG-FC (CS-SSG-FC-72-024), STEADFAST Study Group, 10 Mar 72, subj: Liaison Visit -- Operation STEADFAST.

25

Memo ATCS (CG-72-60), CofS for BG West, 16 Mar 72, subj: STEADFAST Study Group Organization and Procedures.

The STEADFAST Study Group completed a proposed charter on 22 March which delineated the mission, authority, and responsibilities of the group. The charter, which was forwarded to the Chief of Staff for approval and distribution on 22 March, designated by name the three Special Assistants to the Chief of Staff -- Generals Jones, Duquemin, and West -- and designated the Executive Officer of each headquarters staff section as the STEADFAST point of contact for that particular office. The charter was approved by General Pepke on 23 March and the document itself was distributed to pertinent members of the CONARC headquarters staff on 24 March.²⁶ This charter officially designated General Jones as the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for developing the Force Command; General Duquemin in the same capacity for developing the Training and Doctrine Command; and General West, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, as Special Assistant for staff co-ordination within Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command. All three special assistants were directly responsible to the Chief of Staff for their particular assignment and were to work within policy guidance provided by him. The Special Assistants for the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command were tasked with developing plans for the reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command in accordance with approved concepts; with preparing organizational plans and statements of missions and functions for each of the new command organizations; and with preparing the necessary plans for the realignment of selected functions, resources, and responsibilities. General West, on the other hand, was tasked with co-ordinating study actions and planning pertaining to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command; with co-ordinating designated Operation STEADFAST staff actions within CONARC headquarters; and with maintaining a control system on the status of Operation STEADFAST actions for the Chief of Staff.²⁷

The first order of business for the Operation STEADFAST planning elements was the development of an Outline Plan which was due at the Department of the Army by 5 May 1972. This plan would have to contain the organizational structures for the new commands; the location of headquarters installations; milestone dates for major events; the assignment of installations and activities; recommended

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(1) DF ATCOM (CG-72-70), DCSCOMPT to CofS, 22 Mar 72, subj: CONARC Charter for Operation STEADFAST. (2) DF CS-SSG-FC (CG-72-72), CofS to CONARC Stf, 24 Mar 72, subj: Charter, Operation STEADFAST.

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Incl 1, "Charter for Operation STEADFAST," to DF CS-SSG-FC, (CG-72-72), CofS to CONARC Stf, 24 Mar 72, subj: Charter, Operation STEADFAST.

mission statements for both the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command; and cost estimates for the entire organizational process. Following acceptance of the Outline Plan by the Department of the Army, the STEADFAST planning elements would have to develop a Reorganization Plan which was due in Department of the Army by 15 July. This was a detailed plan which would have to contain all of the planning for the actual transfer of responsibilities, functions, and personnel. This latter plan would also have to contain the detailed organizational charts; milestone schedules for each task to be accomplished in each staff activity of the U.S. Continental Army Command; the manpower requirements for the headquarters of the two new commands, as well as those of the subordinate army headquarters in the continental United States; and refined cost estimates. In addition, the STEADFAST planning elements would have to develop Organization and Management Manuals for the two new commands, the subordinate armies, and the individual installations which, in practice, would be the counterparts to CONARC Regulation 10-7. While the subordinate army headquarters and the individual installations would prepare their own manuals, the CONARC Reorganization Plan would have to contain sufficient detail on the Management Systems of the two new commands, and the missions and basic organizational structures of the subordinate armies and installations, to permit the proper development of those manuals. A basic requirement for the Reorganization Plan was the development of specific Tables of Distribution and Allowances for the two new commands and the subordinate armies, as well as for the individual installations. The CONARC Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, would have to develop the budget estimates for FY 1974, but these would have to be based on the reorganization concepts provided by the STEADFAST planning elements. In the same vein, the CONARC Comptroller would have to prepare the FY 1972 Program Realignment based on input from CONARC's program directors. Consequently, those program directors would have to be kept fully cognizant of all Operation STEADFAST reorganization planning.²⁸

Co-ordination Meetings with the Project Manager for Reorganization

During the latterpart of March and the early weeks of April 1972, the principal members of the CONARC Operation STEADFAST Study Group held meetings with General Kalergis to solidify the major points that would require special attention during the reorganization planning project. General Kalergis stressed the fact that the major impact of the reorganization would be at the installation level, but that the area responsibilities of the subordinate army headquarters should not be minimized. The existing functions of the subordinate armies in the continental United States would have to be analyzed in depth; the Operation STEADFAST planning elements would

have to pay particular attention to mobilization requirements and to the integration of training for both the Active Army and the Reserve Components. With regard to manpower requirements, General Kalergis pointed out that the two new major commands would require sizeable staffing and that they should be accorded an appropriate place on the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) in order to ensure an adequate quality of staffing. General Kalergis insisted, however, that he wanted to try to avoid setting any arbitrary space guidance until later on in the operation -- at least until after the Outline Plan had been approved at the Department of the Army. At the time he issued this guidance, General Kalergis had already informed both the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army that the proposed organizations would have to be built from the bottom up. The reaction of those two officials was that no solution would be acceptable if it increased total manpower spaces. Both Secretary Froehle and General Westmoreland stressed the fact that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was currently very active in trying to find ways to cut both the structure and manpower spaces in the nation's Armed Forces. Consequently, they hoped that the reorganization proposed by the Department of the Army would preclude any arbitrary action on the part of the Office of Management and Budget, at least with regard to the Army. Consequently, General Kalergis insisted that the planners must be very "hard-nosed" in their approach to the reorganization.²⁹

Final Department of the Army Directive

Continuing Concern of the U.S. Continental Army Command

Despite the fact that the reorganization concept and the basic assumptions had been approved by the Army Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense, both General Haines, the Commander of the U.S. Continental Army Command, and Lt. Gen. John Norton, Commander of the Combat Developments Command, continued to have certain reservations concerning the form of the reorganization as proposed and the timetable established for its planning and implementation. In particular, General Haines was concerned over the reduction in the number of subordinate armies in the continental United States, as well as the relegation of those armies to the status of mere control organizations for the Reserve Components. Moreover, General Haines was concerned with the impact

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(1) MFR (COMPT-011-72), BG R.L. West, 22 Mar 72, subj: Meeting with MG Kalergis on 21 March (Operation STEADFAST). (2) DF ATCOM (COMPT-007-72), DCSCOMPT to CofS, 24 Mar 72, subj: STEADFAST Status Report. (3) MFR CS-SSG-TC, BG G.J. Duquemin, 25 Apr 72, subj: Executive Agents Meeting, 20 April 1972.

of the reorganization at the installation level, a matter which he considered to be of prime importance in the entire reorganization process. He felt that the Department of the Army study of the installations (Myron Study) would have to be pursued further and analyzed much more thoroughly. Other points which General Haines felt required in-depth analysis included: the future of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command; the relationships of the two new commands to the MASSTER Test Program and the Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC); the assignment of schools -- other than CONARC schools -- to the Training and Doctrine Command; the management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program; the disposition of the mid-management commands currently in the Combat Developments Command; and the provision of adequate medical care for the Army in the continental United States. In mid-April 1972, General Haines pointed out to General Westmoreland that these matters had not been analyzed thoroughly enough to develop the precise data which was scheduled for submission to the Department of the Army by mid-May. Consequently, General Haines recommended that the submission of such precise data be delayed for at least another two months, i.e., until mid-July.³⁰

It was evident from communications between the Combat Developments Command, the Department of the Army, and the U.S. Continental Army Command that the former command was fearful lest the combat developments program -- with all of its complex ramifications -- would be subordinated to the individual training mission in the new organizational setup. This same fear was reiterated by General Haines in his communications with the Army Chief of Staff. In the latter correspondence, General Haines analyzed the three established objectives of the reorganization: to improve readiness in both the Active and Reserve forces; to train individuals in tactics, techniques, and skills; and to develop new force structure, doctrine, and materiel systems. He pointed out that the current readiness posture of Active Army forces stemmed from the personnel posture of the entire Army which would not be changed by the proposed reorganization. He went on to point out that, while there might be some long-range improvement in individual training by recombining that function with combat developments, the split of individual and unit training might eventually prove to be detrimental. General Haines was not convinced that the attainment of the third objective rested on the split of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the stripping down of its subordinate armies. He did feel that the reorganization was untimely because of all of the factors affecting the Army in the continental United States at that time. Such matters as high turnover rates; a zero draft environment; contemporary

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Personal correspondence, GEN Haines to GEN Westmoreland, dtd. 14 Apr 72, subj: Reorganization Planning.

problems of race, drugs, dissent, and absenteeism; the lack of completely workable and standardized ADP systems; the concept tests conducted under the MASSTER Program; and the tests involving the employment of the Reserve Components, all combined to create an environment in the Army which could ill afford the turbulence and the loss of effectiveness which the reorganizational concepts would create. By the end of April, both the U.S. Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command joined in urging the Department of the Army to change the directed implementation studies to feasibility studies so that other alternatives could be evaluated.³¹

Department of the Army Directive

At the end of April 1972, the Department of the Army informed both commanders concerned that the proposed organizational changes were considered to be necessary and were to be completed as expeditiously as possible. At the same time, information was passed to the U.S. Continental Army Command that a decision had been reached at the departmental level that one of the subordinate armies in the continental United States would have to be eliminated. Fort McPherson was to be retained in the Army inventory and the U.S. Continental Army Command was directed to seriously evaluate that site for the headquarters location of the Force Command. In addition, the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff had reached agreement that the reorganization planning schedule must be met in the sequence in which it had been developed by the Department of the Army. The consensus at the Department of the Army level was that the Outline Plan would force the major issues in contention to the surface for early resolution. Whenever major issues did surface, they were to be submitted to the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization for expeditious resolution. General Kalergis was charged with the responsibility for quickly bringing substantial issues to a decision point and with keeping the Army Chief of Staff apprised of the progress made.³² However, in order to allay General Norton's fears concerning the possible submergence of the combat developments program in the proposed command structure, the Army Chief of Staff took steps to designate the Commander, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, as the Deputy Commander for Combat Developments, U.S. Continental Army Command.

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Personal correspondence, GEN Haines to GEN Westmoreland, dtd. 22 Apr 72, subj: Reorganization Planning.

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Incl 1 to DF ATCOM (CS-SSG--TRADOC-69), BG West to CofS, 28 Apr 72, subj: Meeting with General Kalergis on STEADFAST Planning.

This move would ensure the orderly transfer of combat developments missions and functions to the new Training and Doctrine Command.³³

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Info contained in Incoming Msg File, STEADFAST Rec Cy File, ODCSCOMPT STEADFAST Coord Gp.

Chapter III

DEVELOPMENT OF THE OUTLINE PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION

The major concepts approved by the Department of the Army for implementation of the reorganization involved a 3-phase planning process, with the first phase calling for the development of a feasibility plan, i.e., the Outline Plan for Reorganization. The intent of this plan was to establish the basic concepts and structural outlines of the new command organizations. Initially, the Office of the Army Assistant Vice Chief of Staff had established a date of 25 March for the submission of the Outline Plan and 1 June 1972 for the completion and submission of a Detailed Reorganization Plan -- the plan called for in Phase II. These dates, however, were considered to be unrealistic by the U.S. Continental Army Command and were one of the subjects discussed by General Haines with Generals Westmoreland and Palmer in their mid-February meeting. As a result of these discussions, new suspense dates were established which were much more acceptable to General Haines and his CONARC staff. By agreement between the CONARC commander and the Army Chief of Staff, the Outline Plan was to be submitted to the Department of the Army by 1 May 1972 and the Detailed Plan for Reorganization by 15 July. These dates were much more realistic in view of the fact that the Charter for the Department of the Army's Project Manager for Reorganization was not authenticated and published by the Office of the Secretary of the Army until 24 April 1972. Indeed, even the official definitive guidance for the development of the plan was not published by the Department of the Army until 5 April. Moreover, preliminary plans for many problem areas would first have to be completed and the Department of the Army would have to validate a set of planning assumptions on which both the Outline Plan and the Detailed Plan for Reorganization could be based. Of major importance to CONARC were such matters as the status, responsibilities, and functions of the individual installations under the reorganization concept as well as the retention of the current four numbered subordinate armies.¹

Preliminary Studies for Reorganization Planning

Department of the Army Plan for Installation Management

In mid-February 1972, the Office of the Army Assistant Vice Chief of Staff pointed up the fact that changes would be required in the existing installation management information systems due to the changes inherent in the directed reorganization of the command

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See above, pp. 40 - 46.

structure in the continental United States. The Department of the Army established a study team headed by Col. H.L. Myron which was tasked with gathering data concerning the Management Information Systems (MIS) flow at certain pilot installations. These data would then be used as a basis for constructing an installation model which provided for the proper processing of personnel, budgetary, financial, and supply management information. In general, the major purpose of the study was to provide an in-depth look at the functions, inter-relationships, and the flow of information, directives, and reports at the selected pilot installations. The Installation Model Study Team outlined five significant factors which would be taken into consideration in developing the proposed installation model. First, the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) would be extended on the Base Operations (BASEOPS) processing equipment, beginning in the second quarter of FY 1973, a move which would provide the capability to report personnel data from the installation/division level directly to the Department of the Army. All personnel serviced by a SIDPERS installation would be paid directly through the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS). In addition, the Standard Army Integrated Logistics System (SAILS) would be extended in the same equipment environment during approximately the same time frame. The Command Service Support System (CS3) also would be extended to Active Army divisions during the period of projected reorganization. A major factor to be considered was that certain installations belonging to one of the two new commands would be required to support units, activities, or satellite installations of another command.²

Although this study was first scheduled for completion by 15 March 1972, the deadline date was slipped to 15 April. The study team finally completed its work at the end of May 1972, too late for any effect on the development of the Outline Plan. However, as General Haines pointed out to General Kalergis, the study was of inestimable value to the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group in the development of the follow-on Detailed Plan for Reorganization.³

CONARC Installation Assignment Study

At the very outset of the planning cycle, the U.S. Continental Army Command became concerned with certain implications contained

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Incls 1 and 2 to Memo ATCS (CG-72-07), CONARC CofS to All DCS's, 15 Feb 72, subj: DA Satellization Model Plan.

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(1) Ibid. (2) Incl 2 to DF SSG-DTC/FC (CG-SSG-TC-16), CONARC SSG-DTC/FC to CofS, 25 Feb 72, subj: Installation Assignment. (3) Ltr, GEN Haines to MG Kalergis, 18 June 72, re: the Myron Studies.

in the draft charter for the Department of the Army's Project Manager for Reorganization which involved the premise that each of the new commands would necessarily have to command installations, some of which obviously would have to be dual-mission-oriented. Consequently, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group initiated a staff study of all the active and inactive installations and sub-installations then assigned to CONARC. This staff study assumed that all of these installations -- with the possible addition of some others -- would be retained in one of the new commands. Another valid assumption was that installations and activities of other commands would continue to be satellited or tenanted on the installations of the two new commands. Since the Department of the Army had ruled out the establishment of a separate Support Command for installation management, it was obvious that the installations would have to be commanded by the major commands concerned without the benefit of an intervening headquarters structure. The study group did conclude that the concept of splitting installation assignment between the two commands would result in some staff duplication and a complex installation command structure. However, the CONARC Study Group concluded that the ultimate answer to installation assignment should logically be decided by the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, in his capacity as the Executive Agent for the Department of the Army Project Manager. CONARC should not permit the matter to be presented arbitrarily by the Department of the Army as a fait accompli. Consequently, on 28 February 1972, General Haines recommended to General Kalergis that the question of installation assignment be made an integral part of the CONARC Charter for Reorganization. General Haines pointed out that, if this action were taken, his approach to the matter would be within the spirit and intent of the basic concept for reorganization, i.e., that ultimately there would be only one command level between the installations and the Department of the Army.⁴

Reduction in the Number of Subordinate Army Headquarters

At a meeting between the principal members of the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group and the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization on 9 March 1972, General Kalergis confirmed that no final determination had been made at the Department of the Army level as to the number of subordinate army headquarters which would be retained in the continental United States. General Kalergis

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(1) Ltr, GEN Haines to MG Kalergis, 28 Feb 72, re: Responsibility for Installation Assignment, w/1 incl, "Staff Study."
(2) DF CS-SSG-DTC/FC (CS-SSG-TC-16), CONARC SSG to CofS, 25 Feb 72, subj: Installation Assignment. (3) DF CS-SSG-DTC (CS-SSG-TC-17), CONARC SSG to all CONARC DCS's, 28 Feb 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST: Installation Assignment.

indicated, however, that he needed validation of the requirement for four numbered subordinate armies as opposed to three so that the Army Chief of Staff could make the requisite decision. General Kalergis pointed out that, under the reorganization concept, the subordinate armies were removed from the chain of command with regard to both installations and Active Army forces. The missions of these armies would be limited to command and control of the U.S. Army Reserve and training supervision of the Army National Guard; planning and co-ordination of military assistance within geographical areas for such matters as domestic emergencies including natural disasters, civil disturbances, and civil defense; and representational functions such as burial details, participation in community activities, and liaison/representation to State Governors, Adjutants General, and Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army.⁵

CONARC Study and Recommendations. On 10 March 1972, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group requested the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces to prepare a staff study which would facilitate a determination as to the number of subordinate armies to be retained in the continental United States under the reorganization plan. This study was complicated by the fact that the residual missions of the subordinate armies were not necessarily compatible on a geographical basis. The non-uniform geographical distribution of Reserve Component activities precluded any balancing of the Reserve Component workload and equalizing the geographical responsibilities among the remaining armies on a simultaneous basis. The CONARC study addressed three alternatives -- a 4-army configuration with no change in boundaries; a 3-army configuration resulting from the consolidation of First and Third U.S. Armies with the state of Ohio placed in the Fifth U.S. Army area; and a 3-army configuration resulting from a realignment of the current subordinate army boundaries based on equalization of the Reserve Component workload. The study logically concluded that there was a high risk involved in making a decision to eliminate one of the armies prior to the time that the two new headquarters would be established on a firm basis. In addition, any restructuring of the subordinate army boundaries and command lines during the actual reorganization period would only serve to add to the high turbulence and confusion which was certain to result from the reorganization. Consequently, the CONARC study group concluded that the number of subordinate armies should not be altered in the foreseeable future. This subject should and would be readdressed once the major commands had been reorganized and the resulting

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DF CS-SSG-FC (CS-SSG-FC-72-026), CONARC SSG to CONARC DCSOPS, 10 Mar 72, subj: Number of CONUS ARMIES.

problem areas had been identified, analyzed, and solved.⁶

Final Department of the Army Decision. The CONARC Staff Study, along with the recommendations of the Study Group, was forwarded to General Kalergis' office on 14 April 1972. These same conclusions were reiterated by General Haines in his special communications with the Army Chief of Staff on 14 and 22 April 1972. Consequently, the number of armies was one of the major topics discussed by General Westmoreland at a Department of the Army staff meeting on 23 April with the Vice Chief of Staff, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and the Project Manager for Reorganization in attendance. As a result of this discussion, General Westmoreland concluded that the elimination of one of CONARC's armies was actually a major basis for the reorganization concept. He, therefore, directed that the 3-army concept be included in all plans developed by the U.S. Continental Army Command for this purpose.⁷

Department of the Army Guidance for Reorganization Planning

Development of CONARC Assumptions for the Outline Plan

The early planning phases at the U.S. Continental Army Command were complicated by the fact that the Project Manager for Reorganization at the Department of the Army level was not appointed until the first week of March and official definitive guidance for the development of the Outline Plan was not forthcoming until the first week in April. As a result of discussions with Generals Westmoreland and Palmer in mid-February, General Haines had been successful in slipping the suspense date for the submission of the Outline Plan to 1 May. The requirement for planning assumptions, however, was paramount since the Outline Plan would have to contain information relating to both major commands and would include such matters as the command structure; the location of each major command headquarters; the assignment of installations and activities within each command; mission statements for both the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command; milestone charts for the major decisions and events; and data concerning the manpower requirements,

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DF CS-SSG-FC (CS-SSG-FC-72-062), CONARC SSG to CofS, 11 Apr 72, subj: Number of CONUS Armies, w/3 incls.

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(1) Ltr (CG-72-100), MG D.R. Pepke, CONARC CofS, to MG J.G. Kalergis, DA-PMR, 14 Apr 72, re: CONARC Staff Study Concerning the Number of CONUS Armies. (2) MFR ATCS (CS-SSG-TRADOC-69), MG Pepke, 28 Apr 72, subj: Meeting with MG Kalergis -- STEADFST Planning.

onetime costs, and annual operating costs for the reorganization concept.⁸

Because of the urgency of the situation, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group developed a set of planning assumptions on 9 March 1972 with the knowledge that they were subject to change pending future decisions and guidance from the Department of the Army. To begin with, since the reorganization plan was going to affect the Department of the Army across the board, CONARC took action to determine the ramifications of assigning all Army schools to the Training and Doctrine Command. The STEADFAST Study Group assumed that the CONARC commander would be given the authority for installation assignment, thus providing the flexibility necessary to ensure that all installations were efficiently aligned to accomplish their assigned mission. An additional assumption concerned the integration of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command into the Training and Doctrine Command in order to provide for the management of the individual soldier from his initial enlistment/induction, through training, to initial unit assignment. Installations would have to retain support responsibilities within their currently assigned geographical areas in each of the subordinate armies so that turbulence would be minimized and management problems substantially reduced when the two new commands were established. The Force Command would plan, supervise, and provide support to U.S. Army Reserve units both during summer training and on a year-round basis. However, installations of both new commands would be required to provide support for activities of the U.S. Army Reserve within their respective geographical areas. Because of the widespread physical location of the Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) sites requiring support, that responsibility also would have to be split among the installations of both commands. In mid-March 1972, CONARC was still proceeding on the assumption that there would be no reduction in the number of armies located in the continental United States. To assist in the command and control of the units assigned to the Force Command, III Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps would command a limited number of units of the Strategic Army Forces, the bulk of which were actually collocated with the corps headquarters. And, finally, the U.S. Continental Army Command assumed that the two new commands would have to have duplicate staffing requirements in order to accomplish the installation and resources management functions which were currently the responsibility of the subordinate armies.⁹

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Fact Sheet (CS-SSG-FC-72-033), SSG/FC, 14 Mar 72, subj: Outline Plan for the Reorganization of CONARC.

9

Memo ATIT-SSG-TC (CS-SSG-TC-21), CONARC SSG for MG Kalergis, DA-PMR, 9 Mar 72, subj: Reorganization.

Revision of 17 March 1972. Subsequent to discussions with General Kalergis, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group revamped its sets of planning assumptions on 17 March so as to be able to meet its suspense date of 1 May for the submission of the Outline Plan. In its 17 March revision, the Study Group decided that, from CONARC's point of view, certain decisions could then be considered as firm. A final determination had been made that two commands -- a Force Command and a Training and Doctrine Command -- would be established and that the Combat Developments Command would be disestablished. Management echelons between the two new commands and their assigned installations would be eliminated and the responsibilities of the subordinate armies would be limited to command and control of the U.S. Army Reserve, as well as certain area and domestic emergency responsibilities. The U.S. Continental Army Command, however, was still operating on the theory that the four existing armies would be retained and that their current responsibilities would continue in force until the end of FY 1974 in order to facilitate the orderly transfer of functions. The command assignment of individual installations, notwithstanding, those installations would have certain area functions similar to their current responsibilities; selected installations would be subject to dual assignment. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command and certain schools not currently assigned to CONARC could be considered for absorption into the new Training and Doctrine Command. Up to now, all directives received from the Department of the Army had stipulated that the Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, would be located at Fort Monroe. Still remaining to be resolved were such matters as the headquarters location for the Force Command; the headquarters locations for the subordinate armies; a possible redesignation of those armies; and command relationships on the dual-mission installations.¹⁰

Additional Directives of the Commanding General. On 20 March 1972, the three principal members of the STEADFAST Study Group met with General Haines, General Tolson, the CONARC Deputy Commanding General, and General Pepke, the CONARC Chief of Staff to discuss the revised CONARC planning assumptions. General Haines stipulated that the subordinate armies should retain their installation management functions through the end of FY 1973, as a minimum. In addition, General Haines stipulated that, for planning purposes, Headquarters, Force Command, would be located at Fort Sheridan, Ill., and that all CONARC planning should indicate the retention of the four armies at their current headquarters locations. He also indicated that he had no fixed opinion concerning the use of the term "army" for the major subordinate commands. Any apropos

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- (1) MFR CS-SSG-FC (CS-SSG-FC-72-027), BG L.M. Jones, Jr., SSG, 13 Mar 72, subj: Telephone Call from MG Kalergis, DA PMR.
(2) Memo CS-SSG-TC (CS-SSG-TC-41), SSG for CG CONARC, 17 Mar 72, subj: Assumptions for STEADFAST.

designation would be acceptable provided that it permitted the retention of the current four major control areas. Concerning command relationships, General Haines stated that his thinking favored the concept in which the two new commands would have their own installations to command, but dual assignment for certain installations was inevitable. He also introduced the planning assumption that the Reserve Officer Training Corps be assigned to the control of the Force Command rather than to the Training and Doctrine Command.¹¹

Reaction of the Department of the Army Project Manager.

General West had an opportunity to discuss the CONARC planning assumptions with General Kalergis on 21 March, at which time the Project Manager presented the Department of the Army views concerning the issues in question. While General Kalergis was able to understand the CONARC position with regard to the retention of the four armies at the current headquarters locations, the U.S. Continental Army Command would have to consider a 3-army plan as an alternate. Even though the Department of the Army had selected Fort Monroe as the headquarters location for the Training and Doctrine Command, that decision was not adamant and alternate locations could be developed by the U.S. Continental Army Command. Furthermore, the department was not enthusiastic about locating a major headquarters at Fort Sheridan; consequently, the U.S. Continental Army Command should present both the advantages and disadvantages of locating the Force Command headquarters at either Fort Sheridan, Fort McPherson, or Fort Sam Houston. General Kalergis pointed out that, while the U.S. Army Recruiting Command could be considered for possible integration into the Training and Doctrine Command, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, was considering the establishment of a Personnel Center to which that command possibly might be assigned. With regard to the assignment of the non-CONARC schools, the Army War College could be considered for assignment to the Training and Doctrine Command but the U.S. Military Academy and its Prep School at Fort Belvoir would be exempt. Since General Kalergis foresaw FY 1973 as the year of transition, he agreed with the assumption that the subordinate armies would have to be involved in installation management at least until 30 June 1973, or perhaps even a little longer. He justified the latter point by indicating that the reorganization processes would not be complete until 31 December 1973 (mid-FY 1974).¹²

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MFR CS-SSG-TC (CS-SSG-TC-42), BG G.J. Duquemin, SSG, 20 Mar 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST.

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Incl 1 to DF ATCOM (Compt-011-72), DCSCOMPT to Cofs, 22 Mar 72, subj: Meeting with MG Kalergis -- 21 March (Operation STEADFAST).

Slippage of the Suspense Date

At a meeting with the Project Manager on 27 March 1972, the Chief of Staff, Combat Developments Command, recommended that the 1 May suspense date for the submission of the Outline Plan be slipped to 15 May. His command felt that the extra time was essential for completing the required sequential planning with the U.S. Continental Army Command. While General Kalergis seemed to indicate that he would consider the recommendation, the Office of the Project Manager announced on 28 March that no change had been made in the 1 May target date. The Deputy Commanding General, Combat Developments Command, then outlined General Norton's views that a date of 8 May constituted the earliest possible date on which the plan could be submitted. The U.S. Continental Army Command concurred in this latter recommendation, particularly since General Haines was scheduled to be absent from Fort Monroe during the period, 23 April to 1 May. On 3 April, word was received from the Office of the Project Manager that the suspense date had been slipped to 5 May 1972, but that this was the latest possible date on which the plans could be submitted and still meet suspense requirements for the development of budget data.¹³

Definitive Department of the Army Planning Guidance

The Department of the Army eventually published official definitive planning guidance for the development of the Outline Plan on 5 April 1972. At that time, the Department informed the Commander, CONARC, that, concurrent with the preparation and evaluation of the Outline Plan required from CONARC, a thorough examination was being conducted of other managerial and organizational changes that might be required throughout the Army. Included in this concept were an examination of staff relationships at the national level, staff and major command relationships (Department of the Army and its major field commands), and special functional organizations.¹⁴ This official planning guidance did not contain changes in the established reorganization concepts, the reorganization objectives, or the assignment of major responsibilities for planning and executing the directed reorganization. All of this information had been contained in previous directives or had been given

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(1) DF CS-SSG-TC (Compt-018-72), Spec Asst to the CofS to CONARC CofS, 29 Mar 72, subj: Deadline for Outline Plan. (2) DF CS-SSG-TC (Compt-027-72), SSG to CONARC Stf, 3 Apr 72, subj: Outline Plan.

14

Ltr (CG-72-94A3), CofSA to Cdr CONARC, 5 Apr 72, subj: Outline Plan for Reorganization.

informally to the U.S. Continental Army Command in various drafts of proposed directives.¹⁵

Planning Guidelines. The departmental planning guidance stipulated that the Outline Plan to be submitted on 5 May 1972 would include, as a minimum, an organizational concept showing the major sub-elements; the assignment of missions, functions, and resources; a utilization plan, including the necessary facilities; and military and civilian strength estimates. In addition, the plan should contain a general operational concept for accomplishing each of the missions assigned in the designated concept for reorganization. The plan would also include instructions for transferring the functions and responsibilities which were listed in the appropriate annex to these guidelines and intended for each of the Executive Agents. Executive Agents were instructed to provide a base case for validating the reorganization concepts, plans, and actions. The agents also were to recommend measures of effectiveness by which the functioning of both the existing and proposed organizations could be compared. On a definitive basis, the reorganization plan should emphasize readiness, training, and contingency planning for deployable forces as well as effective individual training; associate teaching and the development of doctrine as closely as possible; rationalize combat and force development and the materiel requirement/need process; keep missions and resources together; fulfill area responsibilities in the continental United States, and, in general, be manageable; reduce echelons between the Department of the Army, on the one hand, and the major operating forces and installations in the continental United States, on the other; reduce activities and personnel in the Washington Metropolitan area; reduce the number of major headquarters and people assigned to administrative and headquarters activities; provide a command structure which was responsive to the needs of the installation commander; and clearly define the interfaces of responsibility between the existing and proposed commands and activities.

The Executive Agents were instructed to co-ordinate continuously with appropriate agencies in order to prevent any unnecessary duplication, overlaps, or gaps in the statements of missions, functions, and authority. Intercommand and intracommand relationships were to be appropriately defined, and relationships and channels of communication with Headquarters, Department of the Army, were to be described. Any matter which could not be resolved by the Executive Agents, was to be brought promptly to the attention of the Project Manager so that a timely decision could be made.¹⁶

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Ibid., Incl 1, "Initial Planning Guidance."

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Ibid.

Mission Guidance -- U.S. Army Force Command. The Department of the Army planning guidance regarding the missions and functions of the two new commands was much more explicit than that which had been contained in the various draft documents previously reviewed by the U.S. Continental Army Command. As an operational command, the U.S. Army Force Command had joint and uniservice operational responsibilities. The Commander, U.S. Army Force Command, served as the Army Component Commander of both the U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and the U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). In his uniservice capacity as a major field commander of the Department of the Army, the Commander, U.S. Army Force Command, commanded all Active Division and Special Mission Forces, and designated General Support Forces currently assigned to the U.S. Continental Army Command; all U.S. Army Reserve Forces, with the exception that operational control of USAR Training Divisions would be assigned to the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command; the armies in the continental United States; and those installations where the major activity was force related, as well as other installations, when directed to do so.

The U.S. Army Force Command was responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and ensuring the combat readiness of all assigned troop units and for establishing training criteria for, and supervising the training of, Army National Guard units within the continental United States. The Force Command also participated in the Army's combat developments and materiel development programs, when these programs concerned the combat readiness of its assigned troop units. Consequently, the U.S. Army Force Command was required to provide assistance, advice, and direct support to the commanders of the Army Materiel Command and the Training and Doctrine Command, in the areas in which the Force Command was involved. The Force Command also planned for and executed functions which had geographical area implications in the continental United States, such as civil emergencies and area representation. Likewise, the command was required to plan for and execute those missions which had been assigned to the Army Chief of Staff relative to the defense -- other than air defense -- of the continental United States and relative to military participation in civil defense.¹⁷

Mission Guidance -- Training and Doctrine Command. The proposed Training and Doctrine Command was given the responsibility for two mission categories -- individual training and combat developments. With regard to the former, the Training and Doctrine Command trained individuals in tactics, techniques, and skills; developed and approved training procedures and techniques for Army units; directed, supervised, and supported the Reserve Officer Training Corps and National Defense Cadet Corps Programs; supervised the

17

Ibid., Annex A.

activities of the U.S Army Reserve training divisions and schools; and commanded those installations where the primary activity was related to individual training. In the field of combat developments, TRADOC formulated and documented concepts and doctrines and, in addition, developed materiel requirements and organizations for three major categories of operations -- for the Army in the field in all combat environments, for Army participation in the unified defense of the United States against air and missile defense, and for Army support of U.S. civil authorities and civil defense. In addition, the command determined, within guidelines specified by Headquarters, Department of the Army, the types of forces and materiel required and the approved methods for employing those forces and materiel.¹⁸

Designation of Subordinate Commands. The planning guidance furnished for development of the Outline Plan stipulated that the major subordinate commands of the U.S. Army Force Command included the armies in the continental United States -- or area commands, as the case might be -- the mission of which was limited to command and training supervision of the Reserve Components and to certain designated geographical area responsibilities; III Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps which exercised operational control over designated Active Army troop units; and all assigned major units and installations. The major subordinate elements of the Training and Doctrine Command included all Army service schools and training centers previously assigned to CONARC.¹⁹

Planning Guidelines for the Designated Executive Agents. As Executive Agent for the development and establishment of the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was responsible for preparing and implementing plans which would permit the new commands to assume their responsibilities. Further guidance provided by the Department of the Army stated that these plans would include -- but need not be limited to -- organizational structures for the two new commands, including operational concepts and relationships between the subordinate elements; proposed headquarters sites, including options locating Headquarters, U.S. Army Force Command, at Fort McPherson or Fort Sam Houston; options of four and three subordinate numbered army headquarters, respectively, for the Force Command; space and facility requirements; tentative cost/benefit estimates; and the FY 1973 financial resources funding realignment plans. In addition, the Executive Agent was to develop a phased schedule for activations and transfers of functions, resources, and responsibilities

18

Ibid.

19

Ibid.

from the existing organizations. Included in this task were such matters as operational responsibilities; financial management; personnel management; logistics; support responsibilities; re-allocation of resources; management information systems; and medical services. Plans for the Training and Doctrine Command would be prepared in close co-ordination with the Combat Developments Command which was the Executive Agent for the transfer of functions of that command. In addition, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was instructed to maintain close and continuous co-ordination with the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization, other elements of the Department of the Army staff, and other commands and agencies to ensure that no duplications or omissions occurred.²⁰

The Commander, Combat Developments Command, was designated as the Executive Agent for the orderly transfer of functions of that command to other commands and agencies, as directed. He was to assist in the development of plans for the establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command and the two proposed agencies at the Department of the Army level in order to ensure that the functions of the Combat Developments Command were properly included in all required Outline Plans. In addition, he was required to prepare and implement plans for the actual transfer of functions to the designated commands and agencies. These plans were to include such matters as the disposition of the command's functions; a time-phased transfer of subordinate elements; and a phaseout plan for the headquarters of the command to include the disposition of facilities and the transfer of personnel.²¹

Development of the Preliminary Outline Plans

The press of circumstances -- particularly that of time -- required that the U.S. Continental Army Command begin the development of tentative plans without observing the propriety of waiting for the publication of official planning guidance or the development of an official charter for the Department of the Army Project Manager or, for that matter, an official charter for the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group, itself. Since CONARC was required to initiate its planning processes on the assumption that the Outline Plan was due in the Department of the Army by 1 May 1972, the STEADFAST Study Group was pressed for time.

Preliminary Plan for the U.S. Army Force Command. The first of the preliminary plans completed by the CONARC STEADFAST Study

20

Ibid., Annex C.

21

Ibid., Annex D.

Group was that for the U.S. Army Force Command, since it was the easier of the two to develop. On 14 March 1972, the study group distributed a tentative preliminary plan to the CONARC staff for fleshing out. This plan was based on the assumptions that the Force Command would command all units of the Strategic Army Forces; twenty-seven installations and sub-installations; four subordinate numbered army headquarters which would have Reserve Component and "area" responsibilities; and, through those subordinate army headquarters, all Reserve Component activities. It was visualized by the STEADFAST Study Group that the structure of the Force Command headquarters would closely parallel that currently in existence for Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command. The preliminary plan contained a complete mission statement for the Force Command; tentative general officer assignments for the headquarters staff structure; a diagram of the proposed headquarters staff organizational structure; organizational diagrams and functions statements for the staff sections of each of the proposed Deputy Chiefs of Staff; organizational diagrams and functional statements for the proposed special staff offices; a list of installations for assignment to the Force Command; a draft mission statement for the subordinate armies; and a draft statement concerning the parameters of the proposed Training and Doctrine Command. In addition to reviewing and commenting on the preliminary plan, the CONARC staff was asked to provide comments on general procedural concepts for executing functions in specific areas of responsibility between the Force Command and its armies; between the Force Command and its installations; between the Force Command and units of the Strategic Army Forces which were located on installations assigned to the Training and Doctrine Command; between the Force Command and other activities; and between the armies and the installations. In addition, the staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command was asked to comment on the possibility of eliminating some of the support elements as separate activities and incorporating them within the command headquarters or within the garrison staff.²²

Preliminary Plan for the Training and Doctrine Command

On 27 March 1972, after two weeks of intensive work, the preliminary plan and planning basis for the organizational structure of the Training and Doctrine Command headquarters were completed and distributed to the CONARC staff for review and comment. By that time, the planning assumptions had been clarified by the Department of the Army Project Manager with the result that the STEADFAST Study Group could disseminate information as to which of the planning assumptions were considered firm and no longer open debate. However, the planning assumptions published on 27 March

TABLE 2 -- PROPOSED INSTALLATION ASSIGNMENTS

FORCES COMMAND	TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
<p>Fort Devens, Mass. * Camp Drum, N.Y. Fort Geo. G. Meade, Md. Fort Holabird, Md. * IGMR, Pa.</p>	<p>Fort Belvoir, Va. Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Fort Dix, N.J. Fort Eustis, Va. Fort Story, Va. Fort Hamilton, N.Y. * Fort Totten, N.Y. Fort Hancock, N.Y. Fort Wadsworth, N.Y. * Miller Army Airfield, N.Y. * Fort Tilden, N.Y. Fort Knox, Ky. Fort Hays, Ohio Fort Lee, Va. * Camp A.P. Hill, Va. * Camp Pickett, Va. Fort Monroe, Va.</p>
<p>Fort Bragg, N.C. Fort Campbell, Ky. Fort McPherson, Ga. Fort Stewart, Ga. Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.</p>	<p>Fort Benning, Ga. Fort Gordon, Ga. Fort Jackson, S.C. Fort McClellan, Ala. Fort Rucker, Ala. Fort Buchanan, P.R.</p>
<p>Fort Hood, Tex. Fort Sam Houston, Tex. * Camp McCoy, Wis. Fort Riley, Kans. Fort Sheridan, Ill.</p>	<p>Fort Bliss, Tex. * Fort Chaffee, Ark. Fort Ben Harrison, Ind. Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Fort Polk, La. Fort Sill, Okla. Fort Wolters, Tex. Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.</p>
<p>Fort Carson, Colo. * Fort Douglas, Utah * Fort Irwin, Calif. Fort Lewis, Wash. Yakima Firing Center, Wash. * Fort Lawton, Wash. Fort MacArthur, Calif. Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. Fort Baker, Calif. Fort Barry, Calif. Fort Cronkhite, Calif. * Camp Parks, Calif. * Camp Roberts, Calif.</p>	<p>Fort Ord, Calif. Hunter-Liggett MR, Calif. Presidio of Monterey, Calif.</p>
<p>* Inactive installations. Sub-intallations are indented.</p>	

Source: TAB J to DF CS-SSG-TC, Op STEADFAST Study Gp to CONARC
 Stf, 27 Mar 72, subj: Outline Plan.

still carried the stipulation that there would be four armies at their current headquarters locations and that the Headquarters, U.S. Army Force Command, would be located at Fort Sheridan. These assumptions were subject to later revision by the Department of the Army prior to the submission of the completed Outline Plan at the beginning of May 1972.²³

The CONARC STEADFAST Study Group formulated a series of recommended mission statements for the Training and Doctrine Command by extracting appropriate missions and functions from CONARC Regulation 10-7 and from the Organization and Functions Manuals of the Combat Developments Command and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. The criteria for assignment of installations to the new command were based on the location of major schools or major individual training elements, and the planners developed a list of thirty-four installations and sub-installations for such an assignment. Table 2 shows the installations proposed for assignment to the U.S. Army Force Command and to the Training and Doctrine Command. All military schools and colleges were to be considered for integration into the Training and Doctrine Command with the exception of joint colleges; the U.S. Military Academy and its Prep School at Fort Belvoir; and institutions belonging to other services. The proposed headquarters staff organization for the Training and Doctrine Command was developed by first deleting Force Command-oriented elements from the existing U.S. Continental Army Command headquarters staff organization and then adding appropriate elements for the functions of the Combat Developments Command and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. The headquarters structure as proposed by the study group is shown on Chart 7.

Manpower estimates for the new command were based on two phases of development -- Phase I, in which the subordinate numbered armies were still in the installation management chain; and Phase II, in which automatic data processing systems were brought on line, the subordinate armies were reduced to their directed roles, and installation management was handled directly with the Training and Doctrine Command. The CONARC staff was asked to comment on this concept for the headquarters staff organization, as well as on any internal organizational changes within the headquarters staff which would enhance the performance of the command missions; on the relative adequacy of the estimated manpower strengths; and on the major planning elements and the order of magnitude to be considered in the subsequent refinement of the manpower estimates

for the later stages of organization planning.²⁴

Planning for the Training and Doctrine Command was complicated by the presence of numerous unresolved issues many of which were considered by the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group to be incapable of solution prior to the submission of the completed Outline Plan. Lack of resolution on these issues was attributable to the absence of any firm decisions and the lack of time to study the issues properly. For example, there was no clear cut decision as to whether responsibility for management information systems should be centralized within a Directorate of Management Information Systems (DMIS) or if each staff section should have its own operating element for that purpose, with the central co-ordination of effort and advice to the commander as the only basic functions reserved for the Directorate. Another question concerned the consolidation of all personnel procurement -- whether it be recruiting, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, in-service procurement, or the like -- under one Deputy Commander or a Deputy Chief of Staff. With regard to the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program, no decision had been made as to whether it should be controlled by the armies and report to the Force Command; whether it should be controlled by the installations and report directly to the Force Command or to the Training and Doctrine Command; or whether it should be controlled through the Recruiting Command's network under the direction of the Training and Doctrine Command. Still another question concerned the MASSTER Test Program at Fort Hood and the Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) at Fort Ord. Under the existing command structure, CDEC was assigned to the Combat Developments Command and MASSTER -- less test direction -- to CONARC. By the end of March, no decision had been made as to whether these test organizations should be assigned to the same command, and, if so, which of the two commands it would be.²⁵

Reaction of the Project Manager. On 5 April 1972, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group briefed the Office of the Department of the Army Project Manager on the details of the preliminary plans and the proposed format for the completed Outline Plan. The reaction of the Project Manager and his staff was limited to seven comments which were intended to enhance the finalized Outline Plan. First, the center team concept should be addressed in the finalized plan so as to include the mid-management functions of the combat developments effort. A special format would have to be developed for an

24

Ibid.

25

Ibid., TAB J.

Unresolved Issues Annex to the completed plan which would include such factors as the issue, with an explanation; the principals and functions involved; and a request for resolution of the problem. Any recommended movement of units would have to be supported by appropriate rationale. As far as the subordinate numbered armies were concerned, alternate language should be used in the plan; e.g., "subordinate armies will retain (initiate the transfer of) installation management functions through (sometime during) FY 1973 as a minimum." In addition, the milestone schedule should include a suspense date for the approval of Tables of Distribution and Allowances and a date for the designation of commanders for the two commands. Likewise, the time-phasing schedule should address both hire and reassignment actions for military and civilian personnel alike. And, finally, the plan should include a Cost/Benefit Analysis for each alternative for a 10-year period.²⁶

Views of the Combat Developments Command Concerning the Reorganization

A major objection of the Combat Developments Command to the proposed reorganization of the Army was the concern that the combat developments functions would become submerged when combined with the individual training processes. If this were to happen, the combat developments program would certainly be downgraded from its current content. While General Haines and his staff felt strongly that training was currently the primary major mission of their command, General Norton and his Combat Developments Command staff were indicating that combat developments must be the primary mission of the new command, with individual training playing a secondary role.

Views and Recommendations of the USACDC Commander. In view of the prevailing opinion in his headquarters, Lt. Gen. John Norton informed the Department of the Army Project Manager in late March 1972 of his conclusions and recommendations for the proposed reorganization processes. He urged General Kalergis to ensure that the combat developments mission did not become "submerged" to the extent of threatening what he described as the "substantive vitality" of that program. He did admit that a certain amount of submergence would be inevitable when the combat developments functions were combined under a single commander along with the schools/training functions and the responsibility for operating twenty-one major installations. It was only natural that, in such a situation, the commander's focus of attention and control on combat developments would be less than was the case in the separate Combat Developments Command. To offset these factors, General Norton recommended that the proposed new command be allotted a strong Deputy Commander whose primary responsibility would be the management of the combat developments program. In addition, the integration of the current

combat developments organization with the individual Schools/Centers would have to be carefully structured so as to ensure that the Centers maintained a capability to participate in the complete combat developments program, rather than in just routine matters. Moreover, the division of responsibility for combat developments functions between the new command and the two agencies proposed for the Department of the Army level would have to be established very clearly. Consequently, in order to provide continuity, visibility, and focus for the program, General Norton felt strongly that the term "Combat Developments" must appear in the title of the organization which would perform that function. He, therefore, urgently recommended that the title "Combat Developments and Training Command" be used in lieu of the title, "Training and Doctrine Command," as proposed in the Department of the Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command charters for the reorganization. That is to say, Combat Developments should be indicated as the primary mission of the new command even in the title. As a final gesture, General Norton urged that the current shoulder patch, the distinctive insignia, and motto of the Combat Developments Command be adopted for the proposed new command which combined the combat developments and individual training functions.²⁷

Reorganization Proposals of the Combat Developments Command.

As indicated earlier, both draft versions of the charter for the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization -- as well as the official Department of the Army planning guidance for the development of the Outline Plan -- designated the Commander, Combat Developments Command, as the Executive Agent for the transfer of combat developments functions to the new commands and agencies. However, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was the designated Executive Agent for actually developing and establishing the Training and Doctrine Command. In order to facilitate these planning processes, the Army Chief of Staff, at the beginning of April 1972, designated General Norton as a Deputy Commander of the U.S. Continental Army Command. By 11 April 1972, the Combat Developments Command had developed a tentative plan for phasing the functions of that command into the proposed Training and Doctrine Command. This plan provided for the transfer of combat developments functions in five separate phases, with each phase lasting approximately three months. The transfer phases would begin on 15 August 1972 and end approximately 15 November 1973. During Phase I (15 August 1972 to 15 November 1972), several of the intermediate management echelons of the Combat Developments Command would begin to dissolve, with certain elements of these echelons remaining in place, some elements transferred to the combat developments group

27

Ltr CDCCG, LTG John Norton, Cdr USACDC, to MG J.G. Kalergis, DA-PMR, 27 Mar 72, w/incl, "LTG John Norton's Views on Reorganization of the Army."

at Fort Leavenworth, other elements absorbed into the new Training and Doctrine Command, and still others transferred to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army. This phase involved the actual transfer of several hundred military and professional spaces to other locations.²⁸

During Phase II (15 November 1972 to 15 February 1973) the actual disestablishment of the Combat Developments Command would begin; General Norton would report to the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, rather than to the Department of the Army. During this same time frame, all Combat Developments Command agencies which were collocated with an Army service school would be merged with its counterpart school. Five such agencies, including the Medical Service, Judge Advocate, Chaplain, Ordnance, and Signal Agencies, required special study prior to final action. The functions and responsibilities of the Combined Arms Group at Fort Leavenworth would be expanded somewhat during this phase in anticipation of its expanded middle management role. One option recommended by the Combat Developments Command in this regard provided for the formation of a Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, with the commander having two deputies -- a commandant of the Command and General Staff College and a deputy commander for combat developments. A complete closeout of the Intelligence and Control Systems Group and the Systems Analysis Group was visualized for Phase III (15 February to 15 May 1973). Provision was made during this same time frame for consolidating the CDEC/MASSTER test assets in a manner similar to the concept already developed by the U.S. Continental Army Command. During Phase IV (15 May to 15 August 1973), Headquarters, Combat Developments Command, would close at Fort Belvoir and supervision of the combat developments program would shift completely to Fort Monroe. The last phase beginning on 15 August 1973 was to be merely a consolidation phase. The Combat Developments Command recommended that, during this latter time frame, the construction plans for a new wing on Bell Hall at Fort Leavenworth be reactivated in order to house the expanded combat developments middle management group at that installation.²⁹

At the conclusion of the briefing, General Haines indicated that the phasing schedule developed by the Combat Developments Command seemed reasonable enough, but that he was certain that all the established dates would slip to a certain extent. He also indicated his firm belief that the establishment of the two new

28

MFR CS SSG-TC (CS-SSG-TC-60), MG G.J. Duquemin, 11 Apr 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST/REORG I Meeting with GEN Haines and LTG Norton, Monday, 10 Apr 72.

29

Ibid.

headquarters would not save manpower spaces. At that time, he stipulated that he wanted the Army War College as a part of the new Training and Doctrine Command, but that he did not desire the assignment of any of the logistical schools unless they would be an asset to the new command.³⁰

CONARC Guidance to Its Subordinate Armies

At the end of March 1972, the U.S. Continental Army Command apprised its armies of the impending reorganization and the revised, reduced role which the armies would play. This was the first thorough delineation of the newly proposed missions for the armies in their role as the command and control organization for the Reserve Components. As envisioned by the U.S. Continental Army Command, the missions of the armies with regard to the command and control of the Reserve Components included the command of all U.S. Army Reserve units, with the exception that the armies would exercise command, less operational control, over the U.S. Army Reserve training divisions and schools. In addition, the armies would supervise the training of non-unit Ready Reserve personnel when ordered to active duty for training, or annual training with, or otherwise attached to, U.S. Army Reserve or Army National Guard units within a particular army's assigned area of jurisdiction. This responsibility did not apply to any mobilization designees assigned outside the continental limits of the United States. The armies also would command the Active Army Advisory Groups which supported both the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard and would supervise and administer the advisory services to the Reserve Components within each army's assigned geographical area. The latter responsibility included requisitioning for, and distribution of, military personnel, as well as the hiring and use of civilian technicians. In co-ordination with the installation commanders, the armies would be responsible for the scheduling of annual training periods for all units of the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. In the same manner, the armies were to co-ordinate the administrative and logistical support provided to U.S. Army Reserve units by Active Army installations and activities. With regard to the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program, the armies were responsible only for planning, organizing, and supervising the summer camps in accordance with policies established by the new Training and Doctrine Command. Since mobilization was a major mission involving the Reserve Components, the armies were responsible for developing plans for mobilization at installations within their geographical areas; for supervising the planning for, and actual mobilization of, assigned U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units; and for making recommendations as to the U.S. Army Reserve units which would meet the mobilization requirements. With regard

to other Reserve Component activities in their geographical areas, each army would be responsible for co-ordinating financial services for members of the U.S. Army Reserve; for co-ordinating financial, logistical, and other support to Army National Guard units as directed; for conducting administrative, training, general, and special inspections of the Army National Guard; and for administering the Army Accident Prevention Program to include Aviation Safety.³¹

In addition to the Reserve Component-related missions, the armies were to retain such missions as were oriented to their geographical areas, including planning and co-ordinating support for missions relative to defense -- other than air defense -- of the continental United States and to military support of civil defense. The armies also were to be prepared to assume operational control of all units and activities which would be required to support any such contingency plans selected for implementation. The armies were to maintain liaison and coordinate with State Governors and other high government officials, civilian aides to the Secretary of the Army, and State Adjutants General. The armies were responsible for co-ordinating all area-oriented activities such as planning and co-ordinating support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies including natural disasters, EOD/CBAIC support,³² the Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) Program, civil disturbances, and support to other Federal agencies as directed. They were to be prepared to assume operational control of all units and activities required to execute the plans which they had developed. The armies were to supervise, on an area basis, such activities as the Armed Forces Disciplinary Board, the Armed Forces Police Detachments, the Absentee Apprehension Program, National Crime Information Center terminal operations, and all co-ordination and liaison with state and regional law enforcement agencies. With regard to area representational activities, the armies were to co-ordinate all U.S. Army public information activities and community relations in their areas and to act as regional spokesmen for their areas. In the latter regard, the armies would be empowered to appoint spokesmen

31

Personal correspondence, MG D.R. Pepke to Cofs's, First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth USA's, dtd 31 Mar 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Planning.

32

EOD/CBAIC -- Explosive ordnance disposal/chemical and biological accident and incident control.

for the major metropolitan areas, as required.³³

In addition to delineating the proposed missions, the U.S. Continental Army Command provided the armies with manpower estimates for each staff element in a type-army headquarters with totals of 310 military and 254 civilian spaces. These estimates did not include the activities of the support elements which were to be reduced commensurate with the new missions of each army headquarters. Based on the information furnished by the U.S. Continental Army Command, the armies were required to develop recommended missions statements, staff organizations, and manpower requirements, with the latter identified to branch level.³⁴

Continuing Guidance from the Department of the Army

Successive meetings during the month of April 1972, between the Department of the Army Project Manager and his staff and the CONARC commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, and the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group surfaced further guidance concerning major problems that were affecting the development of the Outline Plan.³⁵

Reduction in the Number of Subordinate Armies

Guidance from General Kalergis and his staff with respect to the reduction in the number of armies of the U.S. Army Force Command changed abruptly at the end of April 1972. Early in that month, General Kalergis indicated that the problem of four versus three armies was one of the most critical facing the reorganization planners and, therefore, required an early resolution. On 13 April, he said that CONARC should develop and submit a study, along with an analysis and recommendations, on the questions of four versus three

33

Personal correspondence, MG D.R. Pepke to CofS's, First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth USA's, dtd 31 Mar 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Planning.

34

Ibid.

35

The entire section is based on: (1) DF CS-SSG-TC (CS-SSG-TC-53), BG R.L. West to CofS, 12 Apr 72, subj: STEADFAST Briefing, w/1 incl; (2) DF (CF-72-102), BG West to CofS, 13 Apr 72, subj: Telephone Conversation -- MG Kalergis, BG West on STEADFAST, w/1 incl; (3) Memo ATCG (CG-72-149), COL K.R. Morton for General Haines, 27 Apr 72, subj: STEADFAST; (4) DF ATCOM (CS-SSG-TRADOC-69), BG West to CofS, 28 Apr 72, subj: Meeting with MG Kalergis on STEADFAST Planning, w/1 incl.

armies. On 25 April, however, General Westmoreland announced that a firm decision had been made at the Department of the Army level that the reorganization planning must proceed on the basis that only three armies would be retained in the continental United States. Two days later, General Kalergis informed the U.S. Continental Army Command that the decision on this matter was final. In rebuttal, Lt. Gen. J.J. Tolson, CONARC Deputy Commander, pointed out that not only would the supervision of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program be made more difficult by the elimination of one of the subordinate armies, but the problems inherent in the overall supervision and management of the Reserve Components would be intensified.

The U.S. Army Recruiting Command

At the beginning of April, General Kalergis informed CONARC that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, was initiating a study aimed at establishing a U.S. Army Personnel Center and that, consequently, the position of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command also was being studied. He felt that the best way to settle the issue at hand was for both concepts -- assignment to the Department of the Army Personnel Center and to the Training and Doctrine Command -- to be fully developed so that he could decide which of the justifications carried the most weight. At a conference on 26 April, he agreed with the CONARC planners that the Recruiting Command should be included within the proposed Training and Doctrine Command and accepted the CONARC concept that initially it should be maintained as a separate command within the organizational structure of the parent command. All of the conferees felt that the current 12,000-man space structure was inordinately large. Two days later, General Kalergis informed CONARC that this matter was still unresolved at the Department of the Army level due mainly to the reorganization envisioned by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. However, for the purposes of the Outline Plan, CONARC should assume that the U.S. Army Recruiting Command would be included in the Training and Doctrine Command, but that initially it must be left as an identifiable sub-command.

Manpower Reductions

At a briefing on 11 April, General Kalergis informed the CONARC planning group that manpower limitations for the proposed reorganization would be based on the end-FY 1973 space authorizations. In addition, he indicated that he expected to see a substantial reduction in overall manpower strengths when the reorganization was completed. He did recognize that base figures were needed for purposes of comparison. It was suggested that the end FY 1972 manpower strengths would serve best for this analysis. It was also agreed that "authorized" spaces should be the common denominator rather than "required" spaces. Two days later, General Kalergis informed CONARC of the Department of the Army's position on the

Department of Defense Program/Budget Decision 92. While Department of the Army intended to notify the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the Program/Budget Decision 92 could not be implemented because of the pending reorganization, the manpower reductions specified in that decision would actually be achieved through the approved reorganization plans. These specified reductions would be in addition to any direct space savings resulting from the disestablishment of the Combat Developments Command. Although no space ceilings had been specified in any of the planning guidance provided up to that time, this factor, in reality, established a hard ceiling for any acceptable plan. At the end of April, General Kalergis re-affirmed for the CONARC planning group that the Program/Budget Decision 92 cuts would have to be absorbed by the reorganization. This determination by General Kalergis, however, was mitigated by the fact that, in attaining the projected manpower level, the U.S. Continental Army Command could consider savings gained from the Combat Developments Command through the reorganization, despite the fact that those spaces did not belong in Program 9.

Supervision of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program

Early in April, General Kalergis indicated to the CONARC planning group that, for the time being, the manner in which the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program was handled should remain an open issue. CONARC should consider the advantages and disadvantages of all available options, including the possibility of placing the program under the control of the Force Command. By the end of the month, General Kalergis indicated that he foresaw no major problems in connection with the supervision of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. General Tolson countered with the contention that the program would have to remain under the control of the subordinate armies, but the directed reduction in the number of subordinate armies would render this supervision much more difficult. General Tolson indicated that additional regional commands might have to be established to supervise the Reserve Officer Training Corps. General Kalergis later revealed that the Department of the Army staff was generally in agreement on the need for improved management of the entire Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. The proposed reorganization was an excellent opportunity to improve the existing organizational system for that program and he (General Kalergis) did not doubt that additional spaces would be required if management were to be improved.

The Army War College

At the beginning of April, General Kalergis raised questions concerning the interface of the Army War College with the proposed Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, particularly with regard to the feasibility of such a proposition. He did not understand how the Training and Doctrine Command could influence the Army War

College if the latter institution remained in its current special status under the Department of the Army. By the end of April, however, General Kalergis informed the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group that he foresaw no problem in placing the Army War College under the Training and Doctrine Command so long as a door into the college was left open for the Army Chief of Staff. Despite the fact that the matter had not yet been fully resolved by the Department of the Army, General Kalergis issued planning guidance a few days later which provided that, for planning purposes, the U.S. Continental Army Command could assume that the Army War College would be assigned to the Training and Doctrine Command.

The MASSTER/CDEC Test Programs


At a conference at the beginning of April 1972, the relationships of the Combat Developments Experimentation Command and the MASSTER Test Programs were discussed with no definitive decisions being reached. General Kalergis did point out that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, was studying several alternatives which would transmit test direction directly from the Department to the two test agencies, with command lines flowing from the Training and Doctrine Command and the Force Command. However, at the end of the month, General Kalergis admitted that his staff was still trying to unravel the CDEC/MASSTER problem, with no solution in sight. He later informed CONARC that the location of the Combat Developments Experimentation Command and the MASSTER Test Program in the Training and Doctrine Command was a valid planning assumption for the development of the Outline Plan. This problem, however, would have to remain unresolved until after the submission of the Outline Plan.

Submission of the Finalized CONARC Outline Plan

The U.S. Continental Army Command completed and forwarded its finalized Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan on 4 May 1972. Upon submitting the plan to the Department of the Army Project Manager, the CONARC Chief of Staff pointed out that he considered it an excellent job, taking into consideration the magnitude of the task and the limited time available for its completion. While it was a workable plan which addressed all salient points, there were a number of inherent risks and impacts that were of particular significance to the U.S. Continental Army Command. The first and foremost of these was in the field of logistics where the highly developed systems of the subordinate armies were being eliminated without an on-board capability to take up the slack. General Pepke and General Haines both felt that this factor could have disastrous results, the recovery from which would be most difficult and long term in nature. Another of CONARC's great concerns was the problem of the span of control as it applied to three separate areas -- the reduction of one army and its effect on the control of the Reserve

Chart 8 -- U.S. ARMY FORCE COMMAND

LEGEND: — COMMAND
 // THERE ARE NUMEROUS SMALL STAFF UNITS LOCATED ON 27 INSTALLATIONS OF OTHER COMMANDS; MOST OF THESE UNITS WILL BE COMMANDED BY FC THROUGH THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER.



Component structure; the control of units of the Strategic Army Forces on installations of other commands; and the field of installation management, particularly for the new Training and Doctrine Command. The U.S. Continental Army Command did take steps to eliminate some of the possibilities which existed for the submergence of the combat developments program in the Training and Doctrine Command, but no specific title was given to either of that command's two deputy commanding generals as recommended by General Norton. A further area which would have to be monitored closely was that of the Williamson Board tests involving units of the Reserve Components; without proper attention, this massive test effort could result in only negligible benefits. A related high risk area was that of the existing mobilization system; the actual impact of the reorganization on that area had not yet been fully evaluated. As a closing cautionary note, General Pepke pointed out that the manpower figures developed for the two new staffs had not been fully refined. Since these figures were necessarily based on assumptions, they could be no more than estimates and there was no guarantee that significant personnel savings would be accomplished. In addition, General Pepke pointed out that both General Haines and he felt strongly that the Department of the Army was becoming too involved in what normally would be considered field operations. Consequently, the reorganization would have to ensure that actual operating responsibility was placed at the lowest possible level of command.³⁶

CONARC Summary

The CONARC Outline Plan provided board guidelines for the reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command, its subordinate armies, the Combat Developments Command, and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Specifically, the Outline Plan projected the formation of the two new commands as directed by the Department of the Army -- the U.S. Army Force Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.³⁷

U.S. Army Force Command. The organizational structure of Headquarters, U.S. Army Force Command, and its organizational elements are shown on Chart 8. The Outline Plan provided that its commanding


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Ltr (CS-SSG-FC-72-073), MG Pepke to MG Kalergis, 4 May 72, re: Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan, w/1 incl.

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Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on Incl 1, "CONARC Outline Plan," to ltr CS-SSG (CS-SSG-TC-70), CONARC to DA, 5 May 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan.

Chart 9 -- STANDARD ORGANIZATION, CONUS ARMY HEADQUARTERS



general would serve as the Army Component Commander of both the U.S. Readiness Command and the U.S. Atlantic Command; in the latter capacity his mission concerned only the development of contingency plans.³⁸ As a major field commander of the Department of the Army, the Commander, U.S. Army Force Command, would command all units of the Strategic Army Forces, as well as all U.S. Army Reserve TOE and TDA program units and reinforcement training units within the continental United States. As an exception to this latter mission, he would exercise only command, less operational control, over the U.S. Army Reserve Training Divisions and Schools. The Commander, U.S. Army Force Command, would directly command twenty major installations, six of which were inactive. The major missions to be assigned to the Force Command's subordinate armies included: command of the U.S. Army Reserve; management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program; co-ordination of geographical area responsibilities; planning for mobilization; co-ordination of support for domestic emergencies; and training supervision over the Army National Guard. Since the armies were eliminated from the chain of command with respect to Active Army units and installations, the U.S. Army Force Command was required to deal directly with the installations. Headquarters for the U.S. Army Force Command was to be located at Fort McPherson, Ga., with staff elements also located at the Atlanta General Depot, some ten miles distant. Headquarters for the three armies were to remain at Fort Meade, Md., Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. Small detachments to supervise the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard Advisory Groups, as well as Professors of Military Science in the ROTC Program, were to be located at Fort Devens, Mass., Fort McPherson, Ga., Fort Riley, Kans., Fort Sheridan, Ill., Fort MacArthur, Calif., and Fort Lewis, Wash. These detachments would be provided visibility and stature by being placed under the command of a general officer. Since the missions and responsibilities of the armies were greatly reduced and standardized to a certain extent, standard organizational structures were developed for the three army headquarters. Chart 9 shows this organizational structure as developed for the purposes of the Outline Plan.

The Commander, U.S. Army Force Command, directly commanded those installations where the major activity was related to the missions of the command and any other installations, as directed. All aspects of installation management for the installations assigned to the U.S. Army Force Command were placed directly under that command. Consequently, the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and assuring the combat readiness of assigned troop units would be performed from Headquarters, U.S. Army Force

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Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, did not exist on a day-to-day basis, but would be activated on order of the Army Chief of Staff when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chart 10 -- COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, U.S. ARMY FORCE COMMAND





Chart 11--U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND



1. Initially USAREC absorbed as a vertical command.
2. Combat Developments staff still under study.
3. Functions may be absorbed by other DCS's.

Command, directly through the installation commanders. However, since some of the units of the Strategic Army Forces would be located on installations assigned to the Training and Doctrine Command, such installation commanders would have to be "dual hatted" for that purpose. That is to say, selected installation commanders would be equally responsive to the directives of both major commanders, although they received their base operations support from only one -- the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command. Chart 10 shows the command relationships for the U.S. Army Force Command in commanding selected installations with their STRAF units, subordinate armies and the Reserve Components, and STRAF units on installations belonging to other commands.

The Training and Doctrine Command. The Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, was to be responsible for the development, direction, management, and supervision of individual training of both the Active Army and the Reserve Components, and for formulating and documenting concepts, doctrine, materiel requirements, and organizations for the Army in the field. In addition, he developed plans and programs for the introduction of new materiel into the Army. As the principal agent of the Department of the Army for training and education, he would command the Army School System and develop training and doctrinal literature. The Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, would directly command twenty-two Active major installations (eleven of which were "dual-hatted"), twenty-eight schools, the U.S. Army Training Centers, and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. In addition to the Army Service Schools currently assigned to CONARC, the Outline Plan showed the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, as commanding the Army War College, the Defense Language Institute, the Defense Information School, the Judge Advocate General School, and the Medical Field Service School. Other school proponentcy would be examined later in connection with development of the Detailed Plan for Reorganization. The organizational structure of the headquarters of the new Training and Doctrine Command, and its subordinate elements, are shown on Chart 11. This chart should be compared with the staff organization for the headquarters as initially proposed by the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group at the end of March 1972 (Chart 7). In addition, the Outline Plan specified that the Commanding General, Fort Leavenworth, would be assigned mid-management responsibilities for tactical combat developments. However, the entire combat developments management structure would have to be analyzed in depth to determine its precise integration into the Training and Doctrine Command prior to the submission of the Detailed Plan in July. Fort Monroe was designated as the headquarters location for the Training and Doctrine Command.

Manpower and Cost Data. The estimated projected costs for the establishment of the U.S. Army Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command -- under the three army concept -- were based upon manpower estimates for the two commands; cost estimates were then

TABLE 3 — COMPARISON OF MANPOWER AND COST ESTIMATES
(THREE SUBORDINATE ARMY CONFIGURATION)

ACTIVITIES	BEFORE REORGANIZATION	AFTER REORGANIZATION	DIFFERENCES
<u>Manpower Authorizations/ Estimates</u>			
Totals	17,639	16,350	- 1,289
Headquarters	7,258	6,156	- 1,102
Support Elements	3,668	3,101	- 567
USA Garrisons	6,713	6,693	- 20
Class II Activities	0	400	+ 400
<u>Annual Operating Costs/ Cost Estimates</u>			
Totals	\$232,965,906	\$219,520,787	-\$13,445,119
Headquarters	119,415,691	107,394,876	- 12,020,815
Support Elements	39,935,460	33,796,989	- 6,138,471
USA Garrisons	73,614,755	73,124,042	- 490,713
Class II Activities	0	5,204,880	+ 5,204,880
<u>One-time Costs:</u> \$22,687,692 Army Operation and Maintenance (OMA); \$441,900 Army Military Personnel (MPA).			
<u>Source:</u> Incl 1 to ltr CS-SSG, CONARC to DA, 5 May 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan, pp. A-6 - A-7.			

compared with the current annual operating costs, as based upon current manpower authorizations for the U.S. Continental Army Command, the Combat Developments Command, and the Recruiting Command. The comparison of these data reflected the differences between the prior statistics and those subsequent to the reorganization. It was estimated in the Outline Plan that the reorganization would result in annual manpower savings of 1,289 spaces and annual savings in operating costs of approximately \$13.5 million. The comparison of the manpower and cost figures prior and subsequent to the reorganization are shown on Table 3. The Outline Plan showed manpower estimates only for the major staff agencies of the U.S. Army Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command, their support elements, and the subordinate army headquarters. Middle management groups and agencies of the Combat Developments Command and the field agencies of the Recruiting Command were not addressed in these comparisons.

Reorganization Phasing. The Outline Plan visualized three separate reorganization phases with Phase I beginning on 1 January 1973, subsequent to receipt of the implementing directive from the Department of the Army. During this first phase, forward elements would be established in the two new headquarters locations; the commanders would be designated; and, as the phase ended, the U.S. Continental Army Command would be disestablished. Phase II was the period when installation management responsibilities would be assumed by the U.S. Army Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command from the armies. Phase III would eliminate those armies from the area of installation management and would complete the entire reorganization program by 30 June 1974.

Major Issues Affecting the Reorganization. One of the major issues facing the reorganization planners was that of actual management, since each of the two new commands would be managing a large number of widely dispersed installations. Automatic data processing was essential for the effective management of those installations, but many of the data processing systems were still in the developmental stages. Only the most optimistic forecasts placed these systems "on line" in the same time frame wherein the subordinate armies were scheduled to phase out of the installation management processes. To be specific, the Standard Army Installation Logistics System (SAILS) had been developed conceptually to handle supply management for the Active Army using the management structure of the armies. This concept would have to be modified to provide for the Active Army/Reserve Components interface and for the U.S. Army Force Command/Training and Doctrine Command interface without the benefit of a subordinate army echelon. Either the armies might have to stay in the field of installation management beyond the planned period, or manual procedures suitable to the new commands would have to be established for the transition period. This "unknown" could possibly generate additional unidentifiable costs and

manpower requirements.

The Outline Plan vested command of the Combat Developments Experimentation Command and the MASSTER Test Program in the Training and Doctrine Command with a provision for the eventual merger of the two agencies. Test direction would flow from Department of the Army, through the Training and Doctrine Command, to the test agencies. Troop resources, however, would be provided by the U.S. Army Force Command under the 5-Year Test Plan prepared by the Department of the Army. This method of handling the Combat Developments Experimentation Command and the MASSTER Test Program, along with the command and control channels depicted in the Outline Plan, were subject to further analysis and would be addressed in the Detailed Plan for Reorganization which was due on 20 July 1972.

The Outline Plan provided that the Reserve Officers Training Corps Program would be supervised and managed by the U.S. Army Force Command through its subordinate armies. This issue was subject to further study, and a final decision regarding the management of the program was to be made by the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, prior to the development of the Detailed Plan. Additionally, the question of the disposition of the Recruiting Command had not been brought to a final decision. The Outline Plan showed the Recruiting Command as a separate command under the direct control of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Recruiting in the Training and Doctrine Command. However, the structure of the Recruiting Command initially would be absorbed into the Training and Doctrine Command in order to preclude turbulence and disruption to its operations in the current no-draft environment. The Outline Plan did provide for a move of the Headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, to Fort Sheridan, Ill., so as to provide additional office space for combat developments staff elements in the vicinity of Fort Monroe.

At the close of its summary in the Outline Plan, CONARC pointed out that the limited time available for the preparation of the plan precluded complete analyses. The manpower estimates were only approximate, and many costs had not as yet been identified. Furthermore, onsite surveys of headquarters facilities would impact upon construction requirements and might even affect staff structuring. Since input from the army staffs was not available until very late in the planning period, much of their data could not be incorporated into the actual plan. CONARC cautioned that considerable study would be required to determine the risks precisely and to develop means to reduce their effects.

Reaction of the Department of the Army Project Manager

Within a week after submitting the Outline Plan, the U.S. Continental Army Command received informal indications of the initial

reaction of General Kalergis and his staff.³⁹ The plan was received in the Office of the Project Manager on Friday, 5 May 1972; General Kalergis and his staff were briefed on the plan on Tuesday, 9 May; and their reactions were transmitted informally back to CONARC on Friday, 12 May. First, they felt that the U.S. Continental Army Command was overplaying the span of control problem, which was not as severe as CONARC portrayed it. With regard to combat developments functions, it seemed to General Kalergis' staff that the CONARC planning group had accepted the input for the Outline Plan from the Combat Developments Command almost verbatim and did not put enough detail into the planning for the Training and Doctrine Command; therefore, the integration of the Combat Developments Command into the Training and Doctrine Command would have to be better delineated. The reviewers also remarked that manpower and cost figures for the Recruiting Command had been dissolved into the overall picture developed by the U.S. Continental Army Command. These figures would have to be stripped out to show the true picture without the Recruiting Command, since the possibility existed that that command would remain assigned to the Department of the Army. General Kalergis pointed out that the Reserve Office Training Corps Program was a significant problem area, particularly with regard to the rating of Professors of Military Science. He directed his staff to co-ordinate with the ROTC Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, in order to develop some alternatives for handling this program. At this time, General Kalergis generally agreed that the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program should be located in the U.S. Army Force Command, rather than in the Training and Doctrine Command.

The Office of the Project Manager was somewhat critical of the headquarters organizations developed for the two new commands and for the subordinate armies. The consensus was that the headquarters organizational charts indicated overstructuring since there were too many blocks on each chart. It was suggested that more functions be consolidated into individual blocks. In addition, General Kalergis pointed out that all proposed organizations would have to avoid the establishment of combined functional and systems-oriented staffs, the staffs would have to be one or the other, but not both. Moreover, the headquarters of the new commands should contain only a small logistical control center since the point of issue for materiel would be also the level of management for all logistical items. While the Outline Plan, as submitted, accepted Fort McPherson, Ga., as the directed location for Headquarters, U.S. Army Force Command, General Kalergis did not want to rule out the possibility of using

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The entire section is based on MFR, LTC M.S. Cralle, OPMR-DA, 11 May 72, subj: Notes of Interest to STEADFAST from LTC Cralle.


Fort Sam Houston, Tex., for that purpose. He felt that a shift to the latter location was possible if the proper rationale were presented to the Army Chief of Staff. He emphasized that there would be no funding of construction merely for the purpose of the reorganization. Proposals for headquarters locations would have to be such that they would fit realistically into existing facilities.

The Project Manager warned CONARC that all plans for the reorganization would have to reflect a reduction in the grade structures for military and civilian spaces and steps would have to be taken to ensure a proper balance between the military and civilians. Furthermore, the guidance furnished in the Department of Defense Program/Budget Decision 92 concerning space reductions would have to be met. In particular, General Kalergis' staff inquired as to the reason for an increase in the number of spaces allocated for combat developments functions in the Training and Doctrine Command when compared to the current organization of the Combat Developments Command. All persons concerned with the reorganization would also have to realize that the general officer structure must be reduced in both grade and number; General Kalergis seemed to feel that this limitation probably applied as well to colonel (O-6) spaces when viewed in total. The Project Manager directed that the general officer grade structure in the proposed commands be compared with the current structure for that level in the U.S. Continental Army Command; the Combat Developments Command; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army; the U.S. Army Recruiting Command; and the subordinate armies.

The U.S. Continental Army Command was reminded that the time phasing for the new commands and agencies would have to conform to an overall schedule of events; the phasing schedule developed for the Outline Plan could serve as a guide. General Kalergis also stated that he did not want to get involved with exact titles and designations at this time, preferring to use the titles, Force Command, Training Command, Analysis Agency, and Test Agency. In the actual development of plans for the reorganization, General Kalergis wanted to be certain that everyone appreciated the facts of the 3-phase plan for reorganization. The first plan -- the recently submitted Outline Plan -- was merely a feasibility plan; the second plan -- the Detailed Plan for Reorganization -- would develop in detail the specific alternatives which had been decided upon; the third plan -- the Implementation Plan -- would serve to implement the contents of the Detailed Plan.


Required Revisions to the CONARC Outline Plan

The Outline Plan, as it was submitted on 5 May 1972, contained a number of unresolved issues and some areas in which final decisions were not yet firm. At the end of May 1972, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group published the first changes to the Outline Plan, based



Map 1 -- BOUNDARIES OF THE THREE SUBORDINATE ARMIES

CHART 12 -- HEADQUARTERS, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND



a. UNDER THE STAFF SUPERVISION OF DCSPER.

b. UNDER THE STAFF SUPERVISION OF DCS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.

on decisions which were made after the publication of the plan or too shortly before its publication to be included. These changes provided firm decisions on which the contents of the Detailed Plan for Reorganization could be based. These revisions stipulated that, for the purposes of the Detailed Plan, Third U.S. Army would be phased out, and only First U.S. Army at Fort George G. Meade, Fifth U.S. Army at Fort Sam Houston, and Sixth U.S. Army at the Presidio of San Francisco would remain. New boundaries for the three armies are shown on Map 1. The staff organization for Headquarters, Doctrine and Training Command, as shown on Chart 11 was changed, as indicated on Chart 12. The following organizational changes were included: the Operations Directorate was transferred from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training to form the basis of a new Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence; as indicated by the title, the latter staff section also absorbed the formerly separate Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Aviation and History staff elements were relocated in this new Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence which was further enlarged by the transfer of the Communications-Electronics Division from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Recruiting was eliminated from the staff organization and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel was designated as the staff point of contact for the U.S. Army Recruiting Command; and the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, were merged to form a new staff section -- the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resources Management. Two changes were made in the lists of installations assigned to the new commands -- Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., was removed from the installation list of the U.S. Army Force Command since it was a major installation of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. In addition, Fort Sheridan, Ill., was transferred from the U.S. Army Force Command to the Training and Doctrine Command. As a final correction, the list of schools which were not currently assigned to the U.S. Continental Army Command -- but which could be considered for possible inclusion in the new Training and Doctrine Command -- was enlarged to include all of the following:⁴⁰

- Army War College
- Defense Information School
- Defense Language Institute
- Medical Field Service School
- Judge Advocate General School

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Incl 4, "Changes to the Outline Plan," to DF CS-SSG (CS-SSG-TRADOC-103), Op STEADFAST to CONARC Stf, 26 May 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.

Defense Systems Management School
Army Security Agency School
Medical Veterinary School
Medical Optical and Maintenance Agency
Army Logistics Management Assistance Center
Management Engineering Training Agency
Joint Military Packaging Training Center
Army Materiel Command Ammunition School

Chapter IV

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DETAILED PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION

Completion of the Department of the Army Myron Board Studies

The Installation Management Study


The Department of the Army Installation Management Study -- as described in the previous chapter -- was completed by the end of April 1972, but not early enough for its contents to be digested by the CONARC Staff and the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group for inclusion in the Outline Plan for reorganization which was submitted to the Department of the Army on 5 May 1972. The installation study provided a current installation management model which would serve to evaluate organizational concepts and aid in the reorganization of the Army as envisioned in Operation STEADFAST. The first step in the construction of a valid installation management model was the identification of representative type installations. Fort Lee, Va., Fort Knox, Ky., and Fort Bragg, N.C., met the stated requirements, and an on-site installation management survey -- limited to twenty-seven functional areas and items -- was conducted at these installations from 27 February through 17 March. Throughout the development of the study, the board was limited by two major reorganization constraints; any reorganization of the Army could not cost significantly more to implement than the current Army organization, and any reorganization of the Army must be capable of implementation within a reasonable period of time, i.e., two years.¹

Planning Assumptions. The functional installation study was based on a number of assumptions which were basic to the successful reorganization of both the U.S. Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command. First, the installations would have to have the capability of supporting a variety of units, activities, satellites, and sub-installations, regardless of command alignment. The Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) would be extended to the Base Operations System (BASOPS) installations, beginning in the fall of 1972, and to the Combat Service Support System (CS₃) divisions in the continental United States during implementation of the reorganization. The capability to report personnel directly from the installation/division level to Headquarters, Department of the Army (Project 70X) would be attained when SIDPERS was fully extended in the continental United States. The Standard Army Installation Logistics System (SAILS) A/B level would be extended to BASOPS installations in the first quarter of calendar

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HQ DA, Functional Study of Installation Management, Apr 72, pp. 1-1 - 1-3.

Chart 13 -- INSTALLATION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS TYPE II ORGANIZATION



- COMMAND
- . - . - . COORDINATION
- SUPPORT AGREEMENT

year 1973. The SAILS A(-) level, then under development by the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, was to be extended during the reorganization time frame. Within the continental United States, Vertical The Army Authorization Documents System (VTAADS) would become operational during December 1972 and CS₃ would be extended to divisions during the period of reorganization. However, any Department of the Army standard automated systems, other than those mentioned above, would not be fielded in the 2-year time frame. On the other hand, the Consolidation of Military Personnel Activities (COMPACT) concept would be implemented concurrently with the extension of SIDPERS. There would be only one Logistical Control Center (LCC) within each of the two new major commands, and installation support roles would remain as they were at the time of the study. Three area commands would be established from the current four numbered armies in the continental United States; area commands would be subordinate to the U.S. Army Force Command and would be responsible for the command of Reserve units and geographic areas of responsibility -- less installation command and control. The command channel stock funds would continue to be the primary means of financing installation inventories, but there would be no direct reporting for financial information within two years of 1 July 1972.²

Development of Organizational Concepts. Because of the importance of command relationships, the study team developed three organizational concepts to be used as a framework for analyzing various functional areas. The Type I Concept left the internal installation relationships as they were, dividing the CONARC installations between the two new major commands. The installation commander would answer only to one major commander, but there would be no separation of the primary missions of readiness and individual training at either the installation or at major command level. The Type II Concept -- the concept eventually adopted for the Operation STEADFAST reorganization -- also left the internal installation relationships as they were, divided the CONARC installations between the two commands, but split the primary mission responsibilities at the major command level. The installation commander, however, would receive no relief in terms of span of attention and would inherit the added burden of reporting to two major commanders. Command relationships under the Type II Concept are shown on Chart 13. The Type III Concept released the installation commander from one of the primary missions of readiness or individual training. Those units which were not assigned to the same major command as the installation commander would be tenants on the installation subject to an agreement between the two major commands. Such an agreement would balance the unit's requirements in performance of its primary mission with its secondary

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Ibid., pp. 1-3 - 1-4.

utility to the installation commander in the performance of his primary mission.³

Conclusions and Recommendations of the Board. In developing its overall report, the Department of the Army study board concluded that certain functions which were performed at the installation level, were not affected by any changes in organization above that level. However, the board felt that the functions of area support, Reserve Components, budgeting, and responding to domestic emergencies could be served satisfactorily by the Type II Concept. Of these four functions, budgeting stands alone in terms of a management problem when addressing the submission of mission budgets for cross-assigned units. On the other hand, the command relationships, readiness reporting, force development, and mobilization functions could be served by either the Type II or Type III Concepts provided that, under the Type II Concept, it was acceptable for the installation commander to report to two major commands. Installation support and school support by STRAF units on installations of the Training and Doctrine Command were considered to be negotiable areas by the two commands concerned in terms of the reorganization objectives, e.g., the balance between individual training and readiness. It was the further consensus of the board that, if cross-assigned units were not placed under the direct control of the major commander, the Type II Concept was the preferred organization. However, if the cross-assigned units were placed under the direct control of the major commander, then the Type III Concept was the preferred organization. However, it was evident to the members of the board that the dominant reorganization objectives of increased readiness of deployable forces, increased emphasis on individual training, and the alignment of mission and resources were adequately satisfied by either the Type II or Type III Concepts.

Based on the stated conclusions, the Myron Board recommended that either the Type II or Type III Concept be adopted since they equally satisfied the reorganization objectives. However, if the Type II Concept were adopted, it would have to be acceptable for the installation commander to report to both major commands. In addition, both major commands would have to promulgate mission statements for implementing the proper operating procedures for domestic emergencies, area support, and the Reserve Components. An administrative procedure also would have to be published to provide for mission budget submissions by cross-assigned units through the installation comptroller.⁴

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Ibid., pp. 3-1 - 3-12.

4

Ibid., pp. 7-62 - 7-63.

The CONUS Army Management Study

The CONUS Army Management Study, prepared by the same board, was a follow-on and an adjunct to the Installation Management Study. Its primary purpose was to validate, from the perspective of a CONUS army headquarters, the conclusions contained in the previous study. Its secondary purpose was to recommend the disposition of CONUS army management functions -- along with associated staffing and reports -- with regard to those which should be performed by area commands upon reorganization; those which should be performed after the reorganization but not by the Area Commands; and those which should be eliminated as a result of the reorganization. Six of the twenty-seven functional areas and items used in developing the installation management study were discarded as not being applicable at the level of the CONUS armies. However, an additional twenty functional areas and items (making a total of forty-one used in developing the CONUS Army Management Study) were added as applicable to the army area. Headquarters, First U.S. Army, was selected for analysis for obvious reasons. First, the conclusions contained in the Installation Management Study were derived from surveying three installations, two of which were in the First U.S. Army area. These conclusions could then be validated from a supporting CONUS army viewpoint. In addition, First U.S. Army had a significant responsibility with regard to the Reserve Components and the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program -- 37 percent of the nation's Reserve Components and 36 percent of the Army officers commissioned through the ROTC Program came from programs in the First U.S. Army area of responsibility. Since the area of the Reserve Components was identified in the Installation Management Study as a major problem, it warranted closer scrutiny at the level of the CONUS armies. Finally, First U.S. Army had a large geographic responsibility -- a 15-state area which contained over one-third of the U.S. population and approximately one-half of the nation's industrial plants. The on-site survey was conducted at Fort George G. Meade, Md., from 17 through 22 April 1972; the report was completed during the first week of May.⁵

The functions currently performed by First U.S. Army were analyzed and a recommended disposition of the functions, along with related spaces, was made. The evaluation of the CONUS army was based upon the assumptions that an Area Command would be subordinate to the U.S. Army Force Command and would be responsible for command of U.S. Army Reserve units and for geographic areas of responsibility, less installation command/management. Since these underlying assumptions were used, certain organizational entities, such as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, were identified for

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HQ DA, Functional Study of CONUSA Management, May 72,
pp. 1-1 - 1-3.

retention in the Area Command in their entirety. During the analysis process, the board determined that responsibility for the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program should lie primarily within the U.S. Army Force Command. To facilitate a general assessment of the reallocation of functions and spaces then integral to First U.S. Army, the organizational entities were grouped into three board categories. First, were those elements which were directly associated with the U.S. Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, and the ROTC; second, those organizational elements which operated primarily in support of the headquarters or performed an area support type function; and, finally, those organizational elements not included in the first two categories, the resources and functions of which had been identified as candidates for transfer to the commands envisioned as existing subsequent to the reorganization. The headquarters structure developed by the study group represented only 40 percent of the current authorizations for First U.S. Army. The remaining spaces -- approximately 1,220 -- were declared as being available for redistribution or savings.⁶

CONARC Reaction to the Installation Management Study

A draft copy of the Installation Management Study was forwarded to the U.S. Continental Army Command for review and comment on 26 April but was not distributed to the CONARC Staff until 10 May 1972, five days after the completion and forwarding of the STEADFAST Outline Plan.⁷ The consensus of the CONARC staff was that the Type II Concept for Installation Management was more compatible with the organizational concept of decentralization. This concept placed commensurate authority along with responsibility at the lowest possible (installation) level. Despite the fact that the installation commander would have to answer to two senior commands, he would command all activities on his post, an arrangement which fulfilled the commander's ultimate responsibility. The STEADFAST Study Group pointed out that the Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan actually adopted the Type II Concept and provided for "dual-hatted" installation commanders. The official CONARC response to the Department of the Army pointed out that both the Installation and CONUS Army Management Studies were a superlative job of compilation and documentation. In order to obtain the fullest value from the studies, copies were distributed to all major CONARC staff elements and CONUS army commanders, while pertinent portions of the studies were forwarded to the installation commanders concerned. However, it was

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Ibid., pp. 3-1 - 3-13.

7

- (1) Ltr DACS-SP, Deputy PMR to CONARC DCSCOMPT, 26 Apr 72. (2) Memo, CONARC DCSCOMPT to SSG and All DCS's, 10 May 72.

the CONARC belief that one of the most important uses of these studies would be to provide a better visibility for installation management. Moreover, CONARC felt that the studies would provide to be invaluable as a doctrinal source for those responsible for rewriting Army Regulation 10-10 and would also serve as a textbook on installation management at the Army Logistics Management Center (ALMC).⁸

Guidance for the Development of the Detailed Plan

CONARC Preliminary Guidance

Shortly after the submission of the Outline Plan to the Department of the Army, the U.S. Continental Army Command's STEADFAST Study Group began the preparation of preliminary guidance for the development of the Detailed Plan for Reorganization which was due at Department of the Army by 20 July 1972. The preliminary guidance was finally approved by the Chief of Staff on 25 May and disseminated to both the CONARC Staff and to the subordinate armies on 26 May. The preliminary guidance for the CONARC staff consisted of five parts: the content outline of the Detailed Plan; the staffing schedule for the plan; administrative instructions regarding the preparation of staff input; changes to the major elements of the Outline Plan; and the specific input required from each staff office. Guidance furnished the armies was similar except that an additional section dealt with the new boundaries for the three armies which would remain. General guidelines for the plan indicated that the actual reorganization would begin on 1 January 1973, but that the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command would not be formed until 1 July. During the period, 1 July to 31 December 1973, Force Command/Third U.S. Army would operate at Fort McPherson and the Training and Doctrine Command/U.S. Continental Army Command would operate at Fort Monroe. The existing organizations of the Third U.S. Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command would be phased out on 31 December 1973. The armies would be phased out of installation management not later than 1 July 1974.⁹

The first part of the guidance consisted of an outline which showed the manner in which the contents of the Detailed Plan would

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(1) DF, STEADFAST Study Gp to DCSCOMPT, 17 May 72, subj: The Functional Study of Installation Management, w/incls. (2) DF, DCSCOMPT to CONARC CofS, 15 Jun 72, subj: Proposed Letter to MG Kalergis -- Myron Study. (3) Ltr, MG Pepke to MG Kalergis, 19 Jun 72, re: The Myron Study.

9

(1) DF CS-SSG, SSG to CONARC CofS, 11 May 72, subj: STEADFAST Detailed Plan, w/7 incls. (2) DF CS-SSG, SSG to all CONARC Stf Secs, 26 May 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, w/5 incls.

be structured -- an executive summary and three separate books. The first two books addressed a specific time frame and the events and actions that occurred in a chronological sequence, while the third provided a reference for action which might affect the reorganization. The staffing schedule was developed so as to complete the Detailed Plan on time for its submission to the Department of the Army on 20 July. Since the time available for each event was extremely limited, it was mandatory that the suspense dates be met. The staff sections were requested to prepare their input in such a way that it could be inserted into the plan without need for further composition, editing, or typing. In addition, all inputs would have to be closely coordinated with all staff elements of Headquarters, CONARC, and with the other commands affected by the reorganization. The final part of the guidance consisted of a detailed listing of the input required from each CONARC staff section, describing the specific tasks and identifying the book, volume, chapter, and paragraph where the input would be inserted in the detailed plan.¹⁰

In preparing input for the Detailed Plan, the previously prepared Outline Plan -- as changed by the fourth part of the guidance -- was to be used as a baseline. As a minimum, certain steps were to be used in developing the input: missions and functions of the new organizations were to be determined through branch level or office, as applicable; manpower requirements were to be determined; organizational charts were to be diagrammed through branch level; and all affected reports and procedures were to be described. Using the reorganization phases, major functions scheduled for transfer were to be listed in time sequence, including all associated reports and responsibilities. In other words, those actions would have to be addressed which were necessary to constitute the new functioning organizations as described in Chapters 1 and 2 of Volumes A and E of the Detailed Plan.¹¹

Revised Organization for Headquarters, TRADOC

In developing the guidance for the Detailed Plan, the STEADFAST Study Group had to take into account the decision by General Haines that the organizational structure for Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command -- as submitted in the Outline Plan -- contained too many Deputy Chiefs of Staff and should be reduced to a more manageable level. In addition, General Haines directed that

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DF CS-SSG, SSG to CONARC Stf, 26 May 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.

11

Ibid., Incl 5.

Chart 14 -- PROPOSED ORGANIZATION, HEADQUARTERS,
TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND






Chart 15 -- ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW STAFF SECTIONS

DCS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT



DCS FOR OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE



consideration be given to the consolidation of the functions of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Force Development and Intelligence into other staff elements. As a result of several staff conferences, the STEADFAST Study Group recommended the reduction of the number of deputy chiefs of staff in the headquarters from eight to six by combining the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and the Comptroller into a Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management and establishing a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence. The former action provided for the management of both spaces and dollars in a single staff agency, thus giving the commander of the Training and Doctrine Command a focal point for management. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence established a vital point of contact for co-ordination with the Force Command and consolidated the operational and intelligence functions within the headquarters. In addition, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command was being established as a subordinate element of the Training and Doctrine Command, rather than having the status of a Deputy Chief of Staff. The STEADFAST Study Group announced that, in developing the two new staff sections, a critical review of the functions of all staff sections would be made. Such a review would result in a realignment wherever duplication existed with a consequent savings in personnel spaces. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, concurred in the proposed reorganization with one exception. While the original proposal called for a Comptroller Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, Army Regulations specified certain functions for the comptroller of a major command which were not included in this directorate. Hence the title was changed to that of Director of Financial Resources. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development had many reservations concerning the proposed organization, but concurred because of the stated need to reduce the number of Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the headquarters. In his comments, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence pointed out that the intelligence functions of the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence would have to include the threat and technology functions formerly conducted by the Threat and Technology Office of the Combat Developments Command. The CONARC Chief of Staff approved the proposed headquarters organization on 6 June for inclusion in the finalized Detailed Plan. Chart 14 shows the proposed headquarters organization, while Chart 15 shows the internal organization of the two new staff sections.¹²

12

(1) DF CS-SSG-TRADOC, SSG to CofS thru DCSCOMPT, 24 May 72, subj: Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Headquarters Organization. (2) DF, DCSCOMPT to CofS, 6 Jun 72, subj: TRADOC HQ Organization, w/3 incls.

Decisions by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army met with the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization on 14 June to provide needed guidance for the development of the Detailed Plan. While the basic philosophy of the reorganization was to strengthen the hand of the installation commander, the concept of franchises was being proposed by the Department of the Army in such fields as Open Mess and Commissary management. Under this concept, the installation would control the activity but technical guidance and support would come from a central agency. General Palmer also pointed out that the concept of communications support for installations by the Strategic Communications Command was considered to have merit. Consequently, a favorable reaction was requested from the U.S. Continental Army Command, if possible. While there was still no decision at the Department of the Army level concerning the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, the location of Headquarters, Force Command, at Fort McPherson, Ga., had become firm, as well as the location of the Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe. With regard to the latter installation, it was the intent of the Department of the Army to recognize Fort Monroe as a permanent post. General Palmer also informed the reorganization planners that the consensus at Department of the Army leaned toward only one deputy commander for each command; hence it would be very difficult to sell the idea of two deputies for either command. In like manner, the decision to retain only three subordinate armies was firm; there was no possibility of retaining the current four. The CONARC planners also were being requested to develop a university system to incorporate all schools which would provide a clear line of communications between the schools and the functional directors. However, the position of the Army War College was a sensitive subject and that institution would have to be incorporated into the university concept without any stated or implied intent to change the current system. Mobilization planning was considered to be a major problem area in which the Department, itself, would have to become involved. As a final gesture, General Palmer stated that there would have to be some recognition at the departmental level of military construction needs for the new headquarters as well as the need for improved quality of the military personnel assigned to those headquarters.¹³

Official Department of the Army Guidance for Detailed Planning

While a draft copy of the Department of the Army Guidance for Detailed Planning had been forwarded to the U.S. Continental Army

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(1) MFR, BG West, 14 Jun 72, subj: Spill-out on Meeting with Vice Chief of Staff (STEADFAST). (2) MFR, BG West, 14 Jun 72, subj: STEADFAST Planning.

Command in two parts on 6 and 7 June, the Office of the Project Manager informed the CONARC planners that this guidance would be revised and reduced in volume.¹⁴ The official version of the guidance was published and distributed to CONARC on 15 June 1972, approximately five weeks after the submission of the Outline Plan. In its official guidance, the Department of the Army announced that a review of the Outline Plan and the functional analyses of the installations and CONUS armies indicated that the achievement of the stated reorganization objectives was entirely feasible. Consequently, the detailed plans would provide the basis for measuring the degree to which the reorganization would achieve the specified objectives and measure likely costs such as personnel and mission turbulence. The detailed plans, as approved, would provide the basis for completing the FY 1974 budget and the implementing plans.¹⁵

General Guidelines. In the field of general guidance, total strength ceilings were established at 7,839 to 8,439 spaces for the combined strengths of headquarters and their support and field activities, to include the Force Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and the CONUS armies. Detailed planning should assume full management at the installation level and exception management at higher levels. However, in view of the many important ongoing actions throughout the Department of the Army, planning should avoid duplicating functions which would be established elsewhere. Furthermore, under the general reorganization concept, the Training and Doctrine Command was visualized as the repository of functional training/educational expertise for all U.S. Army training and education. A basic objective of the Detailed Plan, therefore, was to develop a structure which would place all Army schools into a university concept. In view of the increased emphasis on Reserve Component readiness under the reorganization and the revised roles of the CONUS armies, a clear delineation of mobilization planning and execution responsibilities would have to be made with regard to the Force Command, the Training and Doctrine Command, the CONUS armies and the installations. In addition, the Detailed Plan would have to take into account the effects of the numerous actions then under study throughout various areas of the Department of the Army which might have a significant effect upon the outcome of the plans.¹⁶

14

(1) Ltr, Dep PMR-DA to CONARC DCSCOMPT, 8 Jun 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Detailed Planning. (2) MFR, BG West, 14 Jun 72, subj: STEADFAST Planning.

15

Ltr DACS-MR, PMR-DA to DA ACSFOR, Cdr CONARC, and Cdr CDC, 15 Jun 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Detailed Planning.

16

Ibid.

Ongoing Actions Affecting the Detailed Plan. The Department of the Army guidance for developing the Detailed Plan contained a number of significant actions which were either under study at the departmental level or in varying stages of implementation. All of these actions would affect, in some way, the actual development of the finalized Detailed Plans for Reorganization. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, was then preparing the proper documentation for implementing a recently developed and approved program known as "Basic Policies for Weapons Systems Acquisition in the Department of the Army." At the same time, a task force within the Office of the Project Manager for Reorganization was developing a concept for the Combat Developments Process based upon the reorganization concept. At the Continental Army Command level, a concept was being developed to establish three doctrinal centers which would serve as focal points for the development of new concepts, doctrine, and organization. These included a Tactical Center at Fort Leavenworth, a Logistical Center at Fort Lee, and an Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison. In the personnel field, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, was developing a concept for bringing together many of the operating agencies such as the Office of Personnel Operations, the Office of the Adjutant General, and the Personnel Information Systems Command. In like manner, the Surgeon General was developing a plan for the establishment of a command to control all medical activities providing health care in the continental United States. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army, was staffing a proposal to establish a troop support activity which would manage such activities as food service, clothing sales, and commissaries, with the possibility of including clubs and messes at a later date. In this same vein, tests were being conducted in Fifth and Sixth U.S. Armies for alternate ways of providing centralized management and supervision of nonappropriated fund activities, clubs and open messes. In other areas, the Army Materiel Command was also developing a plan which would reorganize elements of its headquarters, commodity commands, and other activities. The Strategic Communications Command was developing a plan for providing full communications-electronics support for all commanders in the continental United States in the same manner as provided to oversea component commanders. And, finally, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, had conducted a study to determine the disposition of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) functions and elements when the Defense Investigative Service was established.¹⁷

Specific Guidance for the U.S. Continental Army Command

Of particular interest to the U.S. Continental Army Command was Annex B of the guidance document containing the guidance for detailed planning by that particular command. In general, CONARC was warned that additional strong justification was needed to support the requirement for two Deputy Commanders at both of the new commands. The feeling at Department of the Army was that not more than one deputy commander could be justified for either command.

Force Command. For the purposes of the detailed plan, the CONUS army boundaries were those which had been decided upon at the 18 May 1972 Executive Agents Meeting. In addition, Third U.S. Army would be phased out and the headquarters at First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies would remain at their present locations. With the freeing of the CONUS armies from their mid-management responsibilities, the detailed plan should focus the role of those armies on their Reserve Component and area missions. Staffing should be reduced correspondingly. Only three supervisory elements should be considered in the plan for supervising the ROTC Program and National Guard training and for commanding the Reserve Adviser Groups. These could be general officer detachments and should be incorporated within the CONUS army tables of distribution. As a final measure, the detailed plan should delineate clearly the responsibilities of the CONUS armies with regard to mobilization.¹⁸

Training and Doctrine Command. The Training and Doctrine Command was intended to be the repository of training/educational functional expertise and act as an umbrella over all U.S. Army training and education. It was intended to be the U.S. Army School/University System with all schools, except the U.S. Military Academy, considered for placement therein. Proposals and rationale for the inclusion of specific schools should be quickly completed so that decisions could be made prior to the finalization of the Detailed Plan. The plan, moreover, should give separate visibility to a concept for integrating doctrine with training, and the recommendations of the Three Center Concept Study (Task Force ATLAS) should be included. In addition, the plan should address the "phase-in" of combat developments functions to include organization, concept of operation, and manpower distribution for the combat developments elements of the new command.¹⁹

Logistics. The detailed plan was to include the transfer of installation-related logistics management functions from Headquarters,

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Ibid., App II, Anx B.

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Ibid., App III, Anx B.

CONARC and its CONUS armies to the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command in a three-phased program, with the transfer to be essentially complete by 31 December 1973. The size of the logistical staff elements -- to include dedicated support elements -- as indicated in the Outline Plan for both new commands was considered to be excessive and should be reduced. Since the CONUS armies would be responsible only for the logistics management of the Reserve Components and for the logistics aspects of the headquarters' area command missions, the size of the logistics elements in the CONUS armies should not exceed that shown in the STEADFAST Outline Plan. Detailed guidance also was given for the assumption of stock fund functions, the extension and expansion of logistics systems, the conduct of maintenance programs, and the Maintenance Assistance Inspections Teams.²⁰

Installation Management. Although the thrust of the reorganization in the continental United States was at the major command and CONUS army level, there were additional implications for installation management in terms of revised command relationships and responsibility for multiple sets of missions and allocated resources. Consequently, the detailed plan should provide that the installation commander command all units, activities, and personnel assigned to that installation with only minor exceptions. Where elements of both major commands were assigned to an installation, the installation commander should report to, and be responsible to, both major commanders in their areas of responsibility for the missions and resources assigned. Separate installation staffs should not be formed except as needed for base operations expertise or adaptability to mobilization requirements. The Functional Study of Installation Management was to be used as a basis for review of installation management and identification of potential management improvements. Any changes from existing procedures for geographical area responsibility were to be included in the detailed plan. In addition, installations were to be tasked to provide support for Reserve Components by their respective major command in co-ordination with the responsible CONUS army.²¹

Engineer Activities. The Detailed Plan should provide for the transfer of most of the Engineer functions then performed at the CONUS armies to the headquarters of each of the major new commands with a minimum workload, if any, shifted to the installation level. Moreover, the engineer staffing at each new command headquarters and at each CONUS army should approximate that recommended in the

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Ibid., App VI, Anx B.

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Ibid., App VII, Anx B.

Functional Study of CONUSA Management, CONARC, in conjunction with the Office of the Chief of Engineers, should determine the feasibility and desirability of establishing the engineer section at the new major command headquarters as a Special Staff Office in lieu of placing this function under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. In co-ordination with the Office of the Chief of Engineers, CONARC was to consider alternate means to support the installations with technical expertise to include tasking the District Engineer to prepare plans for installations on a reimbursable basis; permitting installation commanders to contract for their design requirements; or centralizing design functions at the Office of the Chief of Engineers with the installation facilities engineer providing the raw data and the major command reviewing the installation proposal prior to forwarding.²²

Stationing and Installations. For purposes of the Detailed Plan, the Force Command headquarters was to be located at Fort McPerson, Ga., the Training and Doctrine Command headquarters at Fort Monroe, Va., and the CONUS army headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, Md., Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. In addition, the U.S. Continental Army Command was directed to co-ordinate with the U.S. Army Materiel Command on space requirements for headquarters elements of the Force Command at Atlanta Army Depot. Installation Master Plans for the installations involved would not be formally revised until after the reorganization had been approved and publicly announced. Based on the constraints on new construction for reorganization purposes, Installation Master Plans should not require significant revision.²³

Training. In the Detailed Plan, specific attention was to be paid to the delineation of responsibilities for training at both the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command. As a minimum, the plan was to include specific responsibilities for basic combat training; advanced individual training in Training Centers; advanced individual training, that is, initial MOS producing, in units ("Train and Retain" and "Train and Pass"); refresher training; reclassification training; cross training; aggressor training; training evaluation; Reserve Component training; basic unit training; and advanced unit training. The plan should address the co-ordination which would be required between the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command to accomplish all training responsibilities. Also identified in the plan should be those functions, currently the responsibility of CONARC, which would have to be passed to the

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Ibid., App VIII, Anx B.

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Ibid., App IX, Anx B.

Department of the Army staff in order to accomplish a co-ordinated training effort.²⁴

The Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. Pending further evaluation, the Detailed Plan could assume that the Force Command would be responsible for the management and supervision of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program within the continental United States on an area basis. The Training and Doctrine Command, on the other hand, would be responsible for the training concepts, training materials, and curriculum development associated with that program. Further CONARC planning should also consider shifting summer camp support to the training base in 1973 in order to permit the units of the Strategic Army Forces to achieve a higher state of readiness. CONARC should also continue to refine the Supervisory Element concept as a means of improving the management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. In order to provide a sound basis for final decisions regarding the management of the overall program, the Detailed Plan should contain specific organizational diagrams and show the interfaces between the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command in ROTC matters and between ROTC units and supporting installations; portray the rating scheme for the Professors of Military Science; establish responsibilities for summer camp planning, support, and supervision; include a quantitative display of the span of control of supervisory elements (the number of Junior, Senior, and National Defense Cadet Corps units); describe the ROTC functions to be performed by each element associated with that program; indicate the specific phasing for changes in the management of the program; and provide for a system of measuring the effectiveness of the program at the level of the individual Professor of Military Science. CONARC, however, was not to develop this on a unilateral basis; the Management Concept for the Reserve Officer Training Corps was to be refined in co-ordination with the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.²⁵

Supplemental Guidance, 20 June 1972

The Office of the Project Manager issued a letter containing supplemental guidance for the preparation of the Detailed Plan on 23 June 1972. These were supplemental instructions in the two areas of Stationing and Installations and Economic Analysis for use in conjunction with the overall guidance published a week earlier. In the area of Stationing and Installations, the supplementary instructions covered such matters as the assumption of adequate space

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Ibid., App XIII, Anx B.

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Ibid., App XV, Anx B.

criteria for planning purposes; the basing of monetary savings on reductions in the overall strength of the Army; a thorough analysis of related construction costs over the long-range period; the basing of any claims for savings in construction costs on lower construction costs in the new area or a more complete utilization rate of the facilities concerned; the consideration of avoidable costs related to the underutilization of facilities; and the consideration of costs associated with any long term move into temporary facilities. The supplemental guidance also outlined ten sections of a process to develop an economic analysis for the reorganization process: identification of the problem; listing of the postulate objectives; identification of assumptions and constraints; a description of the relevant environment; a listing of postulate alternatives; a determination of costs; a determination of the benefits; a comparison of the alternatives; and conclusions and recommendations. Only the four sections dealing with the assumptions, environment description, alternatives, and costs were to be developed by the principal agents and included in the Detailed Plan. The remaining six portions of the process were to be developed subsequent to the 20 July suspense date for the Detailed Plan by a Task Force which would include representatives of the Principal Agents.²⁶

Concept for Reorganization Phasing

Following the reorganization described in the Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan, installations would report directly to the two new major commands. In two separate memoranda of 22 and 29 May, the CONARC Chief of Staff described a phased transfer of installation management from the CONUS armies to the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command. By the beginning of June 1972, it had become necessary to refine the phasing concept in order to provide additional guidance to the CONARC staff and to the CONUS armies for inclusion in the Detailed Plan. Department of the Army planning guidance indicated that the public announcement of the pending reorganization would take place in January 1973, while the Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan indicated that the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command would become operational on 1 July of that year. Experience gained from the consolidation of the First and Second U.S. Armies and the Fourth and Fifth U.S. Armies indicated that civilian personnel then employed at First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies might begin looking for employment immediately after the announcement. In addition, a concurrent shifting of military and civilian personnel would be required to accomplish the increased workloads at Forts Monroe and McPherson. Consequently, the CONUS armies might be so severely reduced as to be incapable of continuing

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Ltr DACS-MR, Deputy PMR-DA to DA ACSFOR, Cdr CONARC, and Cdr CDC, 23 Jun 72, subj: Supplemental Guidance for Reorganization Detailed Planning, w/4 incls.

installation management. Since the FY 1973 budget envisioned that both the U.S. Continental Army Command and the four CONUS armies would remain in existence throughout FY 1973, the major reorganization should not begin prior to 1 July 1973. However, the manpower problem dictated that the CONUS armies should be phased out of installation management as quickly as possible thereafter. Several alternatives were developed by the STEADFAST Study Group as possible courses of action for the two major commands to assume direct command of the installations concerned. For example, the U.S. Continental Army Command could establish specific dates for the two major commands to assume direct command of each installation; decentralize planning and execution of functional transfers to individual staff sections to meet those specific dates; and task the STEADFAST Study Group to monitor the whole exercise. On the other hand, the U.S. Continental Army Command could establish specific dates for the two major commands to assume direct command of each installation and all functions for that particular installation would be transferred from the CONUS army to the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command on the same day. Or, the U.S. Continental Army Command could delay a decision on which course of action to pursue until the CONUS armies and the CONARC staff had submitted their inputs for the Detailed Plan for Reorganization. The STEADFAST Study Group developed a possible set of dates for the two major commands to assume direct installation management based on the fact that the personnel transfer plan would be completed by 31 December 1973. Third U.S. Army would transfer four installations to the Force Command and five installations to the Training and Doctrine Command on 1 July 1973. All Sixth U.S. Army installations would be transferred during the month of September 1973; all First U.S. Army installations during the month of October; and all Fifth U.S. Army installations during the month of November 1973.²⁷

Other Department of the Army Reorganization Concepts

As the United States Continental Army Command prepared to develop the Detailed Plan for Reorganization, it was apparent that other reorganization actions throughout the Department of the Army were being pursued independently of Operation STEADFAST. All of these actions, however, would have a great deal of bearing on its final plan of reorganization. The Department of the Army Charter for the Project Manager for Reorganization had empowered General Kalergis to look into the reorganization of other areas of the Army including commands, agencies, and the departmental staff. These

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(1) DF CS-SSG, DCSCOMPT (STEADFAST Coord) to all CONARC DCS's, 8 Jun 72, subj: Reorganization Phasing Schedule, w/1 incl, "Funding Schedule." (2) DF CS-SSG, same to same, 9 Jun 72, same subj, w/1 incl, "Discussion Points, Phasing Conference -- 12 Jun 72."

areas included the control of military personnel, logistical control and support, communications support throughout the continental United States, and the control of medical and health activities, Army-wide.²⁸

The U.S. Army Materiel Command

As early as the first week in May 1972, the planning staffs at CONARC and the Combat Developments Command became aware that the U.S. Army Materiel Command was in the throes of a major reorganization. At that time, the STEADFAST planners felt that they would have to be privy to the concepts and details of the Army Materiel Command's reorganization plan so that interfaces between the two new commands and the reorganized Army Materiel Command could be more closely examined.²⁹ In its formal guidance for the development of the Detailed Plan for Reorganization, the Department of the Army pointed out that the Army Materiel Command was developing a plan which would reorganize elements of its headquarters, the commodity commands, and other activities. It was evident that this proposed reorganization could impact upon other reorganization actions, particularly upon Operation STEADFAST. Consequently, the Department of the Army directed that the planning groups at the U.S. Continental Army Command and Combat Developments Command coordinate with the U.S. Army Materiel Command to develop the proper interface for subsequent relationships.³⁰

U.S. Army Medical Command

Early in June 1972, the Office of the Project Manager for Reorganization informed CONARC that the Comptroller of the Army had conducted a study which recommended the formation of a separate Medical Command. The Army Vice Chief of Staff approved his Comptroller's recommendations on 1 July 1972 which provided, among other things, that the proposed Medical Command report directly to the Department of the Army with the Surgeon General having only staff functions. The proposed Medical Command would command all

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OSA, 24 Apr 72, subj: Charter for the Project Manager for Reorganization.

29

Info contained in the Outgoing Msg File, STEADFAST Recy File, ODCSCOMPT STEADFAST Coord Gp.

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Ltr DACS-MR, OPMR to DA ACSFOR, CG CONARC, and CG CDC, 15 Jun 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Detailed Planning, pp. 5 and A-1-A-1.

hospitals in the continental United States but would not command Medical TOE units.³¹ At the time that formal guidance for the development of the Detailed Plan for Reorganization was forwarded to the U.S. Continental Army Command, the Surgeon General's plans had progressed to a certain extent. The Commander, U.S. Army Medical Command -- under the Army Chief of Staff -- would command all Army medical activities in the continental United States, including Class II hospitals; Medical Department Activities (including Class I hospitals) under the MEDDAC Concept; and most of the Class II activities previously under the control of The Surgeon General of the Army. The MEDDAC commander would also serve as the Director of Medical Activities (DMEDA) on the staff of the supported installation. Except where the MEDDAC commander was senior to the installation commander, the former would be rated by the latter, with the Commander, U.S. Army Medical Command, having indorsing and reviewing authority. The headquarters for the new Medical Command would be located at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., which would suffice for the backfill requirements at that installation after the reorganization of Fifth U.S. Army. No STRAF/REFORGER medical TOE units would be included in the new command and the U.S. Continental Army Command would continue to plan for the assignment of such units to the U.S. Army Force Command. However, the establishment of the new command would impact upon the staff requirements for the Office of the Surgeon at the headquarters of both of the new commands as well as at the CONUS army headquarters. The Department of the Army directed the U.S. Continental Army Command to coordinate directly with the Office of The Surgeon General to resolve the question of the transfer of missions and functions as well as the realignment of the headquarters staffs.³²

The U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command

By the beginning of June 1972, the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM) also had entered the reorganization picture with a proposal to extend communications-electronics support to all installations in the continental United States, including those of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the U.S. Army Materiel Command. The Commander, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, would exercise technical direction over the program while the installation commander would exercise command over installation

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MFR, BG R.L. West, CONARC DCSCOMPT, 2 Jun 72, subj: Formation of the Medical Command.

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Ltr DACS-MR, OPMR to DA ACSFOR, Cdr CONARC, and Cdr CDC, 15 Jun 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Detailed Planning, pp. 5, A-1-A-1, and B-XII-1 - B-XII-2.

communications-electronics activities. This was similar to the support provided by the Strategic Communications Command for all oversea component commanders. The U.S. Continental Army Command was directed to develop data in support of this proposal in coordination with the U.S. Army Materiel Command and the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command.³³

The U.S. Army Military Personnel Center

Among the reorganization actions taking place at the Department of the Army level was one in which the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel proposed the bringing together of as many of the operating agencies in the personnel area as possible. By the end of June 1972, the basic organization proposed for the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center consisted of three major elements -- a Deputy for Career Development, a Deputy for Personnel Services, and the Army Physical Disability Agency. The new agency would also include the Office of Personnel Operations (OPO), the Personnel Information Systems Command (PERSINSCOM), and parts of the existing Office of The Adjutant General. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command was not included in the organization of the new agency at that time, but was to be considered for future incorporation. For the present, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command would retain its independent status, reporting directly to the Department of the Army. This effectively removed the Recruiting Command from consideration for inclusion in the new Training and Doctrine Command. Because of the many factors involved, the selection of a site for the new agency presented a major problem. At the end of June 1972, Fort George G. Meade, Md., was considered to be the most desirable location -- close to the City of Washington, yet outside of the National Capital Region. The retention of the reorganized First U.S. Army headquarters at that location, however, did not provide sufficient office space for the proposed agency. Hence, the Department of the Army Project Manager requested that the two planning groups co-ordinate the development of site alternatives. General Kalergis directed that the Detailed Plans to be submitted on 20 July contain outline space requirements for both the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center and the CONUS army headquarters concerned, along with recommendations for filling these requirements.³⁴

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Ibid., pp. 5, A-1-A-1, and B-X-1.

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(1) Ibid., pp. 5 and A-1-A-1. (2) Memo DACS-MR, DA PMR to CONARC DCSCOMPT, 21 Jun 72, subj: Alternatives for Location of DA Personnel Center. (3) MFR, BG R.L. West, DCSCOMPT, 27 Jun 72, subj: Army Military Personnel Center.

Developments at the U.S. Continental Army Command

Command Decisions

With the receipt of the approved guidance for the development of the Detailed Plan for Reorganization, it was evident that the U.S. Continental Army Command might not be able to comply with all elements of that guidance by the 20 July 1972 suspense date. General Pepke informed General Kalergis on 17 June that it would be necessary to submit addendums to the plan subsequent to the established deadline. General Pepke further pointed out that the impact of the new Medical Command, the Army Military Personnel Center, the "Manifesto" at the Department of the Army level, communications support in the continental United States, and CONARC's Task Force ATLAS would have a reverberating effect on organization, staffing, manpower, and costs. The "Manifesto" referred to by General Pepke was an Army Chief of Staff Memorandum (CSM) concerning materiel acquisition guidelines which had been submitted to the Secretary of the Army for approval and signature. Its major purpose was to serve as guidance for the development of procedures for systems acquisition. In order to develop the Detailed Plan, the CONARC Operation STEADFAST Study Group required further guidance and decisions by the CONARC commander with particular regard to the supervision of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program; supervision of the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions; Task Force ATLAS and the Three Center Concept; and the CDEC/MASSTER Test Program.³⁵

The Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. In developing the Outline Plan, General Haines had directed that management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Program be assigned to the Force Command since only the CONUS armies could provide essential mid-management and, in his opinion, the Training and Doctrine Command already had sufficient high priority missions. The Department of the Army staff, on the other hand, pointed out that the ROTC Program was not related to the missions and functions of the Force Command but was an educational function which was strictly in the purview of the Training and Doctrine Command. Moreover, the Army Vice Chief of Staff had approved the concept of conducting the ROTC summer camps within the Training and Doctrine Command's training base. In view of the fact that no alternative could be found which

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(1) DF, Spec Asst to the CofS to CONARC CofS, 17 Jun 72, subj: Detailed Planning Guidance and Status of Certain Planning Actions (STEADFAST). (2) DF ATCOM, STEADFAST Coord to CONARC CofS, 17 Jun 72, subj: Concept and Decision Papers on Status of STEADFAST Actions. (3) Ltr CS-SSG-TRADOC-110, MG Pepke to MG Kalergis, 17 Jun 72, re: Detailed guidance for reorganization planning.

would provide adequate middle management, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group recommended "dual-hatting" the CONUS army commanders for this purpose. Thus the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, would have the mission to direct, supervise, support, and co-ordinate all matters pertaining to the organization, training for, and administration of, the Reserve Officer Training Corps/ National Defense Cadet Corps Programs. The CONUS army commanders would assume mid-management responsibilities in assigned areas for command of the ROTC control elements consisting of management and administrative cells to provide the necessary functions for managing and administering the pertinent programs. The headquarters of the CONUS armies, along with the organic co-ordinating element, would provide general officer command supervision, area support, and co-ordination. This arrangement would permit the Force Command to disengage from management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program and would effectively simplify the command and control problem.³⁶ This concept was approved by General Haines on 20 June with the stipulation that it be expanded and forwarded to the Department of the Army as an Operation STEADFAST concept.³⁷

U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions. Another mid-management problem was encountered with respect to the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions. These activities were to be commanded by the Force Command, with the Training and Doctrine Command exercising operational control. The STEADFAST Study Group indicated a possible solution to this problem which would assign operational control of the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions to the Training and Doctrine Command, but would "dual-hat" the CONUS army commanders. It was evident that the middle management capability required to support the Training and Doctrine Command rested in the CONUS armies, those major headquarters which had overall cognizance and responsibility for the Reserve Components Program. "Dual-hatting" the CONUS army commander for this purpose seemed to be the cleanest and most workable solution, one which would permit the disengagement of Headquarters, Force Command, from management of the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions and effectively simplify the command and control problem. General Haines approved the concept for "dual-hatting" the CONUS army commanders with regard to the command and management of the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions on 20 June 1972. At that time, he stipulated that this concept should also be further developed

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DF ATCOM, STEADFAST Coord to CONARC CofS, 17 Jun 72, subj: Concept and Decision Papers on Status of STEADFAST Actions, w/incl 1.

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MFR, BG West, 20 Jun 72, subj: Meeting with General Haines on Planning Guidance and Status of Planning Actions (STEADFAST).

and forwarded to the Department of the Army as the official STEADFAST concept,³⁸

The Task Force ATLAS Study. The Three Center Concept for mid-management elements of the combat developments program surfaced shortly after the submission of the Outline Plan to the Department of the Army. In mid-May 1972, the CONARC Chief of Staff had established Task Force ATLAS to study and develop the concept for inclusion in the finalized version of the Detailed Plan. The mission of the task force was to determine the need for, and the feasibility of, a Logistics Center and an Administrative Center -- in addition to the existing Combat Arms Agency at Fort Leavenworth -- and to determine an appropriate organizational structure for the three centers along with missions and functions.³⁹ The ATLAS Concept, as developed by the CONARC task force, was briefed to the Chiefs of Staff of CONARC and CDC and selected staff officers of the two headquarters. This briefing revealed the disagreement of the Combat Developments Command with the Task Force ATLAS Concept. CDC envisioned mid-management centers, with inherent tasking authority, which would integrate all combat developments products of the subordinate elements. The ATLAS Concept, on the other hand, envisioned centers which would integrate and task on a selective basis, as approved by the Training and Doctrine Command, but not becoming involved in every minor combat developments product. In such cases, the centers would manage by exception. The task force recommended on 17 June 1972, that the ATLAS concept for the mid-management of combat developments be approved for submission as the STEADFAST study effort and that the study be briefed to General Haines prior to finalization in the Detailed Plan.⁴⁰ The question of the Three Center Concept, however, remained among the unresolved issues at the time that the Detailed Plan for Reorganization was submitted to the Department of the Army.

The CDEC/MASSTER Test Program

The receipt of the official Department of the Army guidance for the development of the Detailed Plan did not provide any resolution of the question of command of the combined CDEC/MASSTER test

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(1) Ibid. (2) DF ATCOM, STEADFAST Coord to CONARC Cofs, 17 Jun 72, subj: Concept and Decision Papers on Status of STEADFAST Actions, w/incl 1.

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See below, pp. 160 - 163.

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DF ATCOM, STEADFAST Coord to CONARC Cofs, 17 Jun 72, subj: Concept and Decision Papers on Status of STEADFAST Actions, w/2 incl.

organizations. Despite numerous efforts -- both written and oral -- by the U.S. Continental Army Command and the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command to obtain a Department of the Army decision which would logically place the MASSTER Test Program at Fort Hood, Tex., and the Combat Developments Experimentation Command at Fort Ord, Calif., under the Training and Doctrine Command, vis-a-vis the status quo, the Office of the Project Manager refused to accept the arguments presented. By mid-June, General Kalergis was still recommending that the MASSTER Program be placed under the command of the Force Command; the Combat Developments Experimentation Command be placed under the command of the Training and Doctrine Command; and that test direction involving resources flow through the Force Command with technical test direction going direct to MASSTER. When these recommendations were presented to General Palmer on 16 June, he raised the question of other alternatives. General Kalergis responded with the information that three alternatives had been examined but then discarded. These included placing the entire program under the Force Command; placing the entire program under the Training and Doctrine Command; and the establishment of a separate U.S. Army Test Command to include the existing Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM). Despite the information presented during the briefing for the Army Vice Chief of Staff, neither the U.S. Continental Army Command nor the Combat Developments Command saw anything to cause them to change their positions.⁴¹

The CONARC/CDC Position. The U.S. Continental Army Command outlined its position, along with supporting arguments, in a position paper forwarded to the Project Manager on 7 June and repeated its rationale and position to the Army Vice Chief of Staff on 17 June. In explaining the command position to the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Pepke pointed out that the collocation of most of the Test and Evaluation Command's test boards with the major schools lent itself to a logical program of concurrent tests by the Army Materiel Command and operational tests using school troops and the expertise of both the schools and agencies. It was the consensus of both the U.S. Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command that the Commander of the Force Command would not want to be encumbered with preparing and supervising these tests, despite the fact that his troops would necessarily be involved in specific tests. Basic to the recommendations of the U.S. Continental Army Command was the fact that MASSTER -- a 600-man package then in place at Fort Hood, Tex. -- should be under the command and control of the Training and Doctrine Command and that distinction

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(1) DF, SSG to CONARC Cofs, 17 Jun 72, subj: MASSTER/CDEC Command Relationship. (2) MFR CS-SSG-TRADOC, BG G.J. Duquemin, 17 Jun 72, subj: PMR's CDEC/MASSTER Decision Briefing to the Vice Chief on 16 June 1972.

should be made between MASSTER and the Commander, III Corps, who was currently "dual-hatted," CONARC did foresee certain instances in which MASSTER -- or some of its elements -- would be moved to installations of either the Force Command or the Training and Doctrine Command for specified tests. However, if they were moved to Force Command installations, CONARC did not feel that the Commander of the Force Command should become enmeshed in testing per se, since he would be concentrating on troop readiness and force deployment. Both CONARC and the Combat Developments Command visualized the Commander of the Force Command in the same light as the major oversea commanders -- vitally interested in the end-product, but not in the day-to-day test procedures.⁴²

In presenting their arguments to the Department of the Army Project Manager, the U.S. Continental Army Command planners pointed out that the MASSTER organization and the Combat Developments Experimentation Command could not possibly be merged in the immediate future, but that a single command -- the Training and Doctrine Command -- would balance their test efforts and provide a natural relationship for eventual savings, elimination of duplication, and long-term merger. Furthermore, the commanders and their staffs who were most familiar with, and thoroughly understood, the processes discussed -- the Commanders of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command -- had agreed that the two agencies in question belonged under the new Training and Doctrine Command. They would not be so adamant in their position if they did not believe it to be in the best interests of the entire Army as well as those of the test program and its direction.⁴³

CONARC Recommendations. Despite all of the arguments used by the Office of the Project Manager to support a split in the command and control of the test programs, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group recommended that the U.S. Continental Army Command persevere in the contention that the MASSTER/CDEC Test Programs be placed under the command of the Training and Doctrine Command. At the same time, the Office of the Project Manager was strongly urged to accept his Executive Agents' view as one which would permit the U.S. Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command to achieve an efficient and effective MASSTER/CDEC organization under the command of the Training and Doctrine Command. On 20 June 1972, General Haines indicated that the U.S. Continental Army Command would continue

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Ltr MG Pepke to GEN Palmer, 17 Jun 72, re: Command of the Combined CDEC/MASSTER Test Program.

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Ltr MG Pepke to MG Kalergis, 7 Jun 72, re: Command and Control of the CDEC/MASSTER Test Programs.

to support its previously stated position that the entire CDEC/MASSTER Test Program be assigned to the Training and Doctrine Command. He further stipulated that a letter be dispatched to the Army Vice Chief of Staff, outlining and justifying CONARC's position in this regard.⁴⁴

Logistical Concepts

The CONARC Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics established a special study group -- within the STEADFAST planning organization -- to develop the logistical portion of the Detailed Plan. In developing the logistical concept for Operation STEADFAST, consideration was given to the transition from the existing organizational structure to STEADFAST, followed by actual operation under the STEADFAST structure. All logistical missions and functions then assigned to, or performed by, the headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command, the Combat Developments Command, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, or the CONUS armies were identified and surveyed for one of three possible actions: retention in the logistics systems of the new commands; elimination; or shifting to the National level, to other major Army commands or agencies, or to the installation level. However, the automated systems of the Standard Army Installation Logistics System (SAILS) would not be completely available during the transition period. Consequently, the new logistics system would have to be designed to accomplish logistics missions and functions at each command echelon with on-going logistics management information systems (both manual and automated) while concurrently taking into cognizance the requirements for the Standard Army Installation Logistics System.⁴⁵

Planning Factors. In developing the logistical concept for Operation STEADFAST, the special study group based its conclusions on a number of pertinent planning factors and assumptions. First, was the fact that the CONUS armies would be eliminated from all except residual functions as rapidly as possible but not later than December 1973. Installations would be required to feed data to the Force Command, the Training and Doctrine Command, and the CONUS armies either directly or through a Logistics Control Center located at the appropriate command. The wholesale logistics system would

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(1) Ibid. (2) DF, SSG to CONARC CofS, 17 Jun 72, subj: MASSTER/CDEC Command Relationships. (3) MFR, BG R.L. West, 20 Jun 72, subj: Meeting with General Haines on Planning Guidance and Status of Planning Actions.

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Fact Sheet, COL V.W. Reaugh, DCSLOG/DSSG, 17 Jun 72, re: DCSLOG Planning for Operation STEADFAST.

be required to feed data in the same fashion. The system to be employed by the two new commands would provide for interface between the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command in order to provide data to FORSCOM in the areas of supply, maintenance, facilities, transportation, and support services for its units located on TRADOC installations, as well as data to TRADOC for its units on FORSCOM installations. Area support and interservice support agreements would remain in effect until changed by co-ordination between the two commands concerned. The transfer of the U.S. Army Reserve and U.S. Army Forces, Readiness Command (ARRED) roles to the Force Command would serve to effectively reduce the logistical role of the Training and Doctrine Command from that currently played by the U.S. Continental Army Command. The Force Command was visualized as assuming its logistical role through a phased transition of functions and responsibilities on a scheduled basis from the combined U.S. Continental Army Command/Training and Doctrine Command. The Force Command would assume support of the Strategic Army Forces and the U.S. Army Reserve on a CONUS-wide basis so that the break between the CONUS armies and CONARC/TRADOC would be made clearly and decisively. In this respect, provisions would be made for duplicating essential portions of the CONARC/TRADOC data base for use by the Force Command. The phasing of the flow of logistical data from installations and the wholesale system to the two new commands would begin as soon as possible and proceed as rapidly as possible.⁴⁶

Conclusions of the Special Study Group. The special study group concluded that only one Logistical Control Center would be organized in each of the two new commands from assets of that command's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. These two centers would perform day-to-day logistical operation and management with on-board systems. The group visualized, however, that only one Logistical Control Center would impose item/system/funding controls on any given installation. It was expected, nevertheless, that the interchange of management information between the two Logistical Control Centers would be such as to enable the establishment of mutually acceptable management systems standards and parameters. Additional definition, system description, and ADP development were required to fully define interface requirements and make use of data sources. The two centers would have to use ADP at the earliest possible date and to the maximum extent possible in carrying out their logistics missions and functions. In this regard, maximum effort would have to be made to automate reports and management data and have the automated applications operational when the new commands assumed their logistics functions. All applications which could be automated would have to be identified so that priority

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Ibid., pp. 1 - 2.

projects could be established for their development. At any rate, the development of applications under the Standard Army Logistics System would continue under existing priorities.⁴⁷

Potential Major Problem Areas. In developing their study concept, the CONARC logistical planners uncovered three areas in which major problems would most probably arise -- engineer, procurement, and transportation. In the engineer field, some reorganization would be needed to stay within the strength ceiling constraints imposed by Department of the Army guidance. In line with that guidance, consideration was being given to such actions as tasking District Engineers to provide additional assistance, as well as the centralization of certain functions at the Department of the Army level or that of the Office of the Chief of Engineers. Actions considered in the area of procurement included an increase in installation contract authority; limiting TRADOC/FORSCOM functions to on-site inspection for compliance with departmental procurement directives; and the transfer of the responsibility connected with the head of a procuring activity (HPA) to either the Department of the Army or a Department of the Army agency such as the Army Materiel Command. In addition, major revision would be required in transportation procedures in such areas as those involving port calls for unaccompanied dependents and the approval of airlift for personal property to oversea commands. The major consideration in these areas would have to be the ensuring of an effective and responsive system of support to Army families.⁴⁸

Reaction of the Commander. On 20 June 1972, General Haines pointed out that the management of logistics was still an area of major concern. He also pointed out that, despite the fact that the shift from the subordinate army headquarters to the major headquarters without the benefit of improved systems would probably degrade logistical effectiveness, that shift could not be delayed merely for that reason. He did feel that certain automated systems would have to be on line before the armies could be disconnected. In further comments on the logistical area, he pointed out that he had no real objection to the Troop Support Concept as contained in the detailed guidance from the Department of the Army. General Haines did feel that this was at least better than the possible alternative

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Ibid.

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Ibid., p. 3.

of vertical commands.⁴⁹

Civilian Personnel Policy

In order to develop a proper civilian personnel policy for the proposed reorganization, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group hosted a conference of civilian personnel directors of the subordinate armies and representatives of the Office of Civilian Personnel, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army. As a result of that conference, a tentative civilian personnel plan was developed for inclusion in the Detailed Plan which was designed to keep turbulence to a minimum; keep within the current Civil Service rules and regulations concerning consolidations and transfer of functions; and offer the greatest possibility for continued employment. As a first step, tables of distribution showing job titles and grades for civilian personnel would be established for the Force Command, the Training and Doctrine Command, the subordinate armies, and their support elements. Once civilian job titles and grades were established, they would have to remain firm until the conclusion of the reorganization. Civilian employees of the First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies would compete for positions in the new tables of distribution for those army headquarters. Prior to entering into this phase, the headquarters of the subordinate armies and their support elements would have to be put in a separate competitive area. This action would forestall employees of any subordinate army headquarters from bumping into positions in the garrison, thus creating additional turbulence and reducing the efficiency of the garrison operation.⁵⁰

For the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command, on the other hand, employees who could be clearly identified with missions transferred to the two new commands would be given transfer of function rights. Thus, employees of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training, U.S. Continental Army Command, would transfer to the Training and Doctrine Command. Employees of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, U.S. Continental Army Command, would transfer to Force Command. Employees of the Combat Developments Command would be given transfer rights to either the Training and Doctrine Command or the Test Agency at Department of the Army, while employees of Third U.S. Army engaged in Reserve Component activities would

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MFR, BG R.L. West, 20 Jun 72, subj: Meeting with General Haines on Planning Guidance and Status of Planning Actions (STEADFAST).

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DF STEADFAST, SSG to CofS, 27 Jun 72, subj: Civilian Personnel Plan (STEADFAST), w/incls.

be transferred to First U.S. Army. All other employees of Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, and the subordinate armies would be placed on merged retention rosters and given job offers to either the Force Command or the Training and Doctrine Command. Wherever job offers were equal, management was constrained to avoid undue turbulence and expense by retaining the right to determine the command to which the employee received a job offer.⁵¹

Development of the University Concept

The official Department of the Army guidance for development of the Detailed Plan for Reorganization surfaced the "University Concept" for the control and management of the Army school system and those schools operated by the U.S. Army for the Armed Services as a whole. In providing his guidance to the STEADFAST Study Group on 20 June, General Haines stipulated that, under the University Concept, the Operation STEADFAST planners should push for the incorporation of all U.S. Army schools -- except the Military Academy -- into the Training and Doctrine Command. This included the Army Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee, Va., other schools operated by the Army Materiel Command, and those Defense Department schools for which the U.S. Army was the executive agent. General Haines stressed that this concept must include the Army War College since a close co-ordination between that institution and the Command and General Staff College was essential to the whole idea. However, the question of the functional proponent tie-in to the schools would be of some concern but should not be directly opposed by the STEADFAST planners. This functional aspect would be an essential feature in obtaining control of the Judge Advocate School and the Medical Schools. General Haines, however, cautioned that the primary application of the functional tie-in concept should be in connection with non-CONARC schools. Hence, the STEADFAST planning group should not be looking for new proponents for schools which were already in the CONARC fold.⁵²

By mid-July, the STEADFAST planning group had developed a conceptual discussion of the University Concept which they visualized as paralleling the placement of all strategic forces and active reserves under the command of the Force Command. The centralized responsibility, control, and direction of individual military

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Ibid.

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MFR, BG R.L. West, 20 Jun 72, subj: Meeting with General Haines on Planning Guidance and the Status of Planning Actions (STEADFAST).

training and education under one commander would assure that the training product was directly and continuously related to the actual requirements of the Army. The new Training and Doctrine Command would be uniquely structured to ensure orderly control of student progression in military training and education programs. A comparison could be made to a typical university system, with administrative control on the main campus exerted over satellite colleges granting two year associate degrees. Such a co-ordinated instructional effort would avoid unnecessary curricular duplication and overlap and would provide for economies and cross-fertilization. The proposed University Concept was not merely a matter of balancing curricula and training programs, but consisted of a whole complex of interrelated matters which made up an integrated system. These matters included instructional substance, procedures, plans, personnel, and the sophisticated management techniques for the use of all types of resources at a minimum cost. In addition, resources would have to be allocated and adjusted to changing requirements and circumstances, so that the whole system would have to be related to the real needs of the Active and Reserve elements of the U.S. Army on a day-to-day basis. With the University Concept, the Training and Doctrine Command would ensure the uniform use of innovative educational media and techniques pioneered in the CONARC schools such as systems engineering of training, programed instruction, computer assisted instruction, and closed circuit television.⁵³

In a comparison as to what the University Concept would mean, the STEADFAST planners pointed out that the U.S. Continental Army Command presently commanded twenty-three Army schools with a combined student load of 41,003; an Instructor School Overhead (ISOH) of 29,922; and an annual operating budget of \$162,952,500. On the other hand, the twelve schools not under the U.S. Continental Army Command were monitored by five different elements which did not allow for standard measures of effectiveness and the standardization of management techniques and criteria. The split in the Army's educational and training system which placed two-thirds of the schools under the U.S. Continental Army Command and one-third under other commands complicated co-ordination, funding, and the development of curriculum content. With the consolidation of all of the Army's schools, the Training and Doctrine Command would have the capability to monitor the Army School System in its entirety, thus ensuring a more closely integrated and co-ordinated training and education program for Army personnel throughout their careers. Under this concept, the wealth of knowledge and expertise available in the school faculties and total student body could be systematically tapped to tackle critical Army problems. The Training

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Incl 1, "University Concept," to Memo, BG G.J. Duquemin to BG R.L. West, 6 Jul 72.

and Doctrine Command could further shift resources or weight the effort by using its resources available within the schools. It was easily seen that this concept would provide a more closely coordinated interface between all doctrinal concepts from the rifle squad to the theater army. In the final analysis, the University Concept would permit the institution of systems management techniques, particularly those providing for the ease of programming and accountability. The system would lend itself readily to routine analysis of the fulfillment of any particular program along with its related costs. Most importantly, however, the Department of the Army could turn to one director of schools to accomplish the education and training mission -- a fully responsible head who possessed both the authority and the resources to accomplish the mission; namely, the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command.⁵⁴

Submission of the Combat Developments Command Detailed Plan

The U.S. Army Combat Developments Command completed its Detailed Plan for Reorganization on 19 July 1972 which consisted mainly of a transfer of functions to the new Department of the Army Class II Agencies and to the new Training and Doctrine Command.⁵⁵ In presenting the Detailed Plan prepared by his staff, Lt. Gen. John Norton, Commander, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, stressed that his command had made a determined effort and had gone far in meeting the targets established by Department of the Army for providing 189 spaces to the new Department of the Army Class II Agency and achieving an additional strength reduction of 691 spaces. However, the plans developed by the Combat Developments Command only provided for a net strength reduction of 416 spaces, plus the release of a 90-man tank company as the result of restructuring the Combat Developments Experimentation Command. In explaining his command's failure to achieve the strength reductions directed by the Office of the Project Manager, General Norton pointed out that the Outline Plan had not given sufficient consideration to the workload of agencies subordinate to the Combat Developments Command. Under the reorganization concept, these agencies would be combined with the schools of the Training and Doctrine Command to provide a foundation for the Army's combat developments efforts. The Outline Plan developed by the Combat Developments Command in May had estimated a reduction of 144 spaces from this amalgamation. In developing the Detailed Plan, however, the staff of the Combat Developments Command decided

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Ibid.

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The entire section is based on Ltr CDCCG, LTG J. Norton, Cdr USACDC, to MG J.G. Kalergis, DA PMR, 19 Jul 72, re: Submission of the USACDC Detailed Plan for Reorganization.

that this was a poor estimate since the trade-offs had failed to take into consideration the current understaffing of both the agencies concerned and the doctrinal elements within the schools. A complete restudy was being made to examine in detail the actual procedures for integrating the agencies into the schools. This study would have to be completed before any real personnel savings could be determined for this portion of the reorganization.

Despite the fact that General Norton considered this Detailed Plan as representing the best effort of the Combat Developments Command for restructure the on-going combat developments efforts of the Army within the prescribed format for the reorganization, several fundamental issues that would have a direct impact upon the final organization and staffing of the commands and agencies were still unresolved. First, there still existed basic differences of opinion concerning the command structure and the procedures for conducting operational testing and field experimentation. In addition, the specific procedures for implementing the Basic Policies for Systems Acquisition in the Department of the Army had not been developed for application to the new organization of the Army within the continental United States. Moreover, the overall Department of the Army concept for managing the Army's combat developments effort, which was undergoing a major redistribution in the reorganization, was not yet clear. General Norton further pointed out that resolution of these major issues would greatly influence the prospects for making the reorganization a workable concept.

Continued Concern Over the Reorganization Concept

General Norton took the occasion of submitting his command's Detailed Plan to once again voice his concern over the entire reorganization concept. He reiterated his belief that the timing and location of the planning effort precluded any in-depth analysis of alternatives. Moreover, the Combat Developments Command was not convinced that the creation of two new Department of the Army Class II Activities was the best way of strengthening the decision making process at that level. Nor did the command, as a whole, feel that such a concept would result in an overall improvement in the combat developments effort of the Army. The establishment of the two Class II Activities would only serve to create another echelon or layer which would assume responsibility for only a portion of the overall combat developments effort. General Norton indicated that the concept that the Class II Activities would address "selected" systems at designated decision points in the development cycle could result in a lack of continuity in the overall development of a system and could cause problems in ensuring the proper interface between "selected" and "non-selected" systems. General Norton pointed out that this was a good time to ask the question, "Does the Department of the Army Staff, through these two new agencies, really want to take the responsibility for the

detailed planning and execution of combat developments activities such as war games, simulations, field tests, and experimentation?"

In addressing the problem of the span of control, General Norton pointed out that, subsequent to the reorganization, the Training and Doctrine Command would have the responsibility for most of the combat developments functions then assigned to the Combat Developments Command. In addition, the new command would be responsible for the Army School System, individual training in the Active Army and the Reserve Components, direction of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program, and possibly command of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Thus, the Training and Doctrine Command would directly command twenty-two active major installations and thirty-five schools. With this great diversity of missions and heavy workload, the Training and Doctrine Command would be hard pressed to provide any significant improvement in the management of the Army's training and combat developments efforts. What is more, the proposed combat developments centers (Combined Arms Center, Logistics Center, and Personnel/Administration Center) were not to be given command authority over the branch and service schools whose work they must guide and integrate. Hence, the centers would have to operate by "tasking authority." While General Norton conceded that this arrangement was workable, he felt that it separated combat developments "tasking" from resources and, in effect, "double-hatted" the school commandants. It was evident that General Norton felt that "double-hatting" in any form represented a very weak organizational solution.

As a final argument, General Norton pointed out that a major reorganization of the U.S. Army in the continental United States which was accomplished concurrently with major changes in procedures -- such as revising operational testing responsibilities and implementing the new Basic Policies for Systems Acquisition -- might well prove to be unmanageable as far as mission continuity was concerned. In any case, personnel turbulence would be a major factor at a time when personnel stability was critical to the Army as a whole, with particular regard to those elements of the Army which would be concerned with the future tasks and composition of that Army. General Norton closed his arguments by reiterating the point which he had stated on numerous occasions previously -- that other alternatives should have been considered before any decision was made to undertake a major reorganization of the U.S. Army in the continental United States.

The CONARC Detailed Plan for Reorganization

The CONARC Position Letter

On 19 July 1972, the CONARC Chief of Staff informed General Kalergis that General Haines had approved the Operation STEADFAST

Detailed Plan which would be forwarded on the following day.⁵⁶ General Pepke pointed out that preparation of the plan had been a massive effort with a short deadline but that the entire staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command was convinced that it would serve well as a new base-point in the reorganization procedures. However, General Pepke voiced his concern -- and that of General Haines -- over several concepts concerning command relationships which were apparent in the Detailed Plan, particularly that which he labeled the "dual-hat syndrome." Throughout the Detailed Plan it was very evident that the basic reorganization concept had forced the subordinate army commanders, as well as almost every installation commander, to report to more than one senior headquarters. While this split in responsibility was not unique, the proliferation of this practice at almost every level was a cause for grave concern to the U.S. Continental Army Command. General Pepke pointed out that this meant that total responsibility was being thrust upon the installation commander and it was he who would have to account for all resources received and expended. Looking down, the installation commander/manager "commanded" as far as he could see; looking up, on the other hand, he could see several managers, any one of which would be his "commander" under certain circumstances. The position of the CONUS army commander would be equally difficult, since he had the burden of tremendous responsibilities and an increased geographical area to oversee, yet his control of resources was minimal and his authority was tenuous. His relationship to the major installation commanders in his area of responsibility was merely one of "co-ordination before crisis." While the STEADFAST planners had attempted to specify the command relationships of the subordinate armies with the major commands and their subordinate installations, those relationships had been difficult to define and left much room for misunderstandings.

General Pepke pointed out that, fundamentally, management was not synonymous with command, a fact that created problems with the implementation of plans already developed. While the management arrangements contained in the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan appeared to be practicable and workable, the command arrangements departed substantially from the traditionally understood military principle of unity of command. A decision to execute this plan constituted a decision to abandon this long accepted principle and accept in its stead the concept of a split in allegiance, loyalty, and responsibility as a normal command alignment. General Pepke pointed out that the consensus of his staff was that this constituted a dangerous departure from sound command theory and practice.

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The entire paragraph is based on ltr, MG Pepke to MG Kalergis, 19 Jul 72, re: Submission of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.

However, General Pepke firmly pointed out that the Operation STEADFAST planners would continue to review the Detailed Plan for reorganization and would use it as a basis for the required Implementation Plan. General Pepke, moreover, emphasized that there were still a number of important decisions which required the priority attention of the Department of the Army so that the U.S. Continental Army Command could proceed logically with the next step in the planning phases.

Executive Summary -- Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan


The Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, as submitted to the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization on 20 July 1972, provided the details on those functional changes envisioned in the Outline Plan of 5 May 1972, coupled with more precise organizational structures, phasing, and costs.⁵⁷ The Detailed Plan was intended to provide the basis for an Implementation Plan which would form and establish two new major commands, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Force Command (FORSCOM). The U.S. Continental Army Command submitted an Executive Summary and a voluminous Detailed Plan which was divided into three books. Book I contained data keyed to the period from January through December 1973 which could be associated with Phases I and II as discussed in the Outline Plan. This book contained not only general organizational information, but also personnel and costing data which was necessary for validation of the plan. An important characteristic of Book I was the chronological sequence of actions required to attain the end reorganization configuration. Additionally, the book addressed the various levels of management in their proper sequence from headquarters and mid-management to installation and school levels. In addition, the book addressed the question of command relationships between the U.S. Army Recruiting Command and the Training and Doctrine Command. Book II concerned the period from January to July 1974 and addressed those actions necessary for final co-ordination between the commands concerned. Additionally, it addressed the final mandatory actions required to phase down the CONUS army headquarters and eliminate the U.S. Continental Army Command. Book III was a compilation of on-going actions, the exact impact of which upon STEADFAST planning could not be adequately assessed at the time the plan was completed. This was a supplemental book identifying potential changes in Books I and II.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. As indicated in the Detailed Plan, the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

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This entire section is based on Incl 1, "Executive Summary," to ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, HQ CONARC to OCofSA, 20 Jul 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.

Chart 16 -- HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND



a ALSO PERSONAL STAFF OF CG
 b UNDER OP CON OCS ROTC

Chart 17 -- U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND ORGANIZATION






Chart 18 -- HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCE COMMAND



^a ALSO PERSONAL STAFF OF CG.

Chart 19 -- U.S. ARMY FORCE COMMAND



LEGEND:

— COMMAND

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--- INACTIVE INSTALLATIONS



THERE ARE NUMEROUS SMALL STRAF UNITS LOCATED ON INSTALLATIONS OF OTHER COMMANDS: THESE UNITS WILL BE COMMANDED BY THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED.

^a INACTIVE INSTALLATIONS

Command, was responsible for the development, direction, management, and supervision of individual training for the Active Army and the Reserve Components, as well as for formulating and documenting concepts, doctrine, training literature, materiel requirements, and organization for the Army as a whole. In addition, he would develop plans and programs for the introduction of new materiel into the Army. As the primary agent of the Department of the Army for training and education, he would command the Army School System and would be additionally responsible for the recruitment and procurement of officer and enlisted personnel. The Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, would directly command 20 active major installations, 35 schools, 3 Doctrine and Development Centers, the Army Training Centers, and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Through the medium of the subordinate armies, he would direct the senior and junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Programs and maintain operational control of the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions. Headquarters for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command would be at Fort Monroe, Va. The organization of the headquarters of the new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, along with a depiction of its major subordinate elements are shown on Charts 16 and 17.

The U.S. Army Force Command. The Commander, U.S. Army Force Command, would serve as the Army Component Commander of the U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and, for the purpose of developing contingency plans, of the U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). As the major field commander of the Department of the Army in the continental United States, he would command all units of the Strategic Army Forces and of the U.S. Army Reserve and would supervise the training of the Army National Guard. In addition, he would exercise command -- less operational control -- over the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions. The Commander, U.S. Army Force Command, would directly command all installations intimately connected with activities of that command, as well as the subordinate armies, except for matters connected with the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. Headquarters for the U.S. Army Force Command would be located at Fort McPherson, Ga., with staff elements located also at the Atlanta Army Depot. The organization of the headquarters of the U.S. Army Force Command and a breakout of its major subordinate elements, are shown on Charts 18 and 19. The primary missions to be assigned to the subordinate army headquarters under the reorganization included the command of the U.S. Army Reserve; management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program; co-ordination of geographic area responsibilities; planning for mobilization; co-ordination of support for domestic emergencies; and the exercise of training supervision over the Army National Guard. The subordinate armies would be completely eliminated from the chain of command with respect to installations and Active Army units and activities. Headquarters for the three remaining subordinate armies would be at Fort George G. Meade, Md., Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and

Map 2 -- CHANGES IN CONUSA BOUNDARIES



Source: DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST. STEADFAST Coord to COMARC Stf, 15 Jan 73. subj: Impact of Revised Boundaries on HQ CONUSA Standardized TDA's.

the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., with area responsibilities as shown on Map 2.

Manpower and Costs. The tables of distribution and allowances inclosed with the Detailed Plan were still undergoing continuing review as the STEADFAST planners finalized missions and functions for the two new commands and their support elements. The plan provided that the tables of distribution and allowances would be subject to modification for civilian grades and spaces until 1 January 1973, and for military grades and spaces until 1 April 1973. Garrison staffing was not addressed in the plan for several reasons: backfill plans for the three installations housing the reduced subordinate army headquarters had not been finalized; late completion of the table of distribution for the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, Training and Doctrine Command, at Fort Monroe and the late approval for the move of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command to Fort Sheridan, Ill., inhibited the completion of garrison staffs for those two installations; and garrison staffing at Fort McPherson, Ga., could not be determined pending firm decisions on internal headquarters arrangements for the Force Command at Fort McPherson and the Atlanta Army Depot. Consequently, the impact of the reorganization on total General Support Forces manpower levels could not be addressed in the plan. However, the manpower estimates shown in Books I and II of the Detailed Plan were compared to existing manning levels. Refined manpower estimates were as follows:

<u>Manpower Summary</u>		
	<u>Outline Plan</u>	<u>Detailed Plan</u>
<u>Totals</u>	<u>9,257</u>	<u>8,029</u>
Headquarters totals	(6,156)	(5,669)
Headquarters TRADOC	2,483	2,191 ^a
Headquarters FORSCOM	1,910	1,705
Headquarters Subordinate Armies (3)	1,763	1,773
Support Elements	(3,101)	(2,360)
TRADOC	1,227	849
FORSCOM	1,034	826
Subordinate Armies (3)	840	685
Guidance of DA-PMR		(8,455 to 7,855)

^a Includes 76 spaces for field activities in support of the Strategic Army Forces.

Estimates of one-time reorganization costs, as shown in Books I and II of the Detailed Plan, were based on the experience of the U.S. Continental Army Command in consolidating First and Second, and Fourth and Fifth U.S. Armies. However, these costs estimates contained numerous imponderables, including such matters as civilian personnel turbulence. Refined cost estimates were compared to current operating costs as indicated in the following table:

<u>Economic Analysis</u>			
<u>Annual Operating Costs</u>	<u>Before Reorganization (FY 1972)</u>	<u>After Reorganization (FY 1975)</u>	<u>Difference</u>
<u>Totals</u>	\$618,980,000	\$596,754,037	- \$22,225,963
Headquarters	110,187,877	88,360,917	- 21,826,960
Support Elements	35,280,303	30,730,296	- 4,550,007
Class II Activities	0	3,268,552	+ 3,268,552
CONARC Schools/ CDC Agencies	473,511,820	468,165,008	- 5,346,812
Add-on to Garrisons	0	6,229,264	+ 6,229,264
One-time costs: <u>Total</u>	<u>\$ 11,187,097</u>		
	9,667,857	Operations and Maintenance, Army	
	921,240	Military Personnel, Army	
	598,000	Military Construction, Army	

Phasing of the Reorganization. The development of phasing for the reorganization was constrained by certain key dates. Since the public announcement concerning the reorganization was scheduled to be made some time between November 1972 and January 1973, major funds would not be available for the reorganization prior to the fiscal year beginning on 1 July 1973. Consequently, the only major personnel move contemplated prior to FY 1974 was the move of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command from Hampton, Va., to Fort Sheridan, Ill., in the last quarter of FY 1973. The importance of the FY 1974 mid-year Budget Execution Review (BER) dictated that as much of the reorganization as possible be completed prior to 1 November 1973. This, in fact, defined a "window" for significant actions beginning on 1 July and ending on 31 October 1973. The CONARC STEADFAST planning group was still considering a tentative phasing schedule which might cause a revision of some of the transfer dates shown

in the Detailed Plan.

Effective 1 July 1973, dual headquarters would be established at Fort Monroe (CONARC/TRADOC) and Fort McPherson (FORSCOM/Third U.S. Army). Command of Forts Jackson, Benning, McClellan, Gordon, and Rucker would be transferred to the Training and Doctrine Command, while command of Forts Bragg, Stewart, McPherson, and Campbell, as well as Homestead/Key West, Fla., would be transferred from Third U.S. Army to the Force Command. Effective 1 August 1973, command of Fort Ord would be transferred from Sixth U.S. Army to the Training and Doctrine Command, while Forts Lewis, Carson, and MacArthur, as well as the Presidio of San Francisco would be transferred to the Force Command. At the same time, Sixth U.S. Army would be transferred from the U.S. Continental Army Command to the Force Command, while the Combat Developments Command would move its initial elements to the Training and Doctrine Command. On 1 September 1973, the command of Forts Knox, Dix, Hamilton, Belvoir, Eustis, and Lee would be transferred from First U.S. Army to the Training and Doctrine Command, while Forts Devens and Meade and the Indiantown Gap Military Reservation would be transferred to the Force Command. At the same time, U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and ROTC units and activities in the Third U.S. Army area would be transferred from that army to First U.S. Army. Concurrent with this latter transfer, First U.S. Army would be transferred from the U.S. Continental Army Command to the Force Command. On 1 October 1973, transfers in the Fifth U.S. Army area would be effected -- command of Forts Sheridan, Leonard Wood, Polk, Leavenworth, Sill, Bliss, Wolters, and Benjamin Harrison would be transferred to the Training and Doctrine Command, while Forts Hood, Riley, Sam Houston, and Camp McCoy would be transferred to the Force Command. Appropriate U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and ROTC units then in the Third U.S. Army area would be transferred from that army to Fifth U.S. Army, while the latter army concurrently would be transferred from CONARC to the Force Command. The final reorganization action would take place on 1 January 1974 when the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, the U.S. Continental Army Command, and Third U.S. Army would all be disestablished or inactivated.

The phasing plan provided that sub-installations and satellites would be transferred to the new major command at the same time that the parent Base Operations (BASOPS) installation was transferred. All sub-installations would be realigned under their new parent installations on 1 July 1973. During the period, 1 January to 30 June 1974, all residual functions of the CONUS armies related to installation management or the command of the Active Army not previously transferred to either the Training and Doctrine Command or the Force Command would be transferred to the appropriate new major commands.

Major Issues Contained in the Plan

Major controversial issues covered in the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan included such matters as civilian personnel management; the civilian grade structure; augmentation of Third U.S. Army headquarters; environmental impact statements; manpower displays and troop lists; the new Medical Command and the U.S. Army Personnel Center; installation mission statements and area support responsibilities; the disposition of reports; information systems; the new Logistics Management Concept; management of Engineer functions; the Army Casualty System; management of the ROTC/NDCC Programs, and the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions; supervisory elements; mobilization planning; the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command; the development of a schools model; the University Concept; the Enlisted Evaluation Center; and management of the combat developments program.⁵⁸ Because of circumstances surrounding the development of the University Concept and management of the combat developments program, these major issues will be treated separately later in this chapter. The issues of management of the ROTC/NDCC Program and the Reserve Components will be treated in a separate chapter.

Civilian Personnel Management. It was evident to the STEADFAST planning group that the magnitude of this reorganization would cause a significant amount of both inter-command and geographical personnel turbulence. Consequently, a plan was devised which would handle a limited number of civilian personnel spaces on a functional transfer basis. Specifically, all civilian personnel spaces in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training in the U.S. Continental Army Command would be functionally transferred to Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. Likewise, civilian personnel would be functionally transferred from Headquarters, Combat Developments Command to Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. The civilian personnel spaces in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, U.S. Continental Army Command, would be functionally transferred to Headquarters, Force Command. Finally, those spaces associated with Reserve Components activities at Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, would be functionally transferred to Headquarters, First U.S. Army.

At the same time, personnel in Headquarters, First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies would be offered reduction-in-force (RIF) rights to those positions in the residual functions to be retained in those army headquarters. All spaces for functional transfer

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This entire section is based on Incl 1, "Executive Summary," to ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, HQ CONARC to CofSA, 20 Jul 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.

would be identified by the servicing Civilian Personnel Office in both the old and the new tables of distribution. All personnel excess to the residual subordinate armies -- or not functionally transferred as indicated -- would be placed on a CONARC retention register. These personnel would be offered employment in inverse retention register order in either the Training and Doctrine Command or the Force Command. However, the geographical transfer turbulence would be drastically reduced by the new positions created by the U.S. Army Medical Command at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and the U.S. Army Personnel Center at Fort George G. Meade, Md. The STEADFAST planning group was confident that all civilian employees desiring employment in the new commands or agencies could be offered a job. In order to preclude undue turbulence, however, all civilian grades and job descriptions would be frozen as of 1 January 1973 and remain stable until 1 July 1974.


Augmentation of Third U.S. Army Headquarters. The Third U.S. Army headquarters had been staffed to execute the functions assigned to a subordinate army. However, beginning in April 1973, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army would be required to function not only as a subordinate army but would have to begin preparations for the assumption of certain responsibilities of Headquarters, U.S. Army Force Command. Hence, high quality personnel would have to be assigned to Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, beginning in April 1973 in order to assume the additional functions. Additionally, key members of the Third U.S. Army staff would have to be earmarked for assignment to Headquarters, U.S. Army Force Command, and stabilized in their existing positions. This stabilization would have to last through FY 1974 in order to provide stability and continuity during the reorganization process.

The U.S. Army Medical Command and the U.S. Army Personnel Center. The Surgeon General of the Army was developing a plan to establish a Medical Command which would command all Class I and Class II hospitals and all Medical Department Activities (MEDDAC's) in the continental United States. Some of the functions that formerly were the responsibility of the subordinate armies were planned for transfer to the Medical Command, to the Force Command, or to the Training and Doctrine Command. This plan presented a major problem since The Surgeon General intended to include the Medical Field Service School, Medical Veterinary School, and the Medical Optical and Maintenance Agency in the new command. The U.S. Continental Army Command, on the other hand, also had included these schools in the Army University family where all schools would become the responsibility of the Training and Doctrine Command. Another reorganization action at the Department of the Army level which had a significant effect on the Operation STEADFAST planning was the decision by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, to establish a U.S. Army Personnel Center. This center was intended to include elements of the Office

of Personnel Operations (OPO), The Adjutant General, the Personnel Information Systems Command (PERSINSCOM), and the Army Disability Agency. The adoption of this concept would have a definite effect on certain installations because of space requirements. In addition, there most probably would be some realignment of the functions of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and The Adjutant General at the Department of the Army level when the Personnel Center Plan was finalized. Because these reorganization actions were still in the planning stages, their impact could not be assessed in Books I and II of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan. However, the U.S. Continental Army Command's Implementing Plan would take into consideration the decisions made by the Department of the Army in these areas.

The Logistics Management Concept. In developing the logistics concept for the two new major commands, all logistics missions and functions then assigned to the headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command, the Combat Developments Command, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, and the subordinate armies were identified for elimination or transfer. The new logistics concept envisioned the use of the existing capability for automatic data processing, along with a planned enhancement of that capability. The logistics staffing for the two new commands would be accomplished by a redistribution of space authorizations then available in Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, and the subordinate armies. However, the subordinate armies would retain those spaces required to continue their logistics role in support of Reserve Officer Training Corps, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard, as well as those required to execute geographic area missions which included domestic emergencies, land defense, survival measures, mobilization, and the military support of civil defense. In developing this concept, the STEADFAST logistical planners gave full consideration to the fact that the Training and Doctrine Command and the Force Command would have installations in each of the three geographic areas in the continental United States. Moreover, each of these installations would be required to feed data to the two new major commands and the subordinate armies either directly or through the Logistics Control Centers of the commands. The wholesale logistics system would be required to feed data in a similar fashion. The new logistics concept would have to provide for appropriate interface between the Training and Doctrine Command, the Force Command, the Army Materiel Command, and the Strategic Communications Command to accept data for Active Army and U.S. Army Reserve units located on installations of another command. Because of the time element involved, area support and interservice agreements would remain in effect until renegotiated by the two new major commands. As a final measure, the logistical planners determined that the new major commands would have to have additional capabilities for automatic data processing.

Chart 20 -- SCHOOLS MODEL ORGANIZATION



Development of the Schools Model. The schools model as developed by the Operation STEADFAST planning group standardized those elements of each school which had commonality. The model addressed both the training and education mission and the combat developments mission. Each school would have a Deputy Commandant for Resident Instruction and a Deputy Commandant for Doctrine (Combat Developments). The latter office integrated the existing missions and functions of the Combat Developments Command Agencies with those missions and functions of the schools which were most closely associated with the combat developments mission. This arrangement placed combat developments on an equal footing with education and, in fact, emphasized combat developments through personnel increases. It was estimated however, that approximately 300 personnel spaces would be saved initially by the overall School/Agency merger. The relationships of the educational and combat developments elements of the schools is shown in Chart 20.

Follow-up to the Detailed Plan

Meeting with the Project Manager on 3 August

Members of the CONARC STEADFAST planning group met with the Project Manager and his staff on 3 August 1972 to discuss the initial reaction of the Department of the Army to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.⁵⁹ Subjects covered in the discussion included personnel, mobilization, the Reserve Components, the ROTC Program, staff structures, the effectiveness of the proposed reorganization, the logistics concept, intraservice support backfill problems, military construction, and the assignment of the MASSTER program. The conference did resolve the issue of the assignment of the MASSTER Test Program; General Kalergis stipulated that his next directive would contain the assignment of the MASSTER Test Program to the Training and Doctrine Command and would also specify that the Department of the Army Test Agency would by-pass the major commands on technical test direction matters. At the end of the conference, General Kalergis further stated that the two new commands should determine methods to measure the effectiveness of the new organizations within a year after the reorganization took place. Consequently, it was up to the planners at all levels to develop ways to assess the degree to which the objectives of the reorganization had been achieved.

Personnel. General Kalergis pointed out that the civilian

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The entire section is based on: (1) MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones, 4 Aug 72, subj: Conference with MG Kalergis on 3 August 1972. (2) Memo, MAJ J.R. Griffith for BG R.L. West, 8 Aug 72, subj: Meeting with Project Manager for Reorganization.

personnel policy must be consistent among the commands and activities involved in the reorganization. Hence, the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel would establish uniform civilian personnel policies and procedures and would co-ordinate all personnel plans. However, a reduction in the number of personnel and in the civilian grade averages beyond the current plans would have to be addressed. In addition, the STEADFAST planning group was instructed to review the requirement for the use of colonels as branch chiefs, particularly in the logistics area. General Kalergis pointed out that there would be fewer general officers and colonels in the structure following the reorganization.

Management of the Reserve Components. General Kalergis also indicated that the management of the Reserve Components and of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program were two of the most important areas in the reorganization and were key issues with General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff-Designate. In particular, General Kalergis stated that the Detailed Plan was lacking in the description of the overall concept for managing the Reserve Components. In reply, General Jones indicated that the Detailed Plan provided functional statements for each headquarters and each staff section and did prescribe how the Reserve Components would be managed, particularly with regard to funding and logistic support. When completed, the Detailed Logistics Plan would further describe the concept for logistical support. However, General Jones emphasized that the reorganization probably would degrade reerve readiness, rather than improve it, since the Reserve Components would be split from their close relationships with the Active Army, and the CONUS armies would be relieved of command of the installations supporting the reserves. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau thought that the Active Army needed to be more aggressive in its supervision of the Army National Guard. As a result of these problems, General Kalergis was instrumental in establishing a board of senior officers at the Department of the Army level to develop an acceptable concept for managing the Reserve Components.

The Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. Since the ROTC Program also was an area of concern to General Abrams, General Kalergis insisted that it be given equal emphasis with the U.S. Military Academy in the future. Consequently, any new system for managing the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program would have to show significant improvement over the existing system. General Jones explained that an additional study was being undertaken by the Operation STEADFAST planning group and would be presented to the Office of the Project Manager when approved by CONARC. General Kalergis emphasized at this point that the STEADFAST planners should consider all alternatives to include that of a vertical command concept.

Staff Structures. In discussing the various staff structures

developed in the Detailed Plan, General Kalergis voiced the concern of the Department of the Army staff that the Combat Developments Command had been picked up in toto and moved to the Training and Doctrine Command. He recommended that the CONARC STEADFAST planning group restudy the structure of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments in the Training and Doctrine Command in light of recent decisions which had been made with regard to the Three Center Concept and the two new Department of the Army agencies. General Kalergis felt that the planners should first determine the functional concept for the management of the combat developments program and then develop a structure to perform that function. The STEADFAST planners would, therefore, have to become more involved in the meshing of the Combat Developments Command into the Training and Doctrine Command.

General Kalergis covered the areas of logistics and personnel jointly since each would be supported by a combat developments agency. There appeared to be some duplication of effort between the Logistics Control Centers of the two new commands and the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, particularly in the systems design element. The Department of the Army staff recommended that this function be accomplished by the combat developments agency at Fort Lee. General Kalergis expressed concern over whether such duplication also existed between the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel of the two commands and the Personnel and Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison. While the STEADFAST planning group was developing a logistics concept for the reorganization, no such similar concept was being developed for the area of personnel. General Kalergis stated that new guidance to be issued shortly would stipulate that both major commands would exercise only minimum management in the areas of logistics and personnel but must be ready to expand upon mobilization. The philosophy that the Department of the Army should operate directly with installations and bypass the new commands seemed to be gaining impetus. General Kalergis went on to point out that his concept of the role of intermediate headquarters under the reorganization was one of minimum management. He was quick to add that this was not a "management by exception concept," and that any concept developed by the reorganization planners would have to have a contingency for quick expansion under mobilization built in.

The Department of the Army staff challenged the requirement for a separate Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development in the structure of the Force Command. This view resulted from the impression created by the establishment of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management in the Training and Doctrine Command and in the revised subordinate army headquarters. Pressure was exerted by the Department of the Army staff to create a Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management at the Force Command; General Jones pointed out that this possibility had been explored by the STEADFAST planners but had been found to be less satisfactory than

having separate functions.

The Department of the Army staff felt that there should be more uniformity in the organizational structure for the CONUS armies. There appeared to be a need to standardize the army structure down to an including the division level, although such a move would still permit a certain amount of desired flexibility. General Kalergis indicated that a certain amount of "layering" was apparent in the structure.

Meeting with the Project Manager on 16 August

General Kalergis met with the CONARC Chief of Staff, the STEADFAST planning group, and members of the CONARC staff at Fort Monroe on 16 August 1972 to discuss the reorganization plan in general and further Department of the Army reaction to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan. At that time, the Project Manager discussed and distributed draft guidance concerning future reorganization planning with a request for comments from CONARC. The revised schedule provided forty-five more days for planning, with the public announcement moved back to some time after the first of the year. However, the time phasing of the planned reorganization was not changed -- activation of the two new commands was still scheduled for 1 July 1973. General Kalergis provided information and guidance on a number of special problem areas which required further development. He pointed out that close co-ordination between the Department of the Army and the Operation STEADFAST planning group was essential in order to eliminate differences and reach agreement on management concepts in the personnel and logistics areas. In addition, a working group had been established by the Department of the Army with Maj. Gen. Donald V. Rattan as chairman to develop a concept for improved readiness of the Reserve Components. General Jones was the CONARC representative on that group, the recommendations of which were scheduled for submission by 8 September. In the same manner, Brig. Gen. T.H. Tackaberry, of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, was working on a proposal for a vertical dedicated structure for the Reserve Officer Training Corps under the Training and Doctrine Command, an area in which CONARC also was developing several alternatives. A decision was to be made as to the best solution for this program on 25 August, with submission to General Haines prior to 7 September.60

General Kalergis stipulated that clubs and messes would remain under the control of the respective installation commander with a

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MFR, BG R.L. West, 18 Aug 72, subj: Program Manager for Reorganization Guidance.

central agency providing only technical advice and assistance. While a detailed description of how area support was currently provided -- as contrasted to that visualized after the reorganization -- was being prepared by the STEADFAST planning group with a scheduled completion date of the end of September, General Kalergis requested its completion by 8 September for use in briefing General Abrams. The CONARC planners pointed out that the concept could not be forwarded until it had been approved by General Haines. General Kalergis admitted at this meeting that the University Concept was still a problem and that, to avoid confusion, the concept name was being changed to "The Army School System (TASS)." The STEADFAST planning group was to develop a co-ordinated position with the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel on each school in question. In the same vein, the Army Materiel Command was still questioning the need for locating the Army Logistics Management Center in the Logistics Center at Fort Lee. It was up to CONARC to get together with the Army Materiel Command to work out an accommodation on this problem.⁶¹

General Kalergis informed the U.S. Continental Army Command that various elements of the Department of the Army Staff had been tasked to co-ordinate the settlement of specific problem areas. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics was responsible for co-ordinating all planning relating to stationing and backfill at installations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel would co-ordinate the overall plans relating to civilian personnel, while the Comptroller of the Army assumed responsibility for costing. At the same time, the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command was preparing plans for communications support based on either a functional or a geographic organization. Two further directives of importance to the STEADFAST planning group were the decisions that the U.S. Army Recruiting Command would remain as a separate command but would move to Fort Sheridan, Ill., beginning on 1 April 1973, and that, for the future, all Combat Developments Command reorganization plans would come through CONARC and be submitted as a single package. In closing the conference, General Kalergis emphasized that three major problem areas would have to be worked out to General Abram's satisfaction if the reorganization were to be implemented: Management of the Reserve Components; management of the ROTC Program; and area responsibilities.⁶²

Unresolved Issues -- Mid-September

Despite the fact that the guidance received from General

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

Kalergis on 23 August had established a suspense date of 30 September for a complete update of the Detailed Plan, the STEADFAST planning group listed some ten major unresolved issues as of 20 September. This fact alone militated against meeting the 30 September suspense and served to underscore a significant need for major decisions in the near future. Although the CONARC plan for management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program had been submitted to the Project Manager on 8 September, no specific guidance had been received concerning its approval. This action impinged upon the staff of the Training and Doctrine Command, the staffs of the subordinate armies, and the establishment of firm space requirements and costs. In addition, it impacted upon certain installations in that spaces and personnel would have to be transferred from Fort McPherson to Fort Bragg, from Fort Meade to Fort Knox, from Fort Sam Houston to Fort Riley, and from the Presidio of San Francisco to Fort Lewis. In the same vein, a decision briefing was scheduled for General Abrams on 21 September regarding the concept of Readiness Assistance Regions (RAR) for management of the Reserve Components. As an adjunct to proper management of the Reserve Components, General Haines had expressed the desire to retain some dedicated advisers at the battalion level. The concept of Readiness Assistance Regions affected the staffing of the subordinate armies, the general officer personnel lists, as well as the costing and garrison staffing at a number of installations.⁶³

The CONARC study for establishing the three major combat developments centers was still incomplete. While an informal inprocess review of the study was completed on 20 September, Forts Leavenworth, Lee, and Benjamin Harrison had been tasked to provide analyses of a functional center with a suspense of 29 September. The final configuration of the three centers would have a major impact on the combat developments process itself, on the overall spaces allocated to the Training and Doctrine Command, and the staffing of both the Training and Doctrine Command headquarters and of the agencies at the three locations. Likewise, work on a finalized schools model was not complete since the CONARC Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training had just hosted a conference of School Commandants to integrate their ideas on the proposed schools model. The draft of the schools model would have to be staffed through CONARC headquarters with a probable completion date of late October. The lack of a firm doctrinal side for the schools model impacted upon the integration of the Combat Developments Command Agencies into their respective schools as well as upon the actual job descriptions. Still in the areas of schools, no decision had yet been reached by the Department of the Army on the assignment of the Judge Advocate

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MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG G.J. Duquemin and BG L.M. Jones,
20 Sept 72, subj: On-Going Actions as of 20 September 1972.

General School, the Medical Department schools, the Army Logistics Management Center, and the Defense Department schools. This factor impacted upon the combat developments processes, the staffing of the Training and Doctrine Command, the organization of the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, and upon overall spaces and costs for the reorganization.⁶⁴

In other matters concerned with the Department of the Army, the lack of resolution with regard to the functions of the new U.S. Army Health Services Command was significantly affecting the organization of schools for the Training and Doctrine Command, the location of the Medical Combat Developments Agency, and on the status of Fort Sam Houston, Tex., as an installation. In addition, the Department of the Army had not yet established an official position concerning the functions of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and direct management of installations. This guidance was essential for alignment of the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of both new major commands. No reply had been received from the Department of the Army concerning the STEADFAST Management Information Systems (MIS) Concept which included plans for handling personnel reporting in the event that the Standard Installation/Division Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS) was not operational. Neither had replies been received to the two letters from General Pepke to the Project Manager and to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel concerning this problem. Because of the lack of guidance for the development of Management Information Systems, all STEADFAST planning in this area was based entirely upon assumptions. All of these factors militated against any useful update of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan by the end of September as directed by General Kalergis in his 23 August guidance.⁶⁵

Establishment of the STEADFAST Steering Group

At the end of August 1972, it was evident that the level and scope of activities in connection with Operation STEADFAST had increased the involvement of all CONARC staff offices in STEADFAST actions. It was also evident that the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization would be levying many and varied requirements on the U.S. Continental Army Command for the refinement and expansion of material contained in the STEADFAST Detailed Plan which had been submitted on 20 July. In order to ensure the necessary control and co-ordination of actions concerned with Operation STEADFAST, the CONARC Chief of Staff rescinded the charter of the

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

STEADFAST Study Group on 22 August 1972. This action was necessary since the study group had been strictly a planning organization. Concurrently, the former Study Group was redesignated as the STEADFAST Steering Group (SSG), an element of the Office of the Chief of Staff. The Steering Group would function as the overall coordinator of STEADFAST actions which would have to be referred to the functional staff offices of the headquarters for required action. In this regard, all STEADFAST tasking actions would emanate either from the Office of the Chief of Staff or from the STEADFAST Steering Group, itself. By designation, the STEADFAST Steering Group was composed of the three Specials Assistants to the Chief of Staff -- Brigadier Generals Duquemin, Jones, and West -- and all personnel formerly assigned to the STEADFAST Study Group. Personnel authorized to act for the STEADFAST Steering Group were the three Special Assistants, along with Colonels E.M. Fry and J.J. Brockmyer, the designated Deputy Special Assistants for Operation STEADFAST. General Pepke directed that all STEADFAST actions would be processed through the STEADFAST Steering Group prior to forwarding to the Command Group for final decision; all policy decisions concerning STEADFAST were reserved to the Command Group.⁶⁶

Management Concepts for the Training and Doctrine Command

The University Concept

The introduction of the "University Concept" for the control of Army schooling into the approved guidance for the development of the Detailed Plan for Reorganization convinced General Haines that all Army schools, except the U.S. Military Academy, should be placed under the control of the new Training and Doctrine Command. This concept would provide for educational integrity and economy and would parallel the placement of all strategic forces and reserve forces under the command of the Force Command. Centralized responsibility for individual military training and education under a single commander would assure that the training product was directly related to the actual requirements of the Army. The organizational concept developed by the STEADFAST planning group was analagous to a university system with administrative control on the main campus exerted over satellite colleges granting 2-year associate degrees. This co-ordinated instructional effort would avoid curricular duplications and provide for overall economies. The university concept was not merely a matter of balancing curricula and training programs, but actually provided for integrated instructional substance, procedures, plans, and personnel. The system also would make use of sophisticated management techniques to improve

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DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CofS to the CONARC Stf, 22 Aug 72,
subj: Establishment of the STEADFAST Steering Group.

the use of resources at a lower cost. The U.S. Continental Army Command commanded twenty-three Army schools, while the Training and Doctrine Command, under the University Concept, was to command thirty-five schools. The twelve schools not under the U.S. Continental Army Command were monitored by five different elements, a factor which inhibited the use of standard measures of effectiveness and standard management techniques. With the consolidation of all of the Army's schools, the Training and Doctrine Command would have the capability to monitor the Army school system in its entirety, thus ensuring better co-ordinated training and education programs for Army personnel throughout their careers. The twelve non-CONARC schools to be added to the Training and Doctrine Command were as follows:⁶⁷

- Defense Information School
- Joint Military Packaging Training Center
- U.S. Army Judge Advocate General School
- U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
- U.S. Army Management Engineering Training Agency
- U.S. Army Materiel Command Ammunition School
- U.S. Army Medical Field Service School
- U.S. Army Medical Optical and Maintenance Agency
- U.S. Army Medical Veterinary School
- U.S. Army Security Agency School
- U.S. Army War College
- The Defense Language Institute

As indicated above, General Kalergis in mid-August indicated that the University Concept was a major problem and that the concept name was being changed to The Army School System (TASS). By the end of September, the Army War College had been removed from consideration for transfer to the Training and Doctrine Command; the Army Materiel Command strongly opposed the transfer of its schools and the Army Logistics Management Center; and the proposed U.S. Army Health Services Command intended to retain command of all the Medical Department schools and activities.⁶⁸ By mid-December the decisions had been made at the Department of the Army level

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Incl 1, "Executive Summary," to ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to OCOFSA, 20 Jul 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, pp. 19 - 20.

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(1) MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones and BG G.J. Duquemin, 14 Sep 72, subj: Telecon between MG Kalergis (DA PMR) and BG Duquemin and BG Jones. (2) MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones and BG G.J. Duquemin, 20 Sep 72, subj: On Going Actions as of 20 September 1972.

that only the Defense Information School and the Defense Language Institute would be added to the schools then under the command of the U.S. Continental Army Command. Thus ended the University Concept which would have placed all Army schools, and those for which the Army acted as Executive Agent, under the control of the Training and Doctrine Command.⁶⁹

The Three Center Concept -- Task Force ATLAS

The need for a mid-management level in the combat developments processes became apparent to both General Haines and the STEADFAST planning group by the time that the Outline Plan had been completed and submitted to the Department of the Army in May 1972. Consequently, General Haines directed the establishment of Task Force ATLAS to determine the need for, and feasibility of, a Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Va., and an Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., in addition to the proposed Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. In addition, the task force was to determine the appropriate organizational structure for all three centers along with associated missions and functions. In accomplishing its mission, the task force was to determine the existing methods of operation; survey existing and potential organizational problem areas; determine the operational and functional guidelines as envisioned if centers were established; determine appropriate structures, chain of command, and locations for the centers; determine the relationship of each center to one another and the interface with the Army War College; determine the doctrinal responsibility for the Division, Corps, Field Army, and Theater Army Support Commands within the operational parameters provided by Fort Leavenworth; determine the command relationships of the Center Commanders and the School Commandants; determine what portions of the Army Logistics Management Center and the Logistics Documents Systems Research Agency (LDSRA) would be integrated into the centers; and determine the relationships between the centers and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.⁷⁰

Conclusions and Recommendations of the Task Force. By mid-June, the Task Force ATLAS study group had completed its preliminary studies and was ready to present its conclusions and recommendations for a command decision prior to inclusion in the STEADFAST Detailed Plan. The task force defined the Combined Arms Center at

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Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to OCoFSA, 18 Dec 72, subj: Revision to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, dated 20 July 1972 (C2, Phase II).

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CONARC SSG, 15 May 72, "Charter for Task Force ATLAS."

Fort Leavenworth as an activity responsible for the development of operational doctrine, organization, and selected materiel needs for combat and combat support forces within assigned areas of pro-pensity for division through field army. It also was a location where resident and nonresident instruction was conducted in the exercise of combined arms command and the functions of the general staff for the Army in the field. The Logistics Center at Fort Lee was defined as an activity which made available at one central point those personnel and services specialized in the science of planning and carrying out the training, education, and doctrinal aspects of supply, maintenance, and movement of forces and related logistical functions. The Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison was defined as an activity which made available at one central point those personnel and services to provide the focal point for development, co-ordination, and communication of the Army doctrine and education related to the functional areas of personnel, administration, finance, military justice, religious activities, and medical service.⁷¹

On 17 June 1972, the task force recommended that Combined Arms and Logistics Centers be established but that the idea of the Administrative Center should be eliminated. A Combined Arms Center should be established at Fort Leavenworth under the command of the Training and Doctrine Command by combining both the Command and General Staff College and most of the elements of the Combat Developments Command's Combat Systems Group, along with specific elements of the Concepts and Force Design Group and the Intelligence and Control Systems Group. Likewise, a Logistics Center should be established at Fort Lee under the command of the Training and Doctrine Command, using the personnel assets and facilities of the Combat Developments Command's Personnel and Logistics Systems Group. Additional assets would come from the Combat Developments Command Maintenance Agency -- which would be disestablished and merged into the center -- the major portion of the Logistics Document Systems Research Agency (LDSRA), and the LOGEX Planning Group. The task force further recommended that all logistical training, educational, and doctrinal developments functions be placed under the Training and Doctrine Command by the transfer of the Army Logistics Management Center from the Army Materiel Command. While the task force recommended against the establishment of the Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, it did recommend that the Combat Developments Command's Personnel Administrative Services Agency (PASA) be integrated into the Adjutant General and Finance Schools to accomplish the combined education, training, and combat developments missions under the command of the Training and Doctrine

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DF TF ATLAS, SSG to CofS, 17 Jun 72, subj: Task Force ATLAS Study, w/2 incls.

Command. On 20 June, General Haines indicated that he still desired the establishment of the Administrative Center and that action should be taken to correct this matter in the Detailed Plan. He pointed out this was the time to bring up the issue of the Commandant versus the Deputy Commandant at the Army schools. General Haines indicated that it would be appropriate to designate the individual who actually ran the school as the Commandant and to differentiate this position from that of the Installation Commander or the Center Commander.⁷²

Further Guidance by the CONARC Commander. At a briefing concerning Task Force ATLAS on 11 July 1972, General Haines emphasized that the Three Center Concept would have to stress strong middle management. Because of the span of control of the Training and Doctrine Command, middle management was essential to relieve the burden on the higher headquarters in the area of combat developments. Therefore, the centers should have tasking authority over the various schools for doctrine and development only. General Haines directed that the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth should be a lieutenant general, with a major general as commandant of the Command and General Staff College and a major general supervising the Combat Doctrine and Developments Activity. The two major generals would serve as deputy commanders, responsible to the commander in their areas of interest. A senior major general should command the Personnel and Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison since that center included actual command of the Adjutant General and Finance Schools and the Personnel and Administrative Doctrine and Development Activity. However, the situation at Fort Lee was to be different; a senior major general -- not necessarily Quartermaster -- would command the Logistics Center and the Army Logistics Management Center, while the Quartermaster School would be commanded by a brigadier general. Both the Quartermaster School and the LOGEX Planning Group would be tenants on the installation which would be commanded by the Logistics Center. This guidance resulted in a revision of the Task Force ATLAS concept just a few days prior to the suspense date for the Detailed Plan.⁷³

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(1) Ibid. (2) MFR, BG R.L. West, 20 Jun 72, subj: Meeting with General Haines on Planning Guidance and Status of Planning Actions (STEADFAST).

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(1) Memo, Cdr CDC to Cdr CONARC, 11 Jul 72, subj: Combined Arms Center. (2) Memo CS-SSG-STEADFAST, Sp Asst to CofS to the CONARC CofS, 12 Jul 72, subj: Three Center Concept (Task Force ATLAS).

Additional Guidance of the Project Manager for Reorganization.

While General Kalergis had included some minor guidelines concerning the Three Center Concept in his overall guidance for the revision of the Detailed Plan, he issued definitive guidance concerning this concept on 5 October. At that time, General Kalergis directed that the three centers be structured so as to be strong focal points for the formulation, development, and integration of new concepts, doctrine, organization, materiel requirements, and functional systems. These centers would report directly to the Training and Doctrine Command and would manage the combat developments programs as designated by that headquarters. The centers would not directly command the service schools, but would have tasking authority for combat developments activities over certain schools associated with the respective center's primary functional area of responsibility. In tasking schools outside their immediate purview, the centers would pass such tasking through the appropriate functional center. Each center would be responsible for maintaining consistency in the doctrine for which it had primary functional responsibility, to include its promulgation throughout the Army School System. Each center would be responsible for the curriculum and instructional consistency at all service schools for that portion of the curriculum for which it had primary responsibility. Consequently, the three centers would be charged with monitoring doctrine dissemination at all Army schools. The service schools, however, were the grassroots base for the training and combat developments efforts of the Training and Doctrine Command. The schools would provide the basic building blocks which were to be used by the centers in developing organization, doctrine, and materiel requirements.⁷⁴ The later guidance resulted in a complete rewrite of Volume B, Book I, of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, with the latest revision taking place on 22 December 1972.

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Incl 1, "Concept of Operations of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Functional Centers," to Ltr DACS-PMR, DA PMR to CONARC CofS, 5 Oct 72, re: The Three Center Concept.

Chapter V

MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

The Reserve Officer Training Corps Program

Existing Structure for the ROTC Program

The management system for the Reserve Officer Training Corps/ National Defense Cadet Corps (ROTC/NDCC) Programs in effect at the time of Operation STEADFAST had resulted from an effort by the Department of the Army to upgrade both of those programs.¹ On the Department of the Army level, this management structure centered around a small ROTC Division, headed by a brigadier general in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, whose primary responsibility was that of policy direction. Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, on the other hand, assumed primary responsibility for the operational management of the combined ROTC/ NDCC Programs. This was implemented by a small staff headed by a brigadier general in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training. The CONUS army commanders, in turn, exercised the prerogatives and responsibilities of command associated with all aspects of the ROTC Program under guidance from CONARC headquarters. In addition, the CONUS armies were responsible for the direct supervision and support of all ROTC elements at academic institutions.

Although no major changes had occurred in this organizational structure since 1967, there had been major changes in certain operational areas to streamline administrative procedures, as well as in the areas of curriculum and educational philosophy. The existing organizational structure, therefore, included 2 brigadier generals, full time; 4 deputy commanding generals at the CONUS army headquarters who devoted considerable time to the ROTC Program; 5 brigadier general camp commanders who devoted full time for 2 months and part time for at least 3 more months each year to the ROTC Program; and 249 dedicated administrative personnel. In addition, eighty-six man-years of support were provided to the ROTC Program from various staff elements of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the four CONUS armies.

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The entire section is based on: (1) Incl 3, "ROTC Re-organization Summary," to DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, SSG to CONARC Stf, 27 Oct 72, subj: STEADFAST Summary Papers; (2) Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 20 Jul 72, Book I, Vol. A, p. A-2-29.14, w/C1 and C/2.

A major deficiency in the existing system was a relatively slow response to guidance from above because of processing delays in the two intervening staff levels -- the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate army headquarters. Another inherent weakness was the excessive span of supervision throughout the entire program; a single colonel at each CONUS army headquarters supervised the ROTC organization for that particular army area. The magnitude of this problem was best illustrated in the First U.S. Army which supervised ninety-seven Senior and fifty-seven Junior Instructor Groups. Consequently, one colonel was responsible for evaluating and rating ninety-seven Professors of Military Science. In addition, general officer supervision of the program was rather austere since both the commander and the deputy commander of each CONUS army performed this function in addition to their primary responsibilities. It was evident that senior officer guidance and attention could not be provided to the numerous and widely scattered operating elements of the Reserve Officer Training Corps.

Reorganization Objectives

Although they were not specifically delineated in the official Department of the Army guidance governing the development of the Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan, the objective for reorganization of the management structure of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program evolved from various conferences and elements of guidance issued by both the Department of the Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command. First, any reorganized management concept would have to provide an efficient and effective organization designed to produce well-educated and dedicated commissioned officers in sufficient numbers to meet the requirements of both the Active Army and the Reserve Components. In addition, any new management concept should, of necessity, minimize headquarters and staff layering so as to ensure a rapid response to operational requirements. Inherent in any new management concept should also be a reduction in the intermediate levels of management and an increase in the capability to exercise direct command supervision. Moreover, the concept should enhance recruiting and advertisement and provide visibility for a viable and vigorous Reserve Officer Training Corps Program at the civilian educational institutions and for prospective students.²

Provisions of the Outline Plan for the ROTC Program

The initial planning guidance furnished by the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization with regard to the

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Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 20 Jul 72, Book I, Vol. A, p. A-2-30, w/C1 and C2.

development of the preliminary STEADFAST Outline Plan merely stipulated that the proposed Training and Doctrine Command would direct, supervise, and support the Reserve Officer Training Corps and the National Defense Cadet Corps Programs.³ At the U.S. Continental Army Command, on the other hand, General Haines twice informed his Operation STEADFAST Study Group (on 17 April and again on 9 May) of his conviction that the ROTC Program should be the responsibility of the Force Command. The rationale for this conclusion was based on the assumption that only CONARC's subordinate armies possessed the requisite mid-management capabilities for supervising, directing, and supporting that program. On 28 April 1972, General Kalergis queried the CONARC STEADFAST planning group with regard to current thinking on the ROTC Program at that level. General Tolson and General Pepke both informed General Kalergis that this was still an unresolved issue; however, for the purpose of the STEADFAST Outline Plan, it would be included in the Force Command structure. At that time, General Kalergis pointed out that there was a general agreement at the Department of the Army level on the need for improved management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Undoubtedly, the contemplated reorganization of the Army was an opportunity to improve the current organizational structure. As a result of this thinking, the Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan continued the ROTC system which existed in the U.S. Continental Army Command by translating it into the structure of the proposed Force Command.⁴

Recommendations of the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group

Despite the desire of General Haines that the ROTC/NDCC Programs be assigned to the Force Command, the CONARC ROTC Directorate recommended that these programs, for obvious reasons, be placed under the Training and Doctrine Command. In a study prepared for the CONARC Chief of Staff, the STEADFAST Study Group also recommended that the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program be assigned to the Training and Doctrine Command. In addition, certain installations assigned to that latter command should be directed to assume intermediate responsibilities in specified geographical areas for command and control of the ROTC/NDCC Instructor Groups. While the Instructor Groups would operate under the control of these designated regional commands, installation

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Incl 1, "Initial Planning Guidance," to ltr, DA to Cdr CONARC, 5 Apr 72, subj: Outline Plan for Reorganization.

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(1) MFR ATCS, MG D.R. Pepke, 28 Apr 72, subj: Meeting with MG Kalergis -- STEADFAST Planning. (2) DF CS-SSG, SSG to CofS, 16 May 72, subj: ROTC.

logistical support would be provided, where possible, by installations of the Training and Doctrine Command or by cross-servicing agreements with installations of the Force Command. Installations which would act as regional commands included Forts Dix, Lee, Benning, Sill, Benjamin Harrison, and Ord. The transfer of missions from CONARC's subordinate armies to these installations would require augmentation for each of the installations, plus augmentation of the other staff agencies supporting the overall ROTC Program. Advantages of this regional structure included a reduction in the span of control; provision of closer supervision and better management of the Instructor Groups; control over the number of detachments assigned to each region to equalize the workload throughout the continental United States; and a more rapid focus of command attention on problem areas or individual deviations because of closer interface with installations and resources.⁵

Division of Opinion Within the STEADFAST Study Group. While the above proposal had emanated from the CONARC ROTC Directorate and had the backing of General Duquemin within the STEADFAST Study Group, it met with opposition from General Jones, the Special Assistant responsible for developing the structure of the Force Command. In supporting General Haines' contentions, General Jones pointed out that the CONUS army commanders were responsible for army area representation and that this particular mission would be enhanced by ROTC visits which would bring that commander into contact with college presidents, an important segment of the civilian population. The CONUS armies and their six proposed supervisory elements could administer and provide supervision over the ROTC Instructor Groups, thus providing those subordinate armies with a highly visible, prestigious mission. Conversely, the management of the ROTC Program would be an additional function for the six regional designated installations of the Training and Doctrine Command which were primarily committed to training. General Duquemin, on the other hand, pointed out that the ROTC function concerned personnel procurement, education, and training, all of which were the designated missions of the Training and Doctrine Command. Moreover, the ROTC Program was primarily an Active Army program and should not be associated exclusively with Reserve Component matters. There was a natural affinity between the responsibilities for supervising the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program which could best be managed by the Training and Doctrine Command. Moreover, if the six installation commanders of the Training and Doctrine Command were authorized

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TAB B, "Conceptual Plan for ROTC Organization under TRADOC," to DF CS-SSG, SSG to Cofs, 16 May 72, subj: ROTC.

to establish ROTC Support Directorates, they could be tasked to manage, administer, and supervise the ROTC Instructor Groups and to co-ordinate general officer visits.⁶

Reaction of the CONARC Commander. In answer to these recommendations, General Haines emphasized that, although there was strong logic for assigning the ROTC Program to the Training and Doctrine Command, he could not accept the mid-management level solution as proposed. He stated that he could not, in conscience, burden 6 center commanders -- 4 Branch Centers and 2 Training Centers -- with such a responsibility. Consequently, he directed that the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program be assigned to the Force Command but that the Training and Doctrine Command be given proponent responsibility for all Programs of Instruction.⁷

Guidance of the Project Manager, 15 June 1972

In providing official definitive guidance for the development of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, the Department of the Army Project Manager stipulated that, pending further evaluation, it could be assumed that the Force Command would be responsible for the management and supervision of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program on an area basis within the continental United States. The Training and Doctrine Command would be responsible for all training concepts, training materials, and curriculum development associated with that particular program. CONARC planning in this regard, however, was to consider the shifting of summer camp support to the Training Base in 1973 in order to permit units of the Strategic Army Forcea to achieve a higher degree of readiness. The Project Manager further directed the U.S. Continental Army Command to refine the ROTC management concept in co-ordination with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army.⁸ General Kalergis reluctantly accepted this solution only because his staff could not find an acceptable alternative which would provide an adequate middle management base. Consequently, this was not a popular decision at the Department of the Army staff, and the consensus in the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group was

6

DF CS-SSG, SSG to Cofs, 16 May 72, subj: ROTC.

7

CONARC ATCS Form 100 (ATCS-CG-72-168), Cofs to DCSCOMPT and SSG, 22 May 72, subj: ROTC.

8

App. XV, "ROTC," to Anx B to Itr DACS-PMR, DA PMR to ACSFOR DA, Cdr CONARC, and Cdr CDC, 15 Jun 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Detailed Planning.

that pressures might develop to reverse it. To bolster this feeling, the STEADFAST Study Group emphasized prior Department of the Army staff comments that the ROTC Program was an educational function belonging purely to the Training and Doctrine Command; that the ROTC Program was not an activity related to the functions of the Force Command; and that the Army Vice Chief of Staff had approved the concept of conducting encampments within the Training and Doctrine Command's Training Base.⁹

Recommendations for Inclusion in the Detailed Plan

The CONARC STEADFAST Study Group informed General Haines in mid-June 1972 that the supervision of the ROTC Program continued to be a source of major concern to the Department of the Army. The problem seemed quite similar to that concerning the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions which were to be commanded by the Force Command, but would be placed under the operational control of the Training and Doctrine Command. The most feasible solution for this latter problem was to "dual-hat" the CONARC subordinate army commanders so that they would be responsible to each of the two new major commanders. If the CONUS army commanders could be "dual-hatted" for one command situation, that same concept could be applied to the ROTC Program. As a result of this logic, the STEADFAST Study Group recommended that the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, be given the mission to direct, supervise, support, and co-ordinate all matters pertaining to the organization of, training for, and administration of, the ROTC/NDCC Programs. The CONUS army commanders could assume mid-management responsibilities in assigned areas for command of ROTC control elements. These latter elements would consist mainly of management and administrative cells to provide the necessary functions for administering and controlling the ROTC/NDCC Programs. CONUS army headquarters, with their organic co-ordinating elements, would provide general officer supervision, area support, and co-ordination. Thus, the CONUS army commander would control all of the resources associated with the ROTC/NDCC Programs but would respond only to the Training and Doctrine Command on matters connected with those programs. This procedure removed the Force Command completely from the management of the ROTC Program and went a long way toward alleviating criticism at the Department of the Army level. General Haines approved this new concept on 19 June 1972 and directed that it be included in the Operation

9

Incl 1 to DF ATCOM, STEADFAST Coord to CofS, 17 Jun 72,
subj: Concept and Decision Papers on Status of STEADFAST Actions.

STEADFAST Detailed Plan which was submitted to the Department of the Army on 20 July,¹⁰

Reaction of the Department of the Army

General Kalergis met with representatives of the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group on 3 August 1972, for the purpose of outlining the Department of the Army's reactions to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan which had been submitted to his office on 20 July.¹¹ At that meeting, General Kalergis indicated that General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff-designate, considered the management of the ROTC Program to be a key issue in the overall reorganization concept. General Abrams felt that, for the future, the ROTC Program should be given the same emphasis as the U.S. Military Academy and that the system for managing these areas would have to show a marked improvement over the system then in existence. General Jones indicated that the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group was reviewing this problem and that a new concept would be provided the Office of the Project Manager subsequent to approval by the U.S. Continental Army Command. General Kalergis directed that various alternatives be considered, including that of a vertical command concept.¹²

Further Study by the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. In issuing definitive guidance on 23 August 1972 concerning revision of the CONARC STEADFAST Detailed Plan, General Kalergis informed the U.S. Continental Army Command that a Department of the Army working group -- under the general staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel -- was examining means of strengthening the ROTC Program. Its proposals were to be submitted by 8 September 1972, as a result of which certain changes might be required in the ROTC management plan which had been included in the CONARC STEADFAST Detailed Plan. These

10

(1) Ibid. (2) DF CS-SSG, SSG to CONARC Stf, 22 Jun 72, subj: ROTC, USAR Training Divisions and Schools, w/1 incl. (3) Ltr, MG Pepke to MG Kalergis, 23 Jun 72, re: Management Concept for the ROTC Program.

11

See above, pp. 151 - 154.

12

(1) MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones, 4 Aug 72, subj: Conference with MG Kalergis on 3 August 1972. (2) Memo, STEADFAST Coord Ofc to CONARC DCSCOMPT, 8 Aug 72, subj: Meeting with Project Manager for Reorganization.

changes would have to be part and parcel of the revised submissions to the Office of the Project Manager on 20 October 1972.¹³

Directives of the Project Manager. In spelling out his definitive guidance, General Kalergis stipulated that, in order to ensure that the ROTC Program was well managed, received appropriate visibility, and provided the control detachments with adequate support, the current "dual-hat" responsibility of the CONUS armies with regard to the ROTC Program would have to be reviewed. Consequently, the independent studies proceeding concurrently at CONARC and in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, would have to be merged. General Kalergis directed CONARC to provide participants for the Department of the Army working group which was examining various alternatives for the management of the ROTC Program. This group, in co-ordination with CONARC, would submit a fully developed conceptual proposal to the Department of the Army Project Manager by 8 September for approval. If approved by the Department of the Army, the proposed concept would be included in both the revised STEADFAST Outline Plan and the Phased Plan for Implementation. However, any concept selected for implementation by the Department of the Army would have to include a concept of operations and a statistical measure of not only the existing system, but each of the primary alternatives, in order to provide a sufficient basis for comparison. As a minimum, the proposed concept of operation would have to include the interaction of all levels of management and functions, both administrative and logistical, performed for the Department of the Army down to the control detachments. Interface with both active Army and Reserve commands and installations were to be included.¹⁴

Recommendations of the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group


Upon completion of the studies at the Department of the Army level, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group informed General Haines and General Pepke that the Department of the Army and the CONARC studies concerning the management of the ROTC Program agreed substantially with regard to certain concepts. In particular, both groups agreed that the supervision of the program would be greatly enhanced by the establishment of a dedicated vertical organization under a Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC on the staff of the Training and Doctrine Command and the establishment of four ROTC Regions --

13

Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to DA ACSFOR, DA TSG, Cdr CONARC, Cdr CDC, and Cdr STRATCOM, 23 Aug 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Planning, p. 3.

14

Ibid., Anx B, App. XI, "ROTC."



Map 3 -- CONTROL REGIONS FOR THE RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS

each commanded by a brigadier general -- to provide the mid-management level element. The Department of the Army study, however, provided these regional commanders with only an austere operational staff; the bulk of administrative and personnel matters would be handled by an unidentified number of personnel from installations and from the headquarters of the Training and Doctrine Command. The CONARC proposal, on the other hand, provided for a more realistic staffing at the regional level.¹⁵

Proposed Mid-management/Regional Organization Concept. As proposed by the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group, the regional commands would be geared to provide intermediate management functions and to increase overall control of the program. By maintaining regional boundaries within the general confines of the proposed CONUS army boundaries, a standardization of control and management of the ROTC Instructor Group could be realized. Using the CONUS army boundaries as proposed by the STEADFAST Study Group (see Map 2), a 4-element regional alignment was proposed. First U.S. Army would have one regional command; Region I headquarters would be located at Fort Bragg, N.C., and would control approximately 110 Senior ROTC units with an average enrollment of 17,805 students. Fifth U.S. Army would be divided into two regions -- Region II at Fort Knox, Ky., controlling 69 Senior ROTC units with an average enrollment of 15,188 students and Region III located at Fort Riley, Kans., with 66 units and an average enrollment of 12,471 students. Sixth U.S. Army would have one region, located at Fort Lewis, Wash.; Region IV would control 45 Senior ROTC units with an average enrollment of 7,845 students. Since the number of units and the number of students enrolled in those units varied from region to region, adjustments would be required in the staffing of each regional headquarters in order to provide adequate support.¹⁶ Map 3 shows the location and boundaries of the four regional commands.

Conclusions and Recommendations. The STEADFAST Study Group concluded that both the Department of the Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command studies concerning the ROTC program generally agreed in concept for the management of that program throughout the continental United States. The plan developed at the CONARC level provided for the maximum supervision and control of ROTC units on a regional basis within the manpower constraints imposed by the Department of the Army. Consequently, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group recommended that the plan developed by the Department


15

Incl 1, "Staff Study, ROTC Analysis," to DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, SSG to CONARC Stf, 18 Sep 72, subj: ROTC Management.

16

Ibid.

Chart 21 -- COMMAND STRUCTURE, REVISED ROTC ORGANIZATION



TOTAL:

430 PERSONNEL IN REGIONAL HQ & ABOVE

2878 PERSONNEL LOCATED IN ROTC INSTRUCTOR GROUPS AT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

GENERAL OFFICERS:

- 1 BG - HQ DA
- 1 MG - HQ TRADOC
- 4 BG - REGIONAL & CAMP COMMANDERS

of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel be approved as modified by the provisions of the CONARC study.¹⁷

The Finalized ROTC Management Concept

The concept for management of the ROTC Program, as included in the revised Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, was based on the plan developed at the Department of the Army level and modified by the U.S. Continental Army Command. This concept included the establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC at Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, and the establishment of four regional commands with mid-management responsibilities in designated areas for command and control of the operating elements of the program. The ROTC Instructor Groups would operate under the direct command of these regional commands. This concept established a more simplified and direct chain of command between Headquarters, Department of the Army and the operating elements -- from the Director of ROTC in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army; through the Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC at Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command (as opposed to a Director for ROTC); through the ROTC Region headquarters (as opposed to the deputy commanding general of the CONUS army); to the Professor of Military Science in the individual ROTC Instructor Group. All operational agencies -- both Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, and the headquarters of the four ROTC Regions -- received sufficient resources to accomplish the overall objectives of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. Chart 21 shows the simplified chain of command for the revised ROTC management structure.¹⁸

Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC, Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. The newly created Office of the Deputy Chief Staff for the Reserve Officer Training Corps at Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, was given staff responsibility over the Senior and Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Programs and the National Defense Cadet Corps Program. This staff office would exercise operational control over the U.S. Army ROTC Regions to include managerial and operational control responsibilities, less those functions and responsibilities retained by the Department of the Army or support functions accomplished by other staff agencies of Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. The

17

Ibid.

18

Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 20 Jul 72, Book I, Vol. A, pp. A-2-29.14 - A-2-36 and Vol. B, pp. B-5-6 - B-5-16.1, w/C1 and C2.

**Chart 22 -- INTERNAL ORGANIZATION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR ROTC HEADQUARTERS, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND**





Chart 23 -- STANDARD ORGANIZATION FOR HEADQUARTERS, ROTC REGIONS



Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC would serve additionally as the Program Director for the ROTC/NDCC Programs to include Program 8 (ROTC/NDCC only), and Budget Program 3300 (Reserve Officer Candidates). Chart 22 shows the internal organization of the staff office as proposed in the revised Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.¹⁹

Organization and Missions of the ROTC Regions. Identical missions were assigned to each of the four ROTC Regions contained in the finalized management structure for the ROTC/NDCC Programs. Each region would command all assigned Instructor Groups offering the Senior and Junior ROTC Programs within its area of jurisdiction. In addition, the region would direct the dual mission of cadet procurement and education within its own area; direct the information, recruiting, and publicity programs both on and off the campus of the host institutions; and plan, program, and budget for those resources required to support the programs. The region would be responsible for providing liaison in both directions -- with higher headquarters, with institutional authorities, and with appropriate installations. The region would also be required to take all actions necessary in the establishment and disestablishment of ROTC and NDCC units and in managing the Army ROTC Financial Assistance (Scholarship) Program. And, finally, the region would be responsible for commanding the annual summer encampments within its area. The organizational structure of the headquarters of the ROTC Region is shown on Chart 23.²⁰

Benefits of the Revised Management Concept. The organizational structure as contained in the revised Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan was designed to provide an improved, visible, effective, and responsive management system for the administration of the largest source of qualified commissioned officers at the least cost to the government. This organization eliminated the basic deficiencies in the existing system, the layering in headquarters, and the excessive span of control. Within the dedicated ROTC management system, policy decisions would be expedited and command response could be rapid. The designation of a major general as the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Reserve Officer Training Corps in the headquarters of the Training and Doctrine Command gave proper emphasis and prestige to the total program through an interface with the highest civilian educational authorities. The general officers (brigadier generals), with supervisory deputies, in the four ROTC Regions increased the senior officer supervision

19

Ibid., Book I, Vol. A, pp. A-2-35 - A-2-36.

20

Ibid., Book I, Vol. B, pp. B-5-6 - B-5-15.

of the operating elements five-fold. Operating costs could be more easily identified, thus enhancing both resource management and programing. Since the regional commander was also the summer camp commander within his area of responsibility, additional general officer requirements were eliminated. The Department of the Army and CONARC felt that the planners had produced what was required of them -- a highly visible, viable, and vigorous ROTC Program which would be capable of inducing dedicated young Americans to serve their country in the Active Army or the Reserve Components.²¹

Phasing Schedule. The phasing of the new management concepts for the ROTC/NDCC Programs was scheduled to coincide with the transition of the existing functions from Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, to Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. However, the transfer of functions, changes in staffing procedures, and physical movement would actually be minimal. Phasing between the subordinate CONUS army headquarters and ROTC Region headquarters would be programed to occur immediately after the CY 1973 summer encampment. Actual transition would begin in March 1973, with a completion date of 1 August 1973. In the transition, the cadre for the headquarters of the new ROTC Regions would be provided initially by the CONUS armies.²²

Management Structure for the Reserve Components

Background of Reserve Components Management

Prior to 1958, all U.S. Army Reserve activities were supervised and administered by Military Districts, the boundaries of which normally coincided with those of the states. Each district was commanded by a senior colonel who was supported by a staff of approximately 300 Army advisers, ROTC instructors, and administrative personnel. The chain of command under this concept, was from the Department of the Army, through the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate CONUS armies, to the districts. In 1958, the Military Districts were replaced by fourteen Active Army corps headquarters. The rationale behind this change included such factors as overcoming the limitations imposed by state boundaries, the clarification and simplification of the chain of command, economy in operations, and the added prestige accruing to

21

(1) Ibid., Book I, Vol. A, p. A-2-31. (2) Incl 3, "ROTC Reorganization Summary," p. 4, to DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, SSG to CONARC Stf, 27 Oct 72, subj: STEADFAST Summary Papers.

22

Ibid.

the U.S. Army Reserve Program through the assigning of Active Army major generals as corps commanders.²³

In January 1967, the Secretary of Defense directed that the fourteen corps headquarters be inactivated over a 2-year period; the U.S. Continental Army Command completed the directed inactivations by 1 July 1968. The missions and responsibilities of the corps were transferred to the subordinate CONUS armies on the assumption that economies and improvements in the administration of the U.S. Army Reserve Program could be achieved. In the latter part of FY 1967, U.S. Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM's) were established to supervise the training of all U.S. Army Reserve units that were not organic to existing Reserve General Officer Commands (GOCOM's), thus providing U.S. Army Reserve units with a responsive mid-management echelon. Initially, some 5,000 to 7,000 civilian technicians were authorized to provide day-to-day operations at these Army Reserve Commands. The subordinate CONUS armies were authorized an additional major general position for the supervision of Reserve activities and various Sector Commands were established to represent the army commander in the field. At the CONARC level, the Deputy Commander continued to be the principal officer responsible for Reserve affairs, in addition to his other duties. However, there was no uniformity in the system; each of the armies adopted somewhat different degrees of centralization within its own headquarters and support in the field differed from army to army.²⁴

During the second quarter of FY 1971, the Secretary of Defense announced the adoption of the Total Force Concept, which would result in much greater reliance on the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. As a matter of national policy, the Reserve Components would be the source of those additional units and individuals required in any future large and rapid expansion of the Active Army. In view of this new role for the Reserve Components, the Department of the Army initiated numerous actions which were intended to improve the capabilities and increase the readiness of both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. Included in such actions were large-scale equipment issues; increased Active Army/Reserve Component associated unit programs; increased technician levels; and improved recruiting programs. When planning was begun for the Operation STEADFAST reorganization of the Army in

23

TAB A, "Supervision of USAR Units," to ltr DARC-PR, CORC DA to CONARC CofS, 7 Aug 72, subj: Seminar on Active Army Support for Reserve Components.

24

Ibid.

the continental United States, it was assumed that the personnel administration and logistical support activities serving the Reserve Components were satisfactory. Major improvements, however, were both desired and required in the areas of training supervision, mobilization planning, and the attainment of operational readiness.²⁵

Preliminary Provisions of the Outline Plan

A major Department of the Army guideline for reorganization was that the CONUS armies should be relieved of their installation management role and that their entire attention should be focussed on the single mission of Reserve Component readiness. The subordinate CONUS armies -- reduced to three -- would command the U.S. Army Reserve units; supervise the training of the Army National Guard; and execute selected domestic emergency missions.²⁶ The Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan, dated 5 May 1972, stipulated that the subordinate CONUS army commanders would directly command all assigned U.S. Army Reserve TOE and TDA troop program units and reinforcement training units. This responsibility included the supervision of all aspects of support for the assigned units -- recruiting, organization, stationing, training, administrative, and logistical. They would also exercise command -- less operational control -- over U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions. The subordinate CONUS army commanders would supervise the training of non-unit ready reserve personnel when ordered to active duty for training or annual training with, or otherwise attached to, U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units within their areas. They also would command the Active Army Adviser Groups supporting the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve and would supervise and administer advisory services to those component units. As training supervisor for the Army National Guard, the subordinate CONUS army commander would be responsible for scheduling and supervising the training of the Army National Guard and for co-ordinating with the installation commanders with regard to Active Army support required for the training of the units involved. In addition, the subordinate army

25

(1) Incl 2, "Reserve Component Management," to DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, SSG to CONARC Stf, 27 Oct 72, subj: STEADFAST Summary Papers. (2) TAB B, "Active Army Support for Reserve Components," to ltr DARC-PR, CORC DA to CONARC Cofs, 7 Aug 72, subj: Seminar on Active Army Support for Reserve Components.

26

Incl 1, "Summary of Major Command Reorganization," to DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, SSG to CONARC Stf, 27 Oct 72, subj: STEADFAST Summary Papers.

commanders would be responsible for determining the effectiveness of the Army National Guard units to perform their mobilization missions. In order to accomplish this latter function, the subordinate CONUS army commanders were authorized to conduct Annual General Inspections and training inspections of all Army National Guard units located within their areas.²⁷

This plan had its advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, the Active Army missions and the span of control of the subordinate CONUS armies would be greatly reduced by the reorganization. As a result, most of the personnel remaining in the subordinate CONUS army headquarters would be able to devote full time to the supervision of the Reserve Components. On the other hand, the reduction of the number of subordinate CONUS armies coupled with the elimination of one deputy commander, impacted adversely upon the capability of the subordinate armies to supervise the overall Reserve Components Program. It was evident to the CONARC planning staff that additional small supervisory elements would be required below the level of the three subordinate CONUS armies in order to improve the supervision and co-ordination of the Reserve Component mission, as well as to compensate for the increased geographical dispersion and span of control that would exist after the reorganization. At the time that the Outline Plan was developed and submitted, it was still not clear as to the number of supervisory elements which would be required, although there were indications that six were needed. Tentative locations were Fort Devens, Mass.; Fort McPherson, Ga.; Fort Sheridan, Ill.; Fort Riley, Kans.; Fort MacArthur, Calif.; and Fort Lewis, Wash. The manpower requirements for these elements would be limited to that necessary for the successful accomplishment of supervisory, inspection, and co-ordinating responsibilities.²⁸

Army Supervisory Elements. The CONARC STEADFAST planning group proposed that, because of the importance, level, and scope of missions, the supervisory elements be commanded by a brigadier general. The commander would directly command the Adviser Groups for the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve, as well as the ROTC/NDCC Instructor Groups within his area. He would assist the subordinate CONUS army commander in the exercise of command over U.S. Army Reserve units and in the inspection and supervision of the training of Army National Guard units. In this latter regard, he would be responsible for maintaining liaison with the state

27

Incl 1 to ltr CS-SSG, CONARC to OCOFSA, 5 May 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan, p. D-36.

28

Ibid., pp. X-D-1 - X-D-2.

adjutants general within his assigned area of jurisdiction. His major responsibility would be to assist the Reserve Components in establishing and achieving high standards of unit and individual readiness and, as directed, in accomplishing other aspects of the Reserve Components mission. As the local representative of the subordinate CONUS army commander, the supervisory element commander would be responsible for representing his superior officer in civic, veteran, patriotic, and other activities.²⁹

Reaction to the Outline Plan. While the CONARC staff indicated a need for a minimum of six supervisory elements comprising the middle management echelon of the Reserve Component program, the Department of the Army felt that that number was excessive. The Army staff based their conclusion on the fact that only one such detachment -- the Deputy Commander for Reserve Forces, Northern Area, Fifth U.S. Army -- existed in CONARC's current structure. Consequently, supplemental guidance from the Office of the Project Manager stated that planning in this area would proceed on the basis that only three supervisory elements would be available. This, in turn, was based on such factors as an increase in the size of the individual army areas and the requirement to improve the supervision of the ROTC/NDCC Programs. The STEADFAST planning staff at CONARC concluded that four such regional detachments were the minimum acceptable for the proper accomplishment of the Reserve Component mission, although agreeing that that number would be difficult to sell to the Department of the Army.³⁰

Provisions of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan

The Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan submitted to the Department of the Army on 20 July 1972 provided that the Commander, U.S. Army Force Command, would directly command the subordinate CONUS armies, except for matters pertaining to the ROTC/NDCC Programs. The primary missions assigned to the subordinate armies were: the command of the U.S. Army Reserve; the exercise of training supervision over the Army National Guard; the management of the ROTC/NDCC Programs; the co-ordination of geographic area responsibilities; planning for mobilization; and the co-ordination of support for domestic emergencies. The CONUS armies were eliminated entirely from the chain of command with regard to

29

Ibid., pp. X-D-2 - X-D-4.

30

(1) MFR, BG R.L. West, 14 Jun 72, subj: Spill-out on Meeting with Vice Chief of Staff (STEADFAST). (2) Ltr DACS-MR, PMR DA to ACSFOR DA, Cdr CONARC, and Cdr CDC, 15 Jun 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Detailed Planning.


installations and Active Army units and activities. The Detailed Plan called for the establishment of four detachments to supervise the U.S. Army Adviser Groups and the ROTC Instructor Groups. These detachments would reflect the status of their commanders, i.e., brigadier generals. These detachments were to be extensions of the subordinate CONUS army staff, rather than act as subordinate headquarters. The element assigned to Sixth U.S. Army would be located in the Denver area, while the element assigned to First U.S. Army would be located at Fort McPherson, Ga. Fifth U.S. Army would retain its existing element at Fort Sheridan, Ill., with tentative plans calling for the location of a second element at Fort Riley, Kans. The assignment of two elements to Fifth U.S. Army was based on the rationale that, while First and Fifth U.S. Armies each controlled 40 percent of the Reserve Component workload, Fifth U.S. Army controlled a geographical area that was double that of the First U.S. Army in size. Moreover, Fifth U.S. Army was to be responsible for 392 Junior and 134 Senior ROTC activities, representing 60 percent of the ROTC workload in the continental United States.³¹

Phasing Schedule for the New Reserve Components Management Concept. The phasing schedule provided in the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan called for the establishment on 1 July 1973 of two dual headquarters setups -- CONARC/TRADOC at Fort Monroe and FORSCOM/Third U.S. Army at Fort McPherson. With the transfer of all of its installations to the two new commands on that same date, the missions of the Third U.S. Army would be reduced to only those concerning the Reserve Components and the ROTC. On 1 August 1973, all Sixth U.S. Army installations would be transferred to the two new major commands and that army concurrently would be transferred from the U.S. Continental Army Command to the U.S. Army Force Command. At that point, Sixth U.S. Army would assume its newly designated role and missions. On 1 September 1973, all First U.S. Army installations would be transferred to the two new major commands; appropriate Reserve, National Guard, and ROTC units and activities would be transferred from Third U.S. Army to First U.S. Army; and First U.S. Army, itself, would be transferred from the U.S. Continental Army Command to the U.S. Army Force Command. On 1 October 1973, all installations assigned to Fifth U.S. Army would be transferred to the two new major commands; those Reserve, National Guard, and ROTC units and activities still assigned to Third U.S. Army would be transferred to Fifth U.S. Army; and Fifth U.S. Army concurrently would be transferred to the control of the Force Command. At this point, the newly developed management structure for the

31

Incl 1, "Executive Summary," to ltr CS-SSG-STeadFAST, CONARC to OCOFSA, 20 Jul 72, subj: Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, pp. 3 and 16.

Chart 24 -- HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION, CONUS ARMIES



--- STAFF SUPERVISION

command and control of the Reserve Components and the ROTC/NDCC Programs would be in place. With the complete reduction of its missions and functions, Third U.S. Army could be inactivated no later than 1 January 1974. All residual functions of the subordinate CONUS armies relating to installation management or the command of Active Army installations, units, and activities not previously transferred to the two new commands would be transferred during the period, 1 January - 30 June 1974.³²

Organizational Structure for the Subordinate CONUS Army Headquarters. In developing the headquarters organization for the subordinate CONUS armies in their new reduced missions, it was evident to the CONARC STEADFAST planning staff that only one deputy commander could be supported. This reduction was based on the reduced role of the subordinate armies and the fact that the only mission of major consequence was the management of the Reserve Components. In addition, where the Outline Plan had called for the establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve and ROTC, the Detailed Plan eliminated that staff section and replaced it with a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training. The Office of the Project Manager had objected to the inclusion of a Comptroller on the CONUS army staff since the revised mission of the subordinate armies no longer required a fiscal officer of that stature. The Comptroller was consequently replaced in the Detailed Plan by a Deputy Chief of Staff for Resources. The internal organization of the subordinate CONUS army headquarters -- as proposed in the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan -- is shown on Chart 24.³³

Responsibilities of the Supervisory Elements. As stated earlier, the subordinate armies' supervisory elements were merely extensions of those army staffs and were responsible for assisting the subordinate army commander in the accomplishment of his mission. The commander of each supervisory element assisted his respective army commander in the supervision and exercise of command over all U.S. Army Reserve units and schools, Active Army Adviser Groups, and ROTC/NDCC Instructor Groups in his assigned area. In addition, he assisted the subordinate army commander in the inspection and supervision of training of Army National Guard units. At the lower levels, he was responsible for assisting the Reserve Components in establishing and achieving high standards of unit and individual readiness and, as directed, in accomplishing other aspects of the Reserve Component mission. He also maintained

32

Ibid., pp. 7 - 8.

33

Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, Book I, Vol. F, pp. F-4 - F-5.

liaison with state adjutants general and the presidents of academic institutions in the supervision of Army National Guard units and ROTC/NDCC Instructor Groups. Within his geographic area, he was responsible for representing his immediate army commander in civic, veteran, patriotic, and other activities. Within that same area of jurisdiction -- or as directed -- the commander of the supervisory element was authorized to make decisions in the name of the subordinate army commander on matters that followed established policy.³⁴

Reaction at the Department of the Army

A major criticism expressed by the Office of the Project Manager in reviewing the CONARC Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan concerned the lack of any explicit description of a concept for the management of the Reserve Components. General Kalergis informed the STEADFAST Study Group on 3 August 1972 that a concept statement was essential since the Detailed Plan was not clear on how the Reserve Components would be managed to improve Reserve readiness. Subsequent to a briefing on the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, General Abrams, Army Chief of Staff-Designate, indicated his feeling that two of the most important areas in the entire reorganization exercise were the Reserve Components and the ROTC Program. At the same time, Maj. Gen. F.S. Greenlief, Chief, National Guard Bureau, indicated that the Army needed to be more aggressive in its supervision of the Army National Guard. He buttressed this statement with the assertion that the Air National Guard, to all intents and purposes, was better managed than the Army National Guard.³⁵

Response of the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group. In response to this criticism by the Department of the Army, General Jones pointed out that the Detailed Plan did provide functional statements for each headquarters, as well as for each staff section therein which, in essence, prescribed a management concept for the Reserve Components. The Detailed Plan also contained a complete description of both the funding flow and the logistics concept. In addition, the Detailed Logistics Plan -- which would be submitted to the Department of the Army by the end of August -- would further describe that latter concept. General Jones did admit that the reorganization would result in a degradation of Reserve Component readiness, rather than in any improvement. This was

34

Ibid., p. F-73.

35

(1) MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones, 4 Aug 72, subj: Conference with MG Kalergis on 3 August 1972. (2) Memo, MAJ J.R. Griffith, Ofc of STEADFAST Coord to CONARC DCSCOMPT, 8 Aug 72, subj: Meeting with the Project Manager for Reorganization.

inevitable since the Reserve Components would be split from their close relationships with the Active Army and the subordinate CONUS armies would be relieved of command of the very installations which were required to support those Reserve Components.³⁶

Guidance for the Revision of the Detailed Plan. In issuing his guidance for the required revision of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, General Kalergis stated that the overall improvement of readiness throughout the U.S. Army called for a force of Reserve Components which was well managed and given appropriate visibility. Therefore, detailed planning for the reorganization would have to develop genuine and substantial improvement in the system which supported those Reserve Components. Because of the importance of this factor, a Department of the Army Working Group had been established under the general staff supervision of the Chief, Office of Reserve Components (CORC), with representation from the U.S. Continental Army Command. Charged with developing an overall concept for improving the management of the Reserve Components, the working group was given until 8 September to complete their work, the approval of which would be the basis for revising that portion of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan pertaining to the Reserve Components. As the result of such a revision, other substantive changes probably would be required in various portions of the Detailed Plan.³⁷

The Department of the Army Committee for the Management of Reserve Components

In the interim, the Chief, Office of Reserve Components, notified CONARC of a "brainstorming" seminar to be held at the Department of the Army on 8 August 1972 to examine the structure for supervision and support of the Reserve Components. This seminar stemmed from General Abrams' queries concerning the adequacy and efficiency of Active Army support of the Reserve Components under the STEADFAST proposals. This brain-storming session led to the appointment of the Department of the Army Working Group for developing an actual management concept to be included in the revised STEADFAST Detailed Plan. This seminar was attended by members of the Department of the Army staff and the three Special Assistants to the CONARC Chief of Staff who were charged with STEADFAST

36

MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones, 4 Aug 72, subj: Conference with MG Kalergis on 3 August 1972.

37

Ltr DACS-MR, PMR DA to DA ACSFOR, DA TSG, Cdr CONARC, Cdr CDC, and Cdr STRATCOM, 23 Aug 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Planning, pp. 3 - 4.

planning. General Jones later represented the U.S. Continental Army Command on the working group which developed the final management concept.³⁸

Proposals Entertained at the Seminar. As a starting point for discussion, the Chief, Office of Reserve Components, proposed the establishment of eight Reserve Component Regional Assistance Commands, the commanders of which would be Active Army major generals. The position of deputy commander would be filled by 4-year statutory tour officers, four from the Army National Guard and four from the U.S. Army Reserve. These eight commands would report to two subordinate CONUS army headquarters which, in turn, would report to the U.S. Army Force Command. (The continental United States would be divided into two armies, with headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, Md., and the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.) Manning of the eight commands would depend upon the number of Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units in each respective assigned geographical area. Army advisers would be assigned to the regional commands which would then designate some as senior advisers to the major units of the Reserve Components, others as "circuit riders", and still others as mobile training teams. The primary emphasis of the regional commands would be on the training of Reserve Component units. Consequently, assignment of additional Active Army missions to the command would have to be accompanied by additional commensurate spaces. The tentative alignment of these commands would follow state boundaries so as to alleviate any impact upon the management structure for the Army National Guard. Some adjustments would have to be made in the boundaries of the Army Reserve Commands which would be required to report to the regional commands along with all General Officer Commands.³⁹

Lt. Gen. H.W. Hollis, Chief, Office of Reserve Components, emphasized to CONARC that these proposals did not represent the inflexible views of either his office or of any other Department of the Army staff agency. In fact, he proposed several additional brainstorming ideas for further consideration. For example, more Mutual Support activities might be scheduled for units of the Active Army and the Reserve Components. Active Army personnel could be assigned as training specialists to the General Officer Commands and the state headquarters of the Army National Guard as an augmentation to the authorized technical staffs. These specialized

38

Ltr DARC-PR, CORC DA to CONARC CofS, 7 Aug 72, subj: Seminar on Active Army Support for Reserve Components.

39

Ibid., TAB B, "Active Army Support for Army Reserve Components."

individuals would not be assigned to U.S. Army Reserve or to Army National Guard TOE or TD spaces. General Hollis pointed out that one of the most pressing problems in connection with the Reserve Components was the fact that the Army's existing method of measuring the readiness of Reserve Component units failed to provide a realistic appraisal of the real capabilities of the unit being tested. Existing standards, which were seldom attained and maintained even by Active Army units, appeared to be beyond the capability of Reserve Component units in their civilian environment. Since the standards automatically consigned a Reserve Component unit to REDCON 3, they were bound to have an adverse impact upon the morale of conscientious unit commanders and their staffs.⁴⁰

Recommendations of the Department of the Army Working Group

The final recommendations of the Department of the Army Working Group -- which grew out of the August brain-storming seminar -- followed very closely the original proposals of the Office of Reserve Components, as indicated immediately above. These proposals were refined in the light of other guidelines provided for STEADFAST reorganization planning, as well as further proposals by Department of the Army staff agencies and the U.S. Continental Army Command. The management concept recommended by the working group was designed primarily to increase the ability of the subordinate CONUS armies to supervise Reserve Component activities. Within the established adviser system, this concept would seek to increase the "hands-on" type of assistance to Reserve Component units and to provide technical expertise in more functional fields. The concept would increase the number of units involved in Active Army/ Reserve Component Associated Unit Programs and would provide the Reserve units with much needed assistance in writing and conducting tests and exercises. Because logistical support was such an important element of this program, the recommended concept was designed to improve the capability of installations to support the Reserve Components.⁴¹

Recommended Organization for Management of the Reserve Components. Although General Hollis and his staff had recommended the retention of only two subordinate CONUS armies (one east and one west of the Mississippi River), the existence of three such armies had already been approved by the Department of the Army in the

40

Ibid.

41

Incl 2, "Reserve Component Management," to DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, SSG to CONARC Stf, 27 Oct 72, subj: STEADFAST Summary Papers.

revised Outline Plan, as well as in the Detailed Plan which had been submitted to the Department on 20 July 1972. These three subordinate CONUS armies were the minimum acceptable to the U.S. Continental Army Command. The recommended concept provided that the subordinate armies would be totally oriented to U.S. Army Reserve activities and to the training supervision of the Army National Guard. Nine Readiness Assistance Regions (RAR) would be responsible to the subordinate armies for the actual readiness of the Reserve Component units within their geographical areas. These Readiness Assistance Regions would be the single point of contact in their areas for all aspects of Reserve Component readiness. By commanding a large number of Active Army personnel who were in direct contact with Reserve Component units, the commander of the Readiness Assistance Region would be assured of up-to-date information on the readiness of all units under his supervision and control. He could then manage his organic assets in order to upgrade the readiness of those units which displayed areas of weakness. If his organic assets were incapable of correcting an identified deficiency in a unit, the Readiness Assistance Region commander would be authorized to request assistance from the Active Army establishment. Branch-oriented Readiness Co-ordinators in the Readiness Assistance Regions would monitor unit readiness and assist the unit commanders in correcting any shortcomings, as well as in reporting other areas which might require outside assistance. These Readiness Co-ordinators would also ensure that maximum mutual assistance was provided between Reserve Component units. To round out the mid-management concept, branch-oriented Readiness Groups (RG), Maintenance Assistance Inspection Teams (MAIT), and Administrative Teams -- all subordinate elements of the Readiness Assistance Regions -- would visit units on a scheduled or as-needed basis to provide assistance which was designed to increase unit readiness.⁴²

Maneuver Area Commands (MAC) and MAC-type elements were proposed to provide the expertise necessary to assist units in writing and executing Command Post Exercises (CPX), Field Training Exercises (FTX), and Army Training Tests (ATT). In some cases, the Maneuver Area Commands would actually write and administer Army Training Tests and would have the capability to assist units selected to participate in special exercises. In a related area, the Mutual Support Program would be expanded to include additional high priority Reserve Component units along the lines of the successful "Round-Out" Program. In order to make the logistical support of the Reserve Components more effective, the concept provided that each Active Army installation supporting significant Reserve Component training activities would be authorized a directorate or division

42

Ibid., p. 2.

on the garrison staff to assist Reserve Component units in the planning and support of both weekend and annual training activities.⁴³

Benefits Accruing from the Recommended Concept. In addition to satisfying the basic objective of improving Reserve Component readiness, the proponents of the recommended concept for managing the Reserve Components pointed out that it would permit the early identification of training requirements and an early decision as to the most effective resource -- whether Active Army or Reserve -- for satisfying a particular requirement. The concept would permit an improvement in the evaluation of unit readiness and bring with it a greater feeling of job fulfillment resulting from improved readiness which, in turn, would lead to better recruiting and retention of personnel. By assigning lieutenant generals as the subordinate CONUS army commanders and major generals as commanders of the Readiness Assistance Regions, the concept amply demonstrated the emphasis which was being placed on the readiness of the Reserve Components. The provision of a small, full-time augmentation of Active Army personnel enhanced the capability of the Army Reserve Commands, the Maneuver Area Commands, and the MAC-type elements to plan, supervise, and co-ordinate training matters. The concept centralized Active Army personnel assigned to Reserve Component duty at or near Active Army installations, thus increasing the desirability of that type of duty. And last, the proposed concept provided an improved statement of responsibilities for mobilization planning and execution.⁴⁴

Reaction of the Subordinate CONUS Armies

The reactions of the subordinate CONUS army commanders and their staffs had been known to the CONARC STEADFAST planning staff during the briefings held at various locations on the new concept for managing the Reserve Components. As a result of these reactions, the U.S. Continental Army Command scheduled a Reserve Component Management Conference for 30 October 1972, at which time, First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies were to present their plans for managing the Reserve Components under the Readiness Assistance Region concept. Third U.S. Army presented a briefing on problems and solutions unique to that particular army as a result of the reorganization.⁴⁵

43

Ibid.

44

Ibid., p. 3.

45

Memo CS-SSG-STEADFAST, MG Jones to MG Pepke, 2 Nov 72,
subj: Reserve Component Management Conference.

Section 265 Officers. During the First U.S. Army presentation at the CONARC conference, a question was raised concerning the large number of 4-year statutory tour officers (Section 265, Title 10, United States Code) allocated to each of the armies. The proposed concept called for the allocation of 74 such officers to First U.S. Army; 69 to Fifth U.S. Army; and 57 to Sixth U.S. Army. All of the army representatives at the conference felt that this allocation had been rather presumptuous. The consensus was that it probably would not be feasible to locate a sufficient number of qualified personnel to staff the subordinate CONUS armies at such an ambitious level. Agreement was reached at the conference that the initial allocation of Section 265 officers be held to 2 per Readiness Assistance Region, 2 advisers per subordinate army headquarters, and 2 per each general staff section at the headquarters of the subordinate CONUS armies. Again, the conferees felt that the assignment of only a limited number of such officers at the time of the reorganization would give the subordinate armies a better opportunity to evaluate the concept.⁴⁶

The Installation Directorate for Reserve Component Support. The First U.S. Army representatives announced that their commander, Lt. Gen. C.E. Hutchin, Jr., had expressed a desire that the Installation Directorate for Reserve Component Support not be organized as a separate staff section. He preferred, on the other hand, that the personnel involved be spread throughout the entire installation staff. However, the Department of the Army Working Group had already analyzed this problem and had agreed that the directorate should be organized as a separate staff section, as had been done successfully at a number of installations. This separate staff section was intended to provide a single point of contact for Reserve Component commanders for all matters affecting the Reserve Forces.⁴⁷

The Readiness Assistance Regions and the Readiness Groups. The concept for establishing Readiness Assistance Regions and allied Readiness Groups was a matter of concern to the subordinate CONUS army commanders. It was evident that these units were intended to provide the management echelon which would ensure the effective accomplishment of their Reserve Component mission. The location and boundaries of the Readiness Assistance Regions and their Readiness Groups had been established by the armies since they were the most knowledgeable as to the needs existing within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The conferees noted that the

46

Ibid.

47


Ibid.

proposed boundaries tended to follow the boundaries of the Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM). Within the Fifth U.S. Army this factor had resulted in Illinois being divided into a northern and a southern sector. In order to preclude the state adjutant general from dealing with two Readiness Groups from two different Readiness Assistance Regions -- Fort Sheridan, Ill. and Schilling Manor, Kans. -- it was proposed that the Readiness Assistance Region Commander at Fort Sheridan be responsible for all Illinois National Guard activities. However, the same situation existed in Pennsylvania which was serviced by Readiness Groups at Oakdale and Indiantown Gap Military Reservation. This meant that the Pennsylvania Adjutant General was required to work with the Readiness Assistance Region commanders at Fort Meade, Md., and Fort Hamilton, N.Y. The matter was further confused by the proposal of Lt. Gen. P.F. Cassidy, Fifth U.S. Army commander, that the Readiness Assistance Region commanders be made commanders in fact. This change would place the Readiness Assistance Region commander in command of Army Reserve Commands and General Officer Commands within his geographical area of responsibility. The proposal would, most probably, cause rank problems since some of the ARCOM commanders might be senior to the commander of the Readiness Assistance Region.⁴⁸

The Subordinate CONUS Army Boundaries. Another problem was a proposal to relocate the subordinate army boundaries in certain areas. Again, it was General Cassidy who proposed that Minnesota and Iowa be retained in the Fifth U.S. Army area, although he had no objections to losing Kansas and New Mexico to Sixth U.S. Army. The CONARC STEADFAST Study Group informed the conferees that the subordinate army boundaries had been planned initially on the basis of Reserve Component workload factors -- 40 percent in First U.S. Army; 40 percent in Fifth U.S. Army; and only 20 percent in Sixth U.S. Army. General Cassidy's proposal would result in an increase in the workload of Fifth U.S. Army while decreasing that of Sixth U.S. Army. In addition, the 88th Army Reserve Command served three states -- Minnesota, Iowa, and Nebraska. Hence, the inclusion of Minnesota and Iowa in Fifth U.S. Army would require assigning those units of the 88th Army Reserve Command in Nebraska to the 96th Army Reserve Command in Sixth U.S. Army. In the same manner, the inclusion of Kansas in Sixth U.S. Army would require assigning units of the 102d Army Reserve Command in that state to the 96th Army Reserve Command. Because this proposal would cause considerable turbulence in the U.S. Army Reserve, the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group nonconcurred. However, because this same proposal was again raised by Maj. Gen. J.J. Wagstaff, Deputy Commander for Reserve Forces, Northern Area, Fifth U.S. Army, and

48

Ibid., pp. 2 - 3.



Map 4 -- FINALIZED CONUS ARMY AREAS

concurrent in by Maj. Gen. J.M. Roberts, Sr., Chief of Army Reserves, the proposal was forwarded to General Pepke for a Chief of Staff decision.⁴⁹

Commanders for the Mini-MAC's. A discussion was held by the conferees as to the proper rank for the commanders of the Mini-MAC's, those Maneuver Area Command elements that were to be created from the assets of the Basic Combat Training Brigades of seven U.S. Army Reserve Training Divisions. The conferees and the STEADFAST Study Group agreed that the colonels who currently commanded the Basic Combat Training Brigades should become the Mini-MAC commanders, a solution which would avoid the problem of seeking additional brigadier general positions or of converting the position of the Assistant Division Commander of the Training Division to that of brigade commander.⁵⁰

General Officer Commands. The approved concept for managing the Reserve Components called for the placing of all General Officer Commands under the Army Reserve Command serving that particular area. However, the Fifth U.S. Army representatives proposed during the conference that all General Officer Commands commanded by a major general be retained as separate commands. First U.S. Army also pointed out that they had a USAR Field Army Support Command (FASCOM) commanded by a major general. Again the conferees agreed that, to preclude rank conflicts, these General Officer Commands should report directly to the subordinate CONUS armies. At this point, Sixth U.S. Army representatives requested that two of their General Officer Commands -- the 351st Civil Affairs Area Headquarters and the 6253d U.S. Army Hospital -- be retained as separate commands reporting directly to that CONUS army headquarters. The rationale for this request was that the 351st Civil Affairs Area Headquarters operated throughout the Sixth U.S. Army area; was a unique unit; and assisted all of the Army Reserve Commands in civil affairs operations. While not on the same scale, the 6253d U.S. Army Hospital was located in the San Francisco Bay area and could be best controlled by Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army. It was agreed that the U.S. Continental Army Command should support its subordinate army commanders in these recommendations.⁵¹

49

(1) Ibid., p.2. (2) The CONUS army boundaries were eventually changed in January 1973 along the lines proposed by General Cassidy. See Map 4.

50

Memo CS-SSG-STEADFAST, MG Jones for MG Pepke, 2 Nov 72, subj: Reserve Component Management Conference, p. 2.

51

Ibid., p. 4.

Revision of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan

During the latter part of August 1972, General Kalergis published supplemental guidelines for required revisions to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan. The concept then being developed by the Department of the Army Working Group was to be used to revise those portions of the Detailed Plan dealing with Reserve Forces. As a consequence, substantive changes subsequently would be required in the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan that had been submitted to his office on 20 July 1972. Changes 2 and 3 to that plan -- as published on 18 and 22 December 1972 -- completely revised the missions, functions, and supporting tables of distribution for the subordinate CONUS armies. In addition, a completely new Volume I was developed and published, outlining the lower echelon management concept, i.e., the use of Readiness Assistance Regions and Readiness Groups.⁵²

Revised CONUS Army Missions

In the revision of the CONARC STEADFAST Detailed Plan, the missions of the subordinate CONUS armies were oriented strictly toward the management of the Reserve Components. Certain residual area functional responsibilities, however, had to be retained at the subordinate army level out of necessity. Simply stated, the commanders of the subordinate CONUS armies were the commanders of the U.S. Army Reserve; the training supervisors of the Army National Guard; and the Executive Agents of the U.S. Army Force Command for domestic emergency plans and operations, as well as for specified civil-military programs within their areas of jurisdiction. Specifically, the subordinate army commander commanded the U.S. Army Reserve TOE and TDA troop program units and reinforcement training units, a responsibility which included the supervision of recruiting, organization, stationing, and training, as well as arranging for the administrative and logistical support of the assigned units. In addition, he exercised command -- less operational control -- over the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions. As far as the individual reservists were concerned, the subordinate army commander supervised the training of non-unit personnel -- except for mobilization designee personnel not assigned to his army -- when ordered to active duty for training or annual training with, or attached to, U.S. Army Reserve and Army

52

(1) Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to DA ACSFOR, DA TSG, Cdr CONARC, Cdr CDC, and Cdr STRATCOM, 23 Aug 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Planning, pp. 3 - 4. (2) Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 18 Dec 72, subj: Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, dated 20 July 1972, w/incls. (3) Summary Sheet, CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group, 22 Dec 72, w/incls.

National Guard units located in his area of jurisdiction. In this revised concept, the subordinate army commander also commanded the Readiness Assistance Regions to include the requisitioning for, and the distribution of, military personnel and the employment and use of civilian technicians.⁵³

As the training supervisor of the Army National Guard, the subordinate CONUS army commander scheduled and supervised the training of Guard units and co-ordinated with the appropriate installation commander for the Active Army support required for training the units. All Air Defense on-site units were exempted from this latter provision. In addition, the army commander was responsible for determining the effectiveness of Army National Guard units with regard to the performance of their mobilization missions. In this regard, he was authorized to conduct Annual General Inspections and training inspections of the Guard units. In this same area, the commanders of the subordinate CONUS armies maintained liaison with, and co-ordinated with, state governors, other high government officials, civilian aides to the Secretary of the Army, and State Adjutants General. They were responsible for co-ordinating all Reserve Component-oriented public information activities and community relations within their areas. Since the ultimate goal established for the Reserve Components was preparation for mobilization, the subordinate CONUS army commanders were responsible for planning for, and executing, the mobilization of Reserve Component units. In addition, they directed the preparation of mobilization plans by Reserve Component units located within their respective geographical areas and ensured the co-ordination of those plans between the units and their mobilization stations.⁵⁴

The geographical area responsibilities remaining with the subordinate CONUS army commanders were reduced to the minimum essentials. They were still responsible for planning and executing the defense -- less aerospace defense -- of the continental United States to include joint operations; planning for combined defense with civilian authorities; and planning for, and executing, nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) post-attack information collection, pre-attack and post-attack measures, and continuity of operations (COOP). In addition, they were responsible for planning and supervising the support required to accomplish geographic-oriented activities such as Chemical-Biological Incident and Accident Control (CBAIC) support; Reserve Component participation in the


53

Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 20 July 72, Book I, Vol. F, pp. F-3 - F-4, w/C1 and C2.

54

Ibid.

Chart 25 -- REVISED ORGANIZATION FOR CONUS ARMY HEADQUARTERS



^a ALSO IS THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMY READINESS REGION COLLOCATED WITH THE CONUS ARMY HEADQUARTERS.
^b MEMBERS OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL'S PERSONAL STAFF.

Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) Program; and, as directed, support required for other Federal agencies. And, finally, the subordinate CONUS army commanders were responsible for maintaining liaison with, and coordinating with, state and regional law enforcement agencies.⁵⁵

In order to reduce the span of control of the subordinate CONUS army commanders, most of the U.S. Army Reserve General Officer Commands were placed under the command of the U.S. Army Reserve Commands. The main exception to this rule placed the Training Divisions and the Maneuver Area Commands directly under the CONUS army concerned. In addition, the 310th FASCOM in First U.S. Army, the 412th and 416th Engineer Brigades in Fifth U.S. Army, and the 351st Civil Affairs Area Headquarters and the 6253d U.S. Army Hospital in Sixth U.S. Army reported directly to the appropriate subordinate CONUS army headquarters. The reasons given for placing these latter units directly under the respective armies were: the possibility of rank conflicts; the geographical distribution of the unit; or the span of control (in the case of Sixth U.S. Army). The revised organizational structure for the subordinate CONUS army headquarters is shown on Chart 25.⁵⁶

The Readiness Assistance Region Plan


While the Operation STEADFAST Plan for the Management of the Reserve Components kept intact the existing personnel and logistical management systems for the Reserve Components, major changes were made in the structure of the adviser effort, the training management system, and the command lines in the U.S. Army Reserve. The approved plan established nine Readiness Assistance Regions (RAR) in the continental United States, each commanded by a major general. The primary mission of these Readiness Assistance Regions was to assist Reserve Component commanders in identifying training requirements and to help in determining the most effective resource -- Reserve Component or Active Army -- to satisfy those requirements. Additionally, the Readiness Assistance Regions routinely provided branch and functional teams to assist U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units. Dedicated advisers -- as subordinate activities of the Readiness Assistance Regions -- were retained at various levels to include Army Reserve Commands, General Officer Commands, State Adjutants General, divisions, brigades, and groups. In addition, certain high priority battalions

55

Ibid.

56

Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 20 Jul 72, Book I,
Vol. I, p. I-1, w/C1, 22 Dec 72.



Map 5 -- READINESS ASSISTANCE REGIONS AND READINESS GROUP BOUNDARIES AND LOCATIONS

(e.g., some units with deployment dates of M plus 90 or less), continued to have dedicated advisers. The proposed structure for the Readiness Assistance Regions consisted of a command element, an administration section, an operations section, and a flight detachment. The majority of the personnel assigned to the operations section also functioned as Readiness Co-ordinators, the number and expertise of whom were dependent upon the number and type of units within the region. The Readiness Co-ordinators were assigned responsibility for all units of one or more branches within a given area of the Readiness Assistance Region and were responsible for determining the training status and training needs of these units. Additionally, they were responsible for taking steps to provide the required training support.⁵⁷

Readiness Groups. In order to alleviate the problem of the span of control, additional subordinate elements known as Readiness Groups were established. As developed in the Operation STEADFAST plan, each Readiness Group consisted of a number of branch and functional teams which were designed so as to be responsive to the requirements of the Reserve Component units within each Readiness Assistance Region's area of responsibility. In order to minimize temporary duty travel, the Readiness Groups were located in the general vicinity of a sizeable concentration of Reserve units. In addition, the locations for these Readiness Groups were selected, to the extent possible, so as to be near Active military installations in order to provide medical, commissary, and post exchange services, as well as family housing accommodations for the men assigned to the groups. The number and locations of the Readiness Assistance Regions and their subordinate Readiness Groups -- as shown on Map 5 -- were as follows:⁵⁸

57

Ibid., pp. I-1 - I-2.

58

Ibid., pp. I-1 - I-4.

from other elements of the Reserve Components; and, as a final resort, the seeking of assistance from the Active Army. Each Readiness Assistance Region was responsible for reviewing all Reserve Component plans pertaining to mobilization, civil defense, domestic emergencies, and special contingencies.⁵⁹

In carrying out its missions of providing assistance to the Reserve Components, the Readiness Assistance Regions were responsible for directing, supervising, and administering the Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team (MAIT) Program within their assigned areas and for forming teams to conduct visits. In addition, the Readiness Assistance Regions directed and supervised those functional specialist personnel who were allocated to provide advice and assistance in unit supply functions, such as property book maintenance, facilities management, food service, and unit records and personnel administration. Consequently, the Readiness Assistance Regions were responsible for forming the administrative teams required to respond to specific needs, either upon request or as determined to be essential by the Readiness Co-ordinators. In order to accomplish these missions, the Readiness Assistance Regions were assigned command over the Readiness Groups and all dedicated advisers within their areas. As the extension of the subordinate CONUS army commander into more localized areas, the commanders of Readiness Assistance Regions maintained liaison with, and conducted staff visits to, State Adjutants General, senior commands of the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, and all General Officer Commands; accomplished Officer Efficiency Reports on Reserve and National Guard commanders; and represented the subordinate CONUS army commander in civic, veteran, patriotic, and other public affairs activities.⁶⁰

Use of Statutory Tour Officers

In order to improve the level of Active Army assistance to the Reserve Components, certain positions were identified within each CONUS army headquarters staff, the related Readiness Assistance Regions, and Maneuver Area Commands for fill by statutory tour Reserve Component officers (Section 265, Title 10, United States Code). It was intended that the integration of these officers with active duty officers would improve the latter's understanding and appreciation of the differences which existed between the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard and between the Reserve Components and the Active Army. However, the plan to

59

Ibid., pp. I-1 - I-2.

60

Ibid.

integrate statutory tour officers was contingent upon their removal from the limitations imposed by the Officer Grade Limitation Act and upon relief from impact upon the Active Army end strength. The approved concept for management of the Reserve Components stipulated that these officers would be included in the end strengths allocated to the subordinate CONUS armies and that their period of assignment would be restricted to a minimum of four years, but would not exceed five years. Positions identified in the tables of distribution of each CONUS army headquarters, related Readiness Assistance Regions, and Maneuver Area Commands totaled 34 in First U.S. Army, 28 in Fifth U.S. Army, and 22 in Sixth U.S. Army. These positions were allocated as follows: 10 in each of the CONUS army headquarters (2 in the headquarters proper and 2 to each general staff section, representing both Reserve Components); 2 in each Readiness Assistance Region (grades O7 and O6 -- 1 Reserve and 1 National Guard, rotated every 4-year tour); and 4 in each Maneuver Area Command or MAC-type element (equally representing both Reserve Components). It was hoped that other positions could be identified at the installations which had support roles for fill in a similar manner. The STEADFAST Steering Group also pointed out that, once the program developed, it might prove possible to increase the number of such officers at the higher levels from the initial allocation of eighty-four spaces.⁶¹

The Maneuver Area Command Conversion Plan

The approved concept for the use of Maneuver Area Commands provided that the two existing Maneuver Area Commands in the Reserve Component structure would be given the primary mission of administering battalion- and brigade-size field training exercises throughout the continental United States. In addition, one Basic Combat Training Brigade from each of the seven U.S. Army Reserve Training Divisions would be converted into a MAC-type element designed to write and administer the actual field training exercises (FTX), command post exercises (CPX), and Army Training Tests (ATT). However, a closer examination of the approved concept by CONARC revealed that the sole use of Basic Combat Training Brigades as Maneuver Area Command elements was not the best solution to this problem. The CONARC staff felt that these Basic Combat Training Brigades would be needed immediately in the event of mobilization in order to provide the proper basic training for the initial surge of mobilized forces. While those individuals were being put through a basic training course, it would be more feasible to organize additional Advanced Individual Training Brigades. In addition, advanced individual training (but not basic combat training) could be conducted within the actual combat units, as was

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Ibid., pp. I-10 - I-11.

currently the situation in the U.S. Continental Army Command. Consequently, the requirement to create seven new Maneuver Area Commands could best be satisfied by converting Advanced Individual Training (Infantry) and Advanced Individual Training (Composite Support) Brigades of the Training Divisions to MAC-type elements. These two types of brigades had been selected by the U.S. Continental Army Command with a view to facilitating their training under the Active Army training structure which was envisioned for the future. This structure -- then under study by CONARC -- provided that all Advanced Individual Training (Infantry) would be conducted at Fort Polk, La., and Advanced Individual Training (Composite Support) primarily at Fort Dix, N.J., and Fort Ord, Calif., with a minor portion of that type training also conducted at Fort Jackson, S.C. Each of the Advanced Individual Training Brigades would be converted to identical Maneuver Area Commands, as follows:⁶²

<u>U.S. Army Reserve Training Brigade</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Supported RAR</u>
3d Brigade, 76th Division (AIT Inf)	East Windsor, Conn.	Fort Devens, Mass.
4th Brigade, 98th Division (AIT CS)	Ithaca, N.Y.	Fort Hamilton, N.Y.
3d Brigade, 80th Division (AIT Inf)	Richmond, Va.	Fort Meade, Md.
4th Brigade, 108th Division (AIT CS)	Charlotte, N.C.	Atlanta, Ga.
4th Brigade, 84th Division (AIT CS)	Milwaukee, Wis.	Fort Sheridan, Ill.
87th Maneuver Area Command	Birmingham, Ala.	Fort McClellan, Ala.
75th Maneuver Area Command	Houston, Tex.	Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
3d Brigade, 104th Division (AIT Inf)	Fort Lawton, Wash.	Denver, Colo.
3d Brigade, 91st Division (AIT Inf)	San Jose, Calif.	Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

Unit Association Plan

One of the major provisions of the approved concept for the management of the Reserve Component structure was the close association to be developed between Active Army and Reserve

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(1) Ibid., pp. I-12 - I-16. (2) Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 20 Jul 72, Book III, Vol. A, pp. III-A-55 - III-A-56, w/C1, 22 Dec 72.

Component units of similar branch and structure. To this end, the concept provided that, to the extent possible, each high priority Reserve Component unit would have an Active Army sponsor unit. As far as practicable, Reserve Component units would be associated with geographically accessible Active Army units, preferably with similar missions. The sponsor unit would be required to make itself available to the Reserve Component unit commander for the discussion of mutual problem areas, for advice, and for other assistance under the Mutual Support Program. Active Army assistance would include such activities as mobile training teams, administrative and logistical assistance teams, and integrated field training exercises and command post exercises.⁶³

Installation Directorates or Divisions for Reserve Component Support

The CONARC STEADFAST Detailed Plan stipulated that each Active Army installation with a mission to support Reserve Component training would be required to establish a single point of contact for that purpose. Consequently, certain Class I and Class II installations would be required to establish either directorates or divisions dedicated to Reserve Component support in order to provide Reserve Component commanders within a geographic area with such a single point of contact for all Reserve Component matters. A total of 330 personnel spaces were to be provided to the selected installations from assets resulting from reductions in the subordinate CONUS army headquarters. These spaces were to be provided in the appropriate garrison tables of distribution as predetermined by the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group. Within First U.S. Army, twelve installations belonging to the U.S. Army Force Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command were selected for the establishment of support directorates, while an additional fourteen installations belonging to other Department of the Army commands and agencies would be required to establish support divisions. In Fifth U.S. Army, thirteen installations of the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command would have to establish support directorates, while four more (two belonging to the Force Command and two to the U.S. Army Materiel Command) were designated for the establishment of support divisions. Within Sixth U.S. Army, only five installations of the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command were selected to establish support directorates, while thirteen belonging to other Department of the Army commands and agencies would establish support divisions. For this purpose, 117 spaces were allocated to First U.S. Army; 136 spaces to Fifth U.S. Army; and 77 to Sixth U.S. Army.⁶⁴

63

Ibid.

64

Ibid., Book I, Vol. I, pp. I-3 - I-8.

Summary

The primary reason for reorganizing the concept for managing the Reserve Components was to improve the readiness of those Reserve Components to meet their deployment objectives. In order to achieve this primary mission, it was necessary first of all to devise a better method to evaluate unit readiness in the Reserve Components; then to increase that unit readiness to an acceptable standard using available resources; and, finally, to maintain that level of readiness. The new concept approved for implementation in the overall Operation STEADFAST reorganization of the Army, restructured the Active Army's advisory efforts so as to improve the use of available resources while providing a clear delineation of specific responsibilities and providing Active Army expertise equally to the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. Even though the assistance of Active Army units would be provided, it was evident that those units would, of necessity, concentrate on their own primary mission of maintaining readiness. Hence, the new concept emphasized an increase in the amount of self-help within the Reserve Components. With only a modest increase in the number of spaces previously allocated to the U.S. Army Adviser System, a totally new readiness assistance system was devised which would ensure that Reserve Component units received more useful guidance and assistance in the future. Although the Army's mission remained unchanged, that mission understandably would have to be accomplished with a considerably smaller Active Army in the immediate future. Since the U.S. Army would have to be capable of rapid expansion according to the dictates of National Policy, the new concept for the management of the Reserve Components provided a solid framework to support the required degree of flexibility.⁶⁵

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Incl 2, "Reserve Component Management," to DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, SSG to CONARC Stf, 27 Oct 72, subj: STEADFAST Summary Papers, p. 5.

Chapter VI

REVISION OF THE DETAILED PLAN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Revision of the Detailed Plan

The original concept in developing the milestone schedule for Operation STEADFAST reorganization planning had envisioned a thorough one-time revision of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan which would be submitted to the Department of the Army on 30 September 1972. This would be followed in sequence by the development of an Implementation Plan which would be submitted through the same channels by 20 October 1972.

Guidance from the Department of the Army Project Manager

The thorough review to which the Department of the Army subjected CONARC's Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan indicated that supplemental information was needed for certain areas and that other aspects of the plan required varying degrees of revision and further validation prior to proceeding into the full-scale development of implementation plans. Consequently, on 23 August 1972, the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization published his definitive guidance for the required revision of the Detailed Plan, as well as the development of both the Implementation Plan and the FY 1974 Command Budget Estimates (CBE). In order to complete the proper budget estimates for submission to the Department of the Army by 30 November 1972, the suspense date for actions revising the Detailed Plan would have to remain as previously established, i.e., 30 September 1972. Only those portions of the Detailed Plan which were revised in accordance with the supplemental guidance provided by the Office of the Project Manager would have to be resubmitted to the Department of the Army for approval. Whenever revisions were made to the Detailed Plan, the changes were to be incorporated into the continued planning for the phased implementation and related FY 1974 budget estimates for the reorganization.¹

General Guidelines for the U.S. Continental Army Command.

Most of the general guidance for revising CONARC's Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan of 20 July 1972 dealt with the area of the Training and Doctrine Command. The only pertinent guidance with

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Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to DA ACSFOR, DA TSG, Cdr CONARC, Cdr CDC, and Cdr STRATCOM, 23 Aug 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Planning, w/5 incls.

regard to the Force Command, as such, was that the proper designations for the subordinate armies remaining in the structure would be determined at a later date. The current designations of First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies would, therefore, be reflected in all planning until the final designations, were made. Guidance for the revision of Book I, Volume A -- that portion of the Detailed Plan dealing with the Training and Doctrine Command -- included a complete clarification of the Three Center Concept; a reduction in the staffing of TRADOC headquarters by assigning a mid-management role in the force development process to the Combat Developments Centers; the provision of a concept of operation for the management of force development programs including the establishment of measures of effectiveness; a delineation of the pros and cons of special purpose branch requirements; and the establishment of a single command responsible for all training aids and devices.²

The Establishment of an Engineer Special Staff Office. The new guidance approved the decision to establish the Engineer as a special staff officer at both of the new headquarters. Consequently, revisions to the Detailed Plan would have to include a description of the organization and functions of the new office. All engineer-related functions performed by various elements of the CONARC headquarters staff were to be considered for transfer to the new special staff office along with the associated personnel spaces. The new office, however, was to be so structured as to minimize the levels of management. In addition, all engineer functions would have to be reviewed so that redundant or unnecessary activities could be eliminated. In this respect, the development of functions for the Engineer Special Staff Office would have to be closely coordinated with the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, in order to eliminate any duplication of functions between the activities of that office and the major commands. Tables of distribution for the subordinate CONUS armies would have to be reviewed for consistency in staffing and grade levels for engineer-related functions so as to be commensurate with the changes in the missions and functions of those armies.³

Instructions for the Development of the Special Staff. The Department of the Army pointed out that the Equal Opportunity/Race Relations Branch was actually four levels below that of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in the headquarters of both new commands. In organizations of this size, this office would have to

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Ibid., Anx. B, App. II and III.

3

Ibid., Anx. B, App VII.

have direct access to primary staff officers. A need also existed for a senior Women's Army Corps officer to act as staff adviser in both TRADOC and FORSCOM on all matters pertaining to personnel of the Women's Army Corps. All positions in the tables of distribution -- both enlisted and officer -- which could be filled interchangeably by either male or female personnel would have to be properly identified. In general, the organizational charts had shown the Inspector General as a member of the Special Staff; the Inspector General would have to be specified as a member of the commander's personal staff. Further revisions to the Detailed Plan would also have to re-evaluate the need for a Surgeon on the staff of the Training and Doctrine Command as well as on the staffs of FORSCOM's subordinate CONUS armies. The Office of the Project Manager recommended that the above-named positions be converted to Medical Staff Officers (MSO-06). Furthermore, the Information Office should reflect a standardized organization at both the Training and Doctrine Command and the Force Command, as well as at the remaining CONUS armies. These should be designated as Information Offices and not as Public Affairs Offices since the latter were limited by certain restrictions of the Department of Defense.⁴

The Army School System. At this point, the Office of the Project Manager indicated that the former "University Concept" had been redesignated as "The Army School System." Still envisioned, however, was the assignment to the Training and Doctrine Command of all Army schools and joint/DOD schools for which the Army was executive agent. This concept also assumed a commonality of some resource or resources between each or any two of the schools which could be managed and supported more efficiently if placed under one command. General Kalergis directed the merging of the current individual efforts of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to examine the applicability of each school for assignment to TRADOC. Furthermore, the revised Detailed Plan should consider the assignment of one or more schools as a special group with a common headquarters under the Training and Doctrine Command.⁵

Placement of CDEC/MASSTER. The U.S. Continental Army Command was informed that revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan would assume the placement of the Combat Developments Experimentation Command within the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, while the MASSTER Test Program would remain within the U.S. Army Force Command. Test direction from the Department of the Army regarding the allocation and control of test resources would flow through

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Ibid., Anx. B, App. XIV.

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Ibid., Anx. B, App. IV.

the appropriate major command headquarters. Technical test direction, when necessary, would flow directly from the Department of the Army Test Agency to the testing activity. Within a period of one year after the reorganization, however, the Department of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development would be required to report on the feasibility of merging the Combat Developments Experimentation Command with the MASSTER Test Program. If an affirmative recommendation were advanced, the report in question would also have to include a recommendation for the optimum placement of the resulting organization.⁶

Slippage of the Deadline Date

Despite the insistence of the Office of the Project Manager that a one-time revision of the CONARC Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan must be completed for submission to Department of the Army by 30 September, a number of major issues remained unresolved as late as 20 September. General Kalergis assured the U.S. Continental Army Command that he would attempt to obtain early answers on those matters which required a decision by the Department of the Army. However, briefings for the Army Chief of Staff and the Vice Chief of Staff on the Three Center Concept, the Combat Developments Process, and the Schools Model were scheduled for the period from 10 to 15 October 1972, thus precluding any earlier decision. Because of the open issues, General Kalergis agreed with the CONARC Chief of Staff and the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group that a complete update of the Detailed Plan by 30 September was not feasible. It was mutually agreed on 20 September that the detailed up-date would be slipped to 20 October. This was the latest possible date for submission, however, if command budget estimates were to be prepared for the new commands by 30 November 1972.⁷

Supplemental Guidance for the Revision of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan

Two briefings were held for Lt. Gen. W.T. Kerwin, Jr., and Lt. Gen. W.E. DePuy -- commanders-designate of the two new commands -- on 12 and 19 October, respectively. At these meetings, the two generals provided guidance concerning the revision of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan. At the 12 October meeting, General

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Ibid., p. 4..

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(1) MFR, BG R.L. West, 25 Sep 72, subj: Executive Meeting with General Kalergis on 20 September (STEADFAST). (2) DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, SSG to CONARC Stf, 22 Sep 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Plan -- STEADFAST Tasking.

Kerwin observed that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in each of the new commands was too large; spaces would have to be clearly earmarked for reduction when the Standard Installation/Division Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS) was operational and on-line. In addition, the Directors of Management Information Systems (DMIS) would have to be placed on the level of the Chiefs of Staff as required by Army Regulation 18-1. It was not made clear, however, whether the lines would have to be redrawn at the Chief of Staff level or whether the establishment of this directorate as a special staff section would suffice. In addition, both generals pointed out that the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics in each headquarters were too large by approximately fifty spaces. Again, spaces would have to be clearly earmarked for transfer to either the Logistics Center at Fort Lee or to other headquarters which would eventually assume the responsibility for developing and maintaining logistics programs. And, finally, the unoccupied career intern spaces in both commands could be deleted and shown as space savings.⁸

General Kalergis and General DePuy reviewed the problems attendant on the establishment of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments in the new Training and Doctrine Command headquarters. Both general officers stressed the fact that they did not desire the establishment of a mirror image of the existing Combat Developments Command in the new headquarters. The CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group was directed to examine a minimum of four alternatives to handle the combat developments program at the Training and Doctrine Command headquarters. These alternatives included a combination of schools and combat developments; a system somewhat paralleling that suggested by General DePuy; a functional approach to combat developments similar to the organization already established for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Schools; or the existing organization of the Combat Developments Command reduced to approximately 150 personnel. It was abundantly clear to the participants at the briefing that the intent of the guidance was to reduce the strength of the combat developments staff office at TRADOC headquarters; to build up the three combat developments centers and make them strong; and to ensure a close and continuous, effective and efficient interface at the schools level.⁹


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MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones, 13 Oct 72, subj: Briefing for LTG Kerwin and LTG DePuy on 12 October.

9

Memo CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG L.M. Jones for COL J.J. Brockmyer and COL Hayden, 13 Oct 72, subj: Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments in TRADOC.

**Chart 26 -- PROPOSED ORGANIZATION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS**



The briefing on 19 October dealt solely with the four alternatives for establishing the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments in TRADOC headquarters. General DePuy, the TRADOC commander-designate, discussed two basic alternatives, the first of which would move the Combat Developments Command to Fort Monroe, Va., in its present configuration with a later reduction in spaces and sorting out of functions. The second alternative -- as proposed by the U.S. Continental Army Command -- would reorganize along functional lines as shown on Chart 26. General DePuy reiterated that neither he nor the Army Chief of Staff wanted a mirror image of the existing Combat Developments Command established within the Training and Doctrine Command. At this point, the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group recommended the development of the second alternative with a space ceiling of 250 persons. General DePuy approved the CONARC recommendation and directed its immediate development. This concept was to be developed by the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group with active participation by the Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff of the Combat Developments Command.¹⁰

CONARC Revisions of the Detailed Plan

Both the Office of the Project Manager for Reorganization and the CONARC STEADFAST Study Group had hoped that the one-time revision of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan would be completed and submitted to the Department of the Army by 20 October 1972. However, the same factors which militated against meeting the original 30 September 1972 suspense dictated the publication of the various required revisions by stages. In all, four changes were published between 20 October -- the first submission -- and 22 December 1972. In order to facilitate the identification of the various changes to the plan, they were printed on pastel colored paper of various hues. Changes No. 1 and No. 2 were published and distributed in two phases each. It had been intended by the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group that, once the revisions to the Detailed Plan were complete, the Executive Summary would be completely revised -- along with a revised table of contents -- to reflect the contents of the finalized plan. The estimated date of publication for the revised Executive Summary was scheduled for mid-November 1972. But by mid-November, many of the unresolved issues had not yet reached the decision stage, while additional decisions required

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MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, BG G.J. Duquemin, 19 Oct 72, subj: Organization of the DCS for Combat Developments within TRADOC.

that still other portions of the Detailed Plan would have to be revised as well.¹¹

Change No. 1 to the Detailed Plan

Change No. 1 to the Detailed Plan was the most voluminous of the various revisions to the plan since it was intended to clear up all of the items which had been brought into question by the intensive review.¹² Certain areas, however, were not complete in time for inclusion in the submission of 20 October 1972 -- the revised deadline date established by the Office of the Project Manager -- and were included in a second phase to Change No. 1 which was published and distributed on 13 November. Change No. 1 was printed on green pages in order to facilitate identification of the revisions throughout the plan.

The Three Center Concept. The three functional combat developments centers -- the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, and the Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison -- had been designed to provide a mid-management capability for the Training and Doctrine Command in directing its combat developments effort. A complete description of this process was included in a new Chapter 1 to Volume B of Book I. Work had not been completed, however, with regard to the definition of specific costs, personnel, tables of organization, and facilities. The status of the Logistics Center at Fort Lee was not finalized until 18 October, too late for submission in the first phase of Change No. 1. The changes submitted on 20 October did indicate that the Logistics Center would not command either the U.S. Army Quartermaster Center or the U.S. Army Quartermaster School, but would be only a tenant activity at Fort Lee.

The Economic Analyses. With Change No. 1 to the Detailed Plan, the economic analyses were submitted in the format specified in the guidance provided by the Office of the Project Manager. The U.S. Continental Army Command cautioned that the cost data represented the best information available as of 20 October 1972. The recency of some decisions precluded the inclusion of all relevant costs associated with the reorganization. Certain costs were

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(1) Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to OCSA, 20 Oct 72, subj: Revision of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan. (2) Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 13 Nov 72, same subj.

12

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to OCSA, 20 Oct 72, subj: Revision to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, w/2 incls.

still being developed and would be submitted at a later date. These included one-time costs for the modification and maintenance of facilities at Forts Leavenworth, Lee, and Benjamin Harrison to accommodate the three expanded centers; one-time costs at Forts Bragg, Knox, Lewis, and Riley for the four ROTC Region headquarters; one-time costs for the modification and maintenance of facilities at installations which were to house the Readiness Assistance Regions and Readiness Groups; reduced annual operating costs for the Logistics Documents Research Systems Agency resulting from the transfer of that agency to the Logistics Center; and increased temporary duty costs for both the ROTC Regions and the Readiness Groups.

The Subordinate CONUS Army Headquarters. Standardized functional statements and organizational structures were provided in Change No. 1 for the headquarters of the subordinate CONUS armies. Although the three CONUS armies were similarly organized in order to facilitate mission accomplishment, some variance in the tables of distribution strengths was necessary because of differences in the number of Reserve Component units in each army area.

The Readiness Assistance Regions (RAR). The concept of the Readiness Assistance Regions (RAR) was substituted in Change No. 1 for the supervisory elements concept contained in the Detailed Plan of 20 July 1972. Details on the organization, functions, and command relationships had not been completed in time for inclusion in the revisions of 20 October 1972.

ROTC Regions. Change No. 1 included a new concept for the management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps which replaced the concept contained in the 20 July 1972 version of the Detailed Plan. This concept was based on the establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC in Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the establishment of four regional headquarters throughout the continental United States. The revised concept was developed to provide high visibility for the ROTC program and to improve its educational representation within today's environment.

Phase II Revisions, 13 November 1972. At the time that the initial changes to the plan were published, certain on-going actions prevented the reaching of decisions in time to meet the deadline of 20 October 1972 established by the Office of the Project Manager. This necessitated the publication of a second phase of Change No. 1 on 13 November containing such matters as the revised organizational structures, functional statements, and tables of distribution for the headquarters of both the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Force Command. Moreover, the status of the Logistics Center and the Logistics Combat Developments Activity at Fort Lee was not finalized until 18 October 1972. The new concept for the Logistics Center, included in the Phase II revisions, stipulated that the Logistics Center would be a tenant activity at Fort Lee, separate from the U.S. Army Quartermaster

Center and the U.S. Army Quartermaster School. Because of recent decisions concerning space authorizations for the Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Logistics in the new commands, Chapters 10 of Volumes A and E -- TRADOC and FORSCOM, respectively -- were rewritten to reflect a new logistics management concept. The Phase II revisions included, for the first time, tables of distribution for the four ROTC Regional Commands. In the interim, the former designation of Force Command had been revised to read Forces Command, with an approved acronym of FORSCOM. These changes had to be substituted throughout the entire Detailed Plan. The CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group also pointed out that much of the functional transfer plans contained in the TRADOC and FORSCOM volumes of the plan had been invalidated by the changes in timing and recent decisions concerning organization and functions. These functional transfer plans were being updated but would be retained at CONARC headquarters for development of the Phased Implementation Plan which was due in Department of the Army by 30 November. Despite the publication of a second phase to Change No. 1, certain actions were not complete at the time of the second submission. These included a revised table of distribution for the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and an overall concept for the Readiness Assistance Regions. It was estimated that these would be ready for submission on or about 20 November 1972. The tables of distribution for the CONARC schools, which reflected the schools model and the integration of the collocated Combat Developments Agencies, would not be ready for submission before mid-December 1972.¹³

Change No. 2 to the Detailed Plan

The first phase of Change No. 2 to the Detailed Plan, printed on blue paper, was submitted to the Department of the Army on 14 November 1972. The first phase of this change included organizational charts for the two new commands; a detailed overview of the Force Development/Combat Developments processes within the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; and a thorough revision of the Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison.¹⁴

The second phase of Change No. 2 was published almost a month later and was more voluminous than the first phase. The letter accompanying the second phase indicated that Changes No. 1 and 2,

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Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 13 Nov 72, subj: Revision to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.

14

Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 14 Nov 72, subj: Revision to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan, Dated 20 July 1972.

along with the STEADFAST Detailed Plan of 20 July 1972, constituted the basic reference for CONARC reorganization data. While further revisions were expected in order to refine certain specific data, no changes were contemplated in the basic concepts. The second phase changes included revisions to the organizational structures and functional statements for the new commands and the subordinate CONUS armies. In addition, extensive revisions were made in the sections concerning cost analysis, facilities, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Minor revisions were made to the section concerning the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, while the section dealing with the Logistics Center at Fort Lee underwent a complete overhaul. As a result of recent decisions by the Department of the Army, the Training Aids Management Agency was integrated into the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Schools (DCST&S) at TRADOC headquarters, an action which necessitated removal of the Training Aids Management Agency from Book III, "Outgoing Action," of the Detailed Plan.¹⁵

Since the letter transmitting the second phase of Change No. 2 had alluded to the need for further revisions to the plan, it was pointed out that revisions concerning the Army Readiness Regions -- as the Readiness Assistance Regions were redesignated -- would be forwarded to the Department of the Army on or about 29 December 1972. This revision would reflect the new guidance concerning the concept, as well as the revised boundaries resulting from a redrawing of the subordinate CONUS army boundaries. In addition, the tables of distribution for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the U.S. Army Forces Command, and the subordinate CONUS armies, undergoing another extensive revision, would be ready for submission to the Department of the Army by 20 December. As a result of newer guidance received from the Department of the Army, Chapters 10 of Volume A and E were again undergoing a major revision. It was expected that those chapters in Volumes A and E dealing with the functional transfer plans would be republished some time in January 1972 to reflect their most recent updates.¹⁶

Change No. 3 to the Detailed Plan

Although Change No. 3 was published and submitted to the Department of the Army on the same day as Phase II of Change No. 2, CONARC indicated that the reason for Change No. 3 was that it reflected information received by the STEADFAST Steering Group

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Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 18 Dec 72, subj: Revision of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, Dated 20 July 1972.

16

Ibid.

subsequent to the printing and collation of Change No. 2. This change, printed on yellow paper, included minor revisions in the economic analyses for the new commands; a revision of the overview of the Force Development/Combat Developments Processes within the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; and updated facilities information.¹⁷

Change No. 4 to the Detailed Plan

Change No. 4 to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan of 20 July 1972 consisted mainly of major revisions to tables of distribution and minor revisions to the economic analyses for the new commands. It was determined at this time, that Change No. 4, printed on pink paper, would apply only to those areas which had been revised in Change No. 3. This meant that only the minor revisions to the economic analyses were considered as being Change No. 4 on 22 December 1972. Major revisions also were made in the tables of distribution of various elements of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command organization, including the headquarters of the major command, itself; the three combat developments centers; and the four ROTC Regions. In addition, new tables of distribution were developed for the subordinate CONUS armies. These changes were printed on green, blue, or yellow paper, depending upon whether they were the first, second, or third revision of that area of the Detailed Plan.¹⁸

Final Guidance from the Project Manager, 5 February 1973

At the beginning of February 1973, the Office of the Department of the Army Project Manager issued a final set of guidelines for the reorganization of the Army in the continental United States.¹⁹ This guidance covered all aspects of the Army reorganization, including CONARC's Operation STEADFAST, the U.S. Army Health Services Command, and the reorganization of the Department of the Army staff. As a basis for the guidance, General Kalergis announced that the overall concept for reorganizing the Army in the continental United States had been approved for actual implementation. In addition, all specific reorganization plans

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Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 18 Dec 72, subj: Revision to Steadfast Detailed Plan, Dated 20 July 1972.

18

CONARC STEADFAST Steering Gp, Summary Sheet, 22 Dec 72, re: Revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan, Dated 20 July 1972.

19

The entire section is based on ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to Distr, 5 Feb 73, subj: Guidance for Implementation, CONUS Reorganization -- 1973, w/6 incls.

submitted to that office for review and approval -- including the CONARC STEADFAST Detailed Plan of 20 October 1972, as revised, and the CONARC STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan of 30 November 1972 -- also had been approved for implementation. This statement was qualified by the stipulation that both plans would have to be modified as indicated throughout the guidance document. Approval of these two plans did not extend to the various tables of distribution and allowances contained therein which would have to be reviewed and approved separately prior to the implementation phase.

The general instructions for the U.S. Continental Army Command indicated that the design of the Logistics System required further clarification. The relationships of the Logistics Center with the staff elements of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Logistics at both TRADOC and FORSCOM, as well as the Management Information Systems staff elements of the two headquarters, would have to be clarified in the STEADFAST Detailed Plan. In particular, the staff elements of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Logistics were not to be given responsibility for the development of computer software or the functional systems design of Class A or Class B Management Information Systems.

Guidelines Affecting the U.S. Army Forces Command. The specific guidance for modification of the CONARC STEADFAST Detailed Plan indicated that the U.S. Army Forces Command should be designated as participating in the combat and materiel development processes as the actual user of the materiel being developed. With regard to mobilization, the U.S. Army Forces Command would not be authorized to task installations and activities of other Department of the Army commands and agencies to provide resources for the mobilization of Reserve Component units without specific authorization from the Department. Consequently, the U.S. Army Forces Command would develop plans only for the mobilization of its own forces. In addition, the Transportation Division of the FORSCOM Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics would have the function of operating the Computerized Airlift Planning System (CAPS) in conjunction with the CONARC Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS). While the development of the system would be the responsibility of TRADOC's Logistics Center, the operational function would be a FORSCOM responsibility.

Guidelines Affecting the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Specific guidance for modification of those portions of the CONARC STEADFAST Detailed Plan pertaining to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command were concerned mainly with the responsibility and operations of the Training Aids Management Agency and the relationships of that agency to the two new commands and the U.S. Army Materiel Command. The guidance also contained seven pages of definitive, line-by-line modifications of the chapter dealing with the organization and functions of the TRADOC headquarters

and to Volume B dealing with the three functional centers.

Final Revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan

In complying with that guidance furnished by the Office of the Project Manager in early February 1973, CONARC published what was intended to be the final revisions to its Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan on 28 February.²⁰ In addition to the required revisions to the overall Detailed Plan, a new Executive Summary was developed to replace the original summary of 20 July 1972. In contrast to the original, the new Executive Summary was intended to stand by itself as a basic reference document rather than serve as an introduction to the comprehensive plan. The actual revisions to the basic Detailed Plan contained further refinements to the organizational structures and the functional statements for the headquarters of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command. Within the Training and Doctrine Command, the detailed overview of the Force Development/Combat Developments Processes was again extensively revised. Considerable revision was required in the treatment of the Three Center Concept, resulting from the latest guidance from the Office of the Project Manager; segments of those portions of the plan dealing with the Combined Arms Center and the Administration Center were updated, while the concept for the Logistics Center was rewritten and republished in its entirety. Those chapters in Volumes A and B of Book I dealing with Management Information Systems were updated, while the concept for the Combat Developments Command/U.S. Continental Army Command School Consolidation and Model was completely revised. The chapters in Volumes A and B dealing with the Logistics Management Concept for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command had been overtaken by events and were deleted.

The New Executive Summary

The new Executive Summary published on 28 February 1973 rescinded the previous summary volume, dated 20 July 1972, and incorporated all subsequent revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan.²¹ As indicated above, this new Executive Summary was intended to


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The entire paragraph is based on ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to OCSA, Attn: DACS-MR, 28 Feb 73, subj: Revision to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan, dated 20 July 1972, w/3 incls.

21

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on Incl 1, "Executive Summary," 28 Feb 73, to ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to OCSA, Attn: DACS-MR, 28 Feb 73, subj: Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, Dated 20 July 1972.

Chart 27 -- TIME PHASED SCHEDULING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATION



stand alone as a reference document, rather than serve as an introduction to the overall Detailed Plan. Consequently, the definitive table of contents to the various volumes and books of the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan were removed from this edition.

Phasing of the Reorganization. The key dates for the phased implementation of the reorganization were 1 March 1973, when the Combat Developments Command was designated a subordinate command of the U.S. Continental Army Command, and 1 July 1973, when the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command were officially established as major commands of the Department of the Army. These pivotal dates had been selected so that all levels of command could begin the preliminary reorganization on 1 March 1973 within the existing constraints of budget and personnel accounting. At the same time, these dates permitted all reports dealing with funding and logistics to be changed simultaneously to the two new commands on 1 July. The complete phasing of the reorganization is shown on the schedule contained in Chart 27. This schedule indicated that the actual command of installations would be assumed gradually by the two new commands during the period, 1 July to 1 October 1973, with the U.S. Continental Army Command remaining as a viable organization throughout this transition period and on until 31 December 1973.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The revised and updated organizational structure for the new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and its major subordinate elements is shown on Charts 16 and 17 (pages 138 and 139 above). As a major Army commander of the Department of the Army, the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, was responsible for acting as the principal agent of the Department for developing, managing, and supervising the training of individuals of both the Active Army and the Reserve Components. In addition, he acted as the principal agent of the Department of the Army for formulating and documenting concepts, doctrine, materiel requirements, and organizations for the U.S. Army, as a whole. He was responsible for developing plans and programs for the introduction of new systems into the Army and for developing training and doctrinal literature. He commanded those subordinate commands, installations, and activities assigned to his jurisdiction by the Department of the Army. Through his installation commanders, the TRADOC commander was responsible for providing base operations and other types of support to Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or other Government activities tenanted or satellited on the installations. It was reaffirmed that the headquarters for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command would be located at Fort Monroe, Va.

The Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. The new Executive Summary reaffirmed the fact that the management of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program had been assigned to the U.S. Army


Training and Doctrine Command, with command responsibility exercised through four ROTC Regional Commands located at Forts Bragg, Knox, Riley, and Lewis. The new ROTC organizational structure approved for implementation provided a highly visible and responsive management system for the administration of the U.S. Army's largest source of qualified commissioned officers. Within this dedicated ROTC management system, policy decisions would be expedited, command response would be rapid, and operating costs could be easily identified, thus enhancing resource management and programing. The assigning of a major general as the Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC at the Training and Doctrine Command gave proper emphasis and prestige to the total program through an interface with the highest civilian educational authorities. This general officer, along with the four brigadier generals commanding the ROTC Regions, increased the senior officer supervision of the operating elements five-fold. In addition, each regional commander also served as the ROTC summer camp commander for his area, thus eliminating the requirement for additional general officers and providing for close year-round co-ordination with installation commanders for summer camp planning.

The Schools Model. The STEADFAST planners had developed a standardized model for all of the schools of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command which were now required to combine their training mission with a combat developments mission. The approved organizational model is shown on Chart 20 (page 150 above). The principal feature of this organization was the establishment of a Deputy Commandant for Combat and Training Developments at the same level as the Deputy Commandant for Training and Education. The approved organization merged the existing missions and functions of the Combat Developments Command agencies with those of the Army service or branch school most closely associated with that combat developments mission. It also helped to facilitate the integration of the instructor/student input into doctrinal development. As a result, the commandant of each school was assigned overall responsibility for both the combat developments mission and the training mission.

The Functional Centers for Combat Developments. Three functional centers had been developed to integrate doctrine and developments as the middle managers for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, and the Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison were responsible for integrating the combat developments efforts of the various schools under tasking authority delegated by the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth served as the focal point for the integration of all combined arms doctrine developed by other organizations; developed appropriate force development materials for combat and combat support


**Chart 28 -- THE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS MID-MANAGEMENT
CONCEPT, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
THE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS CENTERS**

THE COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH




* ALSO COMDT OF C & GSC

THE LOGISTICS CENTER, FORT LEE



* TENANTS
 - - - - COORDINATION
 - TASKING, INVOLVING WHOLESALE/RETAIL LOG INTERFACE

THE ADMINISTRATION CENTER, FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON



* ALSO COMDT INSTITUTE OF ADMIN

forces for divisions and echelons above divisions; and integrated concepts for the personnel and logistics headquarters associated with those same command levels. The Administration Center served as the focal point for the development and integration of the Army's administrative doctrine, organizations, materiel requirements, and systems development functions resulting from the efforts of that activity, itself, and other organizations. In addition, the Administration Center was responsible for evaluating the administrative education and training at all Army service schools and colleges. The Logistics Center at Fort Lee served as the focal point for those combat developments systems related to the management and integration of the Army's logistics concepts, plans, doctrine, organization, materiel requirements, and systems. The Logistics Center also was responsible for reviewing and evaluating logistics systems development and logistics-oriented education and training at all related Army service schools and colleges. The organizational structures and command relationships for the functional centers is shown on Chart 28. It should be noted, however, that in contrast to the other two functional centers, the Logistics Center was only a tenant activity at Fort Lee, with a mere tasking relationship to the Army Logistics Management Center which remained assigned to the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC).


The U.S. Army Forces Command. The revised and updated organizational structure of the new U.S. Army Forces Command and its subordinate elements is shown on Charts 18 and 19 (pages 140 and 141 above). In contrast to his counterpart, the commander of the new U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, was charged with performing missions both as an Army component commander of designated joint commands and as a major Army commander of the Department of the Army. As an Army component commander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, was designated the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces Readiness Command (CINCARRED), and was further designated as the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces Atlantic Command (CINCARLANT), for the sole purpose of developing contingency plans. This latter command would be activated only on orders of the Army Chief of Staff when so directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a major Army commander of the Department of the Army, the commander of the U.S. Army Forces Command directly commanded all Active Army troop units in the continental United States, except those assigned to another command or agency by the Department of the Army; the subordinate numbered armies in the continental United States (CONUSA); all assigned U.S. Army Reserve TOE and TDA troop program units and reinforcement training units within the continental United States; and those subordinate commands, installations, and activities directly assigned by the Department of the Army. One major exception to these command relationships stipulated that the Commander of the U.S. Army Forces Command exercised command, less operational control, over the U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions.

In addition, he supervised the training of all Army National Guard units within the continental United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territory of the Virgin Islands. To carry out his host/tenant responsibilities, the commander of the U.S. Army Forces Command was responsible for providing base operations and other support through his installations to those Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or other Government activities which were tenanted or satellited on his installations.

The Subordinate Numbered Armies in the Continental United States. The three armies in the continental United States were assigned to the U.S. Army Forces Command and were responsible for commanding the U.S. Army Reserve; planning for mobilization of the Reserve Components; co-ordinating support for domestic emergencies; and exercising training supervision over the Army National Guard. The CONUS armies were thus effectively eliminated from the chain of command with respect to installations, as well as to Active Army units and activities. The three CONUS armies were designated as the First U.S. Army located at Fort George G. Meade, Md.; Fifth U.S. Army at Fort Sam Houston, Tex.; and Sixth U.S. Army at the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. The boundaries of these CONUS armies -- as revised in mid-January 1973 -- are shown on Map 4 (page 195 above).

Army Readiness Regions and Readiness Groups. As indicated earlier, the Department of the Army Reserve Component Management Study, which had been conducted at the beginning of September 1972, determined that certain changes in the management of the Reserve Components were necessary in order to increase the emphasis on readiness in that element of the Army. The approved concept for the improved management of the Reserve Components provided for Army Readiness Regions (ARR) and Readiness Groups to assist units of the U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard at the grass roots level. Nine Army Readiness Regions, each commanded by an Active Army major general, were to be established throughout the continental United States with an assigned mission of assisting Reserve Component commanders in identifying training requirements and helping to determine the most effective resources -- either Reserve or Active Army -- to satisfy such requirements. Under the 9 Army Readiness Regions were 25 Readiness Groups at 27 locations throughout the continental United States. The distribution of Army Readiness Regions and Readiness Groups is shown on Map 5 (page 201 above). Each of the Readiness Groups was to be composed of a number of branch teams such as Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, and Engineer, as well as functional teams which would be responsive to the requirements of the Reserve Component units located within an Army Readiness Region's area. The locations of these Readiness Groups were selected, insofar as possible, near concentrations of Reserve Component units and in close proximity to Active military installations in order to provide family housing, medical, post

Chart 29 -- TYPICAL INSTALLATION FUNDING FLOW



➡ MISSION FLOW

⇨ OMA RESERVE FUNDING INFORMATION ONLY

★ BASE OPERATIONS EITHER P2 OR P8T DEPENDING ON MAJOR COMMAND ASSIGNMENT

exchange, and commissary support to the personnel of these groups. In order to provide the Reserve Component commander with a single point of contact on Reserve Component matters, directorates or divisions dedicated to the support of the Reserve Components were to be established at selected Class I and Class II installations. Personnel for these directorates or divisions were provided in revised garrison tables of distribution.

Installation Funding Flow. The flow of funds, as well as budget and manpower guidance for a typical installation, are illustrated on Chart 29. The installation designed for this illustration was assumed to have activities of the Strategic Army Forces, a school of the Training and Doctrine Command, and a Medical Department Activity (MEDDAC). In addition, it provided area support for activities of the Reserve Components and the Reserve Officers Training Corps. The Department of the Army was the main source of funds which were distributed initially to the Army major commands. U.S. Army Forces Command provided Program 2 funding direct to the installation to support P2 activities -- primarily units of the Strategic Army Forces. Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR), funds flowed in the same manner, i.e., from the U.S. Army Forces Command directly to the installation. Since the subordinate CONUS armies had exercised the function of Program Director for all Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve funding, they advised the U.S. Army Forces Command as to how those funds should be broken out in the respective CONUS army area. Program 8T funds for the support of the Army service schools and colleges and the activities of the Reserve Officer Training Corps were allotted to the installation by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Program 8M and Program 3C funds to support medical and communications activities likewise were provided directly to the activities concerned by the U.S. Army Health Services Command and by the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command. The parent command of the installation -- either the U.S. Army Forces Command or the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command -- provided the installation base operations funds. These were allocated as Program P2 funds for FORSCOM installations and Program P8T funds for TRADOC installations.

Installation/Major Command Relationships. The relationships between the Army major command headquarters and those installations which contained units and activities under the jurisdiction of either the U.S. Army Forces Command or the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command had to be carefully defined. When elements of the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command were located on a non-TRADOC installation, the TRADOC commander was authorized to deal directly with that installation commander. Information copies of all directives so provided were to be disseminated to the parent Army major command of the installation. In addition, the TRADOC commander could provide guidance and direction to an installation commander concerning the missions, operations, personnel, and

funding of TRADOC activities and elements located on that installation. The TRADOC commander could also establish any necessary reporting requirements between the installation and his headquarters. In order to avoid duplication, these requirements would have to be co-ordinated with the parent command. The TRADOC commander could alter existing command relationships with TRADOC units, whenever required to do so by Department of the Army-delegated authority, in order to provide the degree of command and control required by his headquarters under the existing circumstances. The command relationships described for the commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command were identical to those governing the commander of the U.S. Army Forces Command when elements of his command were located on non-FORSCOM installations.

New Volume L -- Supplemental Studies

Along with the final revision of the CONARC Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan on 28 February 1973, a new Volume L was developed containing four supplemental studies dealing with military and civilian personnel matters and welfare funds.²²

Modification of the Requisitioning Process for Officer and Enlisted Personnel. With the implementation of the reorganization envisaged under Operation STEADFAST, it became necessary to provide a plan for an orderly transition from the existing system whereby the U.S. Continental Army Command's personnel requisitions flowed up through command channels to the Department of the Army. Under the new system, personnel requisitions for the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command would have to flow directly from the installations or specified reporting activities throughout the continental United States to the new U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). This new installation direct requisition processing system would be built within the framework of the overall reorganization of the U.S. Army and would be consistent with the future implementation of the Standard Installation/Division Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS). The designated installations would be the requisitioning authority for activities and elements of the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at the installation and its satellite activities. The installation commander would be responsible for forwarding all requisitions directly to the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. All matters relating to the distribution of enlisted personnel -- e.g., surplus reporting, requisition cancellation, deletion actions, emergency requisitions, and special

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The entire section is based on Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 28 Feb 73, Book I, Volume L, "Supplemental Studies."

requirements -- would be co-ordinated between the proposed SIDPERS installation commander and the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. Management information regarding personnel distribution would be furnished by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center to either the U.S. Army Forces Command or the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

The assignment of personnel would have to be monitored at all echelons of command so as to ensure that both officer and enlisted personnel were assigned and used according to the provisions of applicable Army Regulations. The installation commander would be responsible for monitoring all requisitions processed through his personnel office and would ensure the proper assignment of personnel in accordance with assignment instructions from Department of the Army. All problems in personnel management associated with the requisition processing function would be handled directly between the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center and the installation commander. Army personnel problems arising between Army major commands (e.g., between the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) were to be settled at the lowest possible command echelon. Any problems involving professional branch officers would have to be settled between the Department of the Army professional branch and the installation commander. Authority would be given to the installation commander to reassign an individual between units of the same command (e.g., FORSCOM to FORSCOM units) at the same duty station. Prior to the reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command into the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on 1 July 1973, installation commanders would have the authority to reassign personnel between CONARC units. However, any request to change assignments across the TRADOC/FORSCOM command lines, regardless of grade, would require approval of the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. The reassignment of individuals between installations in the continental United States also would have to have the approval of the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center.

Civilian Personnel Procedures. The major effect of the organizational changes approved for implementation in the overall reorganization of the Department of the Army was a complete realignment of much of the structure of the U.S. Army in the continental United States. Since Army major commands would be abolished and entirely new commands and organizations established in their stead, it was inevitable that large numbers of civilian personnel would be affected. To begin, only a relatively small number of civilian jobs would be included in functional transfers to the new organizations. In order to best serve the civilian employees affected by the reorganization, an overall placement plan was devised by the Department of the Army with the approval of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. As the first order of business, a reduction-in-force (RIF) would be conducted at the headquarters of First,

Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies in order to retain the residual positions remaining at those locations. Transfer-of-function offers would then be made to a relatively small group of employees for whom there was a clearly identifiable functional movement to the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, or to other activities. These included certain employees from the headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command whose functions were clearly associated with segments of the operational aspects of their command which were being relocated. Some functional transfer offers to the residual First U.S. Army headquarters also would be made for selected employees of Third U.S. Army headquarters.

The actions described above would leave the balance of the new jobs unfilled at both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and would, moreover, leave two major groups of employees without valid job offers. The first group consisted of those employees at the headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command, the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, and Third U.S. Army who had not received a transfer-of-function offer. The second group consisted of those employees at the existing First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Army headquarters who had not received continued employment with the group of residual employees as determined by the reduction-in-force action at those locations. All remaining positions at both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and as many positions as possible at the three new functional centers would be staffed from these two groups. After all available civilian personnel were aligned by grade, type of appointment, Veteran's Preference, and service computation date, job offers would be made at each grade level to persons then holding that grade.

In addition to the two new major commands, many small activities which were also scheduled for establishment in the same time frame would require appropriate staffing. These included the Army Readiness Regions, Readiness Groups, ROTC Field Activities, the Training Aids Management Agency, and the three functional centers for doctrinal development under the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Additionally, there would be some tenant activities, such as the U.S. Army Health Services Command, stationed on TRADOC and FORSCOM installations. The Health Services Command was scheduled to locate at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and would help offset the reduction in the Fifth U.S. Army headquarters. There also would be some transfers-in-place of previous CONARC resources to other major commands at the installation level; these included the transfer of installation medical activities to the new U.S. Army Health Services Command and communications-electronics activities to the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) would be functionally transferred in its entirety from its present location in Hampton, Va., to Fort Sheridan, Ill. Employees who declined that transfer would

not be placed in competition for positions at the two new commands until all of the employees in the two major groups described above had been placed. The Department of the Army did establish definite lines of consideration for the filling of permanent position vacancies during the course of the reorganization to ensure that all employees who were affected by that reorganization received the broadest possible consideration for continuing positions.

Development of the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan

In presenting his guidelines in mid-June 1972 for the development of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan, the Department of the Army Project Manager pointed out that this plan would provide definitive details on those functional changes which were envisioned in the Outline Plan of 5 May 1972, coupled with much more precise information on organizational structuring, phasing, and costs. The Detailed Plan would be the basis for measuring the degree to which the reorganization would achieve its specific objectives, as well as measuring the more likely costs, such as personnel and mission turbulence. Once approved, the STEADFAST Detailed Plan would provide the basis for a Phased Implementation Plan for the establishment of the two new commands.²³

Slippage of the Suspense Date

At the time that the STEADFAST Detailed Plan was submitted to the Office of the Project Manager on 20 July 1972, General Kalergis felt that a one-time revision of the Detailed Plan would be necessary and would have to be completed by 30 September 1972. This would permit sufficient time to complete and submit the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan by 10 October so that the command budget estimates (CBE) for FY 1974 could be completed by 30 November, as required. By mid-August, however, it was evident that considerable work would be required to evaluate fully the Detailed Plan and that guidance would have to be disseminated incrementally by the Office of the Project Manager. Since both General Kalergis and the members of the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group recognized the fact that it was practically impossible to wrap up everything by 10 October, it was agreed to slip the suspense date to 30 November 1972, the latest possible date on which a budget change could be submitted to the Department of Defense. This new suspense date was reflected in the revised time-phased schedule provided

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See above, pp. 110 - 111 and 137.

in the definitive guidance from the Office of the Project Manager on 23 August.²⁴

Initial and Supplemental Guidance from the Project Manager

Initial guidance for the revision of the various detailed plans being developed throughout the Army, as well as for the development of corollary phased implementation plans, was published and distributed to Department of the Army Executive Agents on 23 August 1972. At that time, General Kalergis stated that the review of all detailed plans by his office had led him to conclude that supplemental information was required in selected areas. Moreover, certain aspects of those plans required detailed revision and further validation prior to proceeding into the full-scale development of implementing plans. The phase implementation plans would have to be completed by 30 November 1972 in order to permit the completion of revised budget estimates for the operation of the new commands and agencies for FY 1974. While most of this guidance dealt with contemplated revisions to the detailed plans, certain references were made to matters which would have to be included in the phased plans for implementing the basic organizations and structures contained in those detailed plans. For example, each of the designated Executive Agents would have to develop a coordinated movement schedule with specific dates for the relocation of activities and agencies and including, when applicable, the recommended "not earlier than" and "not later than" dates for these relocations. This information was particularly sensitive with regard to Fort Belvoir, Fort Monroe/Hampton, Va., Fort McPherson/Atlanta Army Depot, Ga., Fort Sheridan, Ill., and Fort Sam Houston, Tex.²⁵

Included in this general guidance was the fact that the phased plans for implementation were to consider the U.S. Army Recruiting Command as a Class II Activity under the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and that it would begin relocating from its present site in Hampton, Va., to Fort Sheridan, Ill., during calendar year 1973. In addition, with the advent of

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(1) MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, MG G.J. Duquemin, 15 Aug 72, subj: Telecon -- MG Kalergis to MG Pepke, 11 August 1972. (2) Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to DA ACSFOR, DA TSG, Cdr CONARC, Cdr USACDC, and Cdr USASTRATCOM, 23 Aug 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Planning.

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Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to DA ACSFOR, DA TSG, Cdr CONARC, Cdr USACDC, and Cdr USASTRATCOM, 23 Aug 72, subj: Guidance for Reorganization Planning.

the proposed management information systems (MIS), the major commands would monitor the routine flow of data and perform management based on feedback; monitor the summary data provided by activities at the Department of the Army level; and monitor, as well, selected data from installations. The scope of management would be limited to that required to provide policy direction, influence priorities, and maintain a dialogue with both the Department of the Army and the installations concerned. The reorganization, however, could not wait for the advent of the contemplated systems but would have to proceed by phases to permit an orderly transition upon their arrival. Consequently, the phased plans for implementation would have to identify those positions on the headquarters staffs of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army Health Services Command, and the subordinate numbered CONUS armies which would be required for an interim period but would no longer be needed once the management information systems were operational. In addition, General Kalergis pointed out that the Detailed Plans did not adequately address the relationships of FORSCOM units on TRADOC and other non-FORSCOM installations, and vice versa. Thus, the phased plans for implementation would have to contain a definitive explanation of such relationships to include proposed concepts for tenant activities.²⁶

Supplemental Guidance, 10 November 1972. By 10 November, the Office of the Department of the Army Project Manager announced that a review of those detailed plan revisions submitted by the various Executive Agents on 20 October had been completed. This statement, however, was not completely true with regard to the U.S. Continental Army Command since the Phase II portion of Change No. 1 to the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan was not submitted to General Kalergis' office until 13 November.²⁷ The new guidance was based on the premise that, although certain additional information was still forthcoming from the Executive Agents, sufficient information existed to provide further guidance to complete the development of the required Phased Implementation Plans. General Kalergis still felt that these plans would have to be submitted to the Department of the Army by 30 November and that all Department of the Army planning for the reorganization would be completed by 31 December. This time table would permit the establishment of on-site cadres for the new commands and agencies on 1 March 1973; the initiation of incremental moves to the locations of the new headquarters on 1 May; and the assumption of operational status by the new commands and agencies on 1 July. It was at this time that the Department

26

Ibid.

27

See above, pp. 215 - 218.

of the Army announced the official designations for the new commands -- the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Health Services Command. All installations listed for assignment to either the U.S. Army Forces Command or the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in the 20 October 1972 revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan were approved for implementation planning. Once again, the Executive Agents were instructed to develop time-phased, co-ordinated movement schedules around specific dates for the relocation of activities and agencies, including "not earlier than" and "not later than" dates for such relocations. The announcement was also made that the U.S. Army Recruiting Command would begin its move to Fort Sheridan in June 1973, with a completion date of not later than 15 July. Consequently, the phase-in of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the phase-out of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command from the facilities in Hampton would have to be closely integrated so as to ensure the continuity of operations by the latter and the initiation of operations by the former on a concurrent basis.²⁸

Factors Inhibiting the Development of the Implementation Plans. Despite the fact that the Office of the Department of the Army Project Manager had indicated that sufficient information was on hand for the development of Phased Implementation Plans, the concept that these plans would be merely the working extensions of the approved Detailed Plans could not be altered. Consequently, any major revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan would, in some degree, affect the materials contained in the forthcoming STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan. Moreover, since instructions for the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command were not provided in the supplemental guidance of 10 November, the functional transfer displays for that command could not be developed in time to be included in the initial CONARC submission of 30 November 1972. As indicated earlier, the new management concept for the Reserve Components had not been included in the first revision -- Change No. 1 -- to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan and thus could not be addressed in the initial CONARC submission of implementing plans.

The Operation STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan, 30 November 1972.

The U.S. Continental Army Command submitted its Operation STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan (SPIP) as scheduled on 30

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Ltr, DACS-MR, DA PMR to Distr, 10 Nov 72, subj: Supplemental Guidance for Reorganization Planning, w/5 incls.

November 1972.²⁹ This plan, the second major extension of the STEADFAST Outline Plan of 5 May 1972, was separate and distinct from the STEADFAST Detailed Plan of 20 July 1972 -- as revised on 20 October -- and was intended to be used in conjunction with that plan. The STEADFAST Detailed Plan would still retain its identity as the basic library reference for the reorganization, while the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan was intended to serve as a base point on which to build movement planning for the reorganization, as well as for facilities and communication planning. The major purpose of the Phased Implementation Plan was to present a graphic display of the time-phased transfer of key functions of the U.S. Continental Army Command and the four existing subordinate CONUS armies either to the major new commands emerging from the structural reorganization of the Army or between existing commands whose responsibilities or jurisdictional boundaries would change as a result of the reorganization. This implementing plan had been developed in two main sections, an Executive Summary and a Detailed Transfer Plan.

The Executive Summary. The Executive Summary contained the Master Time Phasing Schedule, a depiction of the key functions to be transferred, and items of special interest which affected the total reorganization. The Master Time Phasing Schedule, which was limited to key events, is shown above on Chart 27. Because of the limitations imposed, it was necessary to expand on those situations where the transfer of functional responsibility would not coincide with the transfer or assumption of command. While all installations of the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command might start reporting to these two new commands under a particular automated system on 1 July 1973, a period of parallel operation would be in effect until the subordinate CONUS army commander no longer commanded the installations within his former area of jurisdiction. Even though the majority of all functional transfers would be complete by mid-July 1973, the subsequent relief of command and actual transfer of responsibility would not be complete until October 1973.

One of the more crucial events in the reorganization process was the development of the FY 1974 Command Operating Budget (COB). Planning would have to be completed so that firm missions and manpower and resource guidance were available to all headquarters involved in developing their budgets. Consequently, the key personnel who would develop and later execute the operating budgets would have to be in place at both new major headquarters by 1

29

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 30 Nov 72, subj: STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan, w/1 incl.

March 1973. Additional personnel would have to be on site to accept the 1 July workload when the changeover of responsibilities of the new headquarters began. Equally important were those Financial Management Information Systems required to provide data for the operation of the headquarters. The actual positioning of technically qualified personnel and the required software and hardware were necessary to ensure a successful transition during the period of reorganization.

In the area of schools and training, it was essential that the headquarters of the new ROTC Regions be activated prior to the opening of the 1973 - 74 academic year. These actions would have to be completed by 15 August 1973 to ensure the proper administration of the ROTC/NDCC Programs, as well as the ROTC Scholarship Program. Responsibility for the ROTC summer camps would not be transferred from the subordinate CONUS armies prior to 1 October 1973.

In the Adjutant General area, the transfer of Third U.S. Army's personnel accounting capability for Reserve Forces to First and Fifth U.S. Armies would not take place until 1 October 1973, a date that was dependent upon the conversion of automatic data processing systems at the U.S. Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (USARCPAC) in St. Louis, Mo. The transfer of administrative services functions, however, would have to be initiated on 1 March 1973; the internal headquarters services such as mail and distribution, postal, and records management would have to begin with the activation of the advance elements of the two new headquarters. The command portion of those same administrative services -- command postal, records management, publications, and the like -- would be phased in, beginning on 1 July 1973.

The U.S. Continental Army Command emphasized the fact that the transfer of all Judge Advocate functions was dependent upon the publication of general orders by the Department of the Army assigning courts martial jurisdiction to the headquarters of the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Any delay in the publication of these orders beyond 1 July 1973 would delay the functional transfers to the two new commands. Likewise, all Army Regulations pertaining to claims functions would have to be revised no later than 1 July 1973 -- and preferably by 1 March -- so that functions and personnel could be transferred to the Department of the Army as scheduled.

The Detailed Transfer Plan. The STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan was designed to provide information to the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization at a level necessary for that individual -- as well as the Department of the Army staff -- to discharge assigned functions for managing the reorganization.

TABLE 4 -- KEY REORGANIZATION DATES -- U.S. CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND/COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND

EVENT	DATE	EVENT	DATE
Public Announcement	11 Jan 73	FORSCOM Established as a Department of the Army Major Command	1 Apr 73
Department of the Army DCSOPS Assumed Army Staff Responsibility for the Army War College	12 Jan 73	Headquarters, FORSCOM, Organized	1 Jul 73
Headquarters, CDC Forward, on Site (Fort Monroe)	24 Jan 73	Headquarters, TRADOC, Organized (All Units Assigned to First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies are Reassigned to FORSCOM and TRADOC)	1 Jul 73
CDC Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Discontinued and Army War College Reorganized to Absorb SSI Functions	1 Feb 73	Headquarters, First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies Reassigned to FORSCOM	1 Jul 73
Cadre on Site for New Major Commands	1 Mar 73	Headquarters, FORSCOM, and Headquarters, TRADOC, Receive Financial Management and Logistical Reports Directly from all Installations	1 Jul 73
Headquarters, Third U.S. Army/FORSCOM and Headquarters, CONARC/TRADOC Organized	1 Mar 73	CDC Units Inactivated/Discontinued and CDC Discontinued	1 Jul 73
CDC Discontinued as a Department of the Army Major Command and Established as a Subordinate Command of CONARC	1 Mar 73	Army Readiness Regions Organized	1 Jul 73
Fort Leavenworth Redesignated as Fort Leavenworth and the Combined Arms Center	1 Mar 73	CONARC Class I Medical System Transferred to USAHSC	1 Jul 73
Fort Benjamin Harrison Redesignated as Fort Benjamin Harrison and the Administration Center	1 Mar 73	ROTC Regional Headquarters Organized	1 Jul 73
Logistics Center, Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity and Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Activity Organized (Phase Out of CDC PALS Group and COMS Group Begins)	1 Mar 73	CONUS Armies May Assist FORSCOM/TRADOC with Installation Management from 1 July through Dates Indicated: Third U.S. Army (Fort McPherson) Sixth U.S. Army (Presidio of San Francisco) First U.S. Army (Fort George G. Meade) Fifth U.S. Army (Fort Sam Houston)	1 Aug 73 1 Sep 73 1 Oct 73 1 Nov 73
Service School and CDC Agency Merger	1 Mar 73	Major Commands Operational	1 Jul 73
Phase Out of CDC Systems Analysis Group Begins	1 Mar 73	CDC First Contingent to Fort Monroe	24 Jul 73
Combined Arms Center Assumes CDC Nuclear Agency Functions	1 Mar 73	CDC Second Contingent for Fort Monroe	19 Sep 73
Begin Phase Out of CDC Concepts and Force Design Group	1 Mar 73	Realign CONUS Army Boundaries	1 Oct 73
Begin Move of CDC Intelligence and Control Systems Group to Fort Leavenworth	2 Mar 73	CDC Residual Elements to Fort Monroe	16 Nov 73
CDC Medical Service Agency Functions Transferred to U.S. Army Health Services Command (USAHSC)	1 Apr 73	Inactivate Third U.S. Army (TOE)	31 Dec 73
		Discontinue CONARC	31 Dec 73
		Reorganization Essentially Complete	31 Dec 73

For example, the information provided by the implementation plan listed the key functions being transferred by the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate CONUS armies which involved policy responsibility of a Department of the Army staff office; required the approval of, or co-ordination by or with, an Army staff office; or could not occur until the Department of the Army had accomplished other actions. The implementing plan was tailored to present graphically the key functions transferred from the losing to the gaining command during the reorganization, all of which would be monitored by the Project Manager for Reorganization, the Department of the Army staff, and the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group. The key functions listed in the plan were those principal activities and events performed by a division level staff element to accomplish its mission, the slippage of which would cause a significant impact upon the reorganization processes. As directed by the Office of the Project Manager, bar charts indicated the time required by the pertinent staff section to prepare the function for transfer; the time at which the direct responsibility for the function was transferred; and the length of time required to complete the actual transfer. Also included were two designated points -- the "not sooner than" and "not later than" dates -- at which that transfer of function could begin in order to complete the transfer of the majority of functions by 31 December 1973.

Final Guidance from the Project Manager, 5 February 1973

Despite his earlier stipulation that all Department of the Army planning for the reorganization would have to be completed by 31 December 1972, the Department of the Army Project Manager issued still another set of guidelines on 5 February 1973 regarding a final revision of the various detailed plans and the corollary implementation plans for reorganization. At that time, General Kalergis announced that all reorganization plans addressed and modified in this 5 February 1973 guidance had been approved for actual implementation. The Office of the Project Manager would continue to co-ordinate the activities of the Department of the Army staff and the major commands in the continental United States during the implementation period in order to ensure an integrated reorganization. All problems arising from the implementation would be resolved by that office. All parties were reminded that three key planning dates were of utmost importance during the implementation phase -- the cadre for the new commands would be on-site by 1 March 1973; all major commands would assume operational status on 1 July; and the reorganization would have to be essentially complete by 31 December 1973. A new schedule of key target dates for the accomplishment of the reorganization is shown on Table 4. All activities scheduled for discontinuance or inactivation, a major reduction-in-force, or major transfers of functions were again instructed to develop and implement the required plans to ensure an orderly phase-down or transfer. Special consideration

was to be given to ensuring the continuing employment of career and career conditional employees and to the reduction of the turbulence associated with other personnel actions.³⁰

Recent decisions concerning the relocation of certain schools were to be included in the implementation plans developed for the installations assigned to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The Department of the Army study to relocate elements of the U.S. Army Chemical Center and School to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., and Redstone Arsenal, Ala., was approved for implementation. All actions associated with this move were to be accomplished as scheduled prior to the end of FY 1973. In addition, the proposal by the U.S. Continental Army Command to relocate the activities of the U.S. Army Chaplain School at Fort Hamilton, N.Y., and the U.S. Army Chaplain Board at Fort George G. Meade, Md., to Fort Wadsworth, N.Y., was approved for implementation with the phased move to be accomplished as scheduled by the end of the first quarter of FY 1974.³¹

Specifically, the guidance stipulated that both the STEADFAST Detailed Plan and the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan, as previously submitted by the U.S. Continental Army Command, were approved, subject to modification contained in this guidance, proper. In this respect, the only modification of any importance to be included in the revision of the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan was that the charts pertaining to the stock fund budgets would have to show that such budgets for the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command would be prepared and submitted during the period, February to May 1973. The remark accompanying the chart was to state that the Stock Fund Charter would have to be published by 30 June 1973.³²

Revision of the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan, 28 February 1973

In accordance with the guidance contained in the 5 February 1973 directive from the Office of the Department of the Army Project Manager, the U.S. Continental Army Command published its revisions to the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan on 28

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Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to Distr, 5 Feb 73, subj: Guidance for Implementation, CONUS Reorganization -- 1973, w/6 incls.

31

Ibid., Anx. A, App. IX.

32

Ibid., Anx. B, App. I.

February, concurrent with the final revisions of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan.³³ In publishing its revisions, the U.S. Continental Army Command indicated that the changes resulted in part from recent decisions on matters of importance and in part from an update of data received subsequent to the publication of the original implementing plan on 30 November 1972. Included in the Executive Summary was a revised description of implementation planning for the Combat Developments Command and a new section pertaining to activities of the Adjutant General of the U.S. Continental Army Command. An additional Annex K was added to the Detailed Transfer portion of the plan, containing a summary of the reorganization actions to be accomplished by the Combat Developments Command.

Implementation Planning for the Combat Developments Command.

A new concept for the merger of the Combat Developments Command and the U.S. Continental Army Command had been developed subsequent to the completion and submission of the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan on 30 November 1972. This concept was considered to be the simplest, yet most effective means of transferring functions while, at the same time, ensuring that the existing activities remained proportionately operational until such time as the newly created organizations were prepared to assume responsibility for on-going combat developments functions. The actual reorganization processes were to begin on 1 February 1973, at which time the headquarters of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command would be reconfigured to resemble the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's headquarters staff. Since Headquarters, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, would retain control of the Army's combat developments program during this transitional period, those of its elements which were not involved in the reconfiguration would continue to function as Headquarters, USACDC (-). All groups and agencies assigned to the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command would continue to exist and operate as heretofore, with the exception that the Strategic Studies Institute would be transferred to the Army War College on 1 February.

Effective 1 March 1973, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, would establish Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command/U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional); command of all USACDC elements would be transferred concurrently to the CONARC commander. At that time, the commander of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command would be designated as the Deputy Commander for Combat Developments, CONARC/TRADOC (Provisional), while

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This section is based on ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 28 Feb 73, subj: Change 1, STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan, w/1 incl.

the support side of his former headquarters would continue to exist as USACDC (-). This support element had three major functions -- support of the newly formed Deputy Chief of Staff of Combat Developments; administration of the residual functions of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command which would be managed from Fort Belvoir, Va.; and planning and implementing the disestablishment of the command, itself. The newly formed Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments was an integral part of Headquarters, CONARC/TRADOC (Provisional), and would use the command authority of the CONARC/TRADOC commander to task subordinate elements for combat developments projects. Also on 1 March 1973, the three functional centers for combat developments -- the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Va., and the Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. -- would be organized with a concurrent action redesignating the Combat Developments Command's Combat Operations Management Systems Group, the Personnel and Logistics Systems Group, and the Personnel and Administration Systems Agency as the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, the Logistics Center, and the Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Agency, respectively. The subordinate agencies and elements of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command which were scheduled for dissolution, would begin handing off functions to the designated new organizations immediately after 1 March.

At the agency level, all Combat Developments Command Agencies -- with specified exceptions -- were assigned to their counterpart schools, effective 1 March. Tasking for the combat developments processes would then go to the schools from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, Headquarters, CONARC/TRADOC (Provisional), through the appropriate functional center. Exceptions to these school assignments were the Medical and Maintenance Service Agencies which were assigned to the Logistics Center; the Judge Advocate General Agency which was temporarily assigned to the Logistics Center pending further assignment to the Judge Advocate General; and the Nuclear Agency which was assigned to the Combined Arms Center.

Effective 1 July 1973, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command/U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional) would be redesignated Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command/U.S. Continental Army Command, a title which would remain in effect until all of the residual functions of Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, had been accomplished. The latter headquarters would eventually be disestablished on 31 December 1973. Subsequent to 1 July 1973, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command would be operational and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments would exist as a general staff element of that new headquarters located at Fort Monroe. Headquarters, USACDC (-), however, would still exist at Fort Belvoir to manage the final

actions of the command and to execute its own disestablishment. At the mid-management level, the new functional centers -- along with their combat developments activities -- would be operational and would have assumed responsibility for the mid-management and integration functions of the combat developments processes. Likewise, all combat developments agencies already would have been integrated into the service schools, in accordance with the CONARC Schools Model.

Instructions for the CONARC Adjutant General. With the various phasing dates involved, changes in the boundaries of the subordinate CONUS armies, and the requirements for an immediate directive system for both of the new commands -- the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command -- it was apparent that a complete series of new regulations/directives could not be written, composed, printed, and distributed on a timely basis. Since the various headquarters concerned in the reorganization would be operating in a "dual-hatted" status in the initial stages, plans were developed to redesignate all administrative publications of the U.S. Continental Army Command as HQ CONARC/HQ TRADOC/HQ FORSCOM, with an effective date of 1 March 1973. Using this redesignated series as the basic initial directive system, the two new headquarters would begin issuing directives with an effective date of 1 July 1973. Consequently, as each publication was republished, it would be issued by the appropriate command, or commands.

Relationship of the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan to Other Plans. The U.S. Continental Army Command indicated at the time of revision on 28 February that the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan (SPIP) was a document separate and distinct from the revised STEADFAST Detailed Plan and that further refinements or updates of either plan could be published independently of the other. However, any further refinements of either of these plans would be based strictly on necessity. Both plans were intended to serve as a basis for the development of appropriate plans by the installations and for the development of actual movement orders. In particular, Forts Monroe and McPherson would develop plans for the actual space, facilities, communications, housing, and the like, while the headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command, the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, and the subordinate CONUS armies would be responsible for issuing movement orders to match the installation capabilities.

TABLE 5 -- KEY IMPLEMENTATION DATE CHANGES

EVENT	REVISED DATE
CDC Medical Services Agency Functions transferred to Health Services Command.	1 Apr 73
TRADOC and FORSCOM established as Department of the Army Major Commands and Headquarters Organized.	1 Jul 73
Commander, FORSCOM, functions also as Commander, CONARC.	1 Jul 73
Headquarters, CONARC, reduced to strength of two. Uses Headquarters, TRADOC, staff to perform residual CONARC functions related primarily to summer training activities, necessary final reports, and supervising establishment of FORSCOM and TRADOC.	1 Jul 73
All units and installations assigned to CONARC and First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies are reassigned to FORSCOM or TRADOC, as appropriate. All units and installations presently assigned to First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies concurrently attached to present parent unit.	1 Jul 73
Headquarters, First, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies and Third U.S. Army (TOE) reassigned to FORSCOM and reorganized. Concurrently attached to CONARC.	1 Jul 73
FORSCOM/TRADOC accept command of installations from CONUS army and attached Units are relieved from attachment:	
Third U.S. Army (Fort McPherson)	1 Jul 73
Sixth U.S. Army (Presidio of San Francisco)	1 Aug 73
First U.S. Army (Fort George G. Meade)	1 Sep 73
Fifth U.S. Army (Fort Sam Houston)	1 Oct 73
Headquarters, FORSCOM, and Headquarters, TRADOC, receive financial management and logistical reports directly from all installations.	1 Jul 73
CDC units inactivated/discontinued and CDC discontinued.	1 Jul 73
Army Readiness Regions organized.	1 Jul 73
CONARC Class I Medical System transferred to U.S. Army Health Services Command.	1 Jul 73
ROTC regional headquarters organized.	1 Jul 73
Major Commands Operational.	1 Jul 73
CDC first contingent to Fort Monroe.	24 Jul 73
CDC second contingent to Fort Monroe.	19 Sep 73
Realign CONUS army boundaries.	1 Oct 73
Headquarters, Third U.S. Army (TOE), inactivated.	1 Oct 73
CDC residual elements to Fort Monroe.	16 Nov 73
CONARC discontinued.	31 Dec 73
Reorganization essentially complete.	31 Dec 73

Source: Incl 3 to Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to Distr, 15 Mar 73, subj: Supplemental Guidance for Implementation, CONUS Reorganization - 1973.

Chapter VII

FINAL REVISION AND PROVISIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

Despite previous assurances that the revisions proposed for the end of February 1973 were to be final, the Department of the Army Project Manager had left the door open for further changes to both the STEADFAST Detailed Plan and the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan (SPIP). In his 5 February 1973 guidance to all planning agencies, General Kalergis had stipulated that, as a minimum, three major planning dates would be of the utmost importance during the implementation phase -- the cadre for the two new commands would have to be on-site by 1 March; all major commands (MACOM's) would have to be ready to assume operational status on 1 July; and the entire reorganization process would have to be essentially complete by 31 December 1973. The Office of the Project Manager would, of necessity, continue to coordinate the activities of both the Department of the Army staff and the new major commands during the implementation period and would resolve any and all problems which might arise from that implementation.¹

Supplemental Guidance for Implementation

Because of the fact that certain decisions had not yet been finalized, while still other areas in question required additional study, the guidance contained in the Project Manager's directives of 5 February could not be considered as final. Consequently, the Office of the Project Manager issued supplemental guidance for implementation of the reorganization on 15 March and again on 15 May 1973.

Supplemental Guidance -- 15 March

Supplemental guidance issued by the Office of the Project Manager on 15 March 1973 concerned changes to both the STEADFAST Detailed Plan and the STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan in the areas of Industrial Security, Installation Area Support, and Mission Resources Computability.² In addition, a number of changes were made to key implementation dates as indicated on Table 5.

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Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to Distr, 5 Feb 73, subj: Guidance for Implementation, CONUS Reorganization - 1973, w/6 incls.

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Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to Distr, 15 Mar 73, subj: Supplemental Guidance for Implementation, CONUS Reorganization - 1973, w/3 incls.

Industrial Defense Program. Subsequent to the publication of the definitive "final" guidance by the Office of the Project Manager on 5 February 1973,³ the Department of the Army recommended to the Office of the Secretary of Defense that management responsibility for the Industrial Defense Program be consolidated with the Industrial Security Program at the Defense Supply Agency. Consequently, pending a decision by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, implementation plans for the U.S. Army Forces Command Industrial Defense Program Survey Unit were to be held in abeyance. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army, was instructed to coordinate with the U.S. Continental Army Command so as to ensure that plans for management and organizational changes were consistent with requirements for consolidation of the Defense Supply Agency.

Installation Area Support. In the field of Installation Area Support, the Project Manager assigned responsibility to the Comptroller of the Army (COA) for the overall management and coordination of installation support policies, plans, and implementing regulations at the Department of the Army level. Specifically, the Comptroller of the Army was tasked with developing an appropriate army regulation which would define the terms of reference and implement the concept for area support. Selected major installations assigned to the U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, and the Military District of Washington were to act as area support coordinators and would perform designated area support missions as delineated in the proposed regulation. The regulation, moreover, would have to assign support management and/or performance responsibilities to Department of the Army staff agencies, major commands in the continental United States, installations, and appropriate Reserve Component elements for each separate installation area support function. However, the basic responsibility for ensuring proper support would lie with the major command to which an installation had been assigned.

Specifically, the U.S. Continental Army Command was tasked with preparing implementing regulations, directives, and operating procedures governing the performance of area support coordination and area support missions by the headquarters of both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, as well as their assigned installations. In addition, each functional support area was to be displayed on maps so as to portray graphically the major installation responsible for performing or coordinating such support. All pertinent regulations and supporting maps were to be submitted to the Department of the Army by 1 June

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See above, pp. 241 - 242.

1973.

Compatibility of Missions and Resources. Closely connected with the problem of installation area support was that of the compatibility of missions and resources. It was accepted axiomatically that the Department of the Army staff assigned missions and allocated resources while, at the lower levels of command, the assignment of missions and resources was essentially a command responsibility. In order to assign missions and resources equitably at any level, however, the commander concerned would have to catalogue all known missions and resources. Hence a determination was made that Department of the Army, itself, would continue to establish priorities among missions and allocate resources accordingly; establish controls for tasking commands with new mission; equate resources with changed or new missions; and use command lines for disseminating decisions and modifications thereto. In order to accomplish these objectives, the Comptroller of the Army was tasked with developing a program for implementation during FY 1974 which would provide a clear understanding throughout the chain of command that missions and resources would have to be balanced and that responsibility for enforcing this policy would continue to rest with the Department of the Army staff as well as with commanders at all levels. Consequently, when conducting scheduled inspections, The Inspector General would have to continue to report on the adequacy and use of resources, as well as mission performance. In addition, the Comptroller of the Army would have to analyze the compatibility of resources periodically and establish a mechanism for cataloguing all present and future missions and resources assigned to major commands. To fulfill their responsibilities, major commanders would, in turn, have to establish catalogues of missions and resources down to and including the installation level.

Final Supplemental Guidance -- 15 May

On 15 May 1973, the Office of the Department of the Army Project Manager issued what was intended to be the final supplemental guidance for implementation of the reorganization.⁴ This final directive revised some of the earlier guidance from the Project Manager and transmitted additional information for the guidance of the various planning elements. The revisions were concerned mainly with changes in key dates governing the reorganization; changes in the move of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command; and changes in the reorganization of certain elements of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. In addition, dates for the submission and final approval of

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The entire paragraph is based on ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to Distr, 15 May 73, subj: Supplemental Guidance for Implementation, CONUS Reorganization - 1973, w/5 incls.

the tables of distribution of the Army Readiness Regions (ARR) and certain subordinate elements of the Training and Doctrine Command were moved forward into March and April.

General Guidance. General guidelines issued for the benefit of all concerned extended the Special Service Core Program to the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Health Services Command. However, no additional personnel spaces for the management of this program were authorized for the two major commands which were being organized out of the U.S. Continental Army Command. In addition, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Military District of Washington were directed to establish local Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards at the installation level and at least one senior board within each Naval District in the continental United States. With regard to installation funding, the Department of the Army emphasized that installation commanders should be permitted maximum flexibility in the employment of assigned resources. Consequently, every effort would have to be made to reduce or eliminate funding restrictions at the installation level.

Guidance for the U.S. Continental Army Command. Specific guidelines applicable to the U.S. Continental Army Command required changes in those portions of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan dealing with the management structure for the Reserve Components in the U.S. Army Forces Command; the accomplishment of the combat developments processes in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; and the economic analysis for the entire reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command. Although the Department of the Army had approved the management concept for the Reserve Components as contained in the STEADFAST Revised Detailed Plan and the Revised Phased Implementation Plan of 28 February 1973, certain major modifications were still required. In particular, the specific functions of the headquarters staff elements of the Army Readiness Regions (ARR) -- as well as the functions and responsibilities of the installation staff charged with the coordination of Reserve Component activities -- would have to be fully developed and incorporated into the STEADFAST Detailed Plan. The relationships of the commanders of the Army Readiness Regions with the dedicated advisers of Reserve Component commands, state adjutants general, and general officer commands also would have to be standardized and incorporated into the Detailed Plan. In addition, the system for Reserve Component Adviser reporting and coordination channels would have to be expanded. Within the Reserve Component structure, the Department of the Army approved the location of an Army Readiness Group at St. Louis, Mo., and the establishment of an additional U.S. Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) in the Sixth U.S. Army area encompassing the states of North and South Dakota, Kansas, and Nebraska. This approval, however, did not constitute authority for the actual activation of the new Army Reserve Command. Furthermore, the planners were reminded that Reserve Component personnel

TABLE 6 -- ESTABLISHMENT OF MANEUVER TRAINING COMMANDS

CURRENT DESIGNATION	NEW DESIGNATION	NEW LOCATION
HHC, 3d Brigade, Infantry AIT 76th Division (Training) East Windsor, Conn.	76th Division Maneuver Training Command	Warwick, R.I.
HHC, 3d Brigade, Armored AIT 78th Division (Training) Kearny, N.J.	78th Division Maneuver Training Command	Kearny, N.J.
HHC, 3d Brigade, Infantry AIT 80th Division (Training) Richmond, Va.	80th Division Maneuver Training Command	Alexandria, Va.
HHC, 3d Brigade, Infantry AIT 85th Division (Training) Arlington Hghts., Ill.	85th Division Maneuver Training Command	Fort Sheridan, Ill.
HHC, 4th Brigade, CST 89th Division (Training) Kansas City, Kans.	89th Division Maneuver Training Command	Denver, Colo.
HHC, 3d Brigade, Infantry AIT 91st Division (Training) San Jose, Calif.	91st Division Maneuver Training Command	Camp Parks, Calif.
HHC, 4th Brigade, CST 100th Division (Training) Louisville, Ky.	100th Division Maneuver Training Command	Louisville, Ky.

Operational Readiness Date for all Maneuver Training Commands is 1 October 1973

SOURCE: App 1, Anx C, Incl 1 to Memo DACS-MR, DA PMR to Agency POC's, 24 Apr 73, subj: Guidance for Implementation, CONUS Reorganization - 1973.

serving on active duty under the provisions of Section 265, Title 10, U.S. Code, were not to be included in Active Army end-strength computations. Consequently, space requirements and authorizations for such Reserve Component personnel were to be shown on separate tables of distribution and allowances. These personnel, however, did impact upon authorizations provided in the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) and, until some relief from these limitations could be obtained, the deputy commander slots for the nine Army Readiness Regions were to remain unfilled. As a final matter, the Project Manager approved the conversion of Maneuver Training Commands as indicated on Table 6, with an operational readiness date of 1 October 1973.

In order to regularize the accomplishment of the combat developments processes by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, numerous revisions were required in Chapter 1 of Volume B of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan. This was particularly true with regard to the delineation of responsibilities of Department of the Army and its newly developed test and evaluation agencies. In addition, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of Volume B which governed the three functional combat developments centers, required further revision so as to reflect the fact that these three centers were actually operating activities of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Furthermore, the chapters dealing with the Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., would have to be reviewed thoroughly in order to ensure that they contained the same element of clarity as was described for the Logistics Center. The table of distribution and allowances for the Administration Center required still further revision to reflect the addition of a 27-man Human Resources Developments Directorate in its Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Activity (PACDA). Twelve of these latter manpower spaces were to be provided by the Department of the Army.

Supplemental guidance dealing with the required economic analysis of the U.S. Continental Army Command/Combat Developments Command realignment to U.S. Army Forces Command/U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command stipulated that such an analysis would document one-time costs, as well as changes in operating costs, which would result from the disestablishment of the two former commands and the establishment of the two new major commands. Costs and savings which might be associated with concurrent realignments throughout Department of the Army which were not part of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan would have to be documented in separate Case Study and Justification Folders. To decrease the possibility of misunderstanding and misuse of the economic analysis, certain portions of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan would have to be expanded to reflect the fact that the economic analysis had fully addressed the decision to disestablish the U.S. Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command and establish in their place the

U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In addition, the costs displayed should include only those which could be attributed to the decision to reorganize and would specifically exclude those which would have occurred regardless of that decision. As a result of this reasoning, the economic analysis could not be considered as an appropriate source for any budgetary data. And, finally, the purpose of the economic analysis was to document the changes in annual operating costs under the reorganization alternative as compared to the status quo, and to demonstrate that the reorganization could be accomplished without creating unacceptable one-time costs. All cost data previously submitted in the STEADFAST Detailed Plan would have to be reviewed thoroughly so as to determine their applicability to the economic analysis and to accomplish any required updating as a result of changes in cost estimates.

Transfer of CONARC and Subordinate CONUS Army Functions

Changes in STEADFAST Planning

By mid-May 1973, General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, and Commander-designate, U.S. Army Forces Command, became concerned over the deteriorating personnel status at the headquarters of the subordinate CONUS armies which reflected a diminished capability to perform many functions. At the same time, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was aware that increasing numbers of personnel were reporting for duty at the provisional headquarters of the two new major commands. It seemed, moreover, that all personnel affected by the reorganization now had a greater understanding of the STEADFAST plans and Army Reorganization - 1973. Consequently, General Kerwin informed the STEADFAST Steering Group of his desire to transfer all U.S. Continental Army Command functions, command of the subordinate CONUS armies, CONUS army functions, and installations to the two new major commands on 1 July 1973.⁵ A determination was therefore made that these functions would be transferred on 1 July 1973 with certain exceptions pertaining to Reserve Components, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). This functional transfer was then broached to the subordinate CONUS army commanders for their concurrences. While the subordinate army commanders generally concurred in CONARC's recommendations, the Fifth U.S. Army commander further recommended that the CONUS army boundaries also be realigned to their STEADFAST configuration on 1 July. Staff consensus at the

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DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC Stf, 15 May 73, subj: Transfer of all CONARC and CONUSA Functions to the MACOM's on 1 July 1973.

departure of General Zais and assume actual command when General Zais was promoted on 1 August. Furthermore, inactivation of Third U.S. Army should be scheduled for 30 September 1973 as published in current STEADFAST plans.⁹ On 4 June 1973, the U.S. Continental Army Command approved General Bennett's recommendation with the stipulation that as few people as possible be actually assigned to Third U.S. Army subsequent to 1 July.¹⁰ This situation was clarified by the Department of the Army decision discussed immediately above which reduced the official Third U.S. Army table of distribution to one person on and after 1 July 1973.

Major Problem Areas

Boundaries of the U.S. Army Reserve Commands

At the beginning of May 1973, an important decision concerning the boundaries of the U.S. Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) subsequent to the realignment of the subordinate CONUS army boundaries still required resolution. Tied in with this problem was that of establishing an additional U.S. Army Reserve Command in Sixth U.S. Army and the reallocation of manpower spaces resulting from the inactivation of the 89th Division (Training).¹¹ Final definitive guidance in this matter was disseminated by the Department of the Army on 31 May 1973. Effective 1 July 1973, eastern Ohio was to be deleted from the 99th U.S. Army Reserve Command and added to the 83d U.S. Army Reserve Command. On that same date, the 83d U.S. Army Reserve Command was to be reassigned from First U.S. Army to Fifth U.S. Army, and, in a shift of boundaries between Fifth and Sixth U.S. Armies, the state of New Mexico was to be deleted from the 90th U.S. Army Reserve Command and added to the 96th U.S. Army Reserve Command. In addition, the 81st, 120th, and 121st U.S. Army Reserve Commands were to be reassigned from Third U.S. Army to First U.S. Army. On 1 October 1973, the boundaries of the 79th and 99th U.S. Army Reserve Commands were to be altered so that the eastern boundary of the 99th U.S. Army Reserve Command excluded the area

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(1) Memo AJAAG, Third USA AG to CofS, 11 May 73, subj: Command of Third United States Army after 1 July 1973. (2) Memo AJAGS, Third USA CofS to CONARC CofS, 11 May 73, same subj.

10

Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, MG D.R. Pepke, CONARC CofS to MG W.K. Bennett, Third USA CofS, 4 Jun 73.

11

(1) Ltr ATCS, MG Pepke to LTG Kalergis, 3 May 73.
(2) Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to Cdr CONARC, 21 May 73, subj: Realignment of ARCOM Boundaries.

of the New Cumberland Army Depot but would be formed by the western boundaries of Bradford, Sullivan, Columbia, and Northumberland Counties in Pennsylvania down to the Susquehanna River and thence along the western bank of that river to the Maryland/Pennsylvania state line. However, the definitive instructions for the establishment of the new U.S. Army Reserve Command encompassing the states of North and South Dakota, Kansas, and Nebraska were not furnished at this time.¹²

Problems Associated with the Locations of Army Readiness Regions

At the beginning of June 1973, the Office of the Department of the Army Project Manager queried the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group as to the possibility of any hidden problems associated with the location of the Army Readiness Regions. Such information was required in order to give the Project Manager a ready reference concerning any and all problems connected with a specific Army Readiness Region. This would include Army military construction (MCA) and other investments; possible base closures; an evaluation of the buildings and the availability of transportation; and any other facts which might cause problems during the first two years following the reorganization.¹³ Responses from the subordinate CONUS armies indicated that Fifth U.S. Army anticipated no problems whatsoever from its three Army Readiness Regions which were to be located at Fort Sheridan, Ill., Fort Knox, Ky., and Fort Sam Houston, Tex. Possible problems surfaced in connection with only 3 of the remaining 6 Army Readiness Regions -- 2 in the First U.S. Army area at Fort Dix, N.J., and the Atlanta Army Depot, Ga., and 1 in Sixth U.S. Army at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colo. The future of the location at Fort Dix, however, could not be determined until the Department of the Army, itself, had established a final configuration for that particular installation. The location at the Atlanta Army Depot was affected by a shortage of on-base family housing; excessive travel time to and from its supporting aircraft; and the uncertain future of the depot, itself. Third U.S. Army, however, did not feel that the problems affecting Army Readiness Region IV at the Atlanta Army Depot were sufficient to even recommend a change in location. The location of Army Readiness Region VIII at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was affected by the fact

12

Msg 312016Z May 73, DA (DAAR-OT) to CONARC, subj: ARCOM Boundary Changes.

13

(1) MFR CS-SSG-STEADFAST, COL J.J. Brockmyer, Dep Sp Asst to CONARC Cofs, 4 Jun 73, subj: Evaluation of Each ARR Location.
(2) Msg 041413Z Jun 73, CONARC to CONUSA, subj: Fact Sheet on ARR Locations.

that the office facilities would be austere with no foreseeable improvement. Additionally, no family quarters were available at that particular base nor were there any available at other military installations in the area.¹⁴

Table of Distribution Changes

Very early in the planning processes, the personnel of the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group recognized the fact that any attempt at a major reorganization in the Army would result in inconsistencies and discrepancies in the tables of distribution and allowances for the proposed organizational structures. Subsequent to the publication of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan on 20 July 1972, attempts were made to accept and implement as many changes as possible in order to eliminate these inherent discrepancies. In mid-February 1973, however, a point in time had been reached when the tables of distribution would have to be frozen in order to accomplish personnel actions and cost accounting prior to the actual reorganization, itself. Consequently, the U.S. Continental Army Command issued a directive on 16 February 1973 freezing all tables of distribution as contained in the STEADFAST Detailed Plan from that particular date until 1 July 1973, when the actual reorganization was scheduled for implementation. This moratorium did not affect any revisions to the tables of distribution which were then under advisement by the STEADFAST Steering Group. At the end of February 1973, all tables of distribution were under review with a view to incorporating those actions directed by the Department of the Army and to align both the documents and the documentation with civilian job position titles and grades as determined by approved job descriptions. In addition, all changes to the tables of distribution which had been received and approved by the U.S. Continental Army Command prior to 16 February were to be forwarded to the Office of the Project Manager for approval along with the document submission. The U.S. Continental Army Command estimated that approved and finalized tables of distribution would be ready for publication and dissemination by 10 March 1973. These final revised tables of distribution, however, were not published and distributed until 18 May 1973.¹⁵

14

Memo, CS-SSG-STEADFAST, Dep Sp Asst to Cofs CONARC to Dep PMR DA, 7 Jun 73, subj: Problem Areas Associated with Army Readiness Region Locations.

15

(1) Memo CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC Cofs, 15 Feb 73, subj: Changes to TDA. (2) Msg 161955Z Feb 73, CONARC to Distr, same subj. (3) Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 18 May 73, subj: Revision to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan, dated 20 July 72.

Implementation of the Moratorium. Despite the fact that the U.S. Continental Army Command's directives had stipulated that no changes to the pertinent tables of distribution would be entertained until 1 July 1973, numerous requests for changes were received, some of which were substantive in nature. None of these recommendations, however, contained sufficient justification to warrant an override of the moratorium placed on such changes. In each instance, the recommending headquarters or headquarters element was directed to review the contents of the 16 February directive imposing the moratorium.¹⁶

Changes Directed by CONARC. In mid-April 1973, Lt. Gen. W.E. DePuy, Deputy Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, directed that a Plans and Analysis Office (PAO) be added to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, at the U.S. Army Forces Command. This proposed office was designed to perform a new management function which had not been envisioned when the original STEADFAST plans were developed. At the same time, General DePuy also recommended that the Program and Budget Divisions of both of the new major commands be expanded in order to manage the "installation contracts" concept which was to be part of the new planning procedures. This additional staffing requirement was fixed at five military and three civilian spaces at each headquarters. Since the tables of distribution essentially had been frozen by the U.S. Continental Army Command's directive described immediately above, a method had to be devised to accomplish the directed actions; ensure that ongoing personnel actions were not adversely affected; and yet stay within the Department of the Army Budget and Manpower Guidance (BMG). The staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command concluded that these changes to the tables of distribution could be made immediately without any adverse impact on any civilian employees. The immediate staffing of these offices, however, presented a different problem. The five required civilian spaces could be staffed by taking advantage of the hire lag, so long as the total man-year/dollar ceiling established in the Budget and Manpower Guidance and the total authorized end-strength were not exceeded. At the same time, officer spaces could be filled provisionally by selecting personnel then assigned or requisitioned for general and special staff office sections, while leaving the authorized spaces vacant. The Budget and Manpower Guidance Reviews scheduled for August 1973 would then be used to either substantiate an increase in the tables of distribution or identify positions, command-wide, which could be

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(1) DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC CofS, 2 Mar 73, subj: TDA Changes. (2) DF ATFOR, CONARC DCSFOR to CofS, 10 Apr 73, subj: Changes in FORSCOM TDA.

eliminated with a minimum impact on operational capabilities. These latter recommendations were approved by the CONARC Chief of Staff at the end of April 1973.¹⁷

Major Command Relationships

Resolution of Conflicts Between Major Commands

By the end of March 1973, it became evident to the STEADFAST Steering Group that some sort of relief mechanism or safety valve was necessary to resolve problems which might arise from conflicts in guidance between the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. While the best method of preventing conflicts in guidance and other related problems was prior staff coordination at the headquarters level of the two new major commands, this would become more and more difficult in future years as each of the new commands tended to become more parochial in procedures and policies. Recurring conflicts in guidance on major issues, however, seemed to be rather unlikely. The most likely cause of conflicts would be a slow, insidious divergence of requirements for reports, personnel utilization, and other routine and mundane functions and procedures. Moreover, it was clearly recognized that Department of the Army, itself, would be a potential creator of conflict, while other Department of the Army major commands -- e.g., the Health Services Command and the Strategic Communications Command -- would be potential sources of conflict in specific functional areas.¹⁸

Conclusions of the STEADFAST Steering Group. After studying this matter thoroughly, the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group reached the conclusion that the very nature of the reorganization (i.e., splitting the U.S. Continental Army Command into two major commands) allowed for potential conflicts in installation guidance. Major conflicts would, of necessity, escalate rapidly to the decision level; minor conflicts, on the other hand, would be less apparent and, hence, more difficult to prevent. The burden of resolving these latter conflicts, however, was never to be placed on the installation commander. If resolution was required, the parent major command would have to accept responsibility. Staff action for resolving conflicts normally would be the responsibility of the general or special staff section having staff supervision over the

17

DF ATCOM-M, CONARC DCSCOMPT to CONARC CofS, 10 Apr 73, subj: Addition to HQ TRADOC and HQ FORSCOM TDA's, w/2 incls.

18

DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC CofS, 26 Mar 73, subj: Resolution of MACOM Conflicts, w/1 incl.

functional area concerned. A relief valve would be required, moreover, for those cases where the installation commander could not obtain prompt resolution or where the conflict crossed a number of functional areas. Consequently, periodic meetings between the commanders and staff counterparts of the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command were essential. It was suggested that such meetings be held as often as necessary but, as a minimum, at least once each quarter subsequent to 1 July 1973. This frequency was necessary in order to determine and agree on priorities and requirements and to highlight and resolve potential areas of conflict before the installations were caught in the middle.¹⁹

Approved Recommendations. The STEADFAST Steering Group recommended that, for the period prior to 1 July 1973, every effort be made by the staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command -- in conjunction with Third U.S. Army -- to identify and solve potential conflicts. The decision governing the resolution of each conflict would have to be consummated with a memorandum of understanding which had been properly staffed and formalized. Subsequent to 1 July, the basis for agreement would be complete and detailed staff coordination between counterparts in the various major commands. Consequently, the basic forum for resolving conflicts would have to be the functional staff of the two new major headquarters. Periodic meetings (perhaps quarterly) between the commanders and selected staff officers of the two major commands were necessary to ensure agreement on priorities for the ensuing fiscal quarters. Some of the basis for potential conflicts could be eliminated under a system proposed by the commander-designate of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command which tied programs and resources together in a contract. The various contracts affecting a single installation, however, could not be permitted to conflict. In addition, every major command regulation, every supplement to Army regulations, or other documents affecting installations should be published as a joint or identically worded major command publication. It was felt that these policies and procedures normally would produce agreement. If, however, no agreement was forthcoming and the problem involved resources, then the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Comptroller of the U.S. Army Forces Command should be tasked as a standard procedure to attempt to work out an agreed solution. These staff officers would, in effect, serve as a safety valve prior to escalation of the problem to the Chief of Staff level at the major commands. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Continental Army Command, approved and

disseminated these policies and procedures to all concerned on 5 April 1973.²⁰

Directed Relationships, 1 July - 31 December 1973

On 29 May 1973, the Department of the Army issued instructions concerning the relationships between the U.S. Continental Army Command, the U.S. Army Forces Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1973. Under "CONUS Reorganization of the U.S. Army - 1973," the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command were to be established as major commands of the Department of the Army effective 1 July 1973. These commands would then be responsible to the Department of the Army for all matters within their functional areas of responsibility, except for those matters directly concerned with the implementation of the reorganization. Consequently, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command -- reorganized with a table of distribution structure of two military spaces -- would be retained as the headquarters responsible for the establishment of the two new major commands. The Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, was tasked with providing staff support to the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, for performing those residual CONARC functions related primarily to summer training activities, final reports, and supervising the establishment of the two new major commands. U.S. Army Force Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command would be responsible to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, for all matters concerning the actual implementation of the reorganization. Since the entire reorganization was to be considered essentially complete on 31 December 1973, the U.S. Continental Army Command would be disestablished on that latter date.²¹

Relationships with the U.S. Army Health Services Command

New problems were created for the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command with the decision to establish a U.S. Army Health Services Command whose mission included control of all Medical Department Activities (MEDDAC) located on installations controlled by other major commands. Consequently, a memorandum of agreement was required between these three

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(1) Ibid. (2) DF ATCS 73-0797, CONARC Cofs to Distr, 5 Apr 73, subj: Policy for Resolving Conflicts in Guidance or Instructions Between HQ FORSCOM and HQ TRADOC, w/1 incl.

21

Ltr DAAG-PAP-A (M) (14 May 73) DAMO-ODG, DA to Distr, 29 May 73, subj: Relationships Among Headquarters, CONARC, TRADOC, and FORSCOM.

major commands in order to identify responsibilities and establish applicable relationships between, on the one hand, the two major commanders of installations and units in the continental United States, and, on the other, the major commander of medical units located on the installations of the former. In addition, the three commanders concerned would have to establish policies governing respective inter-command agreements on matters of mutual interest, as well as standardize command relationships and intraservice support agreements between host installations and tenant elements of the U.S. Army Health Services Command. It was generally agreed that the U.S. Army Forces Command would command all medical table of organization and equipment (TOE) units in the continental United States, while the Health Services Command would command all medical table of distribution (TDA) units, with the exception of those field operating activities assigned to The Surgeon General. The installation commander, on the one hand, would be responsible to the U.S. Army Health Services Command for developing required Intraservice Support Agreements which would be negotiated in accordance with concepts embodied in this memorandum of understanding. The U.S. Army Health Services Command, on the other hand, would be responsible for allocating medical mission manpower and funds through medical command channels. It was further agreed that the commander of Medical Department Activities (MEDDAC) or a Medical Center (MEDCEN) at a given installation would assume a dual role in which he would both command assigned table of distribution medical units and serve as -- or designate -- the Installation Director of Medical Activities (DMEDA). The remainder of the document was concerned with relationships between the table of organization and equipment units of the U.S. Army Forces Command and the table of distribution units of the U.S. Army Health Services Command; the measure of support to be provided by FORSCOM units; the use of FORSCOM air ambulance units; stock fund support; minor construction support; and Inspector General and Military Police support. The mutual Agreement of Understanding was signed by the three commanders concerned with an effective date of 28 June 1973.²²

Revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan

Although the U.S. Continental Army Command had published what was intended to be the final revision of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan on 28 February 1973,²³ additional revisions were completed during

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(1) Ltr HSC-ZA, Cdr HSC to Cdr CONARC, 19 Jul 73. (2) Ltr HSC-ZM, Cdr HSC to Cdr TRADOC, 20 Jul 73. (3) Memo CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to TRADOC CofS, 20 Jul 73, subj: Memorandum of Agreement Between TRADOC, FORSCOM, and HSC.

23

See above, p. 222.

the provisional period of operation -- 1 March - 30 June 1973 -- and after the effective date of the actual reorganization. In mid-March 1973, -- just two weeks after the purported final revision -- the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group announced that the STEADFAST Detailed Plan was a dynamic document which would necessarily be updated as important decisions were made and, consequently, additional revisions would have to be published.²⁴

Revision of 9 March

On 9 March 1973, the U.S. Continental Army Command published Change 5 to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan which reflected changes in information received after the printing of the "final" revision of the plan on 28 February. The March revisions included minor changes to the economic analysis and to certain pages which contained information regarding installations assignments. In addition, a number of pen and ink changes were required to reflect policy decisions which had been made subsequent to the printing of those pages in February.²⁵

Instructions for Final Revision

On 16 April 1973, the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group announced that a final revision of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan including all changes required by the Phase II announcements would be published during the month of May 1973. Any actions concerning tables of distribution, however, would be restricted to those directed by either the Commander or Deputy Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command. The staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command was directed to review the plan, itself, along with all of its revisions, and submit necessary changes to the STEADFAST Steering Group by 10 May 1973. Two days later, this announcement was amended to include the fact that functional statements appearing in the final revision of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan would have to be identical to those contained in the recently developed Organization and Functions Manuals for the two major commands. Therefore, any revision to Chapter 2 of both Volume A and Volume E -- dealing with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command, respectively -- would have to duplicate the functional statements in the pertinent Organization and Functions Manuals.

24

Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to AFSC, 15 Mar 73,
subj: Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.

25

(1) Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to CDC, 9 Mar 73, subj:
Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, Dated 20 July 1972. (2) DF
CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to Distr, 9 Mar 73, same subj.

The staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command was again cautioned against submitting any changes to the plan which were not in consonance with these statements. However, any desired conceptual statements or descriptive wording, as desired, could remain in Chapter 2.²⁶

Revision of 18 May

The revised tables of distribution which had been promised for mid-March 1973, were finally published and distributed as Change 3 to the STEADFAST Tables of Distribution and Allowances on 18 May. This included tables of distribution for the two new major commands, the Combined Arms Center, the Logistics Center, the four Reserve Officer Training Corps Regions, and the three remaining subordinate CONUS armies. Included in the revision were all changes which had been directed by the Commander and Deputy Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command; those which had been directed by the Department of the Army; those which were required to align the documents and documentation with civilian job position titles and grades as determined by approved job descriptions; and any changes which had been approved prior to the imposition of the 16 February moratorium. All of the revised tables of distribution were published in their entirety for incorporation into the STEADFAST Detailed Plan.²⁷

CONARC Implementing Instructions for a Final Revision

While, as previously described, the U.S. Continental Army Command had planned to issue a final revision of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan in mid-May 1973, final guidance for such a revision was not received from the Office of the Department of the Army Project Manager until 15 May.²⁸ Upon receipt of the Department of the Army guidance, the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group directed the staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command to submit any required changes in sufficient time to permit publication of the revised plan by the beginning of June. Since this would, to all intents and purposes,

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(1) DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC Stf, 16 Apr 73, subj: Final Revision, Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan. (2) DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC Stf, 18 Apr 73, same subj, w/1 incl.

27

Ltr CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC to DA PMR, 18 May 73, subj: Revision to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan, Dated 20 July 1972, w/1 incl.

28

See above, pp. 249 - 253.

be the final revision of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan, the staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command was instructed to review thoroughly their respective functional areas so as to ensure that all information contained therein was properly updated. The instructions which had been issued in mid-April were accordingly revised so as to move the suspense date for the submission of the required changes back to 22 May. At the same time, the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group announced that publication of the Organization and Functions Manuals for both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command had been unduly delayed. To facilitate future operations, however, the functional statements contained in the Detailed Plan were to be revised, insofar as possible, to provide agreement with those contained in the draft Organization and Functions Manuals.²⁹

Revision of 5 June 1973

On 5 June 1973, the U.S. Continental Army Command published and distributed an extensive revision of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan which incorporated all of the changes required by the Department of the Army Project Manager and further updated all pertinent portions of the plan. Included in these revisions were two slight changes in the Executive Summary, as well as revised organizational structures and functional statements for the headquarters of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the U.S. Army Forces Command, and the latter's subordinate CONUS armies. Included as well, were extensive revisions to the sections dealing with the economic analysis, information systems, the Reserve Officer Training Corps Concept, and the Combined Arms Center. The Training and Doctrine Command's combat developments processes were completely rewritten and Book 1, Volume I -- the Reserve Component Management Plan -- as well as Volume K -- the Audit Trail -- were republished in their entirety.³⁰

Department of the Army Reaction. Because of the time element involved, these extensive revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan had not been coordinated with the Office of the Department of the Project Manager prior to publication and dissemination. Review of the changes by that latter office evoked extensive comment which,

29

DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC Stf, 18 May 73, subj: Final Revision, Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan, w/1 incl.

30

DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC Stf, 6 Jun 73, subj: Revision to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan, Dated 20 July 1972, w/1 incl.

unfortunately, was not forwarded to the U.S. Continental Army Command until 12 July 1973, some two weeks subsequent to the actual implementation of the plan. While many of the comments required only a minor rewrite of certain pages throughout the plan, the Office of the Project Manager did direct a complete revision of Chapter 3, Volume B, dealing with the Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison. Department of the Army guidance directed that a Human Resources Development Division be included in the Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Activity (PACDA) and that the Systems Developments functions be completely redefined. Since the 10-series Army Regulations for the new major commands had already been published and distributed, the comments which addressed discrepancies between the revised STEADFAST Detailed Plan and the pertinent Army Regulations were omitted from the guidance forwarded by the Office of the Project Manager.³¹

Problems Arising from the Late Guidance. Despite the fact that the U.S. Continental Army Command still existed on paper for the implementation of the reorganization, the fact remained that both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command had been established on 1 July 1973 and were fully operational. Subsequent to that latter date, no one at Fort Monroe was cognizant of the changes required by the comments applying to the U.S. Army Forces Command, which meant that the latter command had to be tasked to provide the necessary input. Revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan, however, were to be published by the Residual STEADFAST Steering Group which was still operational at Fort Monroe, Va., as an agency of the U.S. Continental Army Command. While the STEADFAST agency could impose a suspense date for the submission of the required changes to the plan on elements of the Training and Doctrine Command, the U.S. Army Forces Command was only requested to coordinate such a suspense date. The STEADFAST group also announced that, for convenience sake, it intended to consolidate and publish all revisions to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan upon receipt of the input. The U.S. Army Forces Command was also informed that, if appropriate, information copies of follow-up actions taken as a result of guidance from the Office of the Project Manager should be furnished to the STEADFAST Steering Group for inclusion in the historical record.³²


31

Ltr DACS-MR, DA PMR to CONARC, 12 Jul 73, subj: 6 Jun Revision of the CONARC Detailed Plan, w/1 incl.

32

Ltr ATOI, TRADOC to FORSCOM, 17 Jul 73, subj: STEADFAST Detailed Plan, w/1 incl.

**CHARI 30 - DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR TRAINING AND SCHOOLS
US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND**




a Special activity.

Functional coordination.

Source: Operation STEADFAST, Change 6, Final Revision to the Detailed Plan, 15 Aug 73.

CHART 31 — US ARMY PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATION COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS ACTIVITY



SOURCE: OPERATION STEADFAST, CHANGE 6, FINAL REVISION TO THE DETAILED PLAN, 15 AUG 73.

Final Revision to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan -- 15 August

What was actually the final revision to the STEADFAST Detailed Plan was published and distributed on 15 August 1973, some six weeks after the plan had actually been implemented. Changes to that portion of the plan applicable to the U.S. Army Forces Command were strictly minor in nature, requiring the revision of a total of only seven pages in the entire plan. One of the pen and ink changes, however, was of some interest to FORSCOM in that it extended the period for the changeover from the Base Operations (BASEOPS) system of automatic data reporting to the Standard Automated Intermediate Level Logistics System (SAILS) from 1 August 1973 through 1 October 1974 to a period from 1 September 1973 through February 1975.³³

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, on the other hand, not only revised those portions required by the guidance from the Office of the Project Manager, but also took the opportunity to revise that portion of the plan dealing with the organization of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Schools within its own headquarters. The new organizational structure for this latter staff section is shown on Chart 30. The revision of Chapter 3, Volume B, included those changes directed by the Office of the Project Manager -- the establishment of a Human Resources Development Division in the Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Activity (PACDA) (Chart 31) -- as well as complete redefinition of the Systems Development functions.³⁴

Provisional STEADFAST Organization

By mid-February 1973, it had become necessary to delineate the staff procedures and command relationships which would exist during the preliminary provisional period of operations, as well as the command relationships for the first six months following the actual reorganization. In accordance with approved Operation STEADFAST plans, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command (Gen. Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.), was responsible for establishing the headquarters of the two new major commands. It was recognized by the planning agencies that normal staff functions of the U.S. Continental Army Command, as well as those of the two new major commands, would have to continue in force during the transition period. Hence, it

33

Operation STEADFAST, Change 6, "Final Revision to the Detailed Plan," 15 Aug 73.

34

Ibid.

was imperative that all decisions be made by the individual who was responsible for a particular operation in any of the given headquarters. Consequently, the senior general officers concerned would have to be as well informed as possible on all matters pertaining to the U.S. Continental Army Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Forces Command in order to develop their own background and form an understanding of the sister commands. It was imperative that channels for all papers pertaining to each of the three commands flow through those action officers who had primary interest. It was also imperative that the staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command knew exactly with whom they should be dealing at all times.³⁵

General Officer Assignments

Since the U.S. Continental Army Command was responsible for implementing the entire reorganization, the assignment of key staff officers assumed greater importance as the provisional period of operations was reached.³⁶ The success of the entire reorganization hinged particularly on the general officers assigned to the U.S. Continental Army Command and each of the two new major commands. The responsibilities of each of these general officers had to be carefully delineated both for the provisional period of operations and for the period, 1 July - 31 December 1973.

Assignments at Fort Monroe, Va. At Fort Monroe, Va., the key individual in the entire operation STEADFAST reorganization was Gen. Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., who had assumed command of the U.S. Continental Army Command on 1 February 1973 and, on 1 March, assumed the additional duties of Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional) and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional). He was scheduled to relinquish the title of Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, when he physically moved to Ft. McPherson, Ga., on 1 July 1973. He would, however, retain the title of Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, until its disestablishment on 31 December 1973; on and after 1 January 1974, he would retain only the title of Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command. Second in importance in this operation was Lt. Gen. W.E. DePuy, who assumed the duties of Deputy Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command/U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional) on 1

35

STEADFAST Talking Paper, 17 Feb 73, subj: Command Relationships and General Officer Assignments.

36

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on DF ATCS 73-0557, CONARC CofS to Distr, 19 Mar 73, subj: Command Relationships, w/2 incls.

March 1973 and would retain those titles until 1 July; on that latter date he would assume the single title of Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. General DePuy's primary duties during the period, 1 March - 30 June 1973, were to be focussed on those functions of the U.S. Continental Army Command which were scheduled for transfer to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. His specific areas of interest included the standardization of the FORSCOM and TRADOC resource management systems; the effective integration of the service schools and the related combat developments agencies; and the implementation of the three functional center concept. Maj. Gen. O.C. Talbott, in turn, was assigned as Special Assistant to the Deputy Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command/U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional) on 8 March and would continue to serve in that capacity until 1 July when he would become Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. During the period, 8 March through 30 June 1973, General Talbott was to concentrate on the Army Training Centers, the schools, the Training Aids Management Agency (TAMA), and the NCO academies. He was responsible for following through on the implementation of the school/combat developments agency integration and the establishment of the three functional centers. His tasking of the staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate elements was to be through the CONARC/TRADOC (Provisional) Chief of Staff; input to the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, would be through that same channel.

Maj. Gen. D.R. Pepke was scheduled to remain as Chief of Staff, U.S. Continental Army Command/U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional) until 15 May and would coordinate all staff planning for both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command during that period. He served as the focal point for tasking the staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command and its subordinate elements and for the review and processing of actions requiring the attention of the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command. During the period, 1 March through 15 May, 1973, he was to coordinate all O5/O6 officer personnel assignments for the U.S. Continental Army Command/U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command with Maj. Gen. B.E. Huffman, Jr., and for the U.S. Army Forces Command with Maj. Gen. W.K. Bennett. Maj. Gen. B.E. Huffman, Jr., was assigned as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Continental Army Command, on 1 March and would continue in that position until 15 May when he was scheduled to assume the dual functions of Chief of Staff, U.S. Continental Army Command/U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional). During the period 1 March through 15 May, he was to function as understudy to General Pepke in order to develop a broad knowledge of the functions of the U.S. Continental Army Command, the U.S. Army Forces Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In addition, General Huffman was responsible for the development of the staff of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to include review

of the appropriate Organization and Functions Manuals and the Fort Monroe headquarters stationing plan. To assist him in this responsibility, he was scheduled to visit all TRADOC installations, selected FORSCOM installations, U.S. Army training centers, Army service schools, the Training Aids Management Agency, the Combat Developments Command, Project MASSTER, and the Combat Developments Experimentation Command. General Huffman was scheduled to function as Chief of Staff for both the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Continental Army Command until the disestablishment of the latter on 31 December 1973.

As far as the Combat Developments Command was concerned, Lt. Gen. John Norton was not scheduled to move to Fort Monroe at any time. His principal duty was to command the residual Combat Developments Command which was to be redesignated U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (-). This redesignated command was tasked with forming and supporting the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional), at Fort Belvoir, Va. Using the organization designed for that new staff section of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, General Norton would continue to supervise the combat developments products as they flowed up from the service schools and the functional centers during the transition period. In addition, he was responsible for recommending to the Chief of Staff, CONARC/TRADOC (Provisional), those policies and procedures which would be used in the future by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In addition, General Norton also represented the commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, at designated in-process reviews and similar combat developments meetings at both Department of the Army and Department of Defense during the transition period. Maj. Gen. R.C. McAlister was scheduled to assume the dual position of Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command(-), and Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, CONARC/TRADOC (Provisional), about 1 April 1973. He was responsible for supervising the growth of his CONARC/TRADOC (Provisional) staff section at Fort Belvoir and was to assume gradual supervision of combat developments products during the transition period. General McAlister's primary areas of interest were to establish a system of resource management within his staff area of jurisdiction; develop a test interface between TRADOC, FORSCOM/MASSTER, and the Combat Developments Experimentation Command; develop CONARC regulations establishing procedures for coordinated service school/combat developments center operations; and develop models for data flow between service schools, the combat developments centers, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command with regard to combat developments products. While all papers requiring staff decisions would have to be routed through the Chief of Staff, U.S. Continental Army Command, General McAlister was authorized direct coordination with his counterparts at the U.S. Continental Army Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional) and the U.S. Army

Forces Command (Provisional). Effective 1 July 1973, General McAlister would be directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Brig. Gen. B.M. Vaughn, on the other hand, was scheduled to remain as Chief of Staff, Combat Developments Command, until 1 March 1973, when he would assume the duties of Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (-), and Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional). Upon the arrival of General McAlister, General Vaughn would be reassigned as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments.

Assignments at Fort McPherson, Ga. At Fort McPherson, Ga. -- the current location of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, and the designated location of Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command -- Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais was scheduled to continue as Commander, Third U.S. Army, but was not to become involved in any policy planning for the U.S. Army Forces Command. Maj. Gen. W.K. Bennett, on the other hand, would continue to serve as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional), at Fort McPherson for General Kerwin. All general officers assigned to Fort McPherson on and after 1 March 1973 were scheduled to assume control of their respective staff sections in Headquarters, Third U.S. Army/U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional) until 30 June 1973. Both Brig. Gen. M.D. Fuller and Brig. Gen. H.F.T. Hoffman arrived on 1 April 1973 with the former becoming Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the latter, Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development. Brig. Gen. O.W. Dillard arrived on 1 May to assume the duties of Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, while Maj. Gen. J.G. Smith arrived on 1 June to assume the duties of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. The one exception to this general pattern was Brig. Gen. L.M. Jones, Jr., who had been serving as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Continental Army Command, for Operation STEADFAST planning and implementation. General Jones was scheduled to divide his time between Fort Monroe and Fort McPherson in his former staff capacity until 1 April 1973 when he assumed the duties of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, Third U.S. Army/U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional), until the arrival of General Smith. At that time, General Jones assumed the duties of Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.³⁷


Command and Staff Relationships, 1 March - 30 June 1973

During the provisional and transition period -- 1 March through 30 June 1973 -- all staff actions at Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, would continue to be processed through established

37

STEADFAST Talking Paper, 17 Feb 73, subj: Command Relationships and General Officer Assignments.

CHART 32 - COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIP
1 MARCH - 30 JUNE 1973



- : Combat Developments Products
- : Performs Dual Function within CONUSA and FORSCOM

staff procedures. In such cases, the staff agencies of the U.S. Continental Army Command were not required to coordinate with the two Special Assistants to the Chief of Staff for STEADFAST planning and implementation. However, tasking of the staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command, or of its subordinate elements, by the two general officer special assistants would have to be coordinated through the CONARC Chief of Staff, while CONARC papers intended for the two special assistants would be forwarded through this same channel. At the same time, all staff actions related to either the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional) or the U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional) would continue to be processed using the procedures established for Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command. All papers requiring the attention of the command group would be forwarded through the CONARC Chief of Staff while information copies of papers relating to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional) and certain U.S. Army Forces Command papers which might have an impact on the former command would be furnished to the two STEADFAST Special Assistants. Command and staff relationships during the provisional and transition period are depicted on Chart 32.³⁸


Command and Staff Relationships, 1 July - 31 December 1973

The provisional and transitional period of operations was scheduled to end on 30 June 1973, with formal activation of the two new major commands taking place on 1 July. The U.S. Continental Army Command, however, was still responsible for implementing all reorganization planning until 31 December 1973. During the six month period following 1 July, all staff actions of the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command would be processed in accordance with procedures established for those two headquarters, respectively. At the same time, all actions pertaining to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, would be processed at Fort Monroe, using established CONARC procedures. In those cases where the U.S. Army Forces Command was not on distribution, all items of interest to the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, would be pouched to Fort McPherson, Ga. Any significant items requiring action by the CONARC commander would be transmitted for decision by the most expeditious means -- either electrically or by air courier. It was anticipated, however, that both Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command/U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command, would be on distribution for communications of mutual interest during the entire period, 1 July through 31 December 1973.

38

DF ATCS 73-0557, CONARC CofS to Distr, 19 Mar 73, subj: Command Relationships, w/2 incls.

CHART 33 - COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS
1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1973



a Performs dual function.

b Installation transfer concurrent with appropriate CONUSA transfer.

Source: Incl 2 to DF ATCS 73-0557, CONARC CofS to Distr, 19 Mar 73, subj: Command Relationships.

Staff and command relationships during that six month formative period are depicted on Chart 33.³⁹

Personnel Status

Military Personnel. On 10 March 1973, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, directed that a study be conducted to determine if any peripheral missions and functions could be deleted so that excess space authorizations could be redistributed to higher priority activities. Vulnerable activities included the Silver Eagles, the Golden Knights, marksmanship units, bands, honor guards, and Category B units. General Kerwin specifically directed that the 1,100 manpower spaces inadvertently distributed to base operations be transferred back to the training account. At the same time, General Kerwin desired a revalidation of the staffing of Project MASSTER at Fort Hood, Tex., to determine if that agency could absorb some of the directed reductions in the General Support Forces. The Combat Developments Experimentation Command, however, was to be maintained at somewhere near the recognized requirement level, an action which required the restoration of some 200 spaces to that agency. The CONARC commander particularly desired that a different method be developed for articulating the level at which the Operation STEADFAST tables of distribution would be supported, citing the case whereby some embarrassment could be caused if a few installations were shown as being supported at only 50 percent of recognized requirements while the headquarters of both the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command were supported at 100 percent. Consequently, any future presentations concerning manpower reductions would have to address the cessation of missions/functions and base closures.⁴⁰

By the end of March 1973, the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group had completed a revision and complete updating of Volume K of the STEADFAST Detailed Plan which concerned audit trails for the entire reorganization. This revision of 23 March reflected a refinement of numerics plus the inclusion of savings attributable to the reorganization of the schools. As a result of the new figures, a total manpower savings of 2,421 spaces was expected from the Operation STEADFAST reorganization. This new estimate of manpower savings included the elimination of 293 spaces during FY 1975 as a result of the full extension of the Standard Installation/Division Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS). This total manpower

39

Ibid.

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MFR, BG L.M. Jones, Jr., Sp Asst to CONARC CofS, 10 Mar 73, subj: General Support Force - Military.

TABLE 7 -- MILITARY PERSONNEL STATUS

1 JULY 1973

ORGANIZATION	OFFICER			ENLISTED		
	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	%	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	%
HQ TRADOC	638	537	84	334	316	95
HQ FORSCOM	504	441	87	376	343	91
ARR I (Ft. Devens)	261	128	49	180	131	73
ARR II (Ft. Dix)	203	84	41	134	84	63
ARR III (Ft. Meade)	228	118	52	125	98	78
ARR IV (Atlanta AD)	263	134	51	190	136	72
ARR V (Ft. Sheridan)	263	138	53	226	159	70
ARR VI (Ft. Knox)	205	97	47	171	121	71
ARR VII (Ft. Sam Houston)	206	133	65	172	116	67
ARR VIII (Rocky Mt. Arsenal)	205	91	44	133	87	65
ARR IX (Presidio of San Francisco)	205	120	59	145	101	70
ROTC I (Ft. Bragg)	37	31	84	8	5	63
ROTC II (Ft. Knox)	33	23	70	8	5	63
ROTC III (Ft. Riley)	32	16	50	8	8	100
ROTC IV (Ft. Lewis)	27	15	56	8	4	50
Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity	185	144	78	29	24	83
Personnel & Administration Combat Developments Activity	35	19	54	8	3	38
Logistics Center	218	160	73	53	47	89

Source: Memo for CONARC Cofs from CONARC DCSPER, 2 Jul 73, subj: STEADFAST Personnel Status, w/7 incls.

savings exceeded the goal which had previously been established by the Department of the Army Project Manager for Reorganization.⁴¹

Actual status of the military personnel fill of all the headquarters involved in the Project STEADFAST reorganization on 1 July 1973 was as indicated on Table 7.

Civilian Personnel. On 28 March 1973, the U.S. Continental Army Command informed its subordinate CONUS armies that general orders would be issued by the Department of the Army prior to 1 July 1973 establishing both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, on the other hand, would issue the general orders establishing the residual subordinate CONUS armies and other organizations or activities formed as a result of the Operation STEADFAST reorganization. The CONUS armies were directed to establish plans for separation by reduction-in-force (RIF) action of those employees who were surplus and were not awaiting reassignment to either the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command or the U.S. Army Forces Command at the time that the employees' parent organization phased out in accordance with the time frames established in the STEADFAST Detailed Plan. Employees who had accepted positions at the residual CONUS armies -- including those accepting positions at a reduction in grade -- were to be reassigned/downgraded on the same date that the separation by RIF was accomplished. Plans should also provide for those employees accepting positions at either the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command or the U.S. Army Forces Command to be present for duty at their new locations during June or July 1973. Further, the reporting dates for such employees whose retention might be required by the subordinate CONUS armies to permit the continuance of their mission or orderly phase-out would have to be negotiated between the gaining and losing organizations. In no event, however, was an employee's opportunity for continuing employment with a new command or activity to be jeopardized by the need for his services at the losing activity during the period of the phase-out.⁴²

At the end of April 1973, the U.S. Continental Army Command notified all concerned with the Operation STEADFAST reorganization that, in order that the commands proposed for establishment on 1 July 1973 were sufficiently staffed to initiate operations on that date, it was necessary that the majority of civilian employees

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Memo CS-SSG-STEADFAST, for CONARC Cdr from Sp Asst to CONARC CofS, 23 Mar 73, subj: STEADFAST Space Savings.

42

Msg 281936Z Mar 73, CONARC to CONUSA, subj: Effective Date of Civilian Personnel Actions.

transferring to the new commands accomplish their PCS moves between 18 June and 23 July 1973. The specific reporting dates for the transferring employees were to be negotiated by the losing Civilian Personnel Offices with management and employees involved. After a transfer date was agreed upon, the losing command was to issue a notice to the employee concerned at least sixty days in advance of the established reporting date. When personnel considerations or operational requirements dictated the retention of an employee past 23 July 1973, the losing command would request concurrence from the gaining command for a proposed effective date of transfer. In those cases where the operational considerations of the new commands required the services of an employee prior to 18 June -- and the employee concerned agreed to an early move -- the move could be accomplished prior to expiration of the employee's 60-day notice period. In those cases where employees were retained after 23 July, the provision of paragraph 6-4, subchapter 6, Civilian Personnel Regulation 351, Exception to the Retention Order, would have to be observed.⁴³

Provisional Organization -- FORSCOM/TRADOC

Milestone schedules developed for Operation STEADFAST stipulated that cadres for the two new major commands would be on-site by 1 March 1973, and that provisional headquarters would be established at that same time. The provisional headquarters of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command was to be collocated at Fort Monroe, Va., with Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, while the provisional headquarters for the U.S. Army Forces Command was to be collocated at Fort McPherson, Ga., with Headquarters, Third U.S. Army. During the same time frame, the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command would be transferred to the control of the U.S. Continental Army Command and all medical activities at the installation level throughout the continental United States would be collected under the control of the newly established U.S. Army Health Services Command.⁴⁴

Department of the Army Actions. While all provisional organizational matters were the responsibility of the U.S. Continental Army Command in its capacity as Department of the Army Executive Agent for implementing the Operation STEADFAST reorganization, all matters dealing with the permanent organizational structure were the responsibility of the Department of the Army, itself. At the

43

DF AHBLCPO, CPO Ft. Monroe to CONARC Stf, 24 Apr 73, subj: Effective Date of CP Actions -- CONUS Reorganization.

44

See above, pp. 241 - 242.

end of February 1973, that higher headquarters took the first step in the reorganization process when it directed the reassignment of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command from its status as a major command of the Department of the Army to that of a subordinate major command of the U.S. Continental Army Command, effective 1 March 1973. At the same time, the Department of the Army directed the establishment of the U.S. Army Health Services Command as a major command of the Department of the Army with headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., effective 1 April 1973.⁴⁵

In May 1973, the Department of the Army directed the actual establishment of the two new major Army commands, effective on the approved target date of 1 July 1973. With the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the need for a separate U.S. Army Combat Developments Command ceased to exist. Consequently, the Combat Developments Command (-) was to be disestablished as a major subordinate command of the U.S. Continental Army Command, effective 1 July 1973.⁴⁶ With the establishment of the U.S. Army Forces Command, the necessity arose for reassigning the U.S. Continental Army Command's subordinate CONUS armies, as well as the U.S. Army Reserve units assigned thereto. Effective 1 July 1973, the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth U.S. Armies were relieved of their assignment to the U.S. Continental Army Command and assigned as major subordinate commands of the U.S. Army Forces Command. At the same time, the Department of the Army directed that all U.S. Army Reserve units assigned to each respective subordinate CONUS army would remain in their current assignment. This left the U.S. Army Forces Command to accomplish the realignment of the CONUS army boundaries and the reassignment of U.S. Army Reserve units as stipulated in the approved operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan.⁴⁷

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional). The U.S. Continental Army Command established the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional) at Fort Monroe, Va., on 1 March 1973. The commander of the new provisional command was charged with the mission of both an Army Component Commander and a Major Field Commander of the Department of the Army as set forth in Army Regulation 10-7 and special instructions. In addition to his other duties, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was designated as Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Provisional).

45

DA GO 7, 26 Feb 73.

46

DA GO 16, 18 May 73.

47

DA GO 23, 27 Jun 73.

The staff of the U.S. Continental Army Command was directed to commence such internal reorganization actions as were applicable to establish both the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command as reflected in the tables of distribution which previously had been approved by the Department of the Army. These actions were to be taken so that the two new major commands could become fully operational on 1 July 1973.⁴⁸

With the transfer of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command to the control of the U.S. Continental Army Command on 1 March 1973, concurrent action was taken by the latter command to reassign the Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) from the Combat Developments Command, proper, to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, where it was placed under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments.⁴⁹ Numerous other actions in the combat developments area were taken at the same time, particularly with regard to the new functional centers and the existing combat developments agencies which previously had been collocated with an appropriate Army Service School. At Fort Leavenworth, Kans., the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Leavenworth, was redesignated as the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth with the Commander, Fort Leavenworth, assuming the dual command functions. At the same time, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College was relieved from assignment to the U.S. Continental Army Command and assigned to the new Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. To complete the new center, the Combat Developments Command Combat Systems Group was redesignated the U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity (CACDA); relieved from assignment to the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command; and assigned to the control of the new Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth.⁵⁰ At Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Benjamin Harrison, was redesignated as the U.S. Army Administration Center and Fort Benjamin Harrison. Concurrently, the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Personnel and Administrative Services Agency was redesignated as the U.S. Army Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Activity (PACDA). Both the latter activity and the U.S. Army Administrative Schools Center were relieved from their current assignments and reassigned to the control of the new U.S. Army Administration Center and Fort Benjamin Harrison.⁵¹ In

48

CONARC GO's 21, 23 Feb 73, and 39, 1 March 73.

49

CONARC GO 19, 23 Feb 73.

50

CONARC GO's 24, 30, and 32, all dated 23 Feb 73.

51

CONARC GO's 26, 29, and 31, all dated 23 Feb 73.

a related move sixteen branch functional agencies of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command were relieved from assignment to that parent organization and reassigned to the control of the pertinent Army service schools with which they were collocated.⁵²

The third of the three functional centers, however -- the U.S. Army Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Va., -- was not organized until 1 July 1973, concurrent with the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.⁵³

The U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional). The U.S. Continental Army Command established the U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional) at Fort McPherson, Ga., on 1 March 1973. The commander of this new provisional command was charged with the missions of both an Army Component Commander and of a Major Field Commander of the Department of the Army as set forth in Army Regulation 10-7. He was additionally responsible for the missions assigned to Third U.S. Army in its currently approved table of distribution. In addition to his other duties, the Commander, U.S. Continental Army Command, was designated as Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional). As an additional duty, the Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army, served as the Chief of Staff for the new provisional major command. During the provisional period of operations, both administrative and logistical support were to be provided for the new major command by the Commander, Third U.S. Army. The Third U.S. Army staff was directed to commence internal reorganization actions so as to establish the organization of the U.S. Army Forces Command as reflected in the approved Operation STEADFAST tables of organization. All actions were to be taken so that the new command would be fully operational by 1 July 1973.⁵⁴

Actions also were taken during the provisional period of operations to reorganize the subordinate CONUS armies to their newly approved configurations on 1 July 1973. While, as directed by the Department of the Army, the CONUS armies were transferred from the control of the U.S. Continental Army Command to the U.S. Army Forces Command on 1 July 1973, exceptions were made with regard to residual CONUS army/U.S. Continental Army Command functions relating primarily to summer training activities of the Reserve Components and the preparation of the necessary final reports.

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CONARC GO 27, 23 Feb 73.

53

CONARC GO's 60, 29 Mar 73, and 246, 8 Jun 73.

54

CONARC GO's 25, 23 Feb 73, and 38, 1 Mar 73.

Consequently, Sixth U.S. Army was scheduled to remain attached to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, until 1 August; Fifth U.S. Army until 1 September; and First U.S. Army until 1 October 1973.⁵⁵ Action was taken in mid-June, however, to transfer all CONARC and CONUS army functions -- with certain designated exceptions -- to the two new major commands on 1 July 1973, concurrent with the establishment of those commands.⁵⁶

At Fort McPherson, Ga., certain actions were required to realign the staff structure of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, so that the structure of the U.S. Army Forces Command could become fully operational on 1 July. On 23 April, actions were taken to establish the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Management with integral Manpower Control, Documents, and Force Structure Divisions. At the same time, existing Third U.S. Army force development functions were transferred from the Force Development Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training. The U.S. Continental Army Command, however, imposed a moratorium on all force development actions at Third U.S. Army, thus permitting the orderly transfer of force management actions to the new staff section.⁵⁷

On 30 May 1973, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Continental Army Command approved the transfer of certain functions to Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional), effective 1 June. Included in the functions to be transferred were Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Army Marksmanship activities.⁵⁸ This action preceded by just a few days, general plans for the relocation of the entire Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces from the U.S. Continental Army Command to

55

CONARC GO's 67, 68, and 69, all dated 29 Mar 73.

56

See above, pp. 253 - 254.

57

Ltr AFFM-MCD, HQ FORSCOM (Prov) to Distr, 23 Apr 73, subj: Letter of Instructions for the Reorganization of the Force Development Division, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, as Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Management, Headquarters, FORSCOM.

58

(1) Msg 301540Z May 73, HQ CONARC to HQ Third USA/FORSCOM (Prov), subj: Reorganization of the Army -- Transfer of Functions.
(2) Msg 311230Z May 73, CONARC to DA, AIG 7572, and Cdr XVIII Abn Corps, subj: Transfer of Functions.

the U.S. Army Forces Command. The Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan and the operation STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan provided for the transfer in toto of the functions of the CONARC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces to the U.S. Army Forces Command so as to be fully operational at Fort McPherson, Ga., on 1 July 1973. This meant that all reference files of that CONARC headquarters staff section would have to be in place at the new headquarters prior to the effective date. In order to provide adequate time for the transfer and to minimize the time in which the pertinent files would be inaccessible, the U.S. Continental Army Command established a stand-down date at Fort Monroe, Va., of 20 June for the staff section in question. On and after that date, all actions normally forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, U.S. Continental Army Command, were to be forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army Forces Command (Provisional), with an information copy to the former staff section. All telephonic requests for information and assistance would continue to be handled by personnel at Fort Monroe until 1 July. Subsequent to 1 July, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, would be responsible for all actions formerly accomplished at the U.S. Continental Army Command by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces. As an exception to the above instructions, the CONARC Emergency Operations Center was to remain fully operational until 1 July and would continue to process all emergency actions relating to deployments and support to civil authorities for disaster relief, civil disturbances, and explosive ordnance disposal actions.⁵⁹

Transfer of Functions to the Major Commands

Acceleration of the Transfer Schedule. By mid-June 1973, it was evident that the reorganization phasing schedule would have to be revised to accelerate the transfer of functions to the two new major commands. As indicated earlier, it was decided that all former U.S. Continental Army Command and subordinate CONUS army functions -- with certain designated exceptions -- would be transferred to the two new major commands effective 1 July 1973. Realignment of the CONUS army boundaries, however, would take place on 1 October 1973, as originally planned.

Merger of First and Third U.S. Armies. Because of the impending inactivation of Third U.S. Army and the assumption of responsibility

59

(1) DF ATCS 73-1445, CONARC CofS to CONARC Stf, 11 Jun 73, subj: Relocation of DCSOPS to Fort McPherson. (2) Msg 111442Z Jun 73, CONARC to Distr, subj: Relocation of CONARC DCSOPS to Fort McPherson, Ga.

in that area by First U.S. Army, special arrangements had to be made in keeping with the decision described immediately above. First U.S. Army indicated that it was prepared to assume all Reserve Component functions then assigned to Third U.S. Army on 1 July 1973 with certain exceptions. First Army would assume command of all U.S. Army Reserve units in the Third U.S. Army area on the new approved date, with Third U.S. Army retaining operational control for the sole purpose of annual training, until the completion of that training on 1 October 1973. Likewise, First U.S. Army would assume command of Army Readiness Region IV at Atlanta, Ga., and the Readiness Groups at Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Jackson, S.C., on 1 July. Third U.S. Army, however, would retain operational control until 1 October over those personnel required to conduct and evaluate annual training for Reserve Component units. The Commander, Army Readiness Region IV, would assume Third U.S. Army responsibilities for Annual Training 1973 on 1 July 1973 and would be supported by Third U.S. Army and U.S. Army Forces Command staff elements, as required. All other residual responsibilities of the Third U.S. Army as well as specific relationships were to be developed by Third U.S. Army in coordination with First U.S. Army and published as a memorandum of understanding.⁶⁰

Phase-out of the STEADFAST Organization

Project STEADFAST -- U.S. Continental Army Command

By the beginning of April 1973, it was evident to the STEADFAST Steering Group at the U.S. Continental Army Command that, since the two new major commands would have assumed all assigned responsibilities by 30 June 1973, most of the actions for which the group had been created would have been completed by that date and the group staff would already have begun to disperse. Moreover, the Office of the Project Manager at the Department of the Army was already assuming less of a day-to-day interface with Operation STEADFAST and was addressing its directives in a more formal manner to the two new major commands. Consequently, on 3 April 1973, the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group recommended that it be disestablished on 1 July 1973.⁶¹ In response to a query by the Chief of Staff-designate of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the STEADFAST Steering Group further recommended that a residual STEADFAST Steering Group be retained at Headquarters, CONARC/TRADOC, subsequent to

60

Msg 272030Z June 73, Cdr FORSCOM (Prov)/Third USA to Cdr First USA, subj: Assumption of STEADFAST Functions.

61

DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC CofS, 3 Apr 73, subj: Phase Down of STEADFAST.

1 July and that the organization consist of one general officer and three action officers. As approved by the Chief of Staff-designate, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the mission of the residual element would be to provide continuity and to maintain an audit trail of the implementation of the Operation STEADFAST plans, to respond to the Office of the Department of the Army Project Manager, as long as that office remained in existence; to supervise the residual actions of the U.S. Continental Army Command; and to determine and propose solutions for problem areas which would be difficult or impossible to resolve through normal staff action. While this office would continue to monitor all reorganization actions of both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the former command was requested to establish a similar residual group at Fort McPherson.⁶²

On 13 September 1973, Headquarters TRADOC/CONARC, informed both the Department of the Army and the U.S. Army Forces Command that the mission of the Residual Element, CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group, had been accomplished and that the organization was being disestablished as of that date.⁶³ This was an admission that the STEADFAST Reorganization had been successfully accomplished and that, henceforth, such matters would be handled between the Department of the Army and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, on the one hand, and between Department of the Army and the U.S. Army Forces Command, on the other.

Residual STEADFAST Element -- U.S. Army Forces Command

In response to the request by the U.S. Continental Army Command described immediately above, the U.S. Army Forces Command announced on 11 May that all residual STEADFAST planning would be monitored by the new Program Analysis Office of Headquarters, FORSCOM, and that four STEADFAST action officers would be retained to provide continuity and to resolve any problem areas which might develop.⁶⁴

62

(1) Memo CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to Sp Asst to CONARC CofS, 19 Apr 73, subj: Residual STEADFAST Organization. (2) DF CS-SSG-STEADFAST, CONARC SSG to CONARC Stf, 7 May 73, same subj. (3) Msg 091742Z May 73, CONARC to Third USA/FORSCOM (Prov), same subj.

63

Msg 131422Z Sep 73, TRADOC to DA, FORSCOM, USAHSC, and USASTRATCOM, subj: Disestablishment of STEADFAST Steering Group.

64

Ltr AJAOS, FORSCOM (Prov) to CONARC, 11 May 73, subj: Residual STEADFAST Organization, w/1 incl.

In late June, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces Command, decided that the STEADFAST Office would remain operational subsequent to 1 July 1973 for the purpose of coordinating residual STEADFAST matters. One officer was designated to remain in the office which, in turn, was placed under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller. With the demise of the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group in September, however, the need for retaining a residual STEADFAST Office at U.S. Army Forces Command was brought into question. Informal contact at that time with the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army revealed that no major STEADFAST actions were intended in the near future. Consequently, on 7 October 1973, the FORSCOM STEADFAST Office was disestablished and responsibility for all residual STEADFAST matters was assumed by the Management Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller. On and after that date, all matters pertaining to CONUS Reorganization of the Army - 1973 were handled through normal staff channels at the Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.⁶⁵

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(1) Summary Sheet, FORSCOM PAO to FORSCOM CofS, 18 Sep 73, subj: Deactivation of the STEADFAST Office. (2) Memo AFCS, FORSCOM CofS to FORSCOM Stf, 27 Sep 73, same subj.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

On 1 July 1973, the Operation STEADFAST portion of "CONUS Reorganization of the Army - 1973" reached the stage of full implementation. As of that date, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command were established on a fully operational basis; the U.S. Continental Army Command was reduced to an authorized strength of two (General Kerwin commanding and General Huffman as his Chief of Staff); and the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command was disestablished. These actions completed one of the most sweeping reorganizations of the structure of the U.S. Army in the continental United States since the general reorganization of 1942 when the Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and Army Air Forces were established. Operation STEADFAST was part of a general overhaul of the entire U.S. Army structure which not only separated command of the Army's field force elements from the control of schools and individual training in the continental United States but, among other things, also placed all medical activities in a U.S. Army Health Services Command; communications facilities in a U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command; and relocated the Army's personnel activities to the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) under the direct control of the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Unlike previous major reorganizations which affected the Army's activities in the field, no connection was established between the U.S. Continental Army Command and the two new major commands which were formed from it on 1 July 1973. In 1948, the Army Ground Forces had been redesignated as Army Field Forces, while that latter agency subsequently was redesignated as the Continental Army Command in February 1955. Thus, some form of continuity had been provided for the Army's command and control organizations in the field. In the 1973 reorganization, however, the U.S. Continental Army Command was to remain in existence for a period of six months subsequent to the establishment of the two new major commands for the specific purpose of supervising the implementation of the entire Operation STEADFAST reorganization.

The establishment of the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command concurrent with the disestablishment of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command on 1 July 1973, marked the culmination of an intensive planning effort by the U.S. Continental Army Command which had been initiated in February 1972 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army. Further emphasis had been given to this planning effort in March 1972 with the establishment of the Office of the Project Manager for Reorganization at the Department of the Army level. The actual impetus for this reorganization, however, stemmed back much earlier to the

recommendations made by the Department of the Army Special Review Panel (Parker Board) which had been established by the Chief of Staff of the Army in September 1969. Among the many recommendations emanating from this panel in March 1971 were several which would be realized later in the Operation STEADFAST reorganization, such as a reduction in the number of subordinate armies in the continental United States; a realignment of the CONUS army missions toward management of the Army's Reserve Component structure; and the consolidation of the Army's combat developments process with its service school system in a separate command. The full implementation of CONARC's Operation STEADFAST on 1 July 1973, marked the realization of certain goals, the establishment of which had been set in motion some four years earlier.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command combined the U.S. Continental Army Command's service schools and individual training functions with the combat developments processes of the formerly independent U.S. Army Combat Developments Command. This move combined the development of doctrine and related equipment for the Army with the service school and functional training where it logically belonged. To round out control of the combat developments process, three functional centers were established in the fields of combined arms at Fort Leavenworth, personnel and administration at Fort Benjamin Harrison, and logistics at Fort Lee. Since the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) was primarily an educational system for producing officers for the U.S. Army, it also was assigned to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In order to provide better control for this latter educational system, four regional headquarters, each commanded by a general officer, were established across the continental United States. Individual installations throughout the continental United States were assigned to the control of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, if the primary function of that particular installation was concerned with the operation of a service school or an Army training center. Combat and combat support troops (table of organization and equipment units only) located on such installations were assigned to the control of the sister major command, the U.S. Army Forces Command. Command of these units, however, was exercised through the respective installation commander whose primary responsibility was to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Such installation commanders were "dual-hatted" and were ultimately responsible to both of the new major commands.

The U.S. Army Forces Command, on the other hand, was established to command the Army's combat and combat support elements (table of organization and equipment units) in the continental United States, both Active Army and U.S. Army Reserve. As far as the Reserve Components were concerned, the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, commanded all table of organization and equipment, table of distribution, and reinforcement training units of the

U.S. Army Reserve, and supervised the training of the Army National Guard. In order to provide for more efficient command and control of this Reserve Component management structure, the subordinate CONUS armies were reduced in number to three; removed from Active Army command and control functions; completely reorganized; and their boundaries realigned. To aid the CONUS armies in the problem of the span of control, nine Army Readiness Regions were established throughout the continental United States. The major mission of the U.S. Army Forces Command, therefore, was the readiness of all assigned forces, both Active Army and Reserve Component. All installations in the continental United States whose major tenants were combat or combat support units or whose major mission was the training of Reserve Components were assigned to the U.S. Army Forces Command.

The discontinuance of the STEADFAST Steering Group by the U.S. Continental Army Command in mid-September 1973, was an admission by the command which had been responsible for supervising the entire STEADFAST reorganization that Operation STEADFAST had been implemented successfully and that the mission of the STEADFAST Steering Group had been completed. The disestablishment of the U.S. Continental Army Command on 31 December 1973 officially removed that supervisory element from the structure created for and by the reorganization. From that date forward, both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command operated fully as major commands of the Department of the Army, subject to control by that higher headquarters. As of 31 December 1973, both Operation STEADFAST and "CONUS Reorganization of the Army - 1973" were essentially complete and both the U.S. Army Forces Command and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command were recognized as operating independently, efficiently, and successfully.

APPENDIX A -- STEADFAST PLANNING PERSONNEL

STEADFAST STEERING GROUP -- U.S. CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND

BG R.L. West	24 Mar 72 - 31 May 73
BG L.M. Jones, Jr.	14 Feb 72 - 30 Jun 73
BG G.J. Duquemin	1 Mar - 15 Dec 72
BG J.C. Faith	26 Feb - 13 Sep 73
COL J.E. Hayden, Jr.	
COL J.J. Brockmyer	
COL E.M. Fry	
LTC A.W. Schlimm	
LTC R.F. McGuffin	
LTC L.A. Floro	
LTC F.D. Bush	
LTC G.N. Dreybus	
LTC J.P. Hehle	
LTC G.S. Palmieri	
LTC C.S. Zeigler	
LTC K.L. Buck	
LTC N.J. Codd	
LTC R.V. Garcia	
LTC M.S. Cralle, Jr.	
LTC J.R. Madigan	
LTC C.D. Jellison	
LTC C.J.J. Easler	
MAJ I.H. Chappell	
MAJ E.R. Foster	
MAJ C.P. Truett	
MAJ R.L. Gardner	
MAJ R.Q. Young	
MAJ R.A. Frakes	
MAJ A.H. Baiden	
1LT G.W. Mitchell (Admin Officer)	

SFC W.L. Glidewell (Admin NCO)
SSG A.L. Stewart
SSG S.L. James
SSG J.G. Johnson
SP4 D.A. Hartman
SP4 J.E. Skain
PFC R.M. Andradez

Mrs. R.P. Berka
Mrs. E.S. Vick
Mrs. E.J. McCallum

Miss C.A. Nedwidek
Mrs. P.A. Markun
Mrs. C.M. Ervin

USACDC FWD - 1 Mar - 30 Jun 73

COL F.L. Taylor
LTC J.M. Dreybus
LTC A.R. Woodruff
MSG D.E. Hancock

RESIDUAL STEADFAST STEERING GROUP - 1 Jul - 13 Sep 73

BG J.C. Faith
LTC K.L. Buck
LTC N.J. Codd
LTC R.V. Garcia
SSG J.G. Johnson

CONARC STEADFAST COORDINATING OFFICE - 24 Mar 72 - 31 May 73

BG R.L. West
COL N. DeBord
MAJ S.L. Brown
MAJ J.R. Griffith
2LT S.M. Bradley

THIRD U.S. ARMY/U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND (Prov) STEADFAST GROUP

COL H.L. Myron
Mr. R.C. Bryan
LTC C.L. Zeigler
MAJ R.O. Schreer
MAJ I.H. Chappell
MAJ P.N. Arsenault
MAJ B.F. Evans, III
CPT T.K. Laughlin
MSG L.C. Smith

GLOSSARY

AAD	--	Atlanta Army Depot
ACSFOR	--	Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army
ADP	--	Automatic Data Processing
AGF	--	Army Ground Forces
AIT	--	Advanced Individual Training
AMC	--	U.S. Army Materiel Command
ARADCOM	--	U.S. Army Air Defense Command
ARCOM	--	U.S. Army Reserve Command
ARLANT	--	U.S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command
ARNG	--	Army National Guard
ARR	--	Army Readiness Region
ARRED	--	U.S. Army Forces, Readiness Command
ATC	--	Army Training Center
ATT	--	Army Training Test
AWC	--	U.S. Army War College
BASOPS	--	Base Operations System
BCT	--	Basic Combat Training
BER	--	Budget Execution Review
BMG	--	Budget and Manpower Guidance
CAA	--	Concepts Analysis Agency
CACDA	--	Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity
CAPS	--	Computerized Airlift Planning System
CATB	--	Combat Arms Training Board
CBAIC	--	Chemical-Biological Accident and Incident Control

CBE -- Command Budget Estimate
 CDC -- U.S. Army Combat Developments Command
 CDEC -- Combat Developments Experimentation Command
 CDSC -- Combat Developments and Schools Command
 CGSC -- Command and General Staff College
 CINCARLANT -- Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command
 CINCARRED -- Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Readiness Command
 COB -- Command Operating Budget
 CofSA -- Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
 COMPACT -- Consolidation of Military Personnel Activities
 COMPASS -- CONARC Movements Planning and Status System
 CONARC -- U.S. Continental Army Command
 CONUS -- Continental United States
 CONUSA -- CONUS armies
 CORC -- Chief, Office of Reserve Components, Department of the Army
 CS₃ -- Combat Services and Support Systems
 CSM -- Chief of Staff of the Army Memorandum
 CST -- Composite Support Training
 DAMPL -- Department of the Army Master Priority List
 DCGRF -- Deputy Commanding General, Reserve Forces
 DCSP&A -- Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration
 DCSRМ -- Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management
 DCST -- Deputy Chief of Staff for Training
 DCSTS -- Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Schools
 DMEDA -- Director of Medical Activities

DMIS -- Director of Management Information Systems
 DOD -- Department of Defense
 DSA -- Defense Supply Agency
 DTC -- Doctrine and Training Command
 EOD -- Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 FASCOM -- Field Army Support Command
 FDC -- Force Development Command
 FORSCOM -- U.S. Army Forces Command
 GHQ -- General Headquarters, U.S. Army
 GOCOM -- General Officer Command (USAR)
 HCOSG -- Headquarters, CONARC, Organization Study Group
 HPA -- Head of a Procuring Agency
 IGMR -- Indiantown Gap Military Reservation
 ISOH -- Instructor School Overhead
 ITAAS -- Intelligence Training Army Area School
 ITC -- Individual Training Command
 JUMPS -- Joint Uniform Military Pay System
 LANTCOM -- U.S. Atlantic Command
 LCC -- Logistics Control Center
 LDSRA -- Logistics Documents Research Systems Agency
 LOI -- Letter of Instructions
 MAC -- Maneuver Area Command
 MACOM -- Major Command
 MAIT -- Materiel Assistance Inspection Teams
 MASSTER -- Modern Army Selected Systems, Test, Evaluation,
 and Review

MAST -- Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic
 MCA -- Military Construction, Army
 MCAR -- Military Construction, Army Reserve
 MCI -- Major Command Installations
 MDW -- Military District of Washington
 MEDCEN -- Medical Center
 MEDDAC -- Medical Department Activities
 MFR -- Memorandum for Record
 Mgt -- Management
 MILPERCEN -- U.S. Army Military Personnel Center
 MIP -- Management Improvement Panel
 MIS -- Management Information Systems
 MTC -- Maneuver Training Command
 NDCC -- National Defense Cadet Corps
 NGB -- National Guard Bureau, Department of the Army
 OCAFF -- Office, Chief of Army Field Forces
 OCAR -- Office, Chief of Army Reserves
 OCE -- Office, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army
 OER -- Officer Efficiency Report
 Ofc -- Office
 OGLA -- Officer Grade Limitation Act
 OMA -- Operation and Maintenance, Army
 OMAR -- Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve
 OPO -- Office of Personnel Operations
 PACDA -- Personnel and Administration Combat Developments Activity

PAO -- Program Analysis Office
 PASA -- Personnel Administrative Services Agency
 PBD -- Program/Budget Decision
 PERSINSCOM -- Personnel Information Systems Command
 PMR -- Project Manager for Reorganization, Department of
 the Army
 PMS -- Professor of Military Science
 POI -- Program of Instruction
 Prov -- Provisional
 R&D -- Research and Development
 RAR -- Readiness Assistance Region
 RC -- Reserve Components
 REDCON -- Readiness Condition
 REFORGER -- Redeployment of Forces from Germany
 RG -- Readiness Group
 RIF -- Reduction-in-Force
 ROTC -- Reserve Officer Training Corps
 SA -- Secretary of the Army
 SAILS -- Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply Subsystem
 SCC -- Strategic Communications Command
 SIDPERS -- Standard Installation/Division Personnel Reporting
 System
 SOD -- Secretary of Defense
 SPIP -- STEADFAST Phased Implementation Plan
 SSG -- STEADFAST Study Group
 STEADFAST Steering Group
 Stf -- Staff

STRAF -- Strategic Army Forces
 STRATCOM -- U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command
 TAADS -- The Army Authorization Documents System
 TAMA -- Training Aids Management Agency
 TASS -- The Army School System
 TDA -- Table of Distribution and Allowances
 TEA -- Test and Evaluation Agency
 TECOM -- Test and Evaluation Command
 TOE -- Table of Organization and Equipment
 TRADOC -- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
 TRICAP -- Triple Capability
 USAHSC -- U.S. Army Health Services Command
 USAREC -- U.S. Army Recruiting Command
 USREDCOM -- U.S. Readiness Command
 USSTRICOM -- U.S. Strike Command
 VCofSA -- Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
 VTAADS -- Vertical The Army Authorization Documents System
 WORSAMS -- Worldwide Structure, Army Medical Service
 WWMCCS -- Worldwide Military Command and Control System

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Fifth U.S. Army	5	AG	1
Sixth U.S. Army	5	Chap	1
		IG	1
III Corp & Ft. Hood	1	IO	1
XVIII Abn Corp & Ft. Bragg	1	SJA	1
USASCH	1	Engr	1
		Surgeon	1
		C-E	1
1st Inf Div (Mech) & Ft. Riley	1	HQ Ft. McPherson	1
1st Cav Div	1		
2d Armd Div	1	FORSCOM Historical Office	37
4th Inf Div & Ft. Carson	1		
5th Inf Div & Ft. Polk	1	HQ Training and Doctrine Command	100
7th Inf Div & Ft. Ord	1		
9th Inf Div & Ft. Lewis	1		
24th Inf Div & Ft. Stewart	1	Total	225
25th Inf Div	1		
82d Abn Div	1		
101st Abn Div (AAslt) & Ft. Campbell	1		
USAJFKCENMA	1		
197th Inf Bde	1		
172d Inf Bde (Alaska)	1		
193d Inf Bde (CZ)	1		

